Roaming Africa: Migration, Resilience and Social Protection

Edited by Mirjam Van Reisen, Munyaradzi Mawere, Mia Stokmans & Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher

From the book Series: Connected and Mobile: Migration and Human Trafficking in Africa


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We are travellers on a cosmic journey, stardust, swirling and dancing in the eddies and whirlpools of infinity. Life is eternal. We have stopped for a moment to encounter each other, to meet, to love, to share. This is a precious moment. It is a little parenthesis in eternity.

Adapted from Paulo Coelho, The Alchemist (1988) by Joëlle Stocker
Preface by Zaminah Malole

The person who has not travelled widely thinks his mother is the only cook.
Ugandan proverb

This Ugandan proverb, which is known in many African languages, teaches human beings to move out of the known and go elsewhere. Migration is not always forced by the violence caused by nature or people – migrating and mobility is also about learning and broadening the mind. It is in the nature of people to move to different places. Mobility is a basic human right. It is a social necessity. Mobility helps economies and sustains livelihoods in arid lands.

Migrants and refugees are often talked about, but rarely heard. As their voices are stifled, we know little about the circumstances of migrants or mobile communities and of those who have been forced to flee and lead lives as refugees. Today, in 2019, there are nearly 70 million people around the world who have been forced from their homes. Among them are more than 25 million refugees, over half of whom are under 18. There are an estimated 10 million stateless people, who are denied nationality and, with it, access to basic rights such as education, health care, employment and freedom of movement.

You will not read in this book about numbers, but about people and the different circumstances in which they migrate, for very different reasons, and with very different needs. Those who migrate often leave everything behind to jump into an unsure life. The Zimbabweans say: “A king’s child is a slave elsewhere”.

We should prepare now for the solutions of tomorrow. Uganda has taken a positive approach towards migrants and refugees. In Uganda, we welcome newcomers and focus on how they can contribute positively to our country and economy. The integration of refugees and migrants into our communities has worked very well. As refugees and migrants have found that they are welcome, they have given back and we as a nation have benefited from what they have to offer. We
urge other countries to follow our example, to see the benefits that migrants bring and to demonstrate commitment towards the protection and integration of refugees.

We invite the African continent to follow the Pan African spirit. We are one continent, really a continent without borders, in which we are guided by the spirit of *ubuntu*: as long as one person suffers, we all suffer. Migrants and refugees are our brothers and sisters. Many cannot go home because of conflict and persecution. Many live in perilous situations. We need to allow migrants and refugees to speak up, not stifle their voice; we need to support them so that they can find their feet and build up their lives, so that they can live in dignity and be part of our communities.

The fear of exploitation and abuse is what undermines the entrepreneurial spirit of migrants and refugees. We need to establish solid frameworks to support them, make sure they are protected by the rule of law and that their safety and security is not undermined. Africa can set an example for the world by applying common sense that is good for the wellbeing of migrants and refugees and that benefits our nations. To achieve this, we need to think of migration and mobility as a natural way of life, which has existed as long as we can remember and which has benefited all our people. A way of life for which we are prepared and have the knowledge and experience to handle within our communities. A Maasai proverb says: “If a stranger comes to stay with you, do not forget when you lay aside his weapons that he is hungry”.

Africa has the wisdom and experience to lead the world towards a sensible approach in which migrants and refugees are not despised, but welcomed, according to African hospitality and traditions of building peace among and between our communities.

H.E. Zaminah Malole
Member of the Commission of Equal Opportunities
Government of Uganda
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About the Authors
Acknowledgement

This book brings together studies from different regions in Africa and Europe. Our common interest was researching mobility as a social phenomenon in a specific context. Concerned that dominant push-pull theories do not describe the varied realities in which people make decisions, we sought to investigate alternative theoretical frameworks. In order to succeed, it was necessary to collaborate with partners with vastly different perspectives embedded in specific local realities.

Consequently, this book is the result of collaboration between Great Zimbabwe University, Mekelle University, Pan African University in Adua and Axum University, Tangaza University, Mbarara University, Mekelle University, Kampala International University, Tilburg University, and University of Leiden, as well as colleagues working within other universities in Africa, especially Somalia, Niger and Sudan. Prof. Dr Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher was the Chairperson of the Editorial Committee and together with Prof. Dr Munyaradzi Mawere reviewed the chapters in a double-blind peer review. The academic standard was set by Prof. Dr Mirjam Van Reisen and Dr Mia Stokmans, who also provided academic support to the authors, and upheld by Prof. Dr Gebre-Egziabher and Prof. Dr Mawere during the peer review. Susan Sellars-Shrestha was responsible for the copyediting of this book, Rick Schoenmaeckers for editorial coordination, and Klara Smits and Kristína Melicherová for editorial support.

We would like to thank NUFFIC (the Dutch organisation for internationalisation in education), the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), Science for Global Development (WOTRO) and other funding organisations for the support provided to the research published in this book. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and the Editorial Committee.

Prof. Dr Mirjam Van Reisen
Executive Coordinator of the Editorial Committee
Principal Investigator
A Word on the Review Procedure

All chapters in this book were subjected to an extensive review process. In the first phase, the chapters were reviewed by the executive editorial team (Professor Dr Van Reisen and Associate Professor Dr Stokmans), who contributed to the topics covered and provided scientific and innovative input. The executive editorial team then provided all chapters that were preliminary accepted with specific comments and recommendations to improve the chapters. Some young researchers were extensively coached during this phase.

In the second phase, the adjusted drafts of all accepted chapters were copyedited by Susan Sellars-Shrestha, who also reviewed the chapters for structure, coherence, comprehension, flow and the like. In the third phase, all chapters were double-blind peer reviewed by two reviewers (Professor Dr Mawere and Professor Dr Gebre-Egziabher), with the assistance of a third peer reviewer (Dr Nulagala) for chapters provided by a member of the peer review team. These reviewers did not evaluate the chapters in the first phase. The authors did not know who the reviewers were, and the reviewers were not informed of the identity of the authors, as all references to authors were removed. The process was handled by the editorial coordinator (Rick Schoenmaeckers). Comments received were communicated to the authors who responded to the comments by making adjustments to the chapters.

In the fourth phase, the adjusted draft chapters were reviewed for the last time by the executive editorial team and moved for final approval by the entire editorial team, who considered sensitive issues and any remaining lack of clarity. All of the chapters included in this book are, therefore, the joint responsibility of the four editors in the Editorial Committee, and based on a rigorous double-blind peer review process. The final decisions about the inclusion of the chapters and printing of the book were taken by Professor Dr Gebre-Egziabher, who served as the chair of the Editorial Committee. The publishing of the project was overseen by Professor Dr Mawere.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>acquired immunodeficiency syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARRA</td>
<td>Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEPA</td>
<td>Europe External Policy Advisors/Europe External Programme with Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>Eritrean Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPRP</td>
<td>Eritrean People’s Revolutionary Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETB</td>
<td>Ethiopian birr</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>human immunodeficiency virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person/people</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>Isis-WICCE</td>
<td>Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange</td>
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<td>KCPN</td>
<td>Kamukunji Community Peace Network</td>
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<td>KIWEPI</td>
<td>Kitgum Women Peace Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTQ</td>
<td>lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OICE</td>
<td>Opportunities Industrialization Centers Ethiopia</td>
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<td>PFDJ</td>
<td>People’s Front for Democracy and Justice</td>
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<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Programme</td>
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<td>PTSD</td>
<td>post-traumatic stress disorder</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Refugee Central Committee</td>
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<td>RMMS</td>
<td>Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>SER</td>
<td>socio-economic resilience (or social and economic resilience)</td>
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<td>STI</td>
<td>sexually transmitted infection</td>
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<td>TB</td>
<td>tuberculosis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defense Forces</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>VoIP</td>
<td>Voice over Internet Protocol</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Zuid Oost Azië</td>
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Part I. Theoretical Perspectives
Introduction

‘Africa Roaming’ is an advertisement for a mobile phone provider; the picture shows an African herdsman in traditional clothing with a stick standing in front of his herd texting on a mobile phone. The advertisement implies that the mobile phone allows him to stay connected while he moves around. It is a pivotal image showing the meeting of modern technology with traditional ways of life. The image alludes to the pervasiveness of digital technology – which is embraced even by traditional pastoralists, who have often proudly rejected modernisation and technology to preserve their identity and way of life. And, pervasive it is: “Safaricom is like that loyal girlfriend or boyfriend who texts all the time” (Mwangi, 2017).

Current approaches to migration are mainly based on the ‘push-pull’ theory of migration, which fails to explain the complexity and multifaceted situations of people on the move. This theory is premised primarily on economic considerations and oversimplifies how decisions are made, leading to policies that are misguided at best and harmful at worst. Alternatives are needed to understand why and how people move, and whether this contributes to resilience or undermines it. Social theory provides a useful lens, acknowledging that within the specificity of each situation a better understanding of motivations, dynamics and drivers can be obtained. This book aims to bring African voices to the fore, working with researchers close to ground realities in Africa, to explain why people in Africa are on the move and provide alternative approaches to setting agendas on this issue.
The most influential innovation of the 21st Century is arguably the global digital architecture. Much of this technology, most of it originating from Europe and the US, has been embraced in Africa, leapfrogging the continent into the 21st Century and requiring it to adapt this architecture to its own structures, systems and contexts (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017).

Information communication technology (ICT) is facilitating mobile communication. It goes hand-in-hand with mobility – movement of all sorts. Mobility is the oldest of human ways of living. It is associated with the traditional livelihoods of pastoralist communities, such as the Afar. Mobility has offered the Afar their livelihood and resilience across three countries – Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea – although their lifestyle is undermined by the current borders resulting from the French and Italian colonial presence in the Horn of Africa (Chapter 5, Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region, by Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). The artificially introduced African borders, which cut through communities that belong together, pose specific challenges (Chapter 4, Continuation of Care across Borders: Providing Health Care for People on the Move in East Africa, by Dorothy Muroki, Boniface Kitungulu & Leanne Kamau), however, digital solutions have the potential to bring such split systems together.

Mobility, in the form of migrating communities, is also associated with the colonial policy of integrating Africans originating from one place as soldiers to fight in other places, or introducing them as migrant labourers or slave labourers in various colonial programmes. This is the origin of the Nairobi slum, Kibera, meaning ‘forest’, where Nubi people remained after having served the British colonial government (De Smedt, 2011). Another example is the Nairobi slum area of Eastleigh, which was founded as a township for Somalis who had moved to the Ngara plains; Eastleigh was established as a separate area in response to the segregation policy of the British colonial government and the inhabitants, till today suffer discrimination, hardship and marginalisation (Chapter 9, Countering Radicalisation in Communities: The Case of Pumwani, Nairobi, by Reginald Nalugala).
Mobility is often associated with conflict and returnees from conflict, such as the children abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, who returned as adults suffering from serious trauma (Chapter 15, *Life after the Lord’s Resistance Army: Support for Formerly Abducted Girls in Northern Uganda*, by Primrose Nakazibwe & Mirjam Van Reisen). Mobility may include returning to the original home, but this is sometimes unrealistic and can be a source of new problems (Chapter 13, *Home, but not Home: Reintegration of Ethiopian Women Returning from the Arabian Gulf*, by Beza L. Nisrane). Due to the many different realities of people on the move, it follows that there is a need for diversified and localised approaches to researching mobility on the African continent.

Recent terminology, such as ‘irregular migration’ or ‘mixed migration’ have created container concepts for people on the move.¹ This creates a problem, as the specific circumstances of people with different experiences are not described by such container concepts. The danger is that the use of such concepts obscures the realities that inform or prompt people to move. This terminology also generalises the various and widely different realities and experiences of migration within overarching umbrella concepts that conceal specificity and uniqueness. The danger is that necessary distinctions can no longer be made, leading to overgeneralisations and a lack of understanding of mobility in specific situations. In this way, the cultural and contextual understanding of mobility on the continent is undermined (Mawere, Van Reisen & Van Stam, 2019). Rather than providing insight into the various modes of mobility across the continent, the use of container concepts frames migration as a negative ‘problem’, appearing as such on policy agendas (Smits & Karagianni, 2019). The framing of ‘migration’ as a problem impacts on people on the ground, creating new realities, which can undermine their resilience (Crowther & Plaut, 2019). Increased mobility, often facilitated in one form or

¹ The concept of ‘irregular migration’ refers to migration that does not fall into regulated streams and ‘mixed migration’ refers to large flows of migration in which movements are made across similar routes for different purposes (e.g., to escape conflict or find work).
another by ICTs, coined as ‘migration’, is increasingly being seen as a potential security threat (Mawere, 2019).

In this book *Roaming Africa: Migration, Resilience and Social Protection*, which is the second in a four-part series called *Connected and Mobile: Migration and Human Trafficking in Africa*, the use of container terms is avoided for the reasons given above, and we have done our best to use clear and accessible language that allows precise descriptions and understanding. In order to promote a clear framework for discussing migration and human trafficking, in this book, we adhere to a strictly legal interpretation of the terms, as defined by international frameworks referring to migrants and refugees (United Nations General Assembly, 2016), or refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons (African Union, 2019). Under international law, a refugee is defined as a person who:

\[\ldots\text{owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.} (\text{Article 1, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto})\]

In addition, Article 1 of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) recognises this definition and expands it to include persons who flee their country “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order” (Organization of African Unity, 1969) to cover the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa at the time of decolonisation. The United Nations provides a consensus on the definition of an international migrant as “someone who changes his or her country of residence, with a distinction made between short-term or temporary migration and permanent migration” (United Nations Secretary-General, 2016, p. 4).

This chapter aims to give an introduction to the book and an overview and justification of the theoretical lenses and methodological approaches used in the research reported. In the next
section, the purpose of the book is set out. In the subsequent section, the core approach used by the authors of the chapters in this series to study migration from a social science perspective is explained. The section that follows describes the different conceptual and theoretical frameworks used in the book – the theory of planned behaviour, cultural entropy, agenda-setting, resilience and social protection. A brief description of the mixed-method approach applied in the research for the chapters is then given. The last section contains an overview of the structure and chapters presented in this book.

The problem with migration studies

So, why is this book – and this series – necessary? The field of migration studies enjoys considerable interest at present, but what contribution do the authors expect this book to make to the field? Firstly, the origin of this book is frustration with the (macro)economic approach to migration, such as the ‘push-pull’ theory of migration, which is used as the dominant frame through which to view any movement from Africa to other places. The (macro)economic approach is almost uncontested and assumed by many to perfectly represent reality. The use of this theory seems to be motivated by (unconscious) political paradigms, instead of solid scientific paradigms. This series intends to explore this theory and propose alternatives that are better suited to explain the movement of people from Africa to other places.

The experience of the authors who contributed to this book is that the situations of people on the move are complex and multifaceted. They have observed many policies on migration misfiring and seen valuable financial, political and executive resources being spent with little hope of resolving the issues at hand. The research on which these chapters is based emerges from close collaboration between the Great Zimbabwe University (Zimbabwe), Mbarara University (Uganda), Tangaza University (Kenya), and Mekelle University (Ethiopia). Research was also conducted in other countries, including Sudan and Niger. The expectation is that more in-depth understanding will be derived if research problems are defined from
a social science perspective (social psychology, sociology, and economics) and if research is conducted in greater proximity to the actual situations being studied and with the involvement of researchers who are close to the realities being investigated.

Secondly, emanating particularly from Europe, the term ‘migration’ has been identified not just as a phenomenon, but as a (potential) societal danger that needs to be controlled. In the last decade, a range of new policy measures have been put in place, mostly by the European Union (EU), to mitigate this phenomenon (Smits & Karagianni, 2019; Crowther & Plaut, 2019). These measures are often the result of, what Munyaradzi Mawere calls, ‘copy-paste’ policies from Europe to Africa (Mawere, 2019). These measures respond to problems identified from a European perspective with measures that fit with European ideas of what the world looks like. In this world view, migration is defined as a security threat that should be curbed at all cost. Proposed solutions suffer from Eurocentricity by emphasizing the Westphalian model of the state as the main mechanism for addressing the problem. However, the African reality on African soil unfolds quite differently. In fact, in Africa, mobility is crucial for sustainable livelihoods. The ways of addressing mobility across the continent are more complex and multi-layered, involving a mix of regional, devolved, and traditional, as well as centrally-led leadership (Mawere, 2019). Hence, the interaction between European policy production and changing realities in Africa is a relevant topic of investigation.

Eurocentric policies introduced on the African continent are largely derived from the functionalist theories of ‘push and pull’, or variations of thereof. The push-pull theory sets the understanding of migration in a framework of push factors that encourage people to move away from one place and pull factors that attract them to another place (Castles, De Haas & Miller, 2011). These factors are derived from the functionality of certain benefits and the theory follows an economic model that assumes that people are attracted from a place with lesser benefits to a place with more benefits. In all of the various ways in which people migrate, digital connectivity is a
crucial enabler and ‘navigating’ tool. A naïve observer may expect that the combination of digital connectivity and physical mobility (from places of lesser benefits to places of larger benefits) will bring social and economic opportunities and that it is naturally beneficial to society. In this book, we show that this assumption needs critical scholarly consideration. Judgements about the benefits and returns of migration are contextual and subjective, and cannot be generalised across situations.

Thirdly, a critical review of the push-pull theory leads to its positivist roots, which explain that the theory relies heavily on the outside judgement of costs and benefits to clarify the rationales for people’s movements. This frame, constructed from an outsider’s perspective, needs to be confronted by analysis based on an insider’s perspective that sets out what motivations people have to explain their own mobility (Chapter 3, *Why do Foreign Solutions not Work in Africa? Recognising Alternate Epistemologies*, by Gertjan Van Stam). There is a sense that African issues are too often approached from an outsiders’ frame of reference, based on assumptions that may not apply in an African context, or are at least in need of questioning. In a message circulating on social media, an African middle-aged man with a long beard and piercing eyes expresses his frustration that everything that is consumed in Africa comes from a foreign place – including perspectives on what drives people and why. This, in his opinion, is also the case in relation to mobility. He expresses bitter frustration with the inequality and injustice experienced and how mobility favours the rich and punishes the poor: “We have passports that don’t give us access to other countries. They get access to our countries, but we don’t get access to their countries” (PN, personal communication to Mirjam Van Reisen, by video on social media, 10 July 2019). “Is this freedom?”, he asks. He points out that Africa works on the basis of *ubuntu*, “I am because you are” and that thinking on Africa needs to be grounded in African philosophy. Applying an ethnographic social science-based approach, Kidane & Stokmans (2019) question the suitability of the push-pull theory to adequately define mobility, and demonstrate that social theories provide a more suitable, locally-relevant, explanatory framework that is deducted
from the perceptions of the participants. Hence, they argue that there is a need for alternative theoretical approaches to explain migratory patterns in the digital world from the experience and interpretation of people on the move.

This book illustrates that mobility patterns are part of varied realities in a large continent leading to different outcomes in a specific context. In order to gain a thorough understanding of movements, it is important to explore different migratory groups (refugees, migrants, returnees and even tourists), as well as different situations on the ground. This allows investigators to compare and understand the situational factors that contribute to the movement of certain groups. The book, therefore, presents a wide spectrum of experiences with migration, including the human trafficking of migrants and refugees, investigated within their concrete situations. This inside approach focusing on the experiences and perceptions of the people involved is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of different contexts and to avoid overgeneralisation in this sensitive field.

The purpose of most research is to diligently and faithfully describe situations and establish reasoned explanations. It is important that research participants recognise themselves in the findings. This points to the need for ecological validity. Studies need to include theoretical frameworks tested within African reality, by African researchers, and with African explanatory frameworks, in order to obtain understanding derived from as close to the natural setting as possible. The approach of the research presented in this book and subsequent volumes is, therefore, purposefully empirical, set in a theoretical questioning of findings and using an explicit ethnographic mixed method approach. Many of the researchers involved come from Africa, work in African universities and were involved in collaborations with European researchers to maximise the relevance of the research approach to the setting at hand. We believe that such a collaborative methodology gives alternative and new insights into the experience of mobility on the African continent and that such an understanding may provide alternative approaches to set agendas on this issue.
The book is part of a series called *Connected and Mobile: Migration and Human Trafficking in Africa*, which aims to make an ethnographic contribution to migration research. The first book, *Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era: The Ongoing Tragedy of the Trade in Refugees from Eritrea* (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017), took an ethnographic approach following the trajectory of one highly mobile group across several countries. This book, *Roaming Africa: Migration, Resilience and Social Protection* locates mobility in various environments, in order to give a nuanced and detailed overview of the diversity of migration in Africa, emphasising the differences between particular places within countries, in border areas and across countries. This book presents a wide range of case studies, which provide a broad exploration of the different phenomena related to mobility and migration and their manifestations within the extended availability of digital technology. It looks at mobility as part of strategies for building resilience by strengthening livelihoods in a variety of African places.

The third book, *Mobile Africa: Human Trafficking and the Digital Divide*, looks at the ‘new’ phenomenon of mobility in trajectories across multiple countries, with a focus on the transaction process of migration, with mobility as a scarce resource that needs to be paid for through agents, facilitators and criminal organisations. This book places particular emphasis on the role of gatekeepers in online and offline information streams, who influence the mobility of people on these trajectories.

The fourth book, *Digital Human Trafficking in Africa*, zooms in on one region, North Africa, and investigates how the digital architecture produces places that can be referred to as ‘black holes’, which are unconnected and in which the ‘gated’ are entirely dependent on ‘gatekeepers’ for information. This book investigates how extremely unequal access to information in the digital environment produces extreme situations of displacement, dehumanisation and trafficking in persons.
A social analysis of migration

This book studies mobility in Africa in the digital era as a social process that unfolds in specific situations from the interaction between different people. It firmly illustrates that a decision to migrate is not an idiosyncratic decision in which a person rationally evaluates the assumed push and pull factors. In the book *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, Kahneman (2012) points out that decision making is never a rational process. Moreover, decisions are taken in specific situations, in which people have a cultural and historical legacy, have specific experiences, and live in a specific community, all of which influence their emotions, their attitudes, the social norms they adhere to, and what they think they can or should do. Hence, the social context affects the decision to migrate.

There are a lot of opinions about migration. This book chooses to investigate migration on a strictly empirical basis, allowing the data to speak for itself so that it can contribute to a fresh understanding of the mobility of people. In each of the situations researched and presented, the authors present empirical material that speaks to the particular situation. For the analysis of the data, the authors use conceptual frameworks of abstract social theories to provide a lens through which the information can be structured, analysed and interpreted. Nonetheless, we found the usefulness of theoretical concepts to differ significantly between contexts, due to people’s cultural and historical legacy; their values, beliefs, and experiences; as well as their perceptions of opportunities and threats in the environment. Consequently, these theories only provide a starting point from which to approach the research problem, but are not regarded as a straitjacket into which the data collection or analyses are forced. This perspective can be implemented by using a convergent design of mixed method studies in which a qualitative emic (insider) perspective is combined with a quantitative epic (outsider) perspective (Creswell & Clark, 2018). In such a design, the data provided by the participants are as important as the theoretical concepts, and the role of the researcher is to let both the data and theory speak to come to a synthesis of both.
Conceptual frameworks

In this book, different conceptual frameworks from the social sciences are used as a preliminary lens through which to approach the research problem(s) being investigated. Three major theoretical approaches are used. First of all, the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) is employed to try and understand what motivates individuals to migrate. The concept of cultural entropy (Stokmans, Van Reisen & Landa, 2018), which refers to the difference in the value system of an individual and his/her perception of the value system of the social network or community the individual is active in, is also used to explain how values and perceptions influence migration. This is a useful concept for examining the differences in the value systems used by the different stakeholders who are involved in the formulating and designing of migration policies at both national and international levels. The third framework is the multiple streams model of Kingdon (1984), which zooms in on the framing of problems in agenda setting and the role of different actors in that process. Finally, we consider the concept of resilience as a measure of the degree to which people perceive that they can participate in society and contribute to common goals. These theoretical frameworks are discussed in the ensuing section.

Theory of planned behaviour

Icek Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour is a widely-accepted and frequently-used socio-psychological model for studying the antecedents of behaviour (see Manstead & Parker, 1995; Armitage & Conner, 2001). The theory holds that the beliefs of people about their situation and in relation to other social groups are central to understanding the decisions they make in their life situations. These beliefs also shape the movement (or intended movement) of people or groups of people, such as refugees, migrants and returnees. The theory identifies three antecedents of behaviour: 1) the personal attitude of the migrating person, which entails his/her beliefs about the instrumental and hedonic benefits or discomforts of migration; 2) the social or subjective norms, which refers to the social pressure by relevant others in the social network of a migrant to migrate, in other
words, the social approval or disapproval of migration; and 3) the perceived behavioural control, which refers to the perceived capacity of someone to migrate and focuses on knowledge, resources, opportunities and threats of migration, as viewed by the migrant. The perceived behavioural control resembles the self-efficacy construct of Bandura (1977, 1982), which refers to the belief of an individual that he/she can implement the decision at hand successfully. The theory of planned behaviour, thus, assumes that background variables, such as socio-economic background and educational level, have an indirect effect on migration (intention) via attitude, social norms and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991). Unfortunately, the theory of planned behaviour has not been specifically used to study migration in the African context, although it could shed light on the decision of refugees, migrants, returnees and tourists to move from one place to another.

Within the context of migration in Africa, attitude (the beliefs of the individual) and social norms (social approval or disapproval of migration) are affected by historical and cultural beliefs relevant to those particular migration situations. People – either as individuals or a community – have a culturally-defined perception of what constitutes rights. The concept of a human rights culture (Rorty, 1993) implies that rights can only be demanded, advocated for, accessed or realised if the social situation recognises those rights as rights. Within a specific community, the beliefs about human rights may or may not be coherent. If they do coincide, the attitude and the social norms give the same impulse towards the decision to migrate. For instance, there is widespread consensus that victims of war should be able to seek protection as refugees. In instances where the perceptions of rights do not correspond, a person faces an internal struggle to decide what to do: follow what you regard as your right or comply with the opinion of the relevant others, who may have the power to enforce their perspective. For example, in the case of Eritrea, the authorities argue that the obligation of citizens is to serve the country, whereas a large number of citizens have decided to escape what they consider to be inhumane treatment and crimes against humanity (Chapter 18, Where is your Brother? Religious Leaders in
Eritrea Offer a Counter Narrative to Totalitarianism, by Makeda Saba). The concept of a human rights culture can help us to consider such situations. The concept is not only relevant to analyse situations within a community, but also to reflect on particular situations where a migrant or refugee is directly or indirectly confronted with a different human rights culture that involves them. Understood in this way, the concept is central in this book, as it helps us to investigate social norms as they manifest in the movement of people.

The third factor in Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour is the construct of perceived behavioural control. This concerns people’s personal judgment, regardless of their objective competence, to accomplish the behaviour. It is not an objective characteristic. If people hear success stories about the migration of others, these stories can affect their attitude to migration, as they are informed about the benefits and losses of migration. But it also affects their perceived behavioural control; it evokes the idea that if other people can do it, I can also do it (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). The believed success of migration probably has a strong influence on perceived behavioural control or self-efficacy, as it is difficult for people to exactly imagine what resources and knowledge are needed in such a complex journey and what suffering may be part of it. In such instances, people often rely on stories about the success of others to get an idea of their chances of success (De Vries, 1992). In this way, an assessment of the attainability of migration can be made without consideration of the lack of own resources and knowledge to accomplish the journey.

Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour assumes that all three antecedents have a positive effect on the intention to migrate and, consequently, on the motivation to start and accomplish a migration trajectory. In most applications of the theory of planned behaviour, behavioural intention plays an important role as an intermediate construct (Armitage & Conner, 2001). In the case of migration, we expect this also to be the case, as refugees and migrants are often not aware of the barriers and dangers they may encounter to start and accomplish a migration trajectory. In other words, refugees and
migrants do not have a realistic perception of their behavioural control. People may move because they feel it is a good idea (based on their attitude and/or social norms) or to escape a miserable situation, without rationally considering the instrumental benefits of migration. It may be just a flight – a move forward to get out of a miserable situation – without consideration of what is next.

Lack of awareness of the barriers and (possible) dangers that may be encountered indicates that people do not always base their decision to migrate on exact and conscious arguments or beliefs. The decision to migrate can also be triggered by negative feelings associated with the person’s current situation. These feelings can be regarded as information (Schwarz, 2011) or cues that directly, as well as indirectly, affect the decision-making process (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). These feelings can be so strong that they blind refugees and migrants from considering their options calmly and coming to a rational decision. Moreover, research (see for example, Kahneman, 2012; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) indicates that feelings triggered by a situation, or as a part of the mood of a person (in the case of trauma), have a strong impact on their first immediate reaction, which can lead them to take a particular approach to a life situation. If positive feelings dominate, one is in a ‘winning mood’ and there can be avoidance of an ill-advised situation; if negative feelings dominate, the person may be focused on leaving this negative situation without fully considering the facts and possible consequences. The feelings may further impact on the person’s beliefs, which may be triggered to back up or counteract this primary affective response. Kahneman (2012) illustrates that an affective reaction takes very little effort and that the affective response always has an impact on an immediate decision. Only if a person feels the necessity to calmly reflect on the decision, for instance, because the considered decision is not in line with social norms, or because one has to account for the decision, than the person activates opinions and beliefs (attitudes, social norms and control beliefs) to counteract or back up this first immediate affective response (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). This points to the need to add a fourth antecedent to the theory of planned behaviour,
namely, the affective feelings an individual has in the current decision situation. In the case of trauma, for example, strong negative feelings associated with trauma (affecting the mood of a person) are dominant and can trigger a flight, fight or freeze reaction. Furthermore, the trauma can impair a person’s ability to deliberately consider attitudes, social norms and self-efficacy. In the studies presented in this book, the affective response is included in the theory of planned behaviour, referenced to Schwarz (2011) and Kahneman (2012).

**Cultural entropy**

In discussing attitudes and social norms as part of the theory of planned behaviour in the African context of migration, we have already mentioned that the human rights culture may differ between different stakeholders in a migration situation. Stokmans *et al.* (2018) also mention that if the beliefs of an individual about his/her human rights do not coincide with the perceived beliefs of other members of the community or stakeholders in the migration process, the person experiences stress due to the contradicting values. The clash of values in a system is what is called cultural entropy. This concept was first introduced by Barrett (2010; 2013) to monitor organisational change, which often goes along with a change in the values underlying the management of work processes. In this context, Barrett (2013) makes an explicit distinction between the values an individual sees as important for him/herself and the values that he/she regards as important (leading principle) by a social group (organisation, community or relevant others). The concept was validated by Stokmans *et al.* (2018) in the context of organisational change and by Mubaya (forthcoming, 2019) in the African policy context of heritage conservation.

Barrett (2013, p. 3) states that values are “a shorthand method of describing what is important to us individually or collectively at any given moment in time”. Values are, therefore, universal in that they transcend a specific context (and time) (Barrett, 2013, p. 3). However, Rorty (1993) claims that human rights values are always held in relation to a specific community and, therefore, not universal; the human rights values of a stakeholder can differ according to the group
of persons they pertain to, such as refugees or migrants from a specific region. This indicates that cultural entropy is situation specific. In consequence, not all values a person holds, are equally important in terms of prescribing social behaviour or decision making in a specific situation. Therefore, it is believed that values are ordered according to their priority with respect to other values in a tiered system. An individual may adhere to a value system in a certain context, which may not necessarily overlap with the value system the individual ascribes to as part of a social group, community, organisation or authority, which will then result in cultural entropy. This cultural entropy may also occur with regards to the human rights values that different stakeholders in the migration process hold in relation to the target group.

According to Barrett, misalignment of a personal value system and the value system attributed to others in the social situation of interest undermines effective behaviour. When this happens, the preferred mode of conduct of an individual triggered by their personal value system does not correspond to the mode of conduct signified by relevant others. In this case, a person can be obliged to do something that is not the best option or decision in the situation, as it is either in conflict with their personal value system or the stakeholders’ value system. People experience this as frustrating. The result is that a person has to invest more energy to get the job done and that the job provides the person with less energy (less satisfaction, relevance or meaning). The findings of Stokmans et al. (2018) and Mubaya (forthcoming, 2019) confirm this. This difference in energy is called ‘cultural entropy’, as it is caused by factors (such as values) that are believed to be at the base of the culture of a community (Barrett, 2010; 2013).

In the area of migration, the differences in values can be situated between the different stakeholders involved. Cultural entropy can pertain to the difference in the values of an individual and those of the social network or community the individual is active in. But it can also be useful for studying the different perspectives on migration held by different stakeholders. Different stakeholders, such as
policymakers who operate at different levels of government, have their own objectives and corresponding human rights values, based on which they formulate and design their migration policies. If different parts of administrations and organisations make use of different value systems in the formulation of their respective migration policies, migration policies may be contradictory. This results in migration policies that are less effective than when cultural entropy is low or zero. The consequence is that more energy and more forceful authority and control is required for the implementation of such policies. Policies in situations of high cultural entropy are, therefore, more costly in financial, political and executive terms.

**Multiple streams model**

Some of the research conducted for this book investigated how authorities play a role in situations where there is an intention to impact on the movement of people. Such intentions can be studied by analysing the process of agenda-setting in public policy. Kingdon (1984) explains agenda-setting as a social process in which he distinguishes three separate streams: 1) the problem stream is the stream of potential problems to be addressed in a public agenda, 2) the policy stream is the stream of possible ways to address these problems, and 3) the political stream is the stream of political priorities. Kingdon’s main question is: “how will new ideas enter a public policy agenda?” He proposes the concept of a ‘policy window’, which is a moment in time when a window opens for new items to be moved on to the agenda. This happens when the three streams come together. The opening of a policy window can be triggered by regular moments, such as budget negotiations or elections, or unexpected ones, such as an impactful event that suddenly emerges. Situations that have the potential to open a policy window are also referred to as ‘focusing events’ (Birkland, 1998). Van Reisen (2009) explains that after a focusing event, the streams need to be redefined, as the perception of the situation prior to the focusing event is no longer the same as after the focusing event. The re-interpretation of the situation after a focusing event to make sense of the new situation is the moment of the opening of a policy window.
Vdovychenko (2019) identifies the Lampedusa disaster on 3 October 2015, when a boat full of refugees caught fire resulting in 366 deaths, as a focusing event. Analysing the documentary *It Will be Chaos* (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018), she narrates how heads of state, the President of the European Commission, Manuel Barroso and various directors of international organisations all came to Lampedusa to explain to the media how they saw the situation after the event and what they thought was the way forward. The role of the Mayor of Lampedusa is particularly interesting. The documentary shows that she was focused on what she saw as the correct framing of the situation. Emphasising the need to use correct terminology to address the victims of the tragedy as ‘refugees’ and not ‘illegal migrants’, she insists that this is critical for the correct framing of the problem. Klandermans & Oegema (1987) analyse the importance of the framing of a problem for social mobilisation. Contesting frames lead to cultural entropy and, as a consequence, the policy window may close, without a change to the policy agenda, because the three streams did not converge. The three streams model of Kingdon (1984) draws attention to the role of policy entrepreneurs – people with responsibilities within the policy process and outside in policy networks – in the definition of a problem and the formulation of political positions, policies and alternative policies.

The process of problem definition is analysed by Melicherová (Chapter 11, *In hospitable Realities: Refugees’ Livelihoods in Hitsats, Ethiopia*, by Kristína Melicherová) as a social process, in which social groups and individuals are mobilised to engage with a policy agenda; she particularly looks at the process of bringing new ideas to the agenda. This process, which is called ‘framing’, is helpful in explaining the relationship between changing social norms and the creation of environments that enable or disable certain possible behaviours through policies. The situational aspect of problem definition is taken as an important precondition for understanding the relationship between policies, agendas and their implementation at different levels of authority.
**Resilience**

The concept of resilience is derived from the Latin word *resilire*, which means to leap back, to recover from a disturbance of some kind. It construes resilience as the bouncing back of a system following a shock to its pre-existing state or path (Martin & Sunley, 2014). The term resilience has been used by sociologists to explain the human ability to return to its normal state after absorbing some stress or after surviving some negative change (Surjan, Sharma & Shaw, 2011, pp. 17–18). A new strategy to achieve resilience for people is social protection, which “is now being recognized as instrumental in both poverty eradication and rural transformation, as well as an integral component of effective humanitarian response and resilience building efforts” (FAO, 2017 p. 2). Conway, De Haan, & Norton (2000, p. 2) define social protection as “public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society”.

Van Reisen, Nakazibwe, Stokmans, Vallejo and Kidane (2018) operationalised socio-economic resilience on the basis of six scales that can be categorised into three different aspects: 1) individual abilities (capabilities and human capital, empowerment, and worry), 2) the perceived social support (embeddedness in the community and trust in government), and 3) perceived income security (Chapter 16, *Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience among Post-war IDPs in Northern Uganda*, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo). Van Reisen et al. (2018) found that the three scales measuring: 1) capabilities and human capital, 2) empowerment, and 3) perceived income security had high correlations, both within and between, and changed due to social protection programmes (cash transfers and trauma counselling). This illustrates that resilience is closely associated with perceived and real sustainable access to livelihoods and the perception of ability to access these. The first definition of livelihood is broadly accredited to Chambers and Conway’s working definition (1992). Their definition was accepted and adapted by the Department for International Development (DFID), among others. In a set of Guidance Sheets (DFID, 1999), DFID recognise that a
livelihood is comprised of the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base (Chambers & Conway, 1992, p. 6). This definition acknowledges the complexity of the livelihood concept and implies that securing livelihoods may entail, for example, access to water, land, health care, education, or even services protecting legal rights (De Silva, 2013, p. 5) and depends on socio-economic resilience to make use of the resources available.

In emergencies that lead people to become destitute, it is often the case that the large-scale loss of livelihood assets could be saved by providing timely assistance. Social protection or livelihood support in emergencies, therefore, consists of actions to protect the assets that are essential for people's livelihoods and to support people's own priorities and strategies. It includes any activity that aims to restore people's dignity and ensure adequate living conditions (Caverzasio, 2001).

Mixed methods

In the foregoing, several conceptual frameworks were discussed as abstract theories that can provide a lens through which to look at migration in Africa. We also indicated that these frameworks have some flaws, due to the social and contextual dynamics of migration processes. In this book, we regard these frameworks as global ideas that should be fine-tuned to the specific dynamics of the African migration context. We believe that theoretical concepts provide an abstract model that can help to understand and explain phenomenon on the ground. But, we are studying social processes, which are affected by the cultural and historical legacy of the people involved, as well as their past experiences and perceptions of what is going on.

Theories provide a starting point from which to approach the research problem, but do not provide standardised guidelines for studying problems, as problems are context-specific and the
uniqueness of the people and the situation involved need to be recognised. This means that the perceptions and experiences of people in the different situations are as important as theoretical concepts when trying to understand the dynamics of African migration. The role of the researcher is to give a voice to the persons involved in the social process of migration, to integrate their views into theories at an abstract level, and to adjust the theories accordingly so that the views of the participants are accounted for. This perspective can be summarised as ‘living with theory’ (Burawoy, 2013), which involves diminishing the separation between participant and researcher, inspiring critical assessment of existing theories and allowing for the participant’s alternative understanding of reality.

The separation between participant and researcher is reduced as the researcher takes into account the perspective of the participant and is responsive to the research situation at hand. In the migration discourse, such an approach is not implementable if the researcher uses the push-pull theory of migration, as this theoretical model takes an etic (or outsider) perspective of the migration situation. Moreover, it assumes that objective push and pull factors motivate a person to migrate, or not, factors that are not known to the researcher as an outsider to the situation. From the perspective of living with theory, the push-pull theory does not take into account a (potential) migrant’s perceptions of the push and pull factors involved, nor their experiences and feelings. Accordingly, we believe that an insider perspective can give valuable information about migration processes as they unfold in real-life situations. The point is that the researcher gathers specific insider information, which necessarily and inevitably makes him or her part of the social reality in which the research takes place (Burawoy, 1998).

Such a research perspective can be implemented as a convergent design, which is one of the three core designs of mixed methods (Creswell & Clark, 2018). In a convergent design, “the researcher intends to bring together the results of the qualitative and the quantitative data analyses so they can be compared and combined” (Creswell & Clark, 2018, p. 65) in a complementary effort.
The objective is to “obtain different but complementary data on the same topic” (Morse, 1991, p. 122) in order to gain a deeper understanding of the research problem at hand.

**Qualitative studies to explore the situation at hand**

In the convergent design used in this book, qualitative studies serve two important objectives. First of all, they give vivid information about the situation studied, as perceived by the people who live in that situation and who give meaning to the social processes unfolding in it. Secondly, qualitative studies enable a researcher to build a rapport with all people involved. Consequently, participants trust the researcher and give inside information about the social processes investigated, and the researcher is empathic and able to take the perspective of the participant. The building of rapport is necessary in a ‘living with theory’ approach.

The qualitative component of this book is based on observations communicated by refugees in different locations on the routes in the network of Africa Monitors and other organisations working with refugees. The data provided through this network was corroborated through interviews and observations by the researchers. Information was communicated through the research monitors from Kampala, Khartoum, Kassala, Addis Ababa and the Shire region. Observations were further investigated in field visits to Addis Ababa and Khartoum. The collaboration of Tilburg University with Africa Monitors and the technique of working with monitors within the trafficking routes, as a way of exploring the modus operandi of traffickers on the routes, resulted in the publication of a high impact volume: *Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era* (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). The observations made about the human trafficking routes were compared with study findings in the host communities. This work concentrated on Ethiopia. Mekelle University conducted several studies as part of the study into host communities, their relationships with refugees and migrants, and the dynamics of human trafficking. Ethiopian researcher, Beza Nisrane (PhD candidate at Tilburg University) conducted additional research into the specific experiences of Ethiopian women who had returned from the Arabian
Gulf and Middle East with human trafficking, migration and reintegration. The findings of the research were presented and compared during a workshop held in Mekelle in January 2018 and a writing week held in February 2018 in Tilburg University. The qualitative research on the use of social media was conducted by Rick Schoenmaeckers through (participatory) observation and interviews carried out during a three-month stay in Hitsats refugee camp (June to August 2017), during which the researcher participated in the daily routines in the refugee camp. The researcher was introduced through Zuid Oost Azië’s (ZOA), a humanitarian organisation working in the camp that had established working relationships with organisations and refugees in relation to unaccompanied minors in the camp. A survey conducted by Kristína Melicherová served as explorative research to describe the population of Hitsats camp and explore their perceptions about the livelihood opportunities available in the camp. This research served as a background against which other research activities took place. The data were collected through a survey and descriptively analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

Quantitative studies to test hypotheses
In the convergent design applied in this book, quantitative studies are important to test causal relationships between concepts, as hypothesised by theory or as derived from the qualitative data provided by the participants. The most rigorous method to test cause and effect hypotheses is a true experimental design (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001). However, using such experiments in examining social processes as they unfold in real-life situation assumes that the researcher has full control over the research situation, including designing the study so that (Van Reisen et al., 2018): 1) respondents are randomly assigned to intervention and control groups, 2) the intervention is based on theory, so hypotheses can be formulated to explain why, and to what extent, the intervention works and in what settings, and 3) the implementation of the intervention is under the control of the researcher and the treatment of each individual assigned to a specific group is equal and the (social and
environmental) context of the treatment is equal or known to the researcher.

These guidelines usually result in an experiment that is carried out in a controlled setting, such as a room at a university or a laboratory, creating an artificial situation that is not representative of the real-life situation in which the cause and effect relationship unfolds naturally (Van Reisen et al., forthcoming, 2019). When research is conducted outside the natural environment, it results in lower ecological validity. The problem identified by many policymakers, who are interested in evidence-based decision making, is that research tends to be carried out in a sterile experimental environment, which undermines our understanding of what may be expected of an intervention in the real-life situation that policymakers are concerned with. Studying social processes demands that an experiment be carried out in a real-life situation. The findings established in such a situation can inform researchers about the way in which the intervention resonates in a natural setting. Araújo, Davids and Passos (2007) call this a representative design. A representative design requires awareness of the specifics in a particular place: “proper sampling of situations and problems may in the end be more important than proper sampling of subjects, considering the fact that individuals are probably on the whole much more alike than are situations among one another” (Brunswik, 1956, p. 39, cited in Araújo et al., 2007).

The study by Kidane and Stokmans (2019) is an example of a true experiment conducted in a real-life situation. This study was conducted in a refugee camp, allowing the implementation of the intervention to be controlled to a great extent. The researcher made use of a mobile app for trauma counselling that was designed for the purpose of the study. This gave the researchers the opportunity to control the assignment as well as the implementation of the trauma counselling in great detail, as the digital app needed a code to be activated. Moreover, due to the camp-setting, participants had no opportunity to go elsewhere and they all showed up for the post-test.
However, in most situations, it is not possible to conduct a true experiment, as a researcher is seldom able to design an intervention and/or control the implementation of the intervention, due to the fact that other stakeholders are important agents in such implementation. Even if the researcher is able to design an intervention that is effective according to his/her ideas, they often depend on others to implement the intervention in a real-life setting. Consequently, the researcher does not have full control over the intervention, nor the assignment of participants across groups. In such a case, researchers can make use of a quasi-experimental design, in which the researcher can compare the effectiveness of the own intervention with that of existing interventions.

However, such a procedure calls for a pre-test (the measurement of the effect variable before the intervention starts), which can be problematic in real-life situations, as implementation agencies often start the implementation of their interventions without the consent of a researcher. In such a case, the effectiveness of the intervention can still be studied, as illustrated in the study by Van Reisen et al. (Chapter 16, *Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link?*), who reported on the effectiveness of social protection programmes. In this study, the researchers were not able to assign people to specific social protection programmes, nor did they have any control over the design of these programmes, as in this real-life setting these were existing programmes being implemented by agencies that had their own objectives. However, in this design, the researchers ‘assigned’ participants to specific groups on the basis of the social protection intervention they were receiving. The researchers had little control over the implementation of the intervention and, therefore, little control over alternative causal explanations.

Irrespective of the kind of experimental design that is used in studying the effects of an intervention in a real-life situation, one should realise that by researching the effect of an intervention for a defined group, one helps this particular group (and, therefore, not another group). This choice can trigger envy and affect the ecological validity of the study. For example, the research by Van Reisen et al. (Chapter 16, *Is
When a researcher realises that the results of an intervention always emanate from social processes in specific social situations that the researcher is participating in, certain standard rules for experimental design can be modified. The rule that representative cases should be chosen is no longer relevant, as representative cases as such do not exist in real-life situations, given that each context is different and specific and, therefore, not representative. The inclination to generalise the results to a wider context (other populations, other social circumstances) needs to be modified based on the understanding of the social reality of the research (representativeness of the experiment and ecological validity of the results). This does not mean that it is not possible to identify results at a more aggregate level. The researcher is prompted to look for general tendencies across different implementation contexts and can, thereby, develop an abstract theory of the working elements of the intervention. This theory can then be used as a guideline to develop (and study) similar interventions in other situations and to validate or adjust the theory.

**Structure of this book**

This book opens by introducing the topic and outlining the key theoretical considerations for the study of migration in Africa (Chapter 1). In Chapter 2, Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher gives an overview of the new manifestations of migration-related phenomena in the Horn of Africa, with a specific focus on Ethiopia. As Gebre-Egziabher explains, being one of the countries with a large population of refugees, internally displaced people and migrants, new migration routes have recently developed from Ethiopia to Europe, as well as...
other countries in Africa. He outlines the new aspects of this phenomena for consideration, such as the impact of refugees on local communities and the extension of human trafficking to people within host communities. In Chapter 3, Gertjan Van Stam critically reflects on the different realities in Europe and Africa and the use of foreign epistemologies, coming from a dominant position. He argues that as a result of epistemological imperialism, the understanding of social migration dynamics in Africa are obfuscated. Van Stam concludes that in order to create a basis for intimate knowledge of migration in African places, epistemological awareness is necessary and needs to make space for African creations of meaning that relate better to social relations in an African place.

One example of Eurocentric epistemology is ‘borders’. In Africa, (national) borders are artificial boundaries, created for political purposes that often have little historical or cultural meaning to the communities split by these borders. The borders, agreed in Berlin in 1884–1885, were established by the colonial powers to divide their rule in Africa, but had little to do with realities on the ground. In East Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, these borders separate communities that belong together. In light of this realisation, in Chapter 4, Dorothy Muroki, Boniface Kitungulu and Leanne Kamau present a study of cross-border communities in East Africa and the challenges involved in serving such mobile communities. The study specifically presents the result of inventorising the problems that arise with the provision of health care to mobile populations in the region. In Chapter 5, Abdelah Alifnur and Mirjam Van Reisen introduce the way of living of a pastoralist community in the Horn of Africa, the Afar people. Their culture and way of living includes many approaches to minimise conflict and maximise resilience in rapidly changing, vulnerable environmental contexts. But their way of living is under pressure due to population growth, increasing pressure on land, and conflict, which has resulted in increased tensions between sedentary and pastoralist communities. The authors argue that their traditional values, norms and customs are important and cost-effective in order to mitigate such rising conflicts.
New perspectives on migration are presented in Chapter 6 by Radoslaw Malinowski and Mario Schulze, who critically examine the relationship between human trafficking and climate change in Kenya. Their conclusion is that there is a complex correlation between climate change and increased vulnerability to human trafficking. In Chapter 7, Antony Otieno Ong’ayo discusses the online and offline dimensions of migration in Africa focusing on the role of diasporas. He argues that the interaction of diasporas through mobile phones by transferring information, payments, and knowledge creates changes in the home communities, as well as expectations about other places. In Chapter 8, Melissa Phillips and Mingo Heiduk look at the role of diasporas in a European context (Denmark) and how the communities try to dissuade relatives in the country of origin (Somalia) from taking insecure and dangerous irregular migration routes to Europe. In Chapter 9, Reginald Nalugala examines how community programmes have led to the social transformation of Somali youth in Nairobi and countered radicalisation.

If making the dangerous journey to Europe is ill advised, what are the options open to refugees and migrants closer to home, in neighbouring countries? To answer this question, in Chapter 10, Bereket Godifay Kahsay, discusses limitations on the access of refugees to economic activities in refugee camps in northern Ethiopia, due to fragmented support systems. In Chapter 11, Kristína Melicherová presents the findings of a survey carried out among Eritrean refugees in Hitsats camp to explore their access to economic activities. She concludes that the situation in the camps is not adequate, including the provision of basic necessities, and that it is very difficult for most refugees to earn a living. These conditions encourage refugees to move on to other places, where they hope that there are better opportunities. In Chapter 12, Tekie Gebreyesus and Rick Schoenmaeckers describe the extremely poor and substandard conditions that unaccompanied and separated minors find themselves in Hitsats refugee camp in Ethiopia – conditions that violate international norms to protect the best interest of the child. These conditions explain why minors often continue their perilous journeys, despite the well-known dangers.
Refugees and migrants often dream of the day that they can return home. Yet, the challenges involved in return migration are large. In Chapter 13, Beza L. Nisrane describes the lack of welcome that Ethiopian women receive when returning home from the Arabian Gulf and show that this can be partly explained by the clash in expectations between the returnees and their relatives at home. She concludes that many women re-migrate as they feel unwelcome and unhappy after their return. In Chapter 14, Shishay Tadesse Abay looks at the lives of return migrants deported from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia and finds that reintegration is extremely difficult. In Chapter 15, Primrose Nakazibwe and Mirjam Van Reisen investigates the trauma of women returnees who were abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda as children and who face hostile and challenging situations on their return, including the difficulty of home communities accepting children born in captivity.

In Chapter 16, the success of efforts for rehabilitation in Northern Uganda, where refugees and rebels returned after the war, is investigated by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, Zaminah Malole and Bertha Vallejo. In this study, the researchers found that social protection schemes for vulnerable women led to significant positive changes in their socio-economic resilience. The authors conclude that psycho-social support significantly increased the positive effects on resilience of social protection. A literature review by Zeremariam Fre and Naomi Dixon in Chapter 17 on social protection programmes by the Government of Ethiopia for vulnerable pastoralist communities in the Afar region, shows that these programmes have had positive results. The authors conclude that the government policies on social protection, targeting vulnerable populations, make a good contribution to strengthening resilience and independence.

The role of government is critical to the conditions in which people can build their lives and livelihoods. But what if a government fails to protect its own people? In Chapter 18, Makeda Saba describes the desperate and deteriorating situation in Eritrea, a country where the majority are required to serve under indefinite National Service,
which is tantamount to slave labour. The inhumane conditions and ongoing human rights violations have led to large numbers of refugees fleeing the country, a number that has not decreased since the peace agreement was signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2018, despite expectations to the contrary. In Chapter 19, Bereket Selassie and Mirjam Van Reisen describe the importance of the rule of law and lament the lack of implementation of a constitution in Eritrea. A constitution provides for protection of citizens, predictability, accountability and justice. It is an essential element of good governance and the foundation of any rights-based society.

In Chapter 20, Stella Maranga analyses how the constitutional reform process in Kenya, which provides a framework for devolution, has also opened up the possibility of protecting women’s rights, despite push-backs in its implementation. In Chapter 21, the final chapter, Istar Ahmed describes how the constitution-making process can be regarded as an opportunity for the interests of youth to be better represented, thereby contributing to a more stable situation in Somalia, and possibly diminishing sentiments that migration from home is always the better option.

Together, these chapters attempt to describe mobility in Africa that is grounded in reality, giving an alternative to the dominant narrative coming out of Europe. By describing mobility more accurately, it is hoped that our understanding will deepen and our solutions become more nuanced and targeted, and, therefore, effective. In this way, we hope to be better equipped to deal with the challenges facing the world today driven by a population on the move.

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Chapter 2

All or Nothing: The Costs of Migration from the Horn of Africa – Evidence from Ethiopia

Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher

Introduction

In Africa, migration has a long tradition and exhibits a wide variety of patterns. Some migrants and refugees pursue seasonal agricultural activities that involve crossing borders regularly and over long periods of time. Others migrate for shorter periods as a reaction to changes in economic conditions, as a means of gaining experience or training, or to save for a future investment. Individuals or whole families may choose to settle in other African countries to attain a better way of life. Or people may migrate to Europe, America, or Asia on a short-term or long-term basis. Crossing borders for the purpose of trading is also common in Africa and, depending on the length of stay, may or may not be thought of as migration. Travel for cross-border trading also occurs between Africa and Europe.

In the first decade and a half of this century, Ethiopia is estimated to have lost at least a million productive people (mostly youth) and billions of US dollars to smugglers and human traffickers, along the three main routes: the Northern, Southern and Eastern migration routes. Pressure from smugglers and traffickers is emerging as a new cause of migration. Smugglers and traffickers are aggressively ‘selling’ a very bad product that entails high risks at a very high price. In order to stop this disturbing trend we need to create employable youths and employment opportunities and promote investment at home in Ethiopia. At the same time, stronger persecution is needed to rid the Horn of smugglers and traffickers, which requires strengthening of the rule of law.
In recent years the Horn of Africa has been an epicentre of immense migratory and refugee movement. Irregular migration from the Horn is mixed in nature, which means that it includes labour migrants (individuals who seek a better life), smuggled and trafficked individuals, unaccompanied minors, refugees and asylum seekers (Schröder, 2015; UNHCR, 2016; Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017). As it is becoming increasingly difficult for Africans to legally arrive and work in Europe, every year tens of thousands of Africans attempt to circumvent border controls and enter illegally as irregular migrants (Reitano, Adal & Shaw, 2014).

Ethiopia is one of the main source countries for migrants and refugees in the Horn of Africa. It is a demographic giant with an estimated total population of nearly 102 million people in 2016. Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa, next to Nigeria (Population Reference Bureau, 2016). The overwhelming majority of Ethiopia’s population is made up of youth (of aged 15–34), with an estimated two million people entering the labour market each year (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016). One of the world’s oldest civilisations, Ethiopia is also one of the world’s poorest countries. As stipulated in the report of the first Growth and Transformation Plan, the country’s annual average per capita income increased from USD 377 in 2009/2010 to USD 691 by 2014/15 (National Planning Commission, 2016). However, the per capital income in Ethiopia is substantially lower than the regional average.

Over the past decade, the Ethiopian economy has experienced strong and broad-based growth, averaging 10.8% per year from 2003/04 to 2014/15, compared to the regional average of about 5% during the same period. The proportion of the population living below the poverty line fell from 38.7% in 2003/04 to 23.4% in 2014/15 (National Planning Commission, 2016). The Government of Ethiopia is currently implementing the second phase of its Growth and Transformation Plan. The plan, which will run from 2015/16 to 2019/20, aims to continue improvements in physical infrastructure and transform the country into a manufacturing hub. The overarching goal is to turn Ethiopia into a lower middle-income
country by 2025. Growth targets are comparable to those under the previous plan, with annual average gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 11%. In line with this manufacturing strategy, the industrial sector is slated to grow by 20% per annum on average (National Planning Commission, 2016).

Despite this promising progress, Ethiopia has faced enormous challenges in recent years. One of the challenges is the irregular migration of its youth, including trafficking and smuggling. Despite economic liberalisation and Ethiopia’s integration into the global economy, many Ethiopians consider out-migration as the only way to achieve a better standard of living (De Regt & Tafesse, 2016). The geostrategic situation of Ethiopia makes it a source, destination, and transit hub for migration and refugee flows, mostly within the region, but also to South Africa (Southern Route), the Gulf countries and Middle East (Eastern Route), and Europe (Northern Route). Ethiopian migrants often choose irregular means of migration because it is perceived to be less bureaucratic and time consuming, cheaper and more likely to be successful (Frouws, Munge, Danish Refugee Council, & RMMS, 2014).

The main objective of this research is to document the reasons for migration from Ethiopia to the rest of the world via different routes and identify the costs of each route. To meet the research objectives, the following questions are posed: What are the reasons for the migration of youth from Ethiopia? How is migration facilitated? And what are the costs and risks of migration from Ethiopia via the three main routes? These questions are addressed in turn in sections 5, 6 and 7.

**Methodology**

The study used both primary and secondary data sources to investigate migration, including irregular migration, along the three main migration routes from Ethiopia: the Southern Route (to South Africa), Eastern Route (to the Middle East and Gulf countries) and the Northern Route (to Libya, Sudan, Israel, and Europe). The main qualitative methods used were individual in-depth interviews and
focus group discussions. These were supplemented by a quantitative survey of household heads.

**Theories of migration**

Throughout the history of migration, theorists have been concerned with the causes of migration and the reasons why people decide to migrate from their place of origin. As a result, there is no single decision-making theory for migration, but a number of different ones that deal with the kind of mental processes that people go through when they decide to migrate. Two examples of decision-making theories of migration are: the push-pull theory and the perceptions theory.

Proponents of the first theory argue that the desire of most people to get ahead in life is the most influential factor that determines the decision to migrate. The theory describes the causes of migration as a series of forces that encourage an individual to leave one place (push factors) and reside in another (pull factors). This approach takes into account the imbalance between the place of origin and the place of destination, and considers the migration flows towards areas believed to be desirable for either economic or non-economic reasons through an interplay of push factors at the place of origin and pull factors at the place of destination.

According to this theory, migration is a form of livelihood and income diversification. On the pull side, youth are attracted by the ‘glamourous’ life in more developed countries, often motivated by the stories of friends, peers and relatives. These people form a network that facilitates the movement of youth out of the villages and small urban areas towards other countries, often crossing borders illegally. With the many push factors in the Horn of Africa (e.g., poverty, unemployment), youth are easily drawn to follow the three main routes of migration. The human capital model views migration as an investment decision based on a cost-benefit analysis. According to this model, it is only when the net benefit is greater than the cost
that people migrate, assuming full employment at the place of destination.

The perception theory purports that people migrate not because they know, but because they perceive (rightly or wrongly) that the place to which they wish to migrate is better than the place in which they are living. This is based on the assumption that migration is a function of how migrants and refugees cognise their present and future places of residence. In this regard, migration is more of an attitudinal thing, in the sense that it depends on the way people, especially youth, see themselves (their inner potential) and their surroundings – past and future – as well as how they see other countries that they are planning to emigrate to.

However, the migration observed in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa seems to follow none of these theories or models. The people interviewed from Tigray, Ethiopia for this study reported that many youth are migrating because of the influence of traffickers and smugglers. The influence of human traffickers and smugglers is not included in these theories and models.

**Migration and human trafficking in the Horn of Africa**

Nowadays, smugglers and human traffickers are playing an increasing role in migration. Groups who are particularly at risk include undocumented migrants and refugees and unaccompanied minors. Although it is difficult to know the number of irregular Ethiopian migrants and refugees, the brutal beheading of 30 Ethiopians (and Eritreans) in Libya by the terrorist group Islamic State (ISIS), mass deportation of more than 165,000 from Saudi Arabia, and killings in South Africa and Yemen are among the recent tragedies and signal the severity of the problem (IOM, 2014b; Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). Communities and administrative bodies alike are reporting their deep concern about the alarming surge in irregular migration (mostly smuggling, but also trafficking) of young women and men including children, particularly girls.
Migration from the Horn of Africa has been fuelled by various socioeconomic and environmental factors. Some migrants and refugees use irregular migration channels due to the extreme resource scarcity, caused by environmental change, drought, crop failure, food insecurity and severe poverty, among other things. According to Koser (2010), “For some people irregularity is a deliberate choice or decision, but many others find themselves in an irregular situation because of lack of information or due to administrative obstacles”. There are also reports of people who used regular channels to out-migrate from the Horn of Africa, but ended up in exploitative situations, or being subjected to abuse, abduction and extortion during their journey or at their final destination. Thus, mixed migration flows from the Horn of Africa are comprised of people with different profiles and varying levels of vulnerability. These include: migrant workers (both regular and irregular), smuggled migrants and refugees, victims of exploitation and abuse, asylum seekers, people seeking to reunite with their families and refugees. According to the Global Commission on International Migration:

*The term ‘irregular migration’ is commonly used to describe a variety of different phenomena involving people who enter or remain in a country which they are not a citizen in breach of national laws. These include migrants who enter or remain in a country without authorization, those who are smuggled or trafficked across an international border, unsuccessful asylum seekers who fail to observe a deportation order and people who circumvent immigration controls through the arrangement of bogus marriages. (GCIM, 2005, p. 32)*

To address the potential threat posed by the unprecedented swelling of migrants and refugees, human trafficking and smuggling, different destination countries have taken enormous steps to reduce the number of immigrants. However, noticeable change has not been observed in terms of the direction and flow of migrants and refugees. Instead, migration has become more complicated, dynamic and mixed in nature (AB, interview with Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017).
Reasons for migration

Studies have found that poverty and low income, unemployment, peer and family pressure, inducement by traffickers and smugglers, and rampant corruption are the key drivers of irregular migration from Ethiopia (Tadelle, 2016; IOM, 2014a). Other studies cite the role of development processes, state formation and policies (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016), as well as high population growth, oppressive political contexts, and insecurity and internal conflicts as drivers (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; IGAD, 2015). This study found that the reasons for migration are interwoven with each other.

The participants identified the main reasons for migration from the study sites as follows:

- **Lack of job opportunities:** Respondents pointed to the lack of job opportunities and their economically-poor family background as drivers of irregular migration in all of the places of origin. Furthermore, many youth consider migration to be a livelihood strategy and the only way to fulfil their future ambitions.

- **Family and peer pressure:** Family and peer pressure were also found to be factors pushing youth to out-migrate.

- **Refugee camps nearby:** The presence of refugee camps nearby (mainly in the Northern Route) was also mentioned as promoting international migration. Eritrean refugees and youth from host communities interact at sporting events, the cinema and other social gatherings, which allows Eritreans to share their migration experiences with Ethiopian youth. Many respondents mentioned that before the establishment of the camps, there was not so much youth out-migration to Europe and other countries, except to Sudan. Respondents said that those who migrate to Sudan usually come back and invest at home. So, international migration via the Northern Route is a very recent phenomenon, highly influenced by the presence of the Eritrean refugees in the camps.
• Smugglers and traffickers: According to a key informant, smugglers and traffickers play a major role in migration from all of the study sites. Smugglers and traffickers are everywhere, and their communication is often hidden and secretive. Some smugglers and traffickers even offer to cover the migration expenses of youth, if they agree to repay them after they reach Europe; this situation is most common in the Northern Route.

Explaining the causes of irregular migration, commander BA from Tigray stated that “youths in the zone are suffering from poverty and unemployment, and they are taking irregular migration as the only possible way-out (BA, interview by Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017).

Figure 2.1. Framework for analysing the factors and costs in the decision to migrate

![Diagram showing factors and costs in the decision to migrate]

Migration decision

Government policies, access to social systems, social services, self-employment and earnings at the place of origin

Socioeconomic status at the place of origin

Change in socioeconomic status

Socioeconomic status at place of destination

Expected present value of mixed migration

Cost of the mixed migration

Probability of wage and other social services at place of destination

Opportunity costs
Costs of living
Costs of transportation

Risk of losing life, risk and cost of health problems (physical and mental) and social adjustment

Psychological and monetary returns (e.g., remittances and change in social status)

International contacts

Returns from mixed migration

Distance

Information flows

Probability of wage and other social services at place of destination

Migration decision

Figure 2.1. Framework for analysing the factors and costs in the decision to migrate
One of the long-term solutions to the problem is to create employable youth in the country, which requires equipping youth with the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes required by the market. Of course, youth also need employment opportunities. Even though poverty and unemployment were high everywhere, international migration was lower in some areas than others. This may be due to strong family and community ties and their attitude towards migration and irregular migration, as well as the presence of smugglers and human traffickers.

The majority of those who out-migrate are from rural areas and poor family backgrounds. Some respondents also mentioned that community leaders in some areas have better awareness about the consequences of irregular migration and try to make society aware of these. Thus, poverty and unemployment seem to be (in most cases) a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for migration. On the other hand, it was observed that many youngsters know the risks involved in irregular migration, but still decide to out-migrate.

The information that migrants and refugees receive seems to be a critical factor in driving them into the hands of smugglers and human traffickers. A policeman by the name BC explained that

[…] human traffickers have a very strong ability to convince people, mainly the youth. Especially the experienced human traffickers can convince the youth that the sheep which is in front of them is actually a dog, not a sheep. (BC, interview by Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017)

The causes of migration are highly entwined, with the presence of smugglers and human traffickers as an increasing relevant factor nudging potential migrants and refugees by promising to facilitate their journey.
Facilitation of migration

The respondents explain that traffickers and smugglers are present everywhere and their inducements and encouragements prompt people to migrate. This appeared relevant in all the three routes investigated. The respondents said that those involved in trafficking and smuggling have built networks that stretch from the rural areas and small towns in all the places of origin to the destination countries. The respondents alleged that some of the traffickers and smugglers have close links with some local, regional and federal government officials, including police and security forces. Human trafficking in the Horn of Africa is a lucrative business.

Many traffickers are getting rich due to this business. The trade is so large that government officials and law enforcement bodies may also be involved. The comments of commander BA, who is from one of the towns in the north-west of Tigray, Ethiopia, support this view:

*A trafficker by the name GM was suspected by the police who were mandated to deal with preventing human trafficking. He was imprisoned for his deeds. After fulfilling all the necessary judicial and legal formalities, police checked the balance of his bank account and obtained that the amount of money in his saving account was ETB 32,309,482 [USD 1,468,612.82]. The trafficker GM is an ordinary person, from a small town in Tigray and there is no sign that he owns a business firm registered by his name. Besides, there is also no indication that the needed taxes are paid for the money that he saved in his account. GM had four different ID cards with four different names, but the same photograph. His case was presented to the court and the court released him by giving appointment for another time. Then he went out of country, and we don’t know where he is now. (BA, interview by Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017)*

This respondent (Commander BA) said that the police suspected that the Ethiopian birr (ETB) 32 million in the traffickers account was obtained by selling people for slavery.

Understanding the routes that irregular migrants and refugees are taking to reach their destinations is a complex task, as migration from
the Horn of Africa is extremely dynamic. Explaining this situation, Horwood (2009, p. 41) states as follows: “The routes used by the smugglers are often changing at short notice, and hence are very dynamic”. However, generally speaking, three main routes are used: the Southern, Eastern and Northern Routes.

In some circumstances, returnee migrants and the refugees themselves act as traffickers and smugglers. When smugglers recruit potential migrants and refugees, they study the economic background of the migrant’s parents and target those who are from economically well-to-do families. After they cross the border, they force the migrants and refugees to call to their parents and ask them to send money for ransom. If their parents are not able to send the money demanded by the smugglers, the migrants and refugees are exposed to serious inhumane actions, including torture, rape, beatings, and other forms of punishment, which dehumanise the individuals, and even killing. These practices occur in all three of the routes mentioned in the previous section (AC, interview with Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017).

Financial cost of migration

In financial terms, the routes used by Ethiopians can be categorised into three main groups: expensive routes (mainly to Europe and North America) which require more than USD 7,000, medium-cost routes (Africa and Asia), which require a minimum of USD 4,000, and budget routes (Middle Eastern countries), which require as little as USD 500. Which migration route is used is often up to the smuggler, as explained by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS, 2017): “Migrants have little influence over which routes they take, with smugglers choosing the routes based on perceptions of safety, levels of violence, ease of transfer to the next stop and levels of corruption likely to be accounted”.

The Southern Route is through Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi to South Africa. This route is increasing used by youth. Mainly Ethiopians and Somalis use this route to migrate to South Africa
(Gebre-Egziabher, Shishay, Kibrom, Atakilty & Kefyalew, 2017a; 2017b). According to RMMS (Frouws & Horwood, 2017), “an estimated number of 14,300 persons emigrate via this route, annually”. The same source also states that, in South African, “80 percent of migrants from the Horn of Africa were Ethiopians and 20 percent Somalis” (Frouws & Horwood, 2017, p. 2). Thus, one can conclude that every year, about 11,440 Ethiopians migrate to South Africa. Gebre-Egziabher et al., (2017a) estimate that “in the last sixteen years, from all over Ethiopia, more than more than 200,000 youths have emigrated to South Africa; via Moyale, crossing the Ethio-Kenya border, via Nairobi, through Tanzania and the like”.

Although “the costs associated with such movements vary considerably and are dependent on the final destination and mode of transport” (Long & Crisp, 2012), Gebre-Egziabher et al. (2017a) estimate that migrants and refugees pay smugglers and trafficker Ethiopian birr (ETB) 114,146.73 per person (USD 3,973). Based on this figure, in the last 16 years, in the Southern Route alone, an estimated USD 950 million was paid by Ethiopian migrants to the smugglers and human traffickers on the Southern Route. Had this money been spent in a legal and productive sector, it could have contributed to creating employment for youth and reducing poverty. Assuming that the Somalis also paid a similar amount, it can be roughly estimated that USD 237 million has been paid by Somalis in the last 16 years. This totals USD 1.187 billion paid to smugglers and human traffickers by 228,800 youths from the Horn of Africa (mainly Ethiopia and Somali) who migrated via the Southern Route, with an intended destination of South Africa in the last 16 years.

The Eastern Route takes migrants and refugees towards the Middle East, mainly Saudi Arabia. The Ethiopians use Djibouti and Somali as transit hubs. This route takes youths from the Horn of Africa into Yemen and then to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States and the Middle East. It is exclusively used by Ethiopians and Somalis (Gebre-Egziabher, 2016). According to RMMS (2017), “A total of 813,683

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2 Using the exchange rate from Oanda.com of 2 August 2019 1 USD = 28.73 ETB
youths have emigrated via the Eastern Route within a decade’s time (between 2006 and 2016) and 72 percent are Ethiopians”. Thus, over half a million (585,852) Ethiopians migrated to the Middle East irregularly from 2006 to 2016. Estimates by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (Frouws et al., 2014) reveal that, as of December 2013, 65,319 migrants and refugees arrived in Yemen, among which 54,213 (83%) were Ethiopians and 11,045 (16.9%) were Somalis (the remaining 0.1% were from other countries). Frouws et al. (2014) reported that:

*Djibouti is the major transit country for Ethiopians travelling irregularly to Yemen and further to Saudi Arabia. In 2012, over 80,000 migrants (78 percent of all arrivals in Yemen) transited via Djibouti, the others transited mostly through Bossaso in Puntland.*

Of course, there are fluctuations from year to year, but the record year this decade was 2016, when 117,107 youths migrated to Yemen, with an intention of continuing to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. During this time, there was no stability in Yemen (Frouws et al., 2014). Many studies on the Eastern Route have also shown that the disappearance of women and girls is common.

![Figure 2.2. Ethiopian arrivals into Yemen (2012–2016)](image)

Source: RMMS (2017)
It can be estimated that in the 15 years from 2000 to 2016 a total of 878,776 Ethiopians migrated to the Middle East at a total cost of USD 439 million (based on USD 500 per migrant). Hence, cumulatively, for both the Southern and Eastern Routes, more than USD 1.626 billion is estimated to have been be paid for irregular migration over this time period (USD 1.187 billion for the Southern Route in the last 16 years and USD 439 million in the Eastern Route in the 15 years from 2000 to 2016).

The Northern Route extends through Sudan, Libya and Egypt. While Libya and Sudan are also final destinations, Libya and Egypt are transit hubs for migrants and refugees travelling to Israel (previously via the Sinai desert) and Europe. This route is regularly used by Ethiopians, Eritreans and Sudanese. Most of the Ethiopians using the Northern Route are from Tigray. The youth who use this route go through Sudan, Libya and Egypt, across the Mediterranean Sea and then finally to Europe. According to RMMS (2017), “in 2016 alone, 40,773 persons from the Horn of Africa arrived in Italy; and out of these 39,953 persons arrived in the months between January and November of 2016”. Eritreans are the largest group using the Northern Route. This is the most risky route and the youth are exposed to the risk of kidnapping, detention, and death while crossing both the desert and the Mediterranean Sea. It is also the most expensive route, and people usually pay around USD 7,000 to arrive at their destination (Frouws et al., 2014). Many people die or disappear on this route and it is hard to estimate the cost per annum. It is also unclear how many of the migrants and refugees using this route are Ethiopians. The costs associated with trafficking on the Northern Route are in the billions of USD over the period 2009–2016 (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017, p. 13, estimated the costs for just Eritrean refugees to Libya, traveling on from Ethiopia and Sudan, as roughly around USD 1 billion in 2017).

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3 This figure is a rough estimate based on the interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this research.
Hence, although impossible to estimate precisely, the total cost of the facilitation of migrants and refugees on the three routes is in the billions of US dollars. This money could be used for the economic development of the sending countries and would go a long way to creating employment. Tragically, migration represents not just a loss of financial resources, it is also a loss of human resources that the country needs for its economic development.

**Conclusion**

The main objective of this research was to document the reasons for migration from Ethiopia to the rest of the world via different routes and identify the financial cost of each route. It addressed three questions: *What are the reasons for the migration of youth from Ethiopia? How is migration facilitated? What are the costs of migration from Ethiopia via the three main routes?*

This research identified the following reasons for the increase in migration from Ethiopia: lack of job opportunities; family and peer pressure; the presence of a refugee camps nearby; and the presence of smugglers and traffickers. These reasons were usually intertwined. The importance of the presence of smugglers and traffickers to nudge migrants and refugees is new and has not been previously identified in migration theory, which has traditionally focused on push-pull theory or perceptions. This research shows that the migration process can be regarded as an exchange process in which human traffickers are aggressively selling (using persuasive communication targeting youth) a very bad product (that entails high risks) at a very high price (high costs). The findings of the study show that even though there are differences between the routes, smuggling and human trafficking in the three routes is posing serious risks to the lives of the migrants and refugees, through kidnapping, holding migrants and refugees for ransom, and violation of their basic human rights. In the Horn of Africa, smuggling and human trafficking is a very financially-rewarding business and is run by network(s) of highly-organised criminals. They prey on unemployment and poverty and have compelling narratives that persuade migrants and refugees.
Based on the calculations made in this research, in the first decade and a half of this century, Ethiopia is estimated to have lost at least a million productive people (mostly youth) and billions of US dollars in payments to smugglers and human traffickers, along the three routes. Hence, the issue of mixed migration from Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa is not only costly in monetary terms, but also in terms of human resources and loss of life. This issue has to be given priority and addressed by creating employable youths and employment opportunities. Attention must also be given to poverty reduction, so that youth can secure their basic needs without going abroad. Smugglers and traffickers are playing a significant role in the mixed migration process, which is a transnational problem and must be addressed accordingly. Stronger persecution is necessary to rid the Horn of the problem of smuggling and human trafficking. Thus, there is a need for an integrated and coordinated approach to fight smuggling and human trafficking by country governments in the Horn of Africa together with the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD), African Union, European Union and United Nations.

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Chapter 3

Why do Foreign Solutions not Work in Africa? Recognising Alternate Epistemologies

Gertjan Van Stam

Introduction

This chapter presents the narrative of a Western-trained engineer working with rural communities in underserved areas of Southern Africa. Through the reflexive interpretation and reinterpretation of physical evidence (nature) and the narratives in communities (nurture), I present insights into the tension between the normative epistemology underpinning technology and the integrative epistemology of rural communities in Southern Africa. With a transdisciplinary sensitivity, I show the effects of technology on meaning-making and resource allocation in these communities. From my 'in situ' embeddedness – living and working with African communities – I investigate the modernist philosophical approach that separates nature from culture and culture from technology, highlighting the intrinsic disrespect for indigenous

The misalignment between foreign solutions and local realities in rural Africa is often the cause of harmful cultural entropy. This clash in value systems undermines solutions that embolden and strengthen local communities. The recognition that value systems may differ is lacking in research on resilience in Africa. The undermining of resilience can lead to loss of trust in what ‘home’ has to offer and encourage people to move to new places. We need to take a fresh approach that values African epistemologies and ways of knowing and that nurtures local talent to take the lead. In order to solve African problems, there is an urgent need to see the situation through an African lens – both when defining the problem and coming up with locally-relevant solutions.
worldviews that guide daily practices in African communities. Using two examples, one of a rural hospital in Zimbabwe and the other of an Internet network in the rural village of Macha, Zambia, this chapter argues for sensitivity towards, and respect for, local epistemologies and the local embodiment of knowledge, as well as for the local ability to define problems and come up with solutions. As part of ensuring such sensitivity and respect, I outline the ‘Big Five’, which are African virtues that can be used to guide interactions and interventions in rural communities of Southern Africa.

In March 2018, I accompanied a team of experts on a journey into a remote rural area in Southern Africa. We went to visit a hospital in Zimbabwe, located more than 500 kilometres from the capital of Harare. I had visited this particular 160-bed hospital several times before. During the visit, we found 15 patients admitted, most of them suffering from malaria, as can be expected in the rainy season. On one of my previous visits in late 2017, I found only two patients admitted to the hospital. Although this hospital has a catchment area with a radius of over 100 kilometres, at any of my visits, the utilisation of its facilities was underwhelming.

Before moving back to Zimbabwe at the end of 2012, my family and I lived in Zambia for 10 years. In the rural village we stayed in, collaboratively, the community itself built a local and wide area network to link the local community to the Internet (Matthee, Mweemba, Pais, Rijken, & Van Stam, 2007). The network provided connectivity in places where there was none before. From its beginning in 2004, the network was always congested (Belding et al., 2012) and the gap between supply and demand has continued to grow ever since (Belding, Johnson, Pejovic, & Van Stam, 2011). The use of this network was overwhelming.

Both of these cases represent efficiency problems with service utilisation in underserved areas. The first case is of service utilisation that is underwhelming, with infrastructure for health care laying idle. The second case is of use that is overwhelming, with communication infrastructure used up to its capacity and beyond. In both cases,
efficiency dissipates and stakeholders become distressed. So, why do foreign solutions not work in rural Africa? To answer this main research question, this chapter examines these two case studies and asks: What is the common thread linking both cases? And how can solutions to their troubles— in health care and communications—be found?

Methodology: Why do foreign approaches not work in Africa?

This chapter is based on a method congruent with the extended case method, as described by Michael Burawoy (1998). In my time in Africa, I have applied and amended this method to suit my longitudinal academic goal: to recognise common cultural threads and values in an effort to understand ‘knowing’ in African society. I have dubbed this adapted method ‘living research’—to live with theory, in theory and for theory (Van Stam, 2012; 2017b). In this setting, I act as a perceptive, reflective, evaluative and active ‘practitioner’, seeking to understand how community members ‘know’ (Bigirimana, 2017). ‘Living with theory’, Burawoy (2013) argues, takes away the separation between the participant and the observer, inspiring critical assessment of existing theory and allowing for alternative understandings. This approach allows for participation while observing and conceiving a hypothesis.

The realisation of the existence of multiple realities, depending on one’s philosophical and epistemological lens, fuels this chapter to uncover foreign (Western) views and theories about an African world, set in normative epistemology. In previous work, Mawere and I (2015) pointed out the very real, and often destructive, ramifications of such views. Due to the messiness of reality, I do not claim that this chapter is universally valid. My perceptions and deductions are based on my happening to be at a particular place, in both time and space. I link my long-term and ongoing observations in Sub-Saharan Africa with my desire, for example, to discern new theories. My notions of significance— for instance, valuing the knowledge of the so-called subaltern—align with my aim to provide a culturally-sensitive and theoretically-rich narrative using reflexive research that unfolds interactively and retrospectively (Ingold, 2000). In this way, I
continuously loop between the critique of Western-dominated theories and practices, using evidence gathered from extended case studies, and confront abstract or foreign projections of an African world with lived experiences. Through the presentation of my work in local, national and international settings, I check the validity of my claims, while gaining an ever-evolving understanding of African epistemologies.

Pathfinding

“It has been quite a journey”⁴ for me, as a Western-trained engineer, to live, learn, and know in rural and urban areas of Southern Africa. Only after considerable study have I started recognising what might make or break the use of technology in so-called ‘underserved areas’ (Van Stam, 2011; 2017d). This journey has taken me almost 30 years, during which time I have worked as a broadcast system engineer at a shortwave radio station in Swaziland, a strategist in telecommunication systems in South Africa, and a resident expert in information and communication technologies (ICTs) in rural Zambia and Zimbabwe (IEEE TV, 2010). I have been fortunate to be involved with communities that use many forms of technology, for example, the use of local subsoils for building housing infrastructure⁵ and ensuring the availability of ‘essential services’ such as water⁶ (Van Stam, 2011, p. 23) and electricity⁷ (Mudenda, Johnson, Parks, & Van Stam, 2014). I was also involved in various community enterprises working to produce biofuel or solve transport challenges with the use of aeroplanes. So-called ‘local talent’ (Bets, Van Stam, & Voorhoeve,

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⁴ A phrase borrowed from Njabulo Khumalo (2017), as he put it in the title of his assessment of the implementation of an information platform (DHIS2) in the health system in Zimbabwe.

⁵ In the process, locally produced, interlocking soil-cement blocks are dry stacked eliminating the use of mortar, concrete or steel columns, using South African Hydraform block making machinery.

⁶ In arid regions, like in Macha, Zambia, water provisioning requires creativity and perseverance, involving the sinking of deep boreholes, the purchasing, installation and maintenance of pumping equipment, and the development of a distribution network covering a wide area.

⁷ Using generators and, later, grid power in Macha, or planning for biofuel in Chikanta or water-turbines in Kalene, Zambia.
2013; Van Oortmerssen & Van Stam, 2010) were at the forefront of these endeavours and trained information technology experts in rural areas (Bishi, Bishi, & Van Stam, 2016; Mudenda & Van Stam, 2012). They sensitised, implemented, and operated infrastructure and services and mobilised, at times, hundreds of people for local development in their respective communities (BBC Clicks, 2011).

In my research, I have reflected on the different ways that we experience reality. In its wake, over 50 publications and a few dissertations were published. I focused on the built environment, mostly concerning access to ICTs, in rural areas of Zambia and Zimbabwe (Van Stam, 2013a; 2014), and examined “the displacement of technology and meaning in an African place” (Van Stam, 2017d). However, upon invitation by my friends in these community, I cannot resist sometimes taking up a screwdriver or a computer or participating with local engineers and other experts in facilitating service delivery (Toyama, 2011). Getting one’s ‘feet wet’, when invited by – and reporting and accountable to – local leadership, provides valuable and transdisciplinary inputs. In all of this, I focused on the nexus between community engagement, culture, and digital technologies. In this quest, I have seen local ‘future centres’ emerging, such as an eHealth laboratory that tests local and national eHealth services (Bishi, Shamu, Van Dijk, & Van Stam, 2017a) and have searched for local perspectives on how to facilitate communities in the use of remittances (Fulgencio, Ong’ayo, Van Reisen, Van Dijk, & Van Stam, 2016), TV white spaces (Gweme & Van Stam, 2016) and eHealth (Bishi, Shamu, Van Dijk, & Van Stam, 2017b).

In this process, I quickly learnt that my skills and, especially, my Western-trained understanding of ‘needs’ and ‘solutions’, was inadequate and incomplete to provide solutions to the problems of these communities (Van Stam, 2012). Whatever I tried to build would fall to pieces, stand idle, or break within a short period of time. Hardly any of the activities I initiated worked, as there was always something

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8 These publications are available from https://www.vanstam.net/gertjan-van-stam.
else needed to complete it, something that was not available and needed sourcing from the outside world.

My training and methodological understanding of how to ‘get it done’ was not cutting it (Mawere & Van Stam, 2015). Electric equipment got blown up by dirty power (Mudenda et al., 2014); the Internet would be available in a manner and at a cost incompatible with the local economy, tools and equipment; that ‘last thing’ needed to complete something took years to arrive; or an airplane would sink in the mud after a freak rainstorm. Those visiting from the outside seemed to be unable to keep hold of what they learnt from the community. I found out the truth in what the Italian Ernesto Sirolli bluntly, but convincingly, presented in his TED Talk: “Want to help someone? Shut up and listen!” (Sirolli, 2012).

I recognised that my training as an engineer, with its methods of essentialising and categorising and its set frames for technical assessments, were leading me astray and preventing me from being part of the solution (Van Stam, 2014b). This mismatch, of course, is quite logical (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a): how can anyone be part of sustainable development when one does not start together, does not share the local community’s understanding and needs, and does not respect the existing craftsmanship in the local community? Turning it around: which nation or people would welcome foreigners that ‘bring development’ but do not share the local understanding of history, culture, way of living and way of knowing? (Mawere, 2016).

The question that hounds me is whether the search for interdisciplinary solutions for the disenfranchised is like a puzzle or a mystery. If it is like a puzzle, it would be a matter of sorting out all the available pieces, consider all available information, and finding the answer. However, if it is a mystery, the answer will remain elusive, because one would misunderstand the underlying question (Van Stam, 2017d, p. 51).

Contemplating this issue has raised some nagging questions in my mind. What if science is proposing answers, or solutions, to
misconstrued questions? What if the methodology used to define problems and validate solutions in Africa settings is flawed? What if the dominant epistemic ‘state of mind’ used to approach and identify issues and guide the assessment of success is not applicable in the African environment?

When reflecting on the dynamic interface between technology and culture in rural communities and its effects on meaning-making – taking into account the local perception of the dynamics of resource allocation (Sheneberger & Van Stam, 2011) – the benefits of technological solutions and interventions that come from the outside appear to be unclear and disserving in many ways. Where (who) do the solutions for conceptualised problems emerge from? (cf, Ahmat et al., 2014). In fact, who defines what the problems are? And who defines the divisions and system of classifications that mark the conceptual frames that technologists use?

When I regarded the hollowness of presumed ‘solutions’ to perceived needs, I decided that I am dealing with a mystery rather than a puzzle. When using a non-African lens, it appears that we are seeking to understand unknown unknowns. Therefore, the philosophy of science and use of dominant epistemologies needs to be reviewed. There is a need for science to wander into unchartered waters.

Thus, my engineering research shifted to gain a better understanding of the question. However, I learnt that ‘questioning the question’ is not necessarily appreciated by engineers, especially when this uncovers moral and political issues, which points to the need to regulate technology platforms, locally and internationally. It is in this way that I started on the path of transdisciplinarity, while setting up intellectual camp in both the natural and social sciences.

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9 The revelations of Edward Snowden (Greenwald, 2014) and, for example, the public concern about unanticipated socio-political influence possibly exercised through social media and information platforms by Cambridge Analytica are pointers towards such a mystery in the use of the Internet and social media.

10 In this line of thought, Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, argues for the regulation of large technology firms (Solon, 2018).
Upon entering a community, and in researching needs and potential local solutions, I focused on building and maintaining relationships first (Van Stam, 2016a). In Murambinda, Zimbabwe, in the year 2000, it took more than six months of unstructured living in the community before I was able to carefully participate in local discussions about needs and solutions (Van Stam, 2017b). From that point onwards, I fervently studied the many histories, local understandings of meaning, complicated settings of the many stakeholders (Kroczek, Mweetwa, & Van Stam, 2013), and built environment in the rural communities in which I lived. Through such study, I endeavoured to discern contemporary and fruitful theories of change and their epistemologies that involve technology from within the communities themselves. I noticed the utter complexity underlying what some call ‘underservedness’. I recognised that what is happening in disenfranchised areas is related to a history of being ‘othered’ (Van Stam, 2016b; 2016c) and, subsequently, being dominated (Van Stam, 2017e). From my position as an engineer in Zambia and Zimbabwe, I found that this ‘othering orientalism’ and its handmaiden ‘hegemonic imperialism’ remains the order of the day in disenfranchised environments. I started to see that many realities express themselves in a clash of paradigms and, subsequently, a clash of epistemologies (Van Stam, 2017d).

To deal with the multiple realities I saw, I conceptualised three different paradigms (although there may be more), which those who I studied in rural Africa seemed to switch between (Van Stam, 2017d, pp. 201–203):

- **I-paradigm**: In the ‘I-paradigm’, which exists in the context of globalised policies and practices, truths are predicated in relation to individualism and capitalism, and people interact the way billiard balls do.

- **We-paradigm**: In the ‘We-paradigm’ one is defined as a derivative of the whole. This reality is set in the community and deals with social personhoods.
• **It-paradigm:** In the ‘It-paradigm’ one considers the inputs from cosmology and religious belonging.

I noticed that my African friends had no problem switching between these realities in a matter of seconds. It sometimes took me weeks to be able to switch with them, especially when I would return to the community from a trip overseas (Van Stam, 2011).

Through lots of lengthy and ongoing conversations, hard study, reflection and introspection and ‘living-the-life’ in rural Africa, I started to recognise and appreciate the local paradigms, philosophies, and epistemologies. I eventually understood their solidification in contemporary cultural expressions and the practice of local engineers. So sensitised, I became enthralled by the ingenuity of local engineers and the general agency of people to provide local solutions to local problems (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a; Van Stam, 2013b; 2016a). For instance, I recognised that 99% of Zambia’s electricity production is green energy (Mudenda et al., 2014) and that mobile money infrastructure allows for expressions of communal love (Fulgencio et al., 2016; Van Stam, 2017d, Chapters 12, 15). From then on, together with my local, national, and international friends and collaborators, I committed myself to searching for pathways that make sense of what technology might mean in the intricate web of meanings, perceptions, and human relationships in disenfranchised areas in rural Africa.

**The voice of the ‘subaltern’**

Although far between, critical voices do pop up, even in mainstream academic literature. In ICT, for instance, various scholars have asked: “are we asking the right questions?” (Gomez & Pather, 2012) and “do pilots really work?” (Surana et al., 2008). These are questions of ideology. Perhaps the most pressing of these questions is: ‘Who defines success?’

Critical and courageous contemporary writers, notably from within Africa, such as Munyaradzi Mawere, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Francis Nyamnjoh and many others, raise the issue of local agency
(for instance, Mawere & Awuah-Nyamekye, 2015; Ndi, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Nyamnjoh, 2012). These academics invariably insist on the existence of different perceptions of reality and success, depending on where one resides. They provide a sound academic basis for the idea of local, African understandings, even while they set their research in the context of global matrixes of power underpinned by Eurocentrism and coloniality.

In my various works, I have shown how the local perspective in the areas where I lived and live – now in rural Zimbabwe – have had a profound impact on how I understand needs and service provisioning. I have made the case for the ongoing existence of orientalism imperialism and colonialism, which I call the ‘Terrible Three’ (Van Stam, 2016c; 2017d; 2017e). These predispositions affect and obscure the contributions of many a technologist and academic, both in and outside Africa.

Living together and sharing resources and conversations with those regarded as ‘subaltern’, or, even more demeaning, generalised as being in the ‘Global South’ (Grosfoguel, 2010), gave me whole new realms of academic sensitivity and understanding of the meaning of technology in the communities in which I live. I had methodologically migrated from interdisciplinarity to transdisciplinarity (Du Plessis, Sehume & Martin, 2013).

So, scientifically, what are some of these realities that I have found in rural Africa in the communities in which I have lived? And, what can be observed about epistemology? What approaches have been unearthed?

**Lessons learnt**

First of all, living and working in rural Africa, I discovered that technology is not only about nature – determined by its essential properties – but, and perhaps more profoundly, about nurture – its affects for humans. We are human beings networked together in complex relationships. Therefore, nature is to be understood in its
social context. It is the local cosmology, epistemology, ontology and methodologies that form the basis of the local, indigenous knowledge system that defines ‘what is’. I learnt that, in the community, knowledge is understood in its embodied form (Mawere & Van Stam, 2017) and not necessarily – or not at all – as text (Van Stam, 2013d). For example, I noticed that network designs of community networks, if they existed, would be drawn up after the creation of the network. Designs drafted upfront were neither consulted nor adhered to, as they were not communally developed. Using my interdisciplinary handling of both the social and natural sciences, and appreciating the local, ever-evolving indigenous knowing, I was gaining some understanding and, hopefully, some wisdom. Subsequently, local realities started to make sense when I began to approach them from the local understanding of reality, set in a dynamic and integrative epistemology. This need to understand technology contextually is real; technology needs to be understood both from where it is conceptualised and from where it is deployed. When those understandings do not overlap, which often seems to be the case in disenfranchised areas in rural Africa, there are at least two worlds – two realities – to consider, one embedded in a local epistemology and one set in a foreign epistemology.

It is in this realisation of the past and the present that the ‘where we are right now’ makes sense. For instance, I discovered that in many disenfranchised areas in Southern Africa, colonialism relied on a circular process of condemnation, brainwashing, and, subsequently, resource release linked to foreign imposed conditions (Van Stam, 2017e). Understanding colonialism in this way I came to realise that such practices are still ongoing. Quite often, external experts would portray my local interlocutors as having essential deficits that need urgent intervention to solve, for instance, approaching technologies as relational instead of ‘being rational’. Proposed solutions would require foreigners to fly in from the West. Only after sufficient compliance was committed to – in the form of a written project proposal – would resources become available. Ironically, the resources involved might have been expropriated from Africa in the
first place (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016b). An academic friend living in Rwanda recognised this, and told me in early 2018: “researchers from abroad that often stopped by my office were almost always on some mission to study about Africa as if Africa was some curiosity-ridden domain to be investigated from their elevated perspective from the outside” (Prof Bruce Krogh, personal communication, 2018).

Secondly, I was amazed to realise that a focus on innovation can be entirely counterproductive. Change brings a lot of risks and is often proposed with such vigour that local relationships in the community and with stakeholders have no time to develop or strengthen. The literature seems to exalt these innovations. However, the innovations proposed are not necessarily mapped with a local understanding of what is valued, are desirable practices, or can be considered a success (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a). In the communities I have visited and lived in Southern Africa, change is the result of a collective process and happens gradually. Therefore, it is essential to observe the ordinary (Van Stam, 2016a).

I learnt that the local focus is on improvisation: one works with what one has. Locally, engineers aim to improve on what works and neglect practices that are not beneficial (Van Stam, 2016a). Such a stance is reflected, for instance, in the current National Health Strategy of Zimbabwe, which states:

*Significant investments in health system strengthening are necessary for the health facilities and other service delivery and coordination platforms to function optimally. [...] new innovative programmes such as e-health are implemented to enhance and not to disrupt what has been working so far.* (MoHCC, 2016, p. 61)

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11 In 2014, for Sub-Saharan Africa, researchers reported a yearly inflow of USD 134 billion – in the form of loans, foreign investment and aid – and a conservatively calculated net outflow of USD 192 billion – mainly in profits made by foreign companies, tax dodging and the costs of adapting to climate change (Sharples, Jones, & Martin, 2014).
Clash of epistemologies

The Burundian scientist Stanislas Bigirimana (2011; 2017) describes how normative epistemology positions externalise knowledge as indubitable, infallible and incorrigible. This aligns with Michael Burawoy’s (2009) assessment of a positive science, which relies on the ‘4Rs’: representativeness, reactivity, reliability and replicability. These authors problematize these approaches as harbouring dichotomies and being removed from the complexity of power.

The use of amended positivistic methods, such as in post-positivism and constructivist-interpretivist and critical-ideological methods, seem not to deal with the fundamental issue of regarding knowledge as existing separate from the knower. The results of any of these methods are further problematized by their dominant use, being focused on the individual. Maslow framed the self-actualisation of the individual as the central theme of human development, something Mawere, Mubaya, Van Reisen, and Van Stam (2016) show is unaligned with the reality in many African places. This consistent framing of ‘the individual’ and reflecting on his effectiveness or her self-actualisation have influenced how success measured. Subsequently, in line with the adage ‘what gets measured gets done’, the conceptualisation of technologies and reports on their implementation are set to echo this foreign discourse of success.

Indirectly, the statesman and former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan stood against such individualism. Preceding his passionate arguments for democracy, he commented on the politics of human beings, stating that “Man is born, lives and dies as a member of a community and the affairs of that community are therefore his and vice-versa” (Annan, 2017). However, dominant western approaches continue to put the individual at the centre. Such a centrality creates division, as it pitches one against the other in a competitive world. Individualism also raises dichotomies, where opposing and mutually exclusive positions are assigned to thinking and doing, for instance, as well as experience and understanding, reason and faith, knowing and knowledge, facts and
principles, orality and textuality, physics and thinking, practice and theory, and reflection and action. The resulting fights over boundaries have taken academic attention away from the value of integrated ways of knowing, often available in the form of counter-narratives.

In the search for a method, I have endeavoured to understand the local epistemologies by gleaning inputs from African philosophies. Although outside the mainstream, often tough to access, and relatively under-researched (Van Stam, 2017d, Chapter 2), the study of African cultural heritage provides narratives on how meaning-making is lived in a community. A rendering of such meaning-making, embedded in conversations and abundance, matured and in the present moment, I called the ‘Big Five’. The Big Five consists of ‘ubuntu’ (communal love), ‘oratio’ (communicating embodied knowledge), ‘relatio’ (relational resource allocation), ‘dominatio’ (maturity through forgiveness and covenants), and ‘animatio’ (the continuous present moment) (Van Stam, 2017d, Chapter 14). This interpretation of African value orientations presents a gateway to understanding and knowing how many Africans sustain their cultural identities against the (often technology enabled) onslaught of the ‘Terrible Three’ (orientalism, imperialism, and colonialism), which has led to Africa’s disenfranchisement for over 500 years. The epistemology of the Big Five is dynamic and integrative, understanding ‘knowing’ as an act of the knower and ‘knowledge’ as having emotional, intellectual, evaluating and pragmatic forms (Bigirimana, 2017). Methodology, of course, is subject to the epistemic base and philosophy of knowing and, in the case of the dynamic and integrative epistemology of the local community, methodological approaches must be subject to and aligned with the level of consciousness one is focusing on (Bigirimana, 2017, p. 1603). Unfortunately, technology research seems to undervalue methods – which are social constructs – that involve a dynamic and integrative (and thus evolving) local knowing in a community of inquiry and that trigger the intention to know, involving human and non-human inputs (for instance, ‘other beings’, as in Mawere, 2013).
In the land of the misunderstood

To my relief, the literature is gradually starting to resonate with the kind of counter-narrative presented in this chapter. For instance, coming back to the rural hospital mentioned in the introduction, a decline in health service utilisation has been noted in Zimbabwe’s National Health Profile (MoHCC, 2015). The profile lists a plethora of social issues that may be causing this underutilisation including, for instance, people’s perceptions and factors like religion, culture, education, status, quality, accessibility, affordability and disease burden. Likewise, usage patterns of African community networks have been reported on, for instance, showing previously unexpected high levels of traffic between local users (Belding et al., 2011). The consequences of these findings, however, are not featuring in the literature yet.

Systems designed outside of Africa are influenced by the cultures and histories of those who created them (Van Stam, 2016b). Without considering all voices, including the voice of the disenfranchised embedded in local epistemologies, any foreign construct is self-validating. Blindly accepting outside definitions creates room for alien systems and platforms to frame and dominate local realities in Africa. Such a colonial act defines (but does not describe) a world in which control is exercised by those who control the mechanisms to do so. Therefore, how one views reality defines the past, present and future.

Disquietingly, the quest to understand African expressions of technology, in its dynamic and integrated forms, is not high on African research agendas. To gain such an understanding, longitudinal interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary studies are needed, as well as a belief in local agency. Furthermore, the fact that realities in so-called ‘underserved areas’ are far removed from realities in environments where services are available needs to be acknowledged. Lastly, we need to be sensitive to underlying clashes of paradigms, and subsequently clashes of epistemology, and the presence – and need for mediation – of undeserved (‘white’) privileges (Van Stam, 2017d, pp. 102–109).
I place a big question mark on the epistemological base and methodologies that the dominant, Western-centric academy use in so-called underserved areas. Many, if not most, of these are not conceptualised or tested in the realities of the disenfranchised and, therefore, their applicability is not proven (Mawere & Van Stam, 2015). However, in our current age of super-colonialism (Van Stam, 2017c), it takes courage to stand up for counter-narratives and for the local desire to amplify local technologies (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a), using locally embodied knowing.

So why do many technologies perform so mediocrely in disenfranchised settings? This may be due to the presence of system diversity, which encompasses three particular lineaments in Africa. When the counter-narrative is ‘diversity equals normality’, due to system diversity (Van Reisen, 2017), technologists are faced with three critically important features in many parts of Africa:

- **Latency**: The issue of latency recognises that the transfer of information, whether digital or interpersonal, takes considerable time. Latency occurs because of the finite speed of light, or whatever means of transport is used, whereby the transfer of information takes time given the enormous distances to information platforms. Bits and bytes have thousands of kilometres to travel, and building relationships also involves traveling and working with all authorities. Getting all the permissions in order takes a significant amount of effort as well as time. In ICT systems, for instance, we noticed that in a mixed flow environment with substantial latency, Linux based systems outperform Windows systems almost ten to one over a 1 Mbps line (Johnson & Van Stam, 2016).

- **Congestion**: Due to the dominant mix of technical, economic and political systems, supply seems unrelated to demand. Although communities are used to sharing abundance (Sheneberger & Van Stam, 2011), technical
systems thriving on models of scarcity are timing out while communities are busy interacting.

- **Variety:** Here, we recognise the enormous variety, diversity and richness of expressions in Africa. It seems that anything one can think of is available in African society and markets. A lot of variety exists in languages, cultures, and regulations, and there is an enormous range of equipment.

In many parts of Africa, the reality of system diversity has been present for a long time. This is unlikely to change soon. Therefore, it is important to think about how “to enhance what has been working so far”, considering the prevalence of system diversity.

**A view on African critical agency**

Referring back to the two cases presented at the start of this chapter – one in which health services are sparsely used and the other in which Internet connectivity is always congested – what is the common thread underpinning these problems? I contend that underutilisation is mainly caused by ‘discontinuities of vision’, due to a disconnect between the normative epistemologies used by those initiating the hospital and the dynamic and integrative epistemologies of many African environments. Reviewing Africa’s extended history, it is clear how pre-colonial epistemologies have been overlaid and crowded out by a foreign normative epistemology. The systems now in place have emerged from an alien worldview, from the I-paradigm. Such systems are poorly matched with local views of continuity, which rely on the maintenance and expansion of human relationships (Sheneberger & Van Stam, 2011). Settler colonialism is long gone, but the normative epistemologies put in place continue to ravish relationships. In the first case, the underutilisation of the hospital, overreliance on a foreign scheme and support (to maintain it) has led to a disrupted vision of health. When testing counter-narratives with the leadership at that particular hospital, I saw eyes sparkle and heard initial ideas about how to augment health operations in light of locally-enshrined values.
In Macha, Zambia, from the outset, local ways of doing were taken into account (Bets et al., 2013; Van Oortmerssen & Van Stam, 2010). The Macha Works Theory of Change involves local talents in a circular and continuous process of community engagement (Van Stam, 2013c), workforce development, and thought leadership (Van Stam, 2014a). Subsequently, ‘new Macha’ was declared by members of the community, and the Internet and technologies facilitating services like community radio became desired vehicles for progress in community life (Mweetwa & Van Stam, 2012).

So, if we want to look from the local perspective and live in the We-paradigm, what are some aspects of the local epistemology that we need to understand? What did I recognise as being regarded as ‘ordinary’ in the African settings I live and work in? Of course, there is no one African reality or cultural expression. However, it appears that the value of ubuntu is widely shared, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, as expressed in the vocabulary of the Big Five, which are explained here:

- **Ubuntu**: In ubuntu (or whatever word in the specific language\(^{12}\)), one views existence from the perspective of the community (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016c).
- **Oratio**: The value of oratio indicates how, in the community, one continuously communicates embodied knowledge (Mawere & Van Stam, 2017).
- **Relatio**: Relatio describes how resources are allocated in relational fashion (Sheneberger & Van Stam, 2011).
- **Animatio**: Animatio signifies the continuous present moment, in which one adjusts according to the way the future presents itself in the continuous present.
- **Dominatio**: Dominatio represents the virtue of maturity, activating ubuntu’s conviviality through forgiveness and in covenants between people.

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\(^{12}\) For instance, *ubumuntu* in Rwanda (see http://www.kgm.rw).
I propose these perspectives on African virtues as tools for intellectual sensitivity – for knowing – and for use in daily encounters in disenfranchised African communities. These Big Five provide a framing for conversations on the ordinary that sustains the art of living and knowing in African places.

**Technology**

So, what is the effect of all this on the use of technology in solving problems for those in ‘underserved’ areas? ‘Living research’ (Van Stam, 2019) in disenfranchised communities raises questions about out of context research and the development of (technical) solutions. There is a need for sensitivity towards the opportunities created by a community, based on a local understanding of local requirements, as well as recognition of the local capacity for seizing those opportunities. The definition of success depends on the local context, epistemology, values, and agency. Techno-solutions based on normative epistemology and imposed on environments other than that in which they emerged from are problematic (Toyama, 2015). However, recognising the community for what it is and recognising what it can do opens up exciting avenues for ways ahead.

While preparing this chapter, I connected with an entrepreneur in the southern part of Rwanda. This person breeds fish. He commented that his “fish team work better than any mechanised device”. He related how he was forced to find this out when his imported equipment failed to work. He explains how he dealt with the problem:

> I converted from paperwork to software and from clipboard mounted charts to handheld Internet devices. Now I have a management information system that helps me home in on trouble spots, and project future feed requirements, sales income and cash flow. (Fish breeder, personal communication, 9 February 2018)

Coming back to the health case presented here, when we regard the field of electronic information handling, it is clear that the current ‘platformising’ of technologies (Van Dijck, Poell & De Waal, 2018) has significant effects, also for the disenfranchised. Dominant
information platforms such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter, as well as upcoming platforms such as Amazon and Alibaba, aim to define the information relationships that are possible. The normative epistemology that guides such platforms assumes to govern how health professionals will interact and how they will exchange information, as prosumers (producers and consumers) of knowledge, also in Africa. However, when we analyse the underlying commercial values that fuel these platforms and compare them to the communal values proposed in the Big Five it becomes clear there is little overlap. As a result, there is a need to empower communities to develop technologies and platforms that genuinely serve them.

In the history of imperialism and colonialism, ‘the centre’ reifies realities in ‘the periphery’ (Galtung, 1971). Coming back to the case of the community Internet network in Zambia: when we look at the architecture of the Internet, it is striking that the current information-streams overlap with the shipping routes of centuries ago (Williams, 2017; see also Van Reisen, Mawere, Stokmans, Nakazibwe, Van Stam & Ong’ayo, 2019). Therefore, I propose that, in its contemporary structure, the Internet will continue to fuel digital exclusion as it inherently reproduces dichotomies and sustains power-distances, bringing the benefits of the periphery to the (super-colonial) centre. However, we can counter this imperial expropriation of information and define new and more just and culturally-aligned technologies that allow communities to benefit from their local resources, locally.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the importance of one’s epistemic position in defining solutions to supposed areas of need. Its explanatory perspective calls for recognition of the implicit intent and explicit capacity of both the community and technologists. When we are decolonised and switch to the We-paradigm – to the community (Van Stam, 2017c) – and reason from a dynamic and integrative epistemology, technologists become intending inquirers, and can function in facilitating and mentoring roles to assist local talents to achieve their collective and individual potential through local
renderings of technology (Bets et al., 2013; Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a). Without such an attitude and orientation, I believe that the impact of technology is minimal at best (Marais, 2011) and can amplify unintended negative consequences that are detrimental to the agency and strength of the local community (e.g., such as human trafficking, see Van Reisen et al., 2017).

Accepting foreign solutions for problems in disenfranchised communities can put such communities under a foreign spell (Van Stam, 2017a) and undermine their agency. Technology is valuable only as a servant in “the amplification of human intent” (Toyama, 2015). Only if we first seek to know local human intent can technology be of use. A transdisciplinary approach that considers both nature (engineering) and nurture (humanities) brings to light that relationships and local knowing are just as substantial as the resulting technologies (Bateson, 1979).

In my research, recognising the clash of epistemologies, I have found that the notion that people who barge in with ideas (the innovators or disruptors) are the ones who will make a difference is flawed. In this chapter, I hope to have shed some light on the mystery of knowing and facilitated an understanding of the existence of local perceptions of reality. I also hope to have offered guidance, by way of the Big Five, for those seeking to align with rural African communities to find solutions to their problems, as they define them, not as outsiders see them, by recognising local ways of meaning-making and the soundness of the embodied knowledge that exists in local communities.

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Part II. Living Borders
Chapter 4

Continuation of Care across Borders: Providing Health Care for People on the Move in East Africa

Dorothy Muroki, Boniface Kitungulu & Leanne Kamau

Introduction

African borders are living places in which communities belong to, and often span, the border areas. People move, work and live across borders. However, essential services, such as health care, are nationally organised, which poses challenges in serving mobile communities across borders. Moreover, borders have traditionally been marginalised areas that are not highly prioritised in national policy implementation. This chapter investigates the challenges that emerge in the border areas, particularly when people move across borders, and the difficulties regarding the accessibility of health services. The main question addressed in this chapter is: What are the challenges involved in providing health services in cross border areas? The investigation on which this chapter is based was

People on the move may need to access health services in countries other than their own – and it is important that they can, as their mobility can increase the spread of communicable diseases. However, access to health care outside the home country can be complicated: people on the move often do not have time to wait for results and are not available for follow up. This study looks at cross-border communities in five East Africa Community countries to determine the challenges in providing health care to people moving across borders. It finds that health programmes are country specific and nationally administered, giving rise to a need to integrate health services and patient follow up to ensure the continuation of care across the region.
carried out as part of the Cross-Border Health Integrated Partnership Project\textsuperscript{13} in East Africa.

Border towns are generally poorly served by national health programmes, in part due to the reluctance of governments on either side of the border to provide services to non-nationals. Although border populations report seeking services across national borders, there is a shortage of data on this transnational access due to a lack of harmonised health services in East African Community partner states. No formal cross-border coordination structures exist, and there is a lack of formal referral and patient monitoring mechanisms across borders. As a result, the health outcomes of cross-border populations are likely to be compromised due to missed appointments, poor treatment adherence, multiple registration in different facilities, and loss-to-follow-up, especially in HIV and tuberculosis (TB) care and treatment.

To investigate these issues further, this study was conducted among vulnerable populations at cross-border sites in five East African Community partner states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The study looked at vulnerable women and girls, female sex workers, men who have sex with men, people who inject drugs, people living with HIV, long distance truck drivers and their assistants, clearing and forwarding agents, and fisherfolk. Health care workers and policymakers in facilities located within a 10 km radius of the cross-border sites were also included in the study.

Marginalised and underserved border areas, with weak health care systems, undermine global health security, because of their capacity to act as incubation sanctuaries for infectious diseases such as HIV and TB. Pockets of high-risk populations in cross-border areas are key bridges for HIV transmission to the general population. It is hoped that this chapter will prompt further research and

\textsuperscript{13} The Cross-Border Health Integrated Partnership Project/FHI 360 is funded by United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The authors are engaged in the implementation of the research under the programme.
collaboration so that we can better respond to the challenges involved in providing health services for mobile communities living in cross-border areas in East Africa, as well as more broadly in other parts of Africa.

**Health risks among mobile communities in East Africa**

The road transport corridors in East Africa are economic lifelines that link Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, which form the East African Community. However, this extensive road network, which links major cities and business hubs with border areas from one country to another, is also a major transmission route for HIV (East African Community, 2015). Surveys in the region have indicated that, compared to the general population, HIV prevalence is higher for some sub-populations concentrated along these routes, including female sex workers, men who have sex with men, people who inject drugs, long distance truck drivers, fisherfolk, and vulnerable women and girls. In Burundi, for example, data shows a HIV prevalence of 21.3% among female sex workers and 4.8% among men who have sex with men, compared to 1.1% in the general population (15–49 year olds) (UNAIDS, 2017a). In Kenya, HIV prevalence among men who have sex with men was estimated to be 18.2%, among female sex workers 29.3%, and among people who inject drugs 18.7%, compared to 4.9% among the general population (NASCOP, 2014). In Uganda, estimates put the prevalence of HIV among female sex workers at 34.2%, men who have sex with men at 13.2%, and people who inject drugs at 26.7%, compared to only 5.9% in the general population (UNAIDS, 2017b).

Wet border areas such as lake regions also report high levels of HIV and TB. For instance, populations in and around Lake Victoria (estimated at 1.7 million) often live in isolated, difficult to reach areas, which serve as incubation pockets for infectious diseases. These populations have a HIV prevalence 2–4 times national averages (NASCOP, 2014), report high levels of HIV/TB co-infection rates (40–60%), and lower HIV/TB treatment retention (up to 75% are lost to follow-up). A HIV prevalence of 15% and 21% was reported
among young women and girls and female fisherfolk, respectively, in Mbita and Rusinga Island, Kenya, where national prevalence is 4.9% (Measure Evaluation, 2017).

Several factors drive HIV transmission along land and wet border areas, including mobility, economic vulnerabilities pushing women into transactional sex, multiple concurrent sexual partnerships, substance abuse, gender-based violence, and poor access to quality health services including HIV services. For mobile workers, especially transport workers, extended periods away from home and family, delays at border crossings, boredom, and increased opportunities for sex with multiple partners have been found to contribute to an elevated risk of contracting HIV (World Bank, 2009). One study found that long-distance transport workers in East Africa had an annual average of 2.8 sexual partners (Morris & Ferguson, 2007). Contact with local communities and sub-groups such as sex workers also increases vulnerability to HIV for both the mobile transport workers and host communities (Measure Evaluation, 2017).

**Health services in cross border areas**

Research on cross-border populations in the region shows that the prevalence of HIV is high in cross-border and transport corridor sites. One study, which looked at female sex workers in ‘hotspots’ in Kenya and on the Kenya-Uganda and Tanzania-Uganda borders found HIV prevalence to be as high as 24% (Measure Evaluation, 2017). Several factors were found to contribute to the increased risk of HIV infection in the cross-border areas, including the phenomenon of ‘mobile men with money’, socioeconomic disparities and lack of alternative income-earning opportunities for vulnerable women and girls in the host communities, and vibrant entertainment venues, which all encourage risky sexual relationships for both men and women.

Because transport corridors and cross-border towns in East Africa are generally poorly served by national health programmes, some border posts have no health services at all (IOM, 2013). Where they
exist, many health facilities lack enough medicine and other supplies and have limited human resources. In addition, there are no systems to track the services provided to people across borders, increasing the risk of poor treatment adherence, multiple registration, and loss-to-follow-up of patients, especially in HIV and TB care and treatment.

One study found that along the transport corridors in the five East African Community partner states, the vast majority of health facilities reported providing HIV counselling and testing services, but less than half provided HIV treatment services and the majority did not have specific information and education materials for key populations (East African Community, 2015). Furthermore, less than a third of facilities offered TB treatment or rapid TB screening and testing. Also, while the majority of the facilities provided condoms and sexually transmitted infection (STI) screening and treatment, fewer than a quarter conducted screening and treatment for hepatitis B and C and cervical cancer. Another study concluded that, although by 2011 some donor-funded initiatives along the transport corridor targeted key and vulnerable populations, “the collective impact of the effort [was] minimal” (IOM, 2011a) and undermined by its limited geographical scope and focus (IOM, 2011b).

Subsequently, these groups report poor access to health services along the transport corridors. For instance, in Kenya, 70% of sex workers and truck drivers at five truck stops had never received information on HIV (IOM, 2011a). Some population groups also have better access to health services than others; for example, truck drivers and their assistants and female sex workers reported more frequent access to health services than people who inject drugs (East African Community, 2015). Measure Evaluation (2017) found that even where services exist, cross-border populations face other barriers in seeking care, including distance from the facility, inconvenient opening hours, cost/having to pay for services, and concerns about the attitudes of health care workers. Bogart et al. (2016) found that the cost of transport was the highest barrier for fisherfolk accessing care, as well as the scarcity of facilities in convenient locations such as landing sites.
Mobile populations also sometimes find that they cannot access any health services, or they must seek episodic care at health facilities, which are often not equipped to provide the scope and quality of services they need, leading to failure to complete prescribed treatment, incomplete and unreliable medical records, and disrupted preventive care (East African Community, 2015). For instance, among fisherfolk, it has been observed that their need to move to new areas seasonally to find the best source of fish impedes timely access to HIV care and their ability to get enough treatment to last for months at a time while they are traveling (Bogart et al., 2016). Lack of time is also a barrier; Bogart et al. (2016) found that fishermen often decided not to seek care if they felt that they did not have enough time, and the need to earn money and keep their jobs often outweighed the need to get treatment for illness.

Mobility undermines treatment adherence monitoring, especially for TB and HIV, as patients cannot be tracked by health providers while on the move (IOM, 2013). Morris and Ferguson (2007) found that the majority of long-distance truck drivers preferred to seek care for STI treatment in private health facilities, some public facilities and pharmacies, with the largest proportion attending private facilities where they did not have to wait, but where adherence monitoring was not possible.

In summary, health services across East African Community partner states are not harmonised and there are no formal cross-border health coordination structures to address the needs of vulnerable and key populations along border areas. In addition, national differences in policies and legal frameworks related to health services undermine efforts to ensure the continuity of HIV and AIDS care across borders. All of these factors place the health of vulnerable mobile communities in cross-border areas at risk.
Research methodology

Between 2015 and 2017, research was conducted at cross-border sites in five East African Community states – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda – to determine the availability and accessibility of health and HIV and AIDS services for key and vulnerable populations (Table 4.1). These were selected as strategic cross-border sites recognised as HIV transmission ‘hotspots’ along the transport corridors. The investigation looked at: the mobility and sexual behaviour of members of the target population (including engagement in transactional sex); the health-seeking behaviour of members of the target population; health services received across borders; and barriers and facilitators affecting access to health and HIV/AIDS services among members of target population.

Table 4.1. Assessment sites in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border site</th>
<th>Land border site</th>
<th>Wet border site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-Uganda border</td>
<td>Busia and Malaba (Kenya and Uganda)</td>
<td>Sio Port and Port Victoria (Kenya) and Majanji (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya-Tanzania border</td>
<td>Taveta (Kenya), Holili (Tanzania)</td>
<td>Kirongwe and Muhuru Bay (Tanzania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda-Uganda border</td>
<td>Gatuna (Rwanda), Katuna (Uganda)</td>
<td>Rubavu (Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi-Tanzania border</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kabonga (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integrated health surveys were conducted using a cross-sectional design to collect data from members of the target population and health care workers. In addition, key informant interviews were conducted with health care workers and managers and focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with members of target populations. Facility assessments were also conducted.
Combined, the integrated health surveys had a sample of 9,117 respondents comprising: 1,904 vulnerable women and girls; 2,155 female sex workers; 281 men who have sex with men; 350 people who inject drugs; 1,379 people living with HIV; 955 long distance truck drivers and their assistants; 461 clearing and forwarding agents; and 1,632 fisherfolk. The sample was distributed across the five countries, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The study also included 275 health care workers spread across the five countries.

Figure 4.1. Key and vulnerable groups sample distribution by country (N=9,117)

The respondents were selected as follows:

- Female sex workers, men who have sex with men and people who inject drugs: Respondent-driven sampling was used.
- Vulnerable women and girls: Potential respondents were 15–24 year olds, assessed to be economically vulnerable. Simple random sampling was used to select households for the study, and a vulnerability checklist applied to select eligible women and girls. Vulnerability criteria included being out-of-school, married or pregnant/had children, or were the head of household.
- People living with HIVs: Identified and recruited through the clinics/centres where they were registered and receiving
antiretroviral therapy care and treatment services. Simple random sampling was used to identify potential respondents from the client registers.

- Long distance truck drivers and clearing and forwarding agents: Consecutive sampling was used to recruit respondents as they arrived at border points and work places until the complete sample was achieved.
- Fisherfolk: Time location cluster sampling was used with a two-stage sampling procedure to select respondents from this sub-group. Health care workers and facility in-charges were selected at health facilities located within a 10 km radius of the cross-border sites. These were recruited on site by research assistants and interviewed upon consent.

The data was collected using tablets pre-loaded with the study tools. Once completed, the data was transferred electronically and stored in a central database for analysis and reporting. Data management and analysis was conducted using Stata software. The qualitative data was analysed using a thematic framework in NVivo10. Analysis was done separately for different countries and by population.

14 The research tools used were: exit face-to-face structured interviews with people living with HIV; face-to-face and venue-based interviews, using a structured questionnaire with men who have sex with men, female sex workers, people who inject drugs, fisherfolk, long distance truck drivers, clearing and forwarding agents and vulnerable women and girls; individual face-to-face interviews using a structured questionnaire with facility in-charges and health care workers from family planning clinics, HIV clinics, outpatient departments, STI clinics, TB clinics and records departments; an inventory checklist administered to health facility managers and health care workers to catalogue equipment and supplies in all facilities in each site as part of functional quality assessment; and health records/document review using the District Health Information System (DHIS2) and other relevant records to assess the utilisation of health services at the facilities. No personal identifying information was collected. Aggregate data on people accessing HIV and AIDS services; maternal, newborn and child health; and STI, TB, family planning and reproductive health services were collated and disaggregated by gender, age and target population. Permission to review health records was sought from ministries of health at national and local levels in all sites.
Mobility and sexual behaviour

Among the vulnerable women and girls, mobility characteristics varied by country.\textsuperscript{15} In Rwanda, over half of the girls (57\%) had lived at the border site for more than six years and about 42\% were born there. In Kenya, only 9\% were born at the border sites and 43\% had lived there for two years or less. In Tanzania and Uganda, nearly all were born at the study site – 88\% in Tanzania and 85\% in Uganda. In Uganda, about 28\% reported having crossed the border into the neighbouring country more than 3 times in the 12 months prior to the survey.

Except in Ugandan sites where the majority were born in the cross-border site, most of the female sex workers in the other sites had come from elsewhere. The study found a lot of movement away from the usual place of residence (cross-border areas) among female sex workers. For instance, among female sex workers in Uganda, about three quarters (74\%) reported that they planned to travel outside their usual county/district of residence within the next three months, with 84\% planning to travel for sex work. The main reason for travelling elsewhere by female sex workers in Kenya was sex work.

Female sex workers also reported frequent cross-border travel in the study sites in four of the five countries,\textsuperscript{16} mostly for sex work. In Uganda and Tanzania, 50\% and 29\%, respectively, of the female sex workers interviewed reported that they had travelled out of the country for sex work, while in Rwanda, 35\% said that they crossed the border to the neighbouring country every week. In Burundi, while over half of the female sex workers said they had never crossed the border, 25\% (6 out of 24) of those who said they had, did so at least every month.

There were equally high levels of mobility among men who have sex with men for reasons that included sex work and visiting sexual partners. In Uganda, a large proportion (93\%) were planning to travel

\textsuperscript{15} The Burundi sample did not include vulnerable women and girls.
\textsuperscript{16} Respondents in Kenya were not asked about cross-border travel.
away from their usual district of residence within the next three months. In Kenya, 8% of those who planned to travel away from their district of residence in the next three months said they would be travelling for sex work.

Among fisherfolk, data on mobility was only available for Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi, where results show that the majority of the fisherfolk interviewed often slept away from home, mostly on fishing business or visiting relatives. The proportion of those who reported often sleeping away from home was 54% in Tanzania, 79% in Uganda, and 82% in Burundi. The period away from home varied widely, from 1 week for 41% of the respondents in Tanzania, to 7–13 days for 16% of the Uganda respondents, and 3 months for 13% of Burundi respondents. The results also show that cross-border/transnational movement is frequent among the respondents in this group. In Tanzania, 60% of the respondents reported having crossed the border to the neighbouring country before, with 11% crossing every week. In Burundi, 40% reported that they cross the border to the neighbouring country every month, and 12% every week.

Among long distance truck drivers in Tanzania and Uganda, when the same question was asked, 64% and 84%, respectively, said that they had been driving long distance trucks for over five years, but while the average duration of a single road trip in the entire Uganda sample was under four days, 23% of the Tanzania group were on the road for over eight days on any one trip. In addition, 95% of the Tanzanian respondents and 74% in Uganda often went to other towns not necessarily on the transport corridor, showing their high level of mobility.

In Tanzania, about half of the clearing and forwarding agents who took part in the research had lived at the border sites for over five years, and 52% travelled to other towns for work. In Rwanda, 32.7%  

17 The Kenyan long distance truck drivers were not asked about mobility and sexual behaviour.
Of the clearing and forwarding agents interviewed had lived in the area for six or more years; of those who came from elsewhere, 56.3% returned home more than once a year.

**Reported engagement in transactional sex**

Among the people living with HIV, sex work was also one of the reasons some travelled out of their usual district of residence. In Rwanda, a third (31%) of the people living with HIV interviewed gave sex work as the reason they travelled out of their district. In Kenya and Uganda, the proportions traveling for sex work were 29% and 36% respectively. None of the people living with HIV in Tanzania and Burundi appear to be engaged in commercial sex – none reported travelling for sex work or receiving goods or cash in exchange for sex.

Although most vulnerable women and girls did not report engaging in commercial/transactional sex, in Uganda 18% said they had received goods or money in exchange for sex and 3.4% said that sex work was the main reason they had travelled outside the district in the previous three months. Transactional sex was also reported by a small proportion of fisherfolk: 17% in Tanzania, 12% in Uganda, and 11% in Burundi said they had received gifts/goods or money in exchange for sex in the three months before the survey. In Uganda, 56% of the people who inject drugs had more than one sexual partner and 38% had received or given money or goods in exchange for sex within the last three months.\(^\text{18}\) Data regarding the sexual behaviour of long-distance truck drivers is not available, except in Tanzania, where 36% of the respondents said that they had exchanged goods or cash for sex in the three months prior to the survey. Among the clearing and forwarding agents, 9% in Tanzania and 14% in Uganda reported having received or given cash or goods for sex in the previous three months.

While the data shows that most vulnerable women and girls did not report engaging in commercial/transactional sex, in Uganda 18% said they had received goods or money in exchange for sex and 3.4% said

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\(^{18}\) This question was not asked of the Kenya group.
that sex work was the main reason they had travelled outside the district in the previous three months. In Tanzania, 42% of the vulnerable women and girls reported that they were engaged in cross-generational sexual relationships. Transactional sex was also reported by a small proportion of fisherfolk. Asked if they had received gifts/goods or money in exchange for sex in the three months before the survey, 17% of the fisherfolk respondents in Tanzania, 12% in Uganda, and 11% in Burundi said they had. In Uganda, 56% of the people who inject drugs had another sexual partner(s), and 38% had received or given money or goods in exchange for sex within the last three months. Data regarding the sexual behaviour of long distance truck drivers is not available, except in Tanzania, where 36% of the respondents said that they had exchanged goods or cash for sex in the three months prior to the survey.

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Health seeking behaviour

To examine the health seeking behaviour of the study population, participants were asked what service they had sought the last time they went to a health facility and whether they had received it. The data shows that while treatment for common illnesses was the leading service sought during the last visit to a health facility by most vulnerable women and girls, there were also some remarkable variations. While more vulnerable women and girls in Tanzania

19 This question was not asked of the Kenya group.
sought antenatal care and new-born services (55%), in Uganda more vulnerable women and girls sought STI treatment (61%) and in Kenya most sought HIV testing services (44%).

Most of the female sex workers who sought health care services across all the cross-border sites needed treatment for common illnesses and HIV testing services. The highest proportion of female sex workers seeking HIV testing services was in Tanzania (32%) and Kenya (26%), while in Kenya and Burundi, the proportions were about 18% and 17%, respectively, and 14% in Rwanda. Demand for STI services was relatively low and was highest among female sex workers in Uganda (15%), Tanzania (14%) and Rwanda (13%). The services that were least demanded by this group across all sites were pregnancy testing, services for post-abortion care, services for sexual and gender-based violence, TB drug refills, substance abuse counselling, nutrition counselling, and screening for non-communicable diseases. Overall, the majority of the female sex workers said that they received the services they sought at the facility during their previous visit.

While the majority of the men who have sex with men across the three countries where data was available sought treatment for common illnesses, a large majority in Kenya (71%) and about a third in Uganda (29%) sought HIV testing services. Comparatively, only 10% of the respondents in Rwanda sought HIV testing services. The results also suggest that health facilities may not be a popular/common source of condoms for this group, as very few reported seeking this service: 12% in Uganda, 2% in Kenya and none in Rwanda. In addition, except for Uganda (28%), very few of the men who have sex with men went to a facility for lubricants (10% in Kenya and 7% in Rwanda). STI services were equally in very low demand among this group across the three countries: highest in Kenya at only 10%, compared to 5% and 7% in Uganda and Rwanda, respectively.

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20 Data on men who have sex with men in this study was only collected in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda.
The results show that in three of the five countries, fisherfolk most frequently sought treatment for common illnesses (Tanzania 60%; Uganda 83%; Rwanda 80%). Demand for laboratory services by this group was high only in Burundi (40%) and Tanzania (37%) and negligible in the other countries. Demand for HIV testing services was highest in Kenya (54%), followed by Tanzania (23%) and under 10% in the other countries. Only in Uganda did a notable proportion seek STI services (15%) – in other countries, the demand was negligible. Demand for condoms, antenatal care and family planning services was low across the five countries.

In Uganda, the most commonly sought service by people who inject drugs was for the treatment of common illnesses (79%), while in Kenya, it was HIV testing services (40%). About a third (33%) of the respondents in Kenya also sought treatment for common illness, while 16% and 9% in Uganda and Kenya, respectively, sought laboratory services (16%). Demand for other services was negligible among this group.

Over 60% of people living with HIV across the five countries studied needed antiretroviral refills at their last visit to a health facility. Treatment for common illnesses and laboratory services were also in moderate demand. In sharp contrast to the other countries, 57% of the people living with HIV in Kenya required antenatal care and newborn care services, and 42% in Uganda required STI services. For both services, demand was almost nil in other countries. Negligible proportions of respondents needed TB services, condoms, family planning and nutrition services. The majority of people living with HIV reported receiving the services they needed during their last visit to a health facility.

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21 Data is available for only one site in Kenya (Sio Port and Lake Victoria), where fisherfolk were sampled.
The results show that in Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda, long distance truck drivers and their assistants\textsuperscript{22} sought treatment for common illnesses more than any other service. The highest proportion seeking HIV testing services was in Kenya (30%). Demand for other services was low, under 10% in most cases.

A significant proportion of the clearing and forwarding agents\textsuperscript{23} in Kenya (68%), Rwanda (58%) and Uganda (42%) sought treatment for common illness. More clearing and forwarding agents in Kenya (76%) needed HIV testing services than in any other country; in Uganda and Rwanda, only 25% and 9%, respectively, sought HIV testing services. In Uganda and Rwanda, 25% and 15%, respectively, sought laboratory services. Demand for antenatal care and newborn services, STI treatment, antiretroviral refills, and condom services was almost negligible among this group.

**Health care services received across the border**

Respondents were asked whether they had sought health care services from facilities located across the border in a neighbouring country in the six months before the survey. In Uganda, 44% of men who have sex with men and nearly a third of the people who inject drugs (29%) said they had sought services across the border in the last six months, as had 25% of long distance truck drivers, 16% of female sex workers and 17% of fisherfolk. The majority of these sought services for the treatment of common illnesses. In Uganda, men who have sex with men had also sought condoms (22%) and lubricants (42%) across the border. Vulnerable women and girls in Uganda were the only group who sought antenatal care and newborn care across the border (29%).

The results show that seeking health care services across the border is not common in the Burundi study site (Kabonga). Only 16% of

\textsuperscript{22} The data from Tanzania was incomplete and was, therefore, not included in this analysis. No long distance truck drivers were included in the Burundi sample.

\textsuperscript{23} No clearing and forwarding agents were sampled in Burundi. The Tanzania clearing and forwarding agents sample had only 23 respondents, of whom only 9 had sought services from a health facility. The sample was dropped from further analysis due to the small number of respondents.
fisherfolk, 8% of female sex workers and 5% of people living with HIV reported that they had ever sought health care services across the border. Of the fisherfolk who did, 15% sought laboratory services. In Rwanda, about a quarter of long-distance truck drivers had sought health services across the border, as well as 15% of female sex workers and 17% of vulnerable women and girls. Of those who did, more than 65% sought treatment and laboratory services. In Kenya, varying proportions of the different groups in the five sites sought health services in the neighbouring country from where they lived. The highest proportion of those who had accessed services across the border in the previous six months were female sex workers in Taveta (18%), vulnerable women and girls in Taveta (16%) and long-distance truck drivers in Busia (17%), mostly for the treatment of common illnesses. Lower cost, proximity and the better quality of services were cited as the main reasons for seeking services across the border.

Barriers and facilitators affecting access to health and HIV/AIDS services

The survey results, as well as the findings of the formative assessments conducted in the five countries, provide some insight into the factors that affect the ability of key and vulnerable populations in the region to fully benefit from available health care services. These factors are discussed here.

Lack of insurance cover and perceived high cost of care

In Rwanda, the formative assessment revealed that lack of money to subscribe to Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) was a key barrier in seeking care. Female sex workers, vulnerable women and girls, and people living with HIV on the Rwanda side of the border with Uganda reported that they sought services in Uganda and paid directly out of pocket because they were not members of the insurance programme. In Tanzania, qualitative interviews revealed that key populations prefer the Community Health Fund, which caters for people in the informal sector and rural areas and is seen as more affordable, than the national health insurance fund. In Burundi, the results also show that the majority of fisherfolk and female sex
workers paid for services directly, mostly out of pocket. In Kenya, over half of the respondents said they paid directly for services, even paying for drugs separately and out of pocket in most cases. The results also show that ‘reasonable’ cost was the key factor for most respondents in choosing facilities for care, including those who sought services across the border in neighbouring countries. For instance, in Holili, Tanzania it was reported that many patients from Kenya cross the border into Tanzania for cheaper health services, because services in Kenya were deemed very expensive:

The cost for services here is very fair and even the clients who come from Kenya find it easy to pay for the health services because the exchange rate is very friendly [...] with KES [Kenyan shilling] 100 (USD 1), they are able to get a good amount of money. (Key informant interview, health facility in-charge, Busia, Kenya)

Hence, differences in costs for health services may steer health-seeking behaviour across borders. As a result health services on one side of the border may be overextended.

**Mobility and time taken waiting for services**

Being on the move was noted to be a barrier to accessing health care services among long distance truck drivers and a major hazard in adherence to treatment:

For truck drivers who may be HIV positive, some of them may have challenges accessing HIV services because they are mobile. It might happen that the day when they should be going to the clinic, they have been assigned to travel outside the country. So, it becomes very difficult for the truck driver to access such services. (Focus group discussion, long distance truck drivers, Malaba, Kenya)

Time taken waiting at the health facility for services was also of major concern, and the majority of respondents in the Kenya sample found the time taken to be too long. Nearly all the female sex workers and some of the long distance truck drivers found the time taken waiting for services too long. In Tanzania, delays and long waiting times in public health facilities were reported in the formative assessment as one of the reasons for not visiting health facilities.
Inadequate quality of services
The perceived low quality of services and lack of drugs was also seen as a barrier to accessing health care services in the study. For instance, in Rwanda, focus group discussants felt that the services provided were of low quality, the drug supply was inadequate and there were limited staff at the facilities. Some facilities were also seen as located in far off areas that took time to get to. In Kenya, it was reported that some of the facilities in the survey did not have drugs available – in one site (Busia), over 50% of the men who have sex with men and nearly half of the people who inject drugs did not get drugs at the facility. Two other sites (Taveta and Malaba) also had many respondents reporting not having received drugs during their last visit to a facility.

Perceived stigma and fear
Perceived stigma and fear due to the criminalisation of specific behaviours and practices, such as homosexuality, sex work and injecting drug use, was reported as another factor hindering people from seeking services. Some of the participants in focus group discussions reported that they felt discriminated against and stigmatised and this affected their willingness to seek health care services. In Uganda, for example, some sex workers, men who have sex with men and people living with HIV reported that they were regularly exposed to extremely negative, discriminatory and hostile reactions from health workers, which discouraged them from seeking care in public facilities: “They tell you to wait outside and that you want me to touch your rubbish and you are the ones destroying our marriages” (Focus group discussion, female sex workers, Busia, Uganda). Another respondent said:

As you know if we go to the main hospitals, most of us, we are likely not to share the problem, so at least if you go to a clinic you tell the nurse instead of the main hospital where you can be a story. (Interview, men who have sex with men, Busia, Uganda)

On the other hand, factors that facilitate seeking health care were identified as friendly health care providers, good quality services, and
easily accessible facilities, as well as prompt services. For instance, in Tanzania, the perceived good quality of services was a key reason why respondents chose the facilities they did and was cited as a reason by nearly half (48%) of the female sex workers, 67% of fisherfolk and 27% of long-distance truck drivers. Easy physical access was also cited as a key reason for choosing a facility, by 61% of the female sex workers, 47% of fisherfolk and 74% of people living with HIV in Tanzania. In Kenya, most of the respondents chose a facility close to home (less than half an hour away). For long distance truck drivers, besides location, convenient opening hours was also a key factor in facility choice. ‘Reasonable’ cost and not having to pay directly for services was mentioned as important in choosing a point of care – most respondents were attracted to facilities that were perceived to charge reasonable or no fees for services.

**Conclusion**

Cross border mobility is a neglected area in research despite the substantial level of mobility in today’s world. In particular, health care needs in cross border areas are significant and specific to different types of cross border communities. Mobility affects health through mobility-related life-patterns, and the utilisation of health care facilities by mobile populations affects treatment. Some of the problems with health care for cross border communities include incomplete patient records of users and lack of completion of prescribed treatment due to lack of follow up or unavailability of treatment. These problems, and others, are not sufficiently addressed by the current health programmes in the region, which are administered nationally. Accordingly, this chapter looked at the challenges involved in providing health services for mobile communities in cross borders areas. It examined the relationship between the cross border mobility of these groups and their sexual behaviour, as well as their access to health care (health seeking behaviour, health care services received across the border, and barriers and facilitators to access to health services).
The study was carried out among 9,117 individuals in 12 cross-border sites in the East African Community countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The participants in this survey were from the following groups: female sex workers; men who have sex with men; people who inject drugs; vulnerable young women and girls; people living with HIVs; long distance truck drivers and clearing and forwarding agents; fisherfolk; and health care workers. The study found that many members of these groups are engaging in transactional sex and traveling for sex work, which increases the spread of communicable diseases in cross border areas. Most of the respondents reported seeking health services for common illnesses, as well as HIV testing services and laboratory services, and to a lesser extent antenatal care and newborn services, STI treatment, antiretroviral refills, and condom services. Although there appears to be high levels of access to health care services, factors such as the quality of health care influence where individuals preferred to access services. In addition, the proportion of target groups seeking health care services across borders is considerable, suggesting the need to adopt and implement a standard package of health services, targeted at mobile and border communities across all the countries in the East African region. It is worth noting that in some of the sites, quality of care was not a major factor in respondents’ choice of preferred health facility. A key barrier in seeking health care services in the region appears to be the cost of services and having to pay for services (lack of insurance), cited in both the survey and qualitative interviews. Other barriers include mobility and time waiting, quality of services, lack of drugs, and perceived stigma.

This study highlights the importance of understanding the health risks and needs of cross border mobile communities, which can vary for different groups and in different countries. It underlines the relevance of addressing these needs in order to ensure the quality of treatment and continuation of care across the region. Based on these findings, there is clearly a need for the increased integration of health services and patient follow up across borders to enable better care provision. There is also room for a health care financing product to remove direct payments for services across borders, which were reported as a barrier by the majority of those who paid for services. It is hoped
that this study will prompt governments of the region need to cooperate closely in order to develop joint approaches through which the health needs of cross border communities can be served.

References


Chapter 5

Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region

Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen

Introduction

Since ancient times, people have travelled across boundaries in search of resources. They have also moved to conquer other societies and territories or to escape from war, natural disasters or major climatic shifts. In a broad sense, the history of the world is the history of human migration and settlement (McNeill, 1984). Hence, ‘mobility’ is not necessarily confined to a pastoral way of life, although pastoralists adhere heavily to a mobile lifestyle (Davies & Hartfield, 2007). Instead, this chapter identifies mobility as a social process, in which resources are shared and interests are managed through conflict management and resolution.

The Afar pastoralists use mobility to optimise livelihoods, cope with drought, maximise efficient resource use and keep their animals free of disease. For the Afar, mobility is a social process, with complex rules in a highly evolved social system. This system also manages conflict, which mainly stems from rivalry over resources, using a combination of customary law, Sharia (religious) law and formal law, all applied in supplementary and complementary ways to achieve solutions that are suited to the context and strengthened by community buy-in. This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of how mobility contributes to resilience and how social processes can help mitigate conflict to optimise solutions for local communities.

24 Part of this chapter, which was prepared for this book, was also published as: Alifnur, A. (2019). Managing mobility driven conflict in the border areas of Afar Region, Ethiopia. American Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 5(1), 1–19.
This chapter looks at pastoralist mobility in the context of conflicting interests and the existing mechanisms to manage and resolve such conflicts. The focus is on the Afar people in the border areas of the Afar Regional State in Ethiopia, who have been particularly neglected in terms of development and research (Tefay & Tafere, 2004). The Afar people have a long history of mobility. They live in a hot, dry and sandy environment, where people survive under challenging circumstances. The resilience of the Afar and their ability to sustain their livelihoods is important. Already, due to the tensions in the region, large refugee camps in Asaita host thousands of Eritrean Afars, who have become dependent on outside support.

Pastoralist mobility is considered instructive when considering migration, for several reasons. First of all, the existing literature on pastoralism provides a number of insights into migration that are specific to the pastoralist context, and yet may reveal dynamics that relate to migration more generally. Secondly, pastoralist mobility gives insights into the dynamics of communities living across borders in different states and the challenges and opportunities that this brings, as well as the conflicts. Conflict is becoming increasingly prevalent in relation to conflicting polities across migration routes. This is also related to the pressures on pastoralism as a sustainable livelihood due to the changing economies that sustain communities (in rural, farming, urban and other communities), as well as the changing contextual realities that impact on these economies (such as population and climate change) (Gina, 2015). Finally, the study of pastoralist mobility is interesting in terms of investigating the relevance of traditional conflict resolution systems specifically designed to deal with conflict-related challenges in the context of migration.

As pastoralist lifestyles are under pressure, and the situation of the Afar is increasingly challenging due to the various developments described in this chapter, a sharp rise in conflict can be expected. While communities struggle to cope, age-old value systems are under pressure. This may lead to an increased divergence of values within and between communities. Cultural entropy allows the divergence of
value systems to be measured. When values systems within and between communities diverge, their organisation and coping strategies may be negatively affected.

The objective of this study is to investigate mobility-related conflict-management as a social process through the lens of cultural entropy. It attempts to depict the relationship between resource shortages, utilisation systems and pastoral mobility. The study also aims to describe the functioning of existing systems of conflict management in Afar communities, to promote viable customary institutions for conflict management and fill the gaps observed in those institutions through formal intervention mechanisms. The main research question is: *What are the main sources of conflict among Afar pastoralists and how are these conflicts managed and resolved?*

The study is based on interviews conducted in the *kebeles*\(^{25}\) of Hidelu, Finto (both in Awra District) and Garriro (Chifra District), located on the western side of Afar Regional State, bordering Amhara Regional State, in Ethiopia. These places are home to pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, and are all rural places. They were selected for their suitability to investigate conflict management between the mobile Afar and other groups.

In the next section we introduce the concept of cultural entropy, as the lens through which we analyse mobility and conflict management among the Afar people. We then describe the Afar people and the social structure of their communities. The subsequent section looks at mobility and conflict, including mobility as a strategy, the procedures for mobility among the Afar, and the causes of conflict in the study areas. We then consider conflict management in the Afar, including the three-pronged system in place – customary law (*Ma’adat*), Sharia law and the formal law courts and administrative system – and practical examples from the study area, before providing a brief conclusion.

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\(^{25}\) A *kebele* is the smallest administrative unit of Ethiopia, similar to neighborhood.
Cultural entropy

This study investigates the role of indigenous institutions in the management of conflict among the Afar and between the Afar and others. A clash of values (between cultural groups or between the state and its people) can be measured using the concept of cultural entropy (Stokmans, Van Reisen & Landa, 2018). A high level of cultural entropy (or difference in values) can lead to a decline in the efficiency of systems and organisations. In order to study cultural entropy in any given context, it is necessary to understand the social structures that are relevant to that situation as well as the values that are important to the people within the system of organisation. The level of cultural entropy informs us about the level of convergence of values within the organisation or system. This can include values underpinning mechanisms to manage conflict within or between organisations or elements of a system. High cultural entropy usually results in less effective policies and management systems, and more resources, effort and energy are needed to keep the system or organisation running. In addition, the higher the level of cultural entropy, the more likely a situation will lead to conflict.

The Afar people

This study concerns the Afar people, an ethnic community in the Horn of Africa. The Afar traditionally follow both seasonal and permanent mobility patterns, due to the nature of their pastoral way of life, which is tuned into the natural environment. Pastoral communities in Ethiopia live in the most water and pasture deprived areas, which experience low annual precipitation averaging between 400 to 700 mm. In many areas, droughts occur on a regular basis. As a result, pastoral land use depends on the scarce water supply available from rivers (Sandford & Habtu, 2000).

The Afar people live in and around the borders of three countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The Ethiopian Afar possess a wide geographic area, stretching as far as Eritrea in the north, Djibouti in the north east and Somalia in the east. The Afar Regional State, which
is part of this geographical area, is home to an estimated 1.3 million Afar people (Minority Rights Group International, 2018). It covers an area of 108,860 square kilometres (Ilukor, Birner, Tilahun & Getu, 2014). The Afar region serves as Ethiopia’s entrance to the Red Sea Port, which has great economic and political importance. It has 5 zones and 32 districts. Chifra District is part of Zone 1 and lies near the base of the eastern escarpment of the Ethiopian highlands. It is bordered by Dubti District in the east, Amhara Region in the west, Zone 4 (including Awra District) in the north and Mille District in the south. The district has two rainy seasons: *karma* (long rain), which occurs from mid-July to mid-October, and *sugum* (short rain), from March to the end of April.

Unfortunately, the Afar people have been denied their right to unrestricted mobility by the various political regimes in Ethiopia. The imperial regime of Haile Selassie (1930 to 1974) instituted the Awash Basin Authority and greatly restricted the mobility of the indigenous Afar community and their access to resources. The Dergu regime (1974 to 1987) forced the centuries-old system of rule in the region (the sultanate) into decline and ordered the communities to institute pastoralist associations and become sedentary. Under this regime, the Afar were ordered to graze their livestock in ‘protected tribal areas’ allotted by the regime. The Government of Ethiopia, led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (incumbent since 1991), has pursued the large-scale land dispossession of locals through the Tandahoo Sugar Plantation Scheme. The Tandahoo Sugar Factory, the largest in East Africa, is established in Zone 1 along the Awash River Basin. It has restricted pastoralist mobility and created range land and water insufficiency problems, which are not balanced by its returns to the local community (Alifnur, 2019).

In recent times, changes in natural conditions have brought about a shift in the patterns of mobility of Afar pastoralists in a way that has triggered conflict. However, it is important to remember that conflict has existed in all periods of human history. Archaeological findings, anthropological interpretations and historical records indicate that people have been engaged in armed conflict since prehistoric times.
(Mohammed, 2001). The history of pastoral societies is particularly tied to social conflict, with both positive and negative outcomes. Although the scope and frequency varies, conflicts are common in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas (Ministry of Peace, 2019). When it comes to Ethiopia, this is no different, as pastoral conflicts have struck Ethiopia in different forms for centuries and, thus, are not a new phenomenon. However, during the past two decades the country has experienced an increase in the frequency and intensity of violence in inter-ethnic conflicts (Lober & Worm, 2015).

Ethiopia’s eastern peripheral lowlands are home to the majority of the country’s pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, and the scene of many local conflicts. Conflicts also occur in different corners of the region; for instance, in the border areas between Afar and Amhara; Afar and Argoba; Afar and Tigray; Afar and Karrayu Oromo, as well as Afar and Issa Somalis. All of these communities have their own way of handling conflict (Ministry of Peace, 2019).

**Social organisation**

The Afar people have a structured system of social organisation and kin-based networks. They combine traditional and formal systems of administration in which both channels are used to regulate members’ day-to-day activities, including conflict. In most cases, formal government organisations are of secondary importance in solving conflict. Afar communities are collectivist in their way of living, characterised by polygamous marriages and an extended family structure. Central to the social organisation of Afar communities is descent and familial ties. The Afar have a patrilineal descent system, based on which a person belongs to a particular clan (*mela*). Afar settlements are composed of a mixture of clans, although each locality is identified with a major clan and sub-clans (or relationships through marriage). This makes it easier to organise social, economic and political support in times of crisis (Tesfay & Tafere, 2004).
The social organisation of the study communities is hierarchical, consisting of the supreme clan, clans (*mela*), lineage groups (*afa*), extended family (*dable*) and household units (*buraa*).²⁶

For example, in Hiddelu (Kalkalsa), a clan called, Alla’ayto-goharto is dominant and extends far into Gulina and Teru districts. Other clans include Hunda-humedo, Kadda-humedo, Ali-gayya, Lau-al’aayto and Asabboora. However, in Garriro the structure is formed from the supreme clan called Arabta and eight clans with their own categories: Haddoda, Bedihitto, Adanto, Utbantto, Namelalite, Bosali, Nessar and Bulokto. In the third community, Finto, the clans consist of Hadarmu, Hayssantu, Muhto, La’ado, Gaminto, Koborto, and Andwolwalo. The clan-based structure consists of individual clan

²⁶ A family refers to the extended family composed of one or more households; a household refers to individual households, which together form a family.
leaders (*kidu-abbá*), collective decision makers (*makabantoo*) and an enforcer (*fie’ma aba*). The latter is an adult or youth concerned with managing the internal (domestic) affairs of a neighbourhood or *kebele*.

In Afar communities different clans or pastoralist groups meet to make arrangements for the use of resources, travel patterns and any other issues related to the group. However, these arrangements are not static and may need to be adapted as locations shift and new realities unfold. Mobility can trigger conflict, especially when situations change.

**Mobility and conflict in Afar Regional State**

**Mobility as a strategy**

Mobility is sometimes considered an adaptive strategy, as it allows pastoralists to adjust to changing weather conditions without permanently departing from a certain territory. It is fundamental to pastoralists’ strategies for coping with unpredictable rainfall, livestock diseases, and scarce natural resources (Van den Akker, Berdel & Murele, 2015). Mobility also allows people to simultaneously exploit more than one fixed environment during climate change. In relation to the Afar people, the existence of well-patterned mobility enables the Afar to make a living without over utilising and destroying environmental resources and disrupting the co-existence of pastoralism, agro-pastoralism and farming, which have taken place side-by-side for centuries (Getachew, 2004).

In this way, pastoral livelihoods are the outgrowth of resource scarcity, such as water and pasture scarcity. The unpredictability and uneven distribution of rain across the area inhabited by the Afar pushes pastoralists in the study sites towards alternative zones. The short supply of water compels pastoralists to take their livestock to an area located hundreds of kilometres away from their residence. Mobility allows pastoralists to cope with the problem of finding enough water and pasture. According to Tesfay and Tafere (2004), mobility has enabled the northern Afar pastoralists to use the spatially variable rangelands for a limited period of time. Likewise, Getachew
(2004) highlighted that the seasonal migration of the Afar makes their land use, settlement and herd management highly efficient and well-organised enabling them to make a living without over-utilising or destroying environmental resources. Afar pastoralists also use mobility as a mechanism to avoid herd diseases and endangering conditions. A group of herders may leave a particular rangeland, not only due to depleted feed and water, but also due to the presence of biting flies, mosquito, ticks and predators (Tesfay & Tafere, 2004).

Mobility can, therefore, be understood as a:

- strategy to optimise the livelihoods of pastoralist communities
- strategy to cope with drought and extreme weather
- mechanism for efficient resource utilisation
- strategy to optimise herd safety

As well as having many positive benefits for the Afar, mobility also has negative consequences. Seasonal mobility and the constant search for adequate pasture and water make it difficult to access health care, education, water, electricity, and financial assistance. Alemayehu (2016) noted that mobility is a major obstacle to the delivery of education in pastoralist districts. The long journeys that pastoralists make can also claim the life of the pastoralists and their livestock. In addition, mobility can create conflict. Gakuria (2013) stated that disputes flare up between farmers and pastoralists and among pastoralist themselves, as migrating camel and livestock herds sometimes graze on farmers' lands or other livestock herders’ grazing lands and use their water points. Farmer-herder conflict is an enduring feature of social life in the Sudano-Sahelian Zone, the arid belt that stretches across Africa from Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean to Somalia on the Red Sea. So, understanding farmer-herder relations is key to conflict management and resolution (Turner, Ayantude, Patterson & Patterson, 2004).
Procedures for mobility

The mobility patterns of Afar pastoralists are clear; each clan member knows the sites it can use, how long they can stay and when they should return to the main settlement. Even the distances covered are well known (Getachew, 2004). The mobility of the Afar involves certain procedures that are deeply embedded in and supported by cultural values and social systems.

Mobility is supported by the exchange of information and forming extended relationships with different groups. In the case of the Afar, exchanging information (xaggu) is often tied to mobility, as local people deliberately move to seek or deliver information about a distant situation. According to Tesfay and Tafere (2004), a team of people monitor the state of the rangeland before allowing herds to use it and guide the movement of people and herds in the Afar region. Information-sharing and distribution across geographies is, therefore, a vital element to decisions regarding mobility patterns. The scouting team is locally called eddo, which literally translates to ‘range scouts’. The team has to get the consent of the host community to use enclosures (deso), which can be allowed only after negotiation. There are also critical pre-conditions that outsiders should respect including, for instance, access may only be allowed for lactating and young stock; all authorised animals must be free from any apparent disease; and access is only allowed for a pre-defined period of time.

Social organisation in the organisation of mobility is critical. Every clan or a specific pastoral territory has a representative responsible for managing the affairs of travellers (mostly his kin groups) and negotiating with people in the area of destination on behalf of the people who accompany him on the journey (Tesfay & Tafere, 2004). When there is a problem managing movement, conflict arises. In addition, other emerging factors may create conflict. Meier, Bond and Bond (2007) noted that the causes and dynamics of conflict in Ethiopia are changing, due to a number of factors, including environmental degradation, shrinking grazing land, climate change and political instability. Conflict can sometimes be attributed to physical mobility in search of scarce resources. However, all forms of
conflict cannot be interpreted as resulting from pastoralist mobility. According to Alemayehu (2016), at times mobility triggers conflict, at other times conflict causes mobility. When there is no traceable kinship between the migrating group and the host community, the likelihood of conflict is higher.

**Causes of conflict**

Conflict occurs for various reasons. But the view that pastoral communities are traditionally warlike and aggressive does not hold true. Conflict not only happens in these communities, but generally tends to happen in places where resources are scarce and not shared fairly; where there is little or no communication between the groups in the conflict; where the groups have incorrect ideas and beliefs about each other; where there are unresolved grievances from the past; and where power is unevenly distributed (Swanstrom & Weismann, 2005). However, according to Bekele (2010), resource-centred orthodoxies about the reason for conflict are being challenging. It is now widely argued that contemporary conflicts among East African pastoralists are driven not only by the scarcity of pastoral resources (which was prominent in the past), but also by competition over new sources of revenue (e.g., government funds) and control of market centres and strategic places. Thus, he asserts that resource-centred solutions are unlikely to bring sustained peace in these areas.

In pastoralist communities in Ethiopia, major causes of conflict include competition for pasture and water, among other things (Ministry of Peace, 2019). Both intra and inter-clan conflicts occur in the lowlands during times when water and grazing resources are scarce. As the population is growing and disasters are become more frequent and intense, resources have become even scarcer and traditional coping mechanisms have been pushed to the breaking point, giving rise to conflict (Van den Akker, Berdel & Murele, 2015). For instance, in 2000, three major conflicts occurred between the main pastoral groups in Borena lowlands: Borena versus Garri, Merehan versus Digodi, and Digodi versus Borena. These conflicts,
in combination with severe drought, resulted in the death and displacement of hundreds of people (Dejene & Abdurahman, 2001).

In the Afar Regional State and its surroundings, differences in value systems exist between Afar pastoralists and others. But such differences were not primary sources of conflict in the past. Rather, past conflicts occurred for two basic reasons: encroachment on a living space (without agreement) and use of scarce resources (without consent). For instance, the wide-scale westward expansion of Issa Somalis in the past decades has led to recurrent bloodshed between the two ethnic groups, most notably in 2002 (Bekele, 2010). The invasion of the Afar boundary by Tigrigna speaking ethnic groups from the northwest is another example of territorial conflict. Tesfay and Tafere (2004) elaborated that in the period prior to the Italian occupation of the region, the Afar experienced a series of raids from Tigrayan highlanders, particularly from the Wajirat and Raya communities, which culminated in considerable loss of life and property on both sides. A report by the Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Peace found that the clan system can be “both a stabilizing and destabilizing force” (Ministry of Peace, 2019, p. 38). The report identifies that the clan system can be regarded as ‘conflict multiplier’, as its communal nature can draw the entire clan into a conflict. Tesfay and Tafere (2004) also added that socio-cultural factors, such as the quest for social honour and prestige, are important causes of conflict, although they concluded that economic ones were more compelling in the above case. The next sections look more closely at mobility and conflict in the study area to identify the sources of conflict and the mechanisms for managing and resolving conflict.

The case of Kalkalsa, Finto and Garriro

In the following sections we zoom in on the reality in the Afar region, with specific reference to three kebeles: Hidelu, Finto and Garriro. Hidelu is located within Awra district and in Hidelu, Kalkalsa villagers are found. The people of Garriro (Chifra District) live on the outskirts of Chifra town. The Kalkalsa and Finto (both in Awra District) live a
pastoral lifestyle, while the people in Garriro are agro-pastoralists. The aim of the study was to investigate how conflicts evolved and are managed within and between these groups. Before looking at conflict management in the study area, this section looks at resource ownership and use; social interactions; mobility patterns; and sources of conflict in the study area.

**Resource ownership and use**

The key resources of the Afar are livestock, land, water and pasture. The resource base declines from time to time due to drought. Key bases are seriously affected, despite efforts by the government and non-government organisations to rehabilitate the region. Due to this, conflict emerges between groups over resources.

As far as water is concerned, the pastoralists in Kalkalsa, Finto and Garriro mainly rely on rivers to water their animals. The people of Hiddelu (Kalkalsa) and Finto mostly use the Awra River for their camels, whereas the people of Garriro, who live on the fringe of Chifra town, use Mille River. Abdulatife and Ebro (2015) list the major sources of water for livestock in Chifra District (where the Garriro live) as permanent rivers, temporary rivers, ponds and traditional wells. They also report that the sources of water for animals and humans are the same, which means that the water may not be clean. In addition to such rivers, alternative man-made water reserves, which are mostly seasonal, are also used by the communities. These include, hand dug wells, shallow ponds and deep wells. In the communities, access to such reserves is open to all clan members. There are critical water shortages during the dry season.

In relation to land resources, the regional land law dictates that all forms of non-grazing land is under the direct control of the state, while grazing land can be used by various clans. Accordingly, each clan exclusively owns a patch of territory. The clan land and its borders are clearly known to clan members, as well as members of neighbouring clans. The tenure over clan land is communal and each clan member has the right to use the land and resources of its clan (Getachew, 2004).
Unlike in Hiddelu (Kalkalsa) and Finto, where the people are purely pastoralists, the people in Garriro are agro-pastoralists. As a result, arable land is a critical resource among Garriro residents. Arable land and irrigable land are distributed to locals to produce grain alongside cattle keeping, but rangeland is commonly owned.

Many rangeland pasture reserves are exhausted for several months of the year. For instance, the reserves in Finto are not sufficient to feed animals for more than three months a year. In this respect, Kalkalsa is in relatively better condition, but is still deteriorating. Due to this, pastoralists have moved into Yallo, Teru, Kelo and Gewane. Pasture reserves in Garriro also persist longer than in Finto. As an alternative to migration, the agro-pastoralists in Garriro supplement animal feeding with crop residue and purchased fodder. In an extensive study Abdulatife and Ebro (2015) concluded that pastoral-based livestock is still the major source of income, but that the communities perceive that rangelands have deteriorated in the last two decades. They conclude that there is a need to restore rangelands. Gina (2015) emphasises that participatory approaches involving the farmers are needed for such restoration to be successful and to ensure that efforts are based on cultural values and customs relevant to the communities and in line with their ability to maintain their rangelands.

**Social interaction**

The social interaction of pastoralist communities is generally kinship based. But beyond kinship ties, the various clans and lineage groups in the three selected kebeles also engage in a complex and dynamic process of cooperation, conflict resolution and consensus building, as well as confrontation. There are also institutions aimed at strengthen community cooperation, which provide zakat (charity/social support) and other informal forms of support. Zakat is a traditional form of social protection arranged within the community. According to the Pastoral Forum Ethiopia, the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction and the Development Fund (PFE, IIRR & DF, 2010), support in the form of zakat is provided to people who have lost animals due to epidemics or raids.
Given the mobile nature of communities in the study areas, contacts are created with other pastoralists or non-pastoralist communities. Communities interact with ethnic and tribal groups beyond their *kebeles*. For instance, pastoral communities in Garriro interact with neighbouring Amhara ethnic groups. They exchange livestock for certain food stuffs, including a local leaf used for leisure (*khat*) in the markets.

Most of the time, interactions among members of the same clan are built on the principles of trust, mutual cooperation and solidarity. Pankhurst and Piguet (2004) reported that historical relations between highlanders and lowlanders in the region have been characterised by periods of conflict as well as coexistence. Interrelations between highland agriculturalists and lowland pastoralists have involved some complementarity, notably in the exchange of livestock for grain, particularly in times of hardship.

Solidarity is expressed through collective resource and information sharing. It may also take the form of sharing punishments when one member of a clan is punished for the negative acts he commits towards non-members. According to Bekele (2010), any incoming compensation is also shared among clan members. Indeed, the principle of collective (as opposed to individual) guilt and responsibility for infractions against outsiders forms the basis for solidarity within Afar clans. However, there are occasional feuds and bloodshed among members of the same clan. Beyond this, inter-ethnic confrontations and conflict are also observed at the western border of the Afar region.

**Mobility patterns**

From Kalkalsa and Finto, pastoralists move northward to the districts of Yallo, Teru and Megale during periods of difficulty. In rare cases, they march as far south as Gewane. On the other hand, the communities of Garriro move westwards to Amhara region and eastwards to the districts of Asaita, Afambo and Detbahir.
The pastoralists move in groups belonging to the same clan or neighbourhood. The movement of pastoralist from Finto and Kalkalsa does not involve the entire family, except in rare cases. Usually adult men representing each household take the livestock together and stay away for a number of months. The elderly, women and children remain at home to look after the house and manage the domestic property.

The time to start moving for Kalkalsa and Finto pastoralists is December. The main drive behind this mobility is to seek pasture for animals. They stay in the destination for nearly half a year (December to May). However, some return in early April when there is a short shower of rain (sugum). The period from May to early June is the most difficult season for Afar pastoralists, not only because of the demand for pasture, but also because of the shortage of water, as it is a time when wells are dry. If sugum rain is delayed, the pasture deteriorates and animal fodder is endangered. This pushes communities to relocate to the aforementioned destinations.

Unlike the pastoralists in Kalkalsa and Finto, agro-pastoralists in Garriro use supplementary feed for their animals, but they are not relieved of mobility. The months immediately before the main rainy season (karma) are especially times of forced mobility. So, a delay in karma rain is a push factor for movement in Garriro. The same is true for other areas. For example, a lack of rain in 2016 due to El Nino had a drastic effect on the study communities, resulting in a massive exodus and change of conventional migration routes. For instance, the pastoralists in Finto do not regularly use the Gewane route, except in extreme circumstances. The shores of the Awash River hold pasture reserves. However, the security problems in Awash valley (which is a hub for Afar and non-Afar groups alike, including the Issa Somali clan) greatly limits mobility in this area. As a result, the people of Garriro avoid taking the route down to Zone 3.

People are mobile in cases where there is temporal and spatial variability in the distribution of resources. When the resources in a certain area are drained, communities drift into other areas and return
when the original place has recovered in terms of pasture. Unlike forced dislocation, pastoralist mobility is arranged following certain procedures and is not random, as an outsider may think. Mobility in the context of Finto and Kalkalsa pastoralists and Garriro agro-pastoralists is a planned operation. They exploit kinship networks and religious-political connections to arrange their mobility routes. For instance, prominent sheikhs (Islamic religious scholars, acting as community representatives) in neighbouring Habru District are often consulted by the Garriro agro-pastoralists before moving into the area.

The time and direction of mobility, as well as the duration of stay, is determined by the availability of water and pasture. In periods of *karma* (the long rainy season), people in all sites remain in their place of residence, because animal fodder and water are accessible. Conversely, during the dry seasons they move to other areas and stay for a long time until times of abundance. The movement of Afar, Somali and South Omo pastoralists is dictated by the seasonal flooding of the Awash, Wabi-Shabelle, Ganalle and Omo rivers, which threatens lives and livelihoods (PFE, IIRR & DF, 2010). The customary, culturally-embedded practices in place within and between the communities are critical for the management of mobility. As the Afar people have a tradition of arranging their movement before moving from one area to another, conflict happens only when such arrangements fail to materialise as planned.

**Sources of conflict**

Inter-group conflict arises between Afar lowlanders and pockets of neighbouring Amhara communities in the highlands due to cattle raiding and the use of water and land. The most common cause of conflict is rivalry over the use of resources. The major resources are range land and water, whose availability is insufficient. Awra and Mille rivers are of vital significance in the region and beyond. They are used for watering animals and irrigation activities. Access to land and water are a source of conflict in Garriro.
Conventional mobility increased during the El Nino-related drought in 2016, which prompted the massive movement of pastoralists. Mobility is a triggering factor for social conflict. During the dry season, communities move in different directions and over different distances, as far as Habru, Worebabu, Teru, Yallo, Asayta and Gewane. In the process they can come into conflict with other clans, especially when they enter a deso (enclosure).

According to the research, cattle raiding caused conflict between clans from Hiddelu and Finto kebeles at the end of 2015. At that time, pastoralists from Hiddelu took one camel from their counterparts in Finto. In response, members of Finto took two camels belonging to Hiddelu pastoralists. The conflict escalated until it became out of the control of the clan leaders, pointing to the important role such leaders can play in conflict resolution based on values shared and accepted within the communities.

In addition, a conflict over access to water broke out between the kebeles of Chifra District and the Sodoma area of Habru District (the Sodoma are ethnic Amhara and largely Muslim). Chifra belongs to the Afar, whereas Habru District belongs to the Amhara. The cause of this conflict was the water sources of Zemzem and Akela in Sodoma, over which the Afar agro-pastoralists are denied access by the host community. The Afar pastoralists claim that the water source of Akela is meant for both them and the Amharas, as the area is located near the border. But the Sodoma herders do not accept this claim and want exclusive control of this water.

Another case of conflict was reported in the vicinity of Garriro between the Afars and Gafera herdsmen. Gafera is in Habru District in North Wollo Zone, where there is a water source developed by government. This water source has different names for each group. The Afars call it Afar Ela, which indicates their affiliation to this water source. But the Gafera assume they have sole possession. This ownership disagreement creates continuous conflict.
Perceived scarcity of land can also cause conflict, and may be the result of multiple factors such as land degradation and demographic, economic and political factors, causing population pressure and inequitable distribution of land. In Awra District (where Kalkalsa and Finto are found), village-level kebeles are marred by internal conflict over the boundary of arable land. Sometimes this conflict spills over to neighbouring kebeles, because of kinship links.

Unlike water-based conflict, land-based conflict on the borders of Afar and Amhara at Chifra has a long history. A place called Shulgora is a disputed territory among the two. Reportedly, conflict occurred in July 2016 and continued up to November 2016 when it was time to harvest crops. According to information received, the conflict took the lives of 6 and wounded 14 Afar people. It also claimed the lives and wounded an unknown number of Sodoma Amhara.

Pasture is also a cause of conflict especially when there is drought. Most of the time, conflict associated with the movement of pastoralists occurs when there is a deso (enclosure) or where hatred has existed between the Afar and the people in the place of destination for a long time. The pastoralists in Finto face conflict during their movement into other areas. The agro-pastoralists of Garriro also move to neighbouring Amhara territory in times of drought with or without the consent of the host community. When there is open consent, the parties usually agree to trade animal fodder (hay and other types of dry grass) among themselves. On such occasions, reciprocal arrangements are created. There is a sense of trust and confidence among the Afar pastoralists in Chifra and Amhara herders from Worebabu District. This situation has enabled the Afar agro-pastoralists to cross the boundaries with neighbouring people even without open consent from the host. However, the research also found that the Gafera now prohibit the Afar from sharing pasture. This is a potential new source of conflict. When the situation becomes tense, it can become life-threatening resulting in mutual attacks in the areas, cattle raiding and slaughter.
Last, but not least, there are *kebeles* from Awra District, which are bordered by North Wollo in Amhara Region, which is known for sporadic conflict. The conflict includes Deraytu, Hidda and Ali-marih-masgid. Transgression of the boundary during drought is the cause of the conflict in these areas. This conflict has great potential to spill over into other *kebeles* if not successfully resolved.

The frequency and intensity of conflict has increased in recent times due to the recurrent droughts facing the Afar people. The pattern of using land, water, and other natural resources among the neighbouring agro-pastoral communities follows a different form than that used by the Afar. Thus, conflicts emerge when the two groups collide over use of the same resources.

**Conflict management in Afar Regional State**

Conflict management involves mechanisms designed to ensure monitoring and evaluation of the conflict, and the behaviour and compliance of parties to the conflict, with resolutions on ending violence, demobilisation and disarmament, or making concessions and remedies, vital in easing tensions (Akpuru-Aja, 2007). The process assumes that there is some convergence of cultural values. If there is no convergence, the level of cultural entropy becomes too high and conflict management breaks down, making conflict inevitable. The process of conflict management includes techniques such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration. The procedures vary in each case, but all of them rely on social processes, as people need to get along with one another and subscribe to the cultural values involved in the process. This section looks at the mechanisms and institutions for conflict management in the Afar region, in general, and the study areas, in particular.

**Customary, Sharia and formal law**

A report on the Pastoralist Community Development Program (Ministry of Peace, 2019) revealed that pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities use various mechanisms to resolve conflict. As well as traditional/customary mechanisms, in which community leaders, clan leaders and prominent community members administer, manage, and
mediate conflicts between different groups and individuals, the Afar also use modern institutions, such as local courts, as well as religious institutions, such as Sharia courts. The three systems for conflict management in the study sites – customary institutions, formal courts of law and administrative agents, and Sharia courts – are both supplementary and complementary, as envisioned in Article 78 (5) of the Ethiopian Constitution. This article gives regional state councils the power to establish or give official recognition to religious and customary courts to adjudicate disputes (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995). In accordance with this provision, the Afar religious courts have branches in different parts of the region and Afar customary institutions are functional in every district of the region.

The actors involved and the techniques used to manage or resolve conflict vary in each case, although they sometimes overlap. When law courts and administrative agents are used, the actors are professional jurists who make up tribunals or other legal bodies to hear cases and provide judgements. Kebele administrators, district or regional leaders, social workers, members of the police force, peace committees, and the military are responsible for applying and executing the court rulings. In the case of customary institutions, the actors are clan leaders (kidu aba), tribal councils (makabons) and executives (fie’ma aba) and elders. In the Sharia courts, the actors are religious judges (qadi).

In the Afar region and districts, the administrative political elites have excessive power to act, but the normative tradition at the societal level restricts them from applying their decisive power, except in some politicised conflicts. In addition, actors in customary institutions have a wide mandate. The kidu aba, makabons, and elders have the mandate to use customary law (mada’a) to negotiate, decide cases and punish offenders, as well as recommend the timing of formal interventions. The formal administrative agents prefer to play a supportive role to customary establishments and Sharia courts, rather than a lead role. Conflicts among close friends or neighbours, especially over property inheritance, marriage, divorce and family, are within the jurisdiction
of Sharia courts. Customary institutions have persisted over generations and are fundamental for maintaining peace and resolving conflict. They mostly deal with intra-clan or intra-group conflicts. They usually address conflicts over such issues as natural resource use, communal property sharing, cattle raiding, revenge killing and *absuma*\textsuperscript{27} marriage. Furthermore, political conflicts of an inter-ethnic or inter-group nature fall within the jurisdiction of the formal legal and administrative agents. The process of conflict management through customary channels follows negotiation, mediation and arbitration techniques. This strengthens a value-based order, rather than an order imposed from above, which might be more dysfunction due to its distance from the people on the ground, which can lead to a high level of cultural entropy. As a result of this distance, and the related cultural entropy, the political structures may have more difficulty in imposing their policies on the ground.

In relation to traditional conflict resolution, there are three forms of assemblies used to manage conflict in the Afar region: *malbo*, *detto* and *billa-ara* (Getachew, 2004). *Malbo* is devoted to mitigating local conflict cases and *gereb*, a jointly established institution, is responsible for alleviating inter-ethnic disputes. In both *malbo* and *gereb* assemblies, a group of prominent elders are involved in a chain of negotiations and arbitration processes to resolve conflicts in an orderly and transparent manner (Tafere, 2006). The third traditional mechanism is *billa-ara*, which is defined by Getachew (2004) as a process of peace making between two different Afar clans in which members of the traditional jury who are elders selected from different clans, other than the clans involved in the conflict, engage in mediation. This process works because of the respect afforded to elders in the community.

In addition, in some place, such as Argoba Special Woreda (district), the government has established peace and security committees

\textsuperscript{27} *Absuma* marriage is a customary arranged marriage practice of the Afar people. It is a cross-cousin marriage in which a close male relation claims the right to marry a girl by virtue of his blood ties to her. The girl is traditionally not expected to turn down a marriage request from a close male relative.
including elders, clan leaders, religious leaders, and the district administrator. This committee handles cases that are beyond the ability of local elders to manage. For these systems to work, it is necessary for the members of the communities to share a minimum number of common values concerning the relevance of such mechanisms. Peace committees have also been established to manage conflict between the Afar and Amhara, but there are no joint customary institutions like *gereb*.

**Conflict management in the study areas**
The balance between the three systems (customary institutions, Sharia courts and formal law courts/administration) is recognised by those involved and, hence, the actors cooperate and generally attempt to contribute to social processes aiming to alleviate conflict without relinquishing the authority vested in them. For instance, the land-based conflict in Garriro in 2016 required religious blessings, cultural feasts, negotiation and formal court decisions. After several weeks of bloodshed, initial efforts were made by the peace committee in the conflicting areas to communicate the recent developments regarding the conflict. This committee is assigned and assisted by the administration agents in the *kebele*. The peace committee in Garriro initiated a peace dialogue, in which community representatives (elders) from both sides met face to face. Accordingly, elders of the Afar went to Sodoma, where they met the sheiks and elders of Sodoma Amhara in order to avoid conflict. In the long process of dialogue, the joint parties reviewed the details of what had happened on each side during the conflict, including the acts of instigators, violations of previous pacts, and the damage suffered. After dealing with all of this, the two sides arrived at a consensus that one of the Afar groups would pay compensation to the Sodoma Amhara, who lost hundreds of cattle during the raids. Conversely, the Sodoma agreed to avoid any retaliatory action in the future. In the meantime, the political administrative body of Garriro *kebele* decided to pay the compensation on behalf of the clan (involved in perpetration) by selling the wheat flour that was supposed to be distributed to them in the form of aid. In this way the fractured relations were mended, at least for the time being.
In order to create community buy-in, the two negotiating teams held a joint community-level briefing and issued orders for their respective community members to respect the pact. This was done at a feast prepared by the two communities. In the case of the Afar, a body called the fie’ma aba ensures that the agreed pact is maintained in its domain. It is responsible for preventing young members from violating the pact by regularly patrolling the area. It is vested with the power to punish individuals who deviate from community norms and agreements. In this sense, it is a regulatory body, with enforcement powers, while at the same time calming and redirecting members towards the normative framework enabling peace.

Despite these efforts, there are the occasional raids between conflicting parties and the truce between the Afar and the Sodoma Amhara has been violated, leading to direct conflict and loss of life. Such a situation may escalate beyond the control of clan leaders and elders. As a restraining move, government authorities may become involved and enforce peace through the military, which can then ban disputed areas to both conflicting groups. However, the involvement of the military remains restricted and when the military leave the potential for conflict remains. Before the Ethio-Eritrean war, the military were camped in the Afar region, near the conflicting zone. Later on, conflict between the Afar and the Sodoma arose when the military evacuated the area. After that there is another occasion of military intervention but not lasting. Ironically, the current military force camped at Jara is facing suspicion from both communities to the conflict, who complain that the military is taking sides.

As well as this specific example, there appear to be some differences as to when the government authorities should act. Some prefer the government to intervene, even if clan leaders do not necessarily invite such intervention. They urge government authorities to act to successfully control conflicts. While some may admire the military interventions in the past for the way they have handled situations when conflict has escalated, others hold the view that the government should intervene only at the invitation of clan leaders.
Whatever intervention takes place, conflicts may be diffused, but may not be completely resolved. Regular attempts at making concessions or cooling down tensions are made by representatives of the conflicting parties, particularly elders. The common trend in conflicts is to control the so-called mishig (fortification). The mishig is a natural terrain used in the disputed territory by the Sodoma Amhara to defend themselves from incoming Afar agro-pastoralists. Previously, the Afar were able to control this fortification when the Sodoma were not alert. This made it difficult for Sodoma farmers nearby to harvest their crops. As a result, the Sodoma mobilised their members and deployed a portion of the community to stand guard, while others harvested the crop. Meanwhile, the Afar agro-pastoralists left the area. When the Afar leave, the Sodoma will not move beyond the fortification deeper into Afar territory, because their sheikhs have firmly warned them not to do. Despite these confrontations and the loss of life and property suffered, the communities have the habit of temporary consensus building and agreement through their tribal representatives.

Such cooperation is also available in the resolution of conflicts that occur among people of the same clan and the mostly small disputes are quickly resolved. The main actors include elders, clan leaders and fie‘ma aba. Inter-ethnic conflicts are also sometimes dealt with by indigenous institutions. But, when the traditional leaders fail to successfully control the conflict, formal administrative agents intervene. An example is a case of camel raiding in a dispute between clans in Finto and Hiddelu. To handle the case, the district administration became involved after earlier arrangements through clan leaders did not succeed. Its way of involvement, however, was not a legal proceeding. Instead, it conducted mediation by which an agreement was reached to give the Finto 5 goats, 1 camel and Ethiopian Birr (ETB) as compensation. In addition to the aforementioned techniques of negotiation and mediation, arbitration is also used. For instance, it is applied in malbo assemblies (council of clan leaders). A good example of this is one that happened between
two Afar clans in Chifra: one from Garriro and the other named Doda from nearby Ta’eboyarea.

When people of different clans enter into conflict, the *makabons* (neutral decision makers drawn from a clan or clans not taking part in the conflict) are often called upon to meet the leaders of the conflicting clans. In the meeting, cultural and religious rituals are performed including the slaughtering animals. Perpetrators are interrogated and their confessions accepted in front of the *makabons*. An oath is taken by injured clan members not to retaliate against the perpetrators until the investigation is finished and decisions made. Once decisions are made after investigation of the matter, punishments are imposed and compensation rendered, together with feasts and rituals. Compensation is given in kind (by giving animals) or in cash, as per Afar customary law. According to informants, the customary law specifies the compensation for human life as 100 camels (Alifnur, 2019).

Customary mechanisms are preferred by the indigenous people in the area. They have relative advantages in terms of responding to crises quickly and reducing the resources used for court cases, thereby saving scarce public funds. In addition, they are seen as more accessible, affordable and fair (Abebe, 2001). They are also advantageous in that they do not seek mere restitution and the upholding of injustice. They simultaneously strive to avert ruptures in social relations and create conditions conducive to peace in the future (Tesfay & Tafere, 2004). To take advantage of both methods, government institutions are engaging with indigenous systems. This institutional support from modern legal set-ups, along with the internal integrity of the indigenous institutions themselves, has contributed to the effectiveness and continued strength of the latter (Tafere, 2006). Proactive engagement by the government is also desirable, such as the activation of a joint peace committee, demarcation of the territory through judicial processes or the initiation of a development project on a disputed area that will benefit both parties, as well as managing day-to-day security by dispatching the police or military.
Conclusion

This chapter asked: *What are the main sources of conflict among Afar pastoralists and how are these conflicts managed and resolved?* For the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in the Afar Regional State, mobility is a strategy for efficient resource utilisation, optimising livelihoods, coping with drought conditions, and optimising herd safety and there are customary procedures in place for mobility. Tafere argues that “The most important internal factor is that the indigenous institutions acquire their status of authority and power from Afar normative frameworks” (Tafere, 2004, p. 37). This study concurs with the view that mobility is a social process and, therefore, sometimes associated with conflict. Social procedures are followed among the Afar people to engage with the different parties to prevent conflict. However, sometimes mobility causes conflict, and conflict can cause mobility.

The direction and distance covered during mobility varies and the duration of stay depends on the availability of water and pasture. This study found that the main source of conflict among Afar pastoralists is rivalry over resource use. It also found that cultural entropy leads to conflict as values clash with challenges. These challenges emerge due to environmental pressure and climate change, scarce resources such as land and water, competing claims over these resources, and increasing population pressure and the pressure of different lifestyles trying to operate in the same environment. While cultural entropy exists between groups (Amhara peasants and Afar pastoralists), it was not found to be a main source of conflict in the region.

If conflict does arise, there are social structures in place to manage and resolve conflict in the Afar region. In order to mitigate conflict, social groups are structured to perform traditional and tested procedures to involve parties and to create possibilities for negotiation and conflict resolution. There are three systems or institutions that work together to manage and resolve conflict in the Afar region: customary institutions, the Sharia courts, and legal courts. Sharia courts and judicial process are formal arrangements, while the customary ones are informal. The parties involved in each
case are different, or they may come together at some point, depending on the complexity of conflict. Informal channels based on customary institutions are seen as most effective by the Afar people. They are timely in responding to crises, require less resources than formal court cases, and seen as more affordable and fair. They follow negotiation, mediation and arbitration techniques and are easily accessible by the people. For all these reasons, they enjoy buy-in and consensus from the local people.

While cultural entropy was not necessarily found to be a major factor causing conflict, it certainly played a part in managing conflict: where value systems were aligned between customary, religious and formal systems, or at least complemented and supported by each other, conflict was more likely to be managed or resolved. The involvement of leaders in customary forms of conflict management strengthens common values among communities. This strengthens convergence (decreases cultural entropy) and buy-in and, therefore, helps prevent full-blown conflict. When conflict breaks out despite these efforts and can no longer be contained, government institutions need to come in to restore calm, but formal institutions still rely on local efforts to create a renewed basis for social cohesion in the areas. The study shows that although cultural entropy can be high between conflicting groups (e.g., the Afar lowlanders and Amhara highlands), customary forms of conflict management tend to find convergence between value systems and are, therefore, more likely to lead to a solution. When cultural entropy is too high for customary systems to manage, the local sharia courts, formal courts and government administration (including police and federal military) can be useful in imposing a situation when conflict escalates out of hand, but only when there is buy-in and support from the customary actors. While such imposition may be needed at times to avoid conflict, it cannot deliver sustainable peace and is not cost effective. Therefore, the evidence of this research points to the importance of traditional mechanisms of leadership and problem-solving at the local level in maintaining peace within and between communities in the Afar.
References


Part III. New Perspectives in Migration
Chapter 6

Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Are Climate Disasters Fuelling Human Trafficking in Kenya?

Radoslaw Malinowski & Mario Schulze

Introduction

The term ‘climate disaster’ is used to describe events that, through their intensity, adversely affect vulnerable populations and their surroundings. In Kenya, the most common type of climate disaster is drought (Mata-Lima, Alvino-Borba, Pinheiro, Mata-Lima & Almeida, 2013). Over the years, Kenya has experienced a number of severe droughts that have impacted on the agricultural sector, which relies heavily on rainfall to sustain production. It is important to note that only 20% of the country is covered by rainfall in regular intervals, while 80% is made up of arid and semi-arid lands (Mbogo, Inganga & Maina, 2014). Consequently, in the absence of rainfall, there is often no viable alternative to continue agricultural production, the effects of which are usually felt immediately.

Kenya is experiencing increased droughts, which are impacting on food security and vulnerability. This study investigates whether people affected by drought in Kenya are at higher risk of being trafficked. The study finds that drought-affected populations are more vulnerable to human trafficking, especially when combined with conflict and in locations where alternative sources of income are not available. The association between climate change and human trafficking is worrying. The findings confirm the need to strengthen resilience as a key element in policies to counter human trafficking.

There is an urgent need to address the underlying causes of vulnerability, including climate change, as a relevant and important element in the fight against human trafficking.
Food security in Kenya deteriorated significantly during the drought in 2017. In July of that year, 2.6 million people (19% of the population) were classified as ‘in crisis’ and ‘emergency’ (Phase 3 and 4 in the Integrated Phase Classification), requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. This number increased to an estimated 3.4 million (25% of the population) from August to October 2017, as the drought persisted. Most of the acutely food-insecure population live in the pastoral counties of Turkana, Marsabit, West Pokot, Baringo, Wajir, Mandera, Tana River and Garissa, as well as parts of the coastal, marginal agricultural areas of Kilifi and Lamu (see Figure 6.1). The number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance (Phase 3 or above in Integrated Phase Classification) doubled between late 2016 and mid-2017, and increased again by almost a million between August and October 2017 (Food Security Information Network, 2018).

Drought is posing problems not only in Kenya, but on a global scale. Since the beginning of the 21st Century, episodes of drought have intensified worldwide and are predicted to become two to three times worse in the coming years (Sheffield, Herrera-Estrada, Caylor & Wood, 2011). To give some examples, Australia was plagued by what has become known as the Millennium Drought, which lasted for approximately 15 years from 1995 to 2009. In addition, drought in north eastern Spain forced the large-scale import of water from France in 2008. Then, in 2017, roughly 5.6 million Ethiopians were in need of assistance due to drought caused by El-Niño between 2015 and 2016 (Reliefweb, 2019). Meanwhile, the intensity and impact of each of these droughts as well as the coping mechanisms adopted in response to them differ from one region to the next. This is because all regions of the world have different geographical, climatological and other characteristics, and because different nation states have distinct economic and logistical capacities to react to climate disasters (IMF, 2016).

One area of interest in relation to climate disasters is the impact of such events on societies and how affected communities react to these extreme, and often unforeseen, changes to their natural and social
environment. Of great concern is the fact that climate disasters can increase the vulnerability of affected people to human trafficking. In his book *Blood and Earth. Modern Slavery, Ecocide and the Secret to Saving the World* (2016), Kevin Bales notes:

> Well, we know environmental change is part of the engine of slavery. The sharp end of environmental change, whether slow as rising sea levels and desertification, or disastrously sudden like hurricane or tsunami, comes first to the poor. I’ve seen men, women and children, families and whole communities impoverished and broken by environmental change and natural disasters. Home and livelihoods lost, these people and communities are easily abused. Especially in countries where corruption is rife, slavers act with impunity after environmental devastation, luring and capturing the refugees, the destitute, and the dispossessed. (Bales, 2016, pp. 8–9)

According to Bale (2016), climate disasters disrupt the economic and social environments of those they affect, thereby increasing people’s vulnerability to crimes that exploit the volatility of their income and livelihoods. Presuming that this is correct, societies who depend on stable climate conditions would also be among those most at risk. As many African countries, including Kenya, rely heavily on agriculture and self-subsistence farming (Muller, Cramer, Hare & Lotze-Campen, 2011), they must then be seen as particularly vulnerable to practices like human trafficking.

This chapter looks at the relationship between climate disasters and human trafficking. It examines the ways in which climate disasters increase the vulnerability of affected populations to human trafficking. It also analyses cross-cutting issues such as conflict, attitude and preparedness in relation to vulnerability to trafficking during and after a climate disaster. Finally, based on the findings, the study attempts to develop a concept in relation to the interplay between climate disasters and human trafficking.

**Nexus between human trafficking and climate disaster**

In the last decade of the 20th Century, with the end of the Cold War era and beginning of globalisation, a sharp increase in trafficking cases
was recorded globally (Gallagher, 2010). Since then, human trafficking has become one of the most lucrative illicit businesses, generating an estimated USD 150 billion in illegal profit for traffickers annually (May, 2017). Since 2000, human trafficking has been defined internationally in the Palermo Protocol as:

…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. (UNODC, 2004, p. 42)

This chapter uses this definition. The components of this definition – the act, means, and purpose – serve as the basis for formulating the methodology and obtaining results. According to the Palermo Protocol, the three main variations of exploitation in human trafficking are:

- The exploitation of the victim’s manpower through forced labour, slavery or servitude
- The exploitation of the victim’s sexual properties
- The exploitation of the victim through the acquisition and sale of his or her organs

In practice, many cases of human trafficking may entail elements of the first two manifestations simultaneously.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), a number of factors can contribute to vulnerability to human trafficking. Among them are: being a child, gender, poverty, social and cultural exclusion, education, political instability, war or conflict, social, cultural and legal frameworks, mobility and demand for cheap labour (UNODC, 2008). Natural disasters are thought to increase the vulnerability of potential victims of trafficking in a number of ways: by forcing or compelling them to migrate, by causing the death of income earners and livestock, by causing the destruction
of property, as well as by deepening social and economic exclusion (e.g., access to education), among other things.

Even though human trafficking is addressed by several national, regional and international policies, a possible link with environmental disasters is not their main focus (IOM, 2015; c.f. IOM, 2016). In turn, interventions during and after an environmental disaster concentrate on humanitarian aspects, with little or no regard for possible incidents of human trafficking among the affected population (IOM, 2015). This could be because human trafficking is still largely conceptualised as an international crime perpetrated by organised criminal networks (such as gangs, mafias and terrorist groups). It is not surprising then that international human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation has become the focus of policymakers, given that its features are the most congruent with the convention.

Unfortunately, this means that local and regional human trafficking undertaken by opportunistic individuals, rather than organised criminal groups, is likely to fly under the radar. Outside the context of organised crime, human trafficking may be linked to cultural traditions, customs and rites. In Kenya, for example, these traditions include child marriage, which is practised by several ethnic communities. Environmental disasters such as drought typically have an impact on the income-generating activities of affected populations (IOM, 2015). In places where the local population ensures their livelihood through activities that rely on favourable weather patterns, and where alternatives are not available, the effects of drought are likely to be profound, leading to increased vulnerability to human trafficking. This is because the affected population could potentially be forced to engage in negative coping mechanisms such as child marriage, child labour or commercial sex work to ensure survival. While it is entirely possible that criminal organisations see a chance to exploit the vulnerability of the affected population and recruit them into exploitative situations, trafficking in this context is more likely to be perpetrated by opportunistic local offenders. This could also be attributed to the fact that the effects of environmental disasters are in most cases felt most strongly in remote areas without
any developed infrastructure, such as roads or communication networks. Such conditions may complicate the process of recruitment, thereby making it either costly or not logistically viable for organised trafficking groups to operate in environments affected by climate disaster, especially when demand can be satisfied elsewhere (Malinowski, 2016; Malinowski & Schulze, 2017).

Another reason why organised criminal groups might be less interested in trafficking populations affected by environmental disasters (such as drought, in the case of this study), is the short-term nature of vulnerability caused by these phenomena. In other words, environmental disasters such as drought make people vulnerable only for a period of time, and once the effects wear off, vulnerability is likely to diminish. A previous study by one of the authors (Malinowski, 2016) conducted among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kenya established that those who were displaced due to floods were not only less frequently targeted by traffickers, but also more resilient to trafficking offers. This was probably because they understood that the floods were going to cease or subside in the near future. International trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, however, often requires established structures and resources. As a result, organised criminal groups are unlikely to invest resources in order to traffic people who may only be vulnerable temporarily. It is more feasible to invest such resources in trafficking people who are vulnerable in the long term or permanently. This includes people living in slums, street children, unemployed urban youth, orphans, and single mothers. To further strengthen this point, a study conducted by IOM (2007) established that events that create time-bound vulnerability (though the case used, an international sports event, was unrelated to environmental disasters) do not guarantee profits to organised criminal networks. Accordingly, this discourages them from investing resources to exploit such vulnerability. However, when there is no need for previous investment because exploitation simply occurs as a result of cultural and other social dynamics, environmental disasters such as drought may create situations in which even temporary vulnerability increases the likelihood of victimisation.
Research question

The main objective of this research was to strengthen the existing anecdotal knowledge base on the nexus between human trafficking and environmental disasters with empirical data. Statistical data was collected to allow the researchers to gain an impression of the scale of the issue, rather than just its nature. The primary interest of the researchers lay in understanding the coping mechanisms of people affected by drought, with a view to providing insight as to why individuals may adopt measures that potentially expose them or others to human trafficking. As discussed in the introduction, societies that depend on certain climate conditions are thought to be highly vulnerable to crimes that exploit the volatility of their income and livelihoods. As many African countries, including Kenya, rely heavily on agriculture and self-subsistence farming (Muller et al., 2011), they must then be seen as particularly vulnerable to practices such as human trafficking. Based on this assumption, the research started with the hypothesis that drought is a catalyst for vulnerability to human trafficking. The main research question was: What is the nexus between climate disaster-related drought and human trafficking in Kenya?

The conceptual framework of this study took into account the influence of drought on individual behaviour. It assumed that drought-affected people are more likely to engage in activities that increase their vulnerability to human trafficking. Nevertheless, this study is guided by the argument that the relationship between drought and human trafficking is not straightforward, as explained in the introduction. Given the complex nature of the latter, drought might have three possible associations with human trafficking:

• Drought increases the vulnerability of the affected population to human trafficking
• Drought decreases the vulnerability of the affected population to human trafficking
• Drought is neutral (neither increases nor decreases) the vulnerability of the affected population to human trafficking
Research methodology

This research used a mixed method approach to data collection. In order to ensure the reliability and validity of the research instruments, they were subjected to revision based on previous research experience, consultations with research experts and a literature review. The research tools were then pre-tested and several variables adjusted with a view to increasing the reliability and validity of the quantitative instrument. For this purpose, a test group was invited from the drought-affected areas in Kenya to partake in a testing-session of the research instruments. This was done to ensure that the survey and interview questions were relevant and would ultimately provide the desired results.

Qualitative and quantitative tools

Both qualitative and quantitative tools were used for data collection. During the data collection, respondents were coached on human trafficking and how to position this phenomenon against other types of migration, especially human smuggling, forced displacement or economic migration. Qualitative data was gathered through semi-structured interviews with affected persons, drought relief organisations, and recruitment agencies.

Quantitative data was also collected from persons living in drought-affected areas using a survey, which was divided into three sections. Section 1 focused on information about the respondent and questions about migration patterns during drought. It also included questions on the quality of life before and after the drought to enable the estimation of whether the respondent was actually affected by drought or not. Respondents were asked to rate this quality of life during the drought on a scale of 1 to 10 (where 1 meant terrible, 2 – very poor, 3 – poor, 4 – poor, but manageable, 4 and 6 – moderate, 7 – good, but with room for improvement, 8 – good, 9 – very good, 10 – perfect). Responses were compared and calculated with those about ‘quality of life’ before the drought (using the same scale). Negative responses represented cases of those whose quality of life had improved (they scored higher for quality of life during the drought).
Those at 0 (quality of life at least remained the same as before the drought) were not considered in the analysis of the impact of drought on human trafficking. A score from 1 to 7 indicated that the drought affected their lives in a negative way, with 1 being moderate impact and 7 very significant impact of drought on the respondents. Table 6.1 indicates the distribution of responses on quality of life before and during drought.

Table 6.1. Distribution of responses on quality of life before and during the drought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses by sub-county</th>
<th>Ranking of quality of life before and during drought (number of respondents)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilifi County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaloleni</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilifi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandera County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandera East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samburu County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samburu Central</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samburu North</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 2 of the survey was concerned with the respondent’s drought experience. Interviewees were asked to rate 12 indicators of drought effects and scores were made accordingly. A low score indicated less effects, while a high score represented severe effects of drought on the respondent.
Section 3 dealt with the respondent’s human trafficking experiences. For the purposes of this study, the components of human trafficking were grouped into three main categories (act, means and purpose). For each category, elements of the definition of human trafficking were specified. Respondents were asked questions about each element of human trafficking and, from their responses, the research assistants identified the corresponding component. A score of 1 was assigned for ‘Yes’ (element was experienced) and a score of 0 for ‘No’ (element not experienced). If they scored at least one component from each column, they were assigned 1 point. Three points meant that the respondent or his or her child was a victim of human trafficking. Two points meant that the respondent was likely to have been in a situation in which human trafficking could have occurred. One or zero points meant that there was no exposure to human trafficking.

**Sampling**
As the 2016/2017 drought has been affecting East Africa and the Horn of Africa in a cyclical way, the three most affected counties in Kenya were purposively selected for this research: Samburu, Kilifi and Mandera. As can be seen, these are arid areas. The selection was based on data derived from the Kenya National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) Vegetation Condition Index (VCI). The drought observation time period ranged from December 2016 to May 2017. According to VCI standards, the three selected counties ranged between the categories of ‘Severe Vegetation Deficit’ and ‘Extreme Vegetation Deficit’ (National Drought Management Authority, 2017). In each county the data was collected in two sub-counties; one remote and one situated in the centre. By choosing one sub-county located in the centre and one in a remote location, the study attempted to capture the difference in the impact of drought on remote areas and county centres (as the county headquarters provide more opportunities, such as access to government institutions, businesses, and civil society initiatives).
The population was divided into two sub-samples: those severely affected and those mildly or not affected by drought. To distinguish the two, the study used the objective criterion of displacement. When drought forces people to migrate in order to mitigate negative impacts, the study assumed that the effects of the drought were severe, contrary to a scenario where no migration ensues (Burton, Kates & White, 1993; Perch-Nielsen, 2004; Raleigh, Jordan, & Salehyan, 2008). The total estimated population for the three counties was 2,359,438 (Kenya National Bureau Statistics, 2010).

Using the sampling formula proposed by Krejcie and Morgan (1970):

\[ s = \frac{\chi^2 N(1-P)}{d^2(N-1) + \chi^2 P(1-P)} \]

the minimum sample size was 384. To enable generalisation, the sample size obtained using the above formula was divided equally among the three counties (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2. Geographic distribution of all respondents and those affected by drought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mandera N (%)</th>
<th>Kilifi N (%)</th>
<th>Samburu N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All respondents</strong></td>
<td>142 (35.0%)</td>
<td>128 (31.5%)</td>
<td>136 (33.5%)</td>
<td>406 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>affected by drought</strong></td>
<td>141 (39.8%)</td>
<td>83 (23.4%)</td>
<td>130 (36.7%)</td>
<td>354 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research team also verified whether the interviewed persons indeed represented the desired target group. Section 1 of the survey contained questions related to the respondent’s quality of life before and after the onset of the 2016/2017 drought. It turned out that a proportion of respondents actually felt that their personal situation did not become worse during the drought, despite having stated that they were affected by the climatic conditions. While this appeared like a contradiction at first, it seems plausible that in certain situations the life of the affected persons could remain the same or improve, regardless of the hardships that could be expected in such a situation. Drought mitigation measures exerted by the affected person or civil society organisations, for instance, could mean that the respondent feels affected, but ultimately not worse off than before.

**Data analysis**

The descriptive and inferential statistical analyses were performed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Selected variables were cross-tabulated and a chi-square test of association was applied. Non-parametric tests were conducted for the data for respondents who were only affected by drought, as well as for those who had two or more human trafficking components. A simplified content analysis process was used to analyse the qualitative data.

**Ethical considerations**

This research was done within the confines of ‘do-no-harm’. Whenever there was a chance of harm occurring, the research team...
was instructed not to proceed. Consent was obtained from the participants before proceeding with the interview or survey. The participants were also informed that they could decide to stop the interview at any time. Underage children were not interviewed for this study for ethical reasons. Finally, the research assistants were required to provide identified victims with the contact information of a specialised organisation, counsellor or social worker, in case they needed care.

Results: All respondents

Correlation between quality of life and risk, optimism, support, age, vulnerability and human trafficking

In order to test the association between drought and vulnerability to human trafficking, several variables were correlated using Spearman's Rho correlation. The results indicate that the Spearman's Rho correlation between the quality of life before and during drought is only 0.401 (p<0.001, 2-tailed). This means that the quality of life before drought is a significant, but rather weak predictor (only 16% shared variance) of the quality of life during drought. All three indicators of quality of life (before and during drought, and the difference between before and during drought) were explored. Next, the relationship between the factor quality of life (before and during drought, and the difference between before and during drought) and other variables such as vulnerability and experiences with human trafficking should be looked at. Table 6.3 presents the Spearman’s Rho correlation.

Table 6.3. Spearman's Rho correlation between the indicators of quality of life and the other variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>QLB-QLD</th>
<th>QLD</th>
<th>QLB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.363***</td>
<td>0.439***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>0.215***</td>
<td>0.315***</td>
<td>0.537***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.289***</td>
<td>0.366***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.250***</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>0.146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>0.404***</td>
<td>-0.532***</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human trafficking</td>
<td>0.275***</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>0.176*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailed); *** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). The table presents only the significant correlations at p<.05.

Variables:
QLB = Quality of life before the drought
QLD = Quality of life during the drought
QLB-QLD = Difference between quality of life before and during the drought
Risk = Readiness to risk taking an opaque offer of job/education/marriage in an unknown place
Optimism = Rate of optimism that the current situation will improve
Support = Support received from others
Age = Age of the respondent
Vulnerability = Indicators of being affected by drought
Human trafficking = Human trafficking component

The highest value (0.537) in Table 6.3 relates to optimism and quality of life before the drought and depicts a relation between past experiences and expectations for the future. A lower, yet recognisable association was also identified between optimism and quality of life during the drought (0.315). Drought, which is a natural phenomenon, can be perceived as a temporary occurrence that eventually ends with the passage of time. A similar manifestation was noted when analysing the predisposition to migration (specifically to human trafficking) among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kenya. The IDPs who had been displaced by flood were less eager to migrate and take a risk than IDPs who had been displaced by other causes (such as inter-ethnic violence or post-election violence) (Malinowski, 2016).

Readiness to risk taking up an opaque offer of job/education/marriage in an unknown place correlates strongly with quality of life before the drought (0.439) and quality of life during the drought (0.363). The moderately strong, positive correlation with the taking of risk variable means that quality of life played a significant role in people taking risky offers (such as those that led to human trafficking) and could catalyse the respondents to take risky decisions.
The difference between life before and life during the drought variable scores a significant correlation with vulnerability (0.404), human trafficking (0.275), age (0.250) and optimism (0.215). The strong correlation with vulnerability to drought can be explained by drought having an impact on the difference between quality of life before and during the drought. As for human trafficking, the difference between quality of life before and during drought impacted on respondents’ experiences with human trafficking. This implies that the greater the difference between quality of life before and during the drought, the higher the chances of being trafficked. It is also important to note that the difference between life before and life during drought variable has a stronger association with human trafficking (0.275) than quality of life before drought (0.176) and quality of life during drought (-0.064). This means that it is not necessarily the quality of life before or during the drought that causes vulnerability to human trafficking, but the difference between them.

Next, the research team explored the relationship between the other variables to get an idea of the interplay between the variables that may affect human trafficking (see Table 6.4).

*Table 6.4. Association of the other variables with human trafficking experiences*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Optimism</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>0.264***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>0.370***</td>
<td>0.471***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>-0.184***</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.185**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human trafficking</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.211**</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.203**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Looking more closely at the interplay between optimism and human trafficking, it seems that the former can play an ambiguous role in preventing or exposing a potential victim to human trafficking. For instance, optimism can sometimes make the victim neglect warning signs that could be indicative of trafficking. Optimism, especially in the context of a natural disaster that is perceived by the affected population to be temporary, could, however, contribute towards the targeted person’s rejection of an offer made by a potential trafficker. This could be because of the expectation that economic conditions will improve in the near future and, hence, there is no need for a drastic change in lifestyle. In order to rule out that the association between the two variables is subject to the second scenario, and that optimism prevented respondents from a taking risky offer and ending up in a trafficking situation, there is a need to consider other correlations. The optimism and risk variables correlated at 0.264, which is a moderately positive correlation. This means that optimism increased the tendency to take the risk of the unknown, thus making the person vulnerable to trafficking. In this context, it means that optimism played a negative role in the connection with human trafficking, explaining why optimism scored a moderately positive correlation (0.211) with the human trafficking variable.

*The readiness to risk taking an opaque offer of job/education/marriage in an unknown place correlates strongly with support received from others (0.370). This indicates that the risk-taking variable increased with support received. In a trafficking scenario, support, just like optimism, can play an ambiguous role. While support from others can improve one’s*
life, it can also increase the likelihood of a person being trafficked. People who are trafficked internationally frequently receive support (both words of encouragement and financial) from family and friends. Often, victims would not be in a position to be drawn into a trafficking situation without the help of family. In some scenarios, help can even become a pressure that drives the person to take up a risky offer. Some forms of family support can also be detrimental, for instance, where the affected family is offered support in the form of accommodating their child, but instead that same child is subjected to child labour or some other type of exploitation.

**Correlation between human trafficking and vulnerability**

The correlation between human trafficking and vulnerability (0.203) is significant (p<.05). However, it is important to clarify that the association between the two is moderate at best, if not weak. A more significant correlation emerges when the values for this variable are grouped into two categories; with those who scored 0–6 (little or no effect of drought experienced or ‘not significantly affected’) in the first category and those who scored 7–9 (significant effects or ‘significantly affected’) in the second category. It transpired that the two groups exhibited significant differences in terms of their degree of association with vulnerability to human trafficking. The Mann-Whitney non-parametric test captures the differences between the two groups.

The level of human trafficking among those who were not seriously affected by drought differed significantly from those who were affected significantly by drought at p=.012\(^{28}\), U=7,160.500\(^{29}\) (N=220), Ws=13,601.500\(^{30}\), and SE=443.830\(^{31}\). Those who were not affected significantly (N=107) had a mean rank of 100.08, while those who were significantly affected by drought (N=113) had a mean rank of 120.37. It transpires that the biggest difference between the two groups can be found in the respective share of respondents who

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28 p = the attained level of significance  
29 U = the number of times observations in one sample preceded observations in the other sample in ranking  
30 Ws = the sum of the ranks of the first samples  
31 SE = standard error
scored 3 components for each column of the human trafficking table (victims of human trafficking). Those who were strongly affected by the drought had a significantly higher representation in this category than those who were less affected.

These results could be explained by the multifaceted nature of human trafficking, which could have resulted in some types of exploitation increasing due to drought, while others that lacked an association with this type of natural disaster registered no such change. This suggests a complex and contextual relationship between drought and human trafficking. It seems that in some situations, where the socio-cultural milieu is conducive, drought increases some streams of human trafficking, while in other circumstances drought has at best a neutral effect on human trafficking. Inferential statistics were conducted on the reduced sample to identify which aspects of this complex association was the most highly correlated with drought.

*Can climate disaster related drought reduce human trafficking?*

As odd as it sounds, drought could also have an inverse relationship with human trafficking; that is, the occurrence of drought could reduce vulnerability to human trafficking in some situations. However, this is only possible for some isolated streams of human trafficking and in specific socio-cultural and economic circumstances. Child marriage (which is included as a form of child trafficking in Kenya) is an example of such an inverse relationship.

For instance, participants from Kilifi and Samburu agreed that the economic hardship brought about by famine could make a higher number of parents open to the idea of marrying off their children at a young age, especially their daughters. Marriage was used as a means of gaining access to more livestock as part of the dowry, or at least to reduce the economic burden of the household. On the other hand, dowry can be an obstacle to child marriage as some individuals will be more inclined to retain their livestock during insecure times. In addition to this, respondents in Mandera claimed that they did not experience a high number of child marriages during the drought as the drought disrupted normal patterns of behaviour, including
cultural rites. Thus, early child marriage, being an important cultural rite, cannot be performed properly due to social (i.e., migration) and economic (i.e., poverty) challenges created by drought, and, hence, families are often forced to postpone child marriages till the drought is over.

**Results: Respondents affected by drought**

The data was then narrowed down to only those respondents affected by drought (317 in total). Respondents were asked to what extent drought had an impact on them on a scale of 0 to 9. Respondents who scored values from 0 to 3 (where 0 meant not affected by drought and 9 meant affected by drought\(^\text{32}\)) were removed. The remaining respondents who scored values between 4 and 9 were then subjected to further analysis about their experiences with human trafficking.

*Table 6.5. Distribution of respondents affected by drought in each county*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Mandera County</th>
<th>Kilifi County</th>
<th>Samburu County</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents (%)</td>
<td>118 (37.2%)</td>
<td>97 (30.6%)</td>
<td>102 (32.2%)</td>
<td>317 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following variables were subsequently tested on the reduced sample with the use of non-parametric tests: location, gender, migration, overt conflict, preparedness for drought, risk-oriented attitude and financial instability.

**Location**

The first additional variable to be analysed in conjunction with the reduced sample was the respondent’s county. Place of residence is

\(^{32}\) From 0 to 3 the effect of drought was low, from 4 to 6 the effect was moderate, and from 7 to 9 the effect was significant.
critical in evaluating the cultural dimensions of human trafficking in the context of drought, as respondents originating from the same counties are more likely to demonstrate a greater degree of cultural homogeneity because of their similar or same ethnical affiliation.

A Kruskal-Wallis test performed on those who were significantly affected by drought ($H (2)=68.526; P=.000; N=317$) showed that there is significant difference in the degree to which human trafficking was experienced across the three counties: the mean rank for Mandera county was 163.66, for Kilifi County was 103.74 and for Samburu county was 205.06. The fact that Kilifi scored the lowest while Samburu scored the highest reaffirms that the former was affected to a lesser extent by human trafficking while the latter was more affected.

In order to understand this further, the research team explored the socio-economic environment of each county and found that Kilifi provided several economic opportunities in agriculture, mining, and tourism, as well as in industries located in neighbouring Mombasa. People residing in Kilifi, thus, had a wide array of options for alternative sources of income. In contrast, Samburu and Mandera counties were predominantly reliant on pastoralism, with the majority of the population having little or no alternative to animal husbandry. Drought can have a greater detrimental effect on an undiversified economy that depends on stable climate conditions, which, in turn, makes more persons vulnerable.

Still, persons living in Kilifi were by no means spared from human trafficking. It was reported that many of them were recruited to work abroad in Gulf States such as Dubai, Saudi-Arabia and Qatar, with several of them ending up being trafficked. In comparison to other areas such as Samburu and Mandera, those trafficked abroad from Kilifi generally had a different profile. This could be because people who are trafficked abroad are often required to possess some form of education and skills (such as teachers, nurses, builders), which are not common among pastoralists and farmers.
For the target group of drought-affected persons, the main danger lies in their lack of access to formal labour market opportunities, which guarantee workers certain things, such as a minimum wage and regular work hours, among other benefits. Consequently, pastoralists and farmers are more likely to be found working in the informal sector. In tourism, for example, this would include occupations such as beach boy (a male who shows tourists around or links them up with drugs or sex workers), cleaning lady (especially in hotels) or vendor (a male or female who sells handcrafted goods). Low returns in this sort of work push many, including children, to supplement their income through prostitution (Tuesday, 2006).

**Gender**

Conventionally, human trafficking has been considered through the lenses of age and gender. Gender would, therefore, be expected to play an important role when it comes to human trafficking among drought-affected people. The Mann-Whitney non-parametric test was used to measure the prevalence of human trafficking among male (mean rank 148.31) and female (mean rank 166.12) respondents, and failed to find a significant difference (U=13709, p=.067, N=314) at p=.05. The effect of gender (r=.104, z=1.835)\(^{33}\) on vulnerability to human trafficking is small to medium. The Mann-Whitney test indicates that the human trafficking experience among the drought-affected population was not significantly different gender wise. Men and women were equally exposed to human trafficking during the drought. Although the two genders might have experienced specific types of exploitation at different frequencies, the overall vulnerability and exposure remained similar for both men and women.

**Migration**

Another factor that has the potential to influence the vulnerability of drought affected populations is migration, both cross border and internal. When the migration variable was tested with the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test on the reduced sample, the results indicated that those who did not migrate (mean rank 169.85) experienced more cases of human trafficking than those who did

\(^{33}\) r = effect size; z = z-score
migrate due to drought (148.12). The Mann-Whitney test indicates that there is a significance difference at p level <.05 between respondents who migrated due to drought (mean rank 148.12) and respondents who did not migrate due to drought (mean rank 169.85) in terms of probability of encountering human trafficking (U=14171, p=.026, N=316). The effect of the estimate (r=.125, z=2.230) is small to medium.

The biggest difference between the two groups can be found among those who scored 0 elements of human trafficking. Those who migrated had a higher number of 0 scores compared to those who did not migrate. Migration appears to have been a mitigation strategy adopted by respondents in response to the drought. Therefore, it can be concluded that migration during drought plays a positive role as a coping mechanism and does not increase human trafficking vulnerability among the affected population.

**Overt conflict**

Prolonged conflict is common in arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya. Displacement, destruction and closure of infrastructure such as schools and hospitals, as well as loss of life and property are some of the effects of overt conflict (for example, between different ethnic groups or along socio-economic lines). Previous research in Kenya (Malinowski, 2016) established a connection between exposure to overt conflict and vulnerability to human trafficking. Respondents affected by drought were grouped into two categories: those who claim to be affected by overt conflict and those who perceive themselves not to be affected by conflict, as shown in Table 6.6.

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34 ‘Subjective belief’ was the best indicator of being affected by overt conflict, as overt conflict does not affect every member of the local community equally. In Kenya, there are several areas where conflict between two ethnic groups persists, yet not all members of the affected community have the same level of impact on their lives.
Table 6.6. Conflict experienced by respondents affected by drought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict situation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>148 (46.7%)</td>
<td>169 (53.3%)</td>
<td>317 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the Mann-Whitney test was applied, it revealed that the prevalence of human trafficking significantly differs ($U=16849$, $p=.000$, $N=316$) among the respondent groups. Interviewees who were or had been in a situation of conflict scored considerably higher (mean rank 188.62) than respondents who had not experienced a conflict situation (mean rank 132.30). The effect of the conflict estimate is rated medium ($r=.325$, $z=5.772$).

The distribution of ranks together with the effects estimate allows the conclusion to be drawn that conflict plays an important role during drought in causing vulnerability to human trafficking. And, in fact, the interplay between conflict and location emerged as a major factor impacting on vulnerability to human trafficking.

![Figure 6.2. The influence of conflict and location, together with drought, on vulnerability to human trafficking](image)

**Preparedness for drought, risk-oriented attitude and financial instability**

The three variables, preparedness for drought, risk-oriented attitude and financial instability, did not increase the impact of drought on vulnerability to human trafficking as there was no difference across the categories for each variable. With respect to preparedness for

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35 Respondents were asked whether they have a contemporary direct experience of overt conflict (mainly over limited resources such as access to grazing areas or water points).
drought (p=.352), the two categories of drought-affected respondents experienced human trafficking in equal measure between those who had 0 elements and those who identified 1, 2 and 3 elements of human trafficking. The same applied to risk-oriented attitude (p=.630) and financial instability, which was conceptualised as having to take out a loan due to drought (p=.731).

Limitations

There were several limitations anticipated before the research and encountered during the research process. Firstly, this research focused on one drought during a specific period of time (2016–2017). A longitudinal research design that repeatedly compares data during drought and no-drought periods would be more suitable to assess the effect of climate disaster related drought and vulnerability on human trafficking.

Secondly, there was failure to anticipate in advance that a certain proportion of affected persons would be unavailable for the survey and interview. This concerns the group of affected persons who may have migrated to foreign countries or other places in Kenya. Locating these persons after their migration was difficult, not only from a logistical perspective, but also given the limited resources at hand.

The random selection of participants presented its own challenges. Even though the research team did not strive to gain a representative sample of the overall population in terms of age, the number of participants within the lowest age spectrum (20–29) turned out to be lower than in the higher age brackets. During the data validation it became clear how this composition came to be. Many of the younger persons in the communities were said to be engaging in income-generating activities or taking part in political rallies during the election period, which rendered them unavailable. In addition, it was argued that elders were seen as the most experienced members of their communities and, by extension, were more likely to represent their peers and families in most matters within and outside their communities
Conclusion and recommendations

This study investigated the nexus between climate disaster-related drought and human trafficking in Kenya. Using a quantitative design, we found that drought has an impact on human trafficking (Spearman’s Rho coefficient =0.203, p<.005) by making the drought-affected population vulnerable to human trafficking. The association is most significant in conjunction with the existence of conflict (U=16849, p<.001) and in certain locations (H [2] =68.526, p<.001). Among the three locations examined, two, Samburu and Mandera, experienced inter-ethnic conflict, and thus the people in those counties were more vulnerable to human trafficking than that in Kilifi. In the context of drought, gender seems to play a lesser role than in a scenario where there is no drought. The same applies to migration, which is a neutral factor in relation to vulnerability to human trafficking.

The study found that of the three possibilities – drought increases, decreases or neither increases nor decreases vulnerability to human trafficking – the first scenario seems to be the most supported by the evidence. That is, drought increases vulnerability to human trafficking in certain circumstances. However, in some circumstances, vulnerability remains neutral or even decreases. It appears that what determines whether drought increase, decreases or has a neutral effect on vulnerability to human trafficking is location (i.e., the socio-cultural context) and whether there is a situation of conflict in that location.

Based on these findings, certain recommendation can be made:

- In relation to the prioritisation of national, regional and international policies, there should be more focus on climate change migration streams, especially non-regularised migration (this also includes human trafficking). Further research is needed to support this by mapping out areas where populations are particularly vulnerable to different types of human trafficking due to climatic disasters.
• It would be helpful to include counter-trafficking measures in humanitarian assistance programmes for drought-affected communities. This should especially be done in areas affected by inter-ethnic conflict and where populations lack alternatives to the main type of economic activity (for example, animal husbandry).

• Finally, further research should be conducted on: the relationship between other types of climate disaster (besides drought) and human trafficking; the role of climate-related natural disasters on child marriage; the role of climate-related natural disasters on child labour; and the interplay between climate induced inter-ethnic conflict and human trafficking in drought prone areas, among other things.

References


Chapter 7

Standing in Two Worlds: Mobility and the Connectivity of Diaspora Communities

Antony Otieno Ong’ayo

Introduction

Global diaspora communities have changed rapidly over the past decades with expanding digital connectivity, although access remains varied in different parts of the world. As stated in Castells’ (1996) seminal work on The Rise of the Network Society, information and communication technology (ICT) has had a major impact on migration. International migration has generated what Vertovec calls “super-diversity”, which describes “new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants” (Vertovec, 2007, p. 1024), and is influenced by both global and local social processes. The result has been the emergence of diaspora communities in various destination countries, whose ties to their country of origin remain, despite the disconnection that migrants may feel from family and friends left behind.

Diaspora communities live in an online/offline world of between their places of origin in Europe and Africa – the ‘here’ and ‘there’. This chapter looks at this connectivity and how it affects their mobility and transnational engagement. It finds that the online platforms established by diasporas enable them to transfer money and skills (financial and social remittances), with significant socio-economic and political impact in both places. The chapter points to the reality of diaspora communities in the digital world, where they take part in life in different spaces. The cyber-presence of diasporas in more than one world drives mobility through connectivity and needs to be recognised in migration studies.
In the Netherlands, Ethiopians, Eritreans and Ghanaians make up some of the most visible diasporas of African background, whose immigration has been largely driven by conflict and regime-conditions (refugees), family union/reunion and formation (De Valk, Liefbroer, Esveldt & Henkens, 2004), and human trafficking (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017; Van Reisen, Gerrima, Kidane, Rijken & Van Stam, 2017; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015). Others have been motivated by study and the search for employment opportunities. As for groups from the Horn of Africa, such as Ethiopians and Eritreans, political conditions at home, especially in Eritrea, have provided sufficient grounds for applying for asylum in the Netherlands. In contrast, Ghanaian migrants are considered ‘economic migrants’, due to the relative economic and political stability in Ghana. Among all groups, the need to stay in touch is influenced by direct relations (next of kin), cultural ties, and efforts to maintain the identities that diasporas possess through their multiple layers of belonging (Madsen & Van Naerssen, 2003; Castles & Davidson, 2000). Links to the country of origin also influence collective organising, which diasporas use to mobilise for transnational activities (Ong’ayo, 2019).

Regardless of their migration status, members of the three African diaspora communities (Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian) often engage in community activities influenced by identity (national or ethnic), cultural practices, the need for safety nets and solidarity in the ‘new’ society. These activities are also influenced by attachment to the country of origin in terms of socio-economic and political developments, which influence their involvement from a distance (see Conversi, 2012). For instance, with some differences, members of the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands travel back and forth between the Netherlands and their countries of origin, where they implement various charity projects, visit family members or establish projects and enterprises in preparation for their return (Ong’ayo, 2016). This entails regular contact via telephone, email, Skype, video, social media and other forms of ICT and digital technology, characterising their simultaneous engagement ‘here and there’ (see Ong’ayo, 2019).
However, not all diasporas from these communities, especially Ethiopian and Eritreans, can return home or undertake transnational activities freely (see Ong’ayo, 2010). This is due to the nature of their relationship with the government in their country of origin (see Ong’ayo, 2014b; 2017), as well as immigration and integration conditions in the country of residence. Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diaspora communities face interrupted circular migration options, because of the migration regime in the Netherlands, which has become more restrictive in the last decade.

While technology presents opportunities that facilitate diaspora linkages with the country of origin, it can also have a disruptive effect on life and society (Van Oortmerssen, 2015), especially in relation to its influence on local populations in the region of origin, where people generally have limited access to the Internet and are sometimes faced with government censure. From a migration control perspective, technology is increasingly being used in the form of biometrics, thermal imaging and radar, while traffickers and smugglers also use some of these advanced technologies to track migrants and trade in refugees on migration routes (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). Diasporas also encounter ICT and digital technology-related control measures by governments in their countries of origin. This can be in the form of the surveillance of refugees and diaspora communities in host countries, while others use these tools to construct and impart identities of nationhood (see Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016). The use of ICT by states (particularly countries of origin) to control diaspora communities also applies to the politics of information, which can be linked to the control of cyberspace through regulation (Glen, 2017) or disruption and even shutdown. These conditions have effects on the connection of diaspora communities to their country of origin, but also on their interactions within the host country.

ICT also influences how diaspora communities reconstruct their identities, because of the influence of contextual conditions (structural and streams) in the host societies and in their countries of origin. The cultural, religious, and social networks that diasporas bring with them further influence the relationship between diaspora
communities and natives of the host country, other migrant communities, and with institutions in the host society.

**Research questions**

This chapter looks at the online/offline dimensions of migration in Africa. It seeks to answer the following research question: *What is the online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities, and how does this connectivity affect their mobility and transnational engagement between the country of residence and origin?*

To answer this question, the chapter looks at the following sub-questions:

- *What are the ‘here and there’ manifestations of the online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities in their transnational practices?*
- *What is the role of agency in how diaspora communities deal with multi-layered structural conditions through offline/online connectivity?*
- *What are the effects of interactions between communities with ICT and digital technology?*
- *What tensions are generated by the increased cyber-based connectivity of diaspora communities?*
- *What are the similarities and differences between the various diaspora communities in terms of how they interact with technology (online/offline connectivity) based on their immigration, integration and transnational engagement experiences?*

This chapter attempts to answer these questions using the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands as a case study. Understanding the online/offline dimensions of migration from Africa to Europe (and circular migration back to Africa) is essential from the perspective of diaspora engagement in the digital era and the social change that this generates in the countries of residence and origin. Within this context, ICT and digital technology serve as instruments through which members of diasporas create connected spaces and function within transnational spaces through their virtual presence – their embedded and disembodied presence (Van Stam,
Giving such social processes a ‘here and there’ perspective offers us an opportunity to explore the social capital that accrues through diaspora online/offline connectivity and its implications for the integration of diasporas and their transnational practices.

**Online/offline diaspora connectivity in a transnational context**

The conditions that influence the formation of diaspora communities are important for the analysis of their online/offline connectivity and the intersection between the ICTs and digital technologies they use to maintain connections from a distance. Linked to the various migratory patterns is the rapid expansion of connectivity, which has generated various opportunities for diasporas to maintain connections with family and friends in their countries of origin. Manifestations of these dynamics can be observed in the remittances (financial, social and material) that diasporas make to their countries of residence (Ong’ayo, 2019, 2016, 2014a, 2014b; Faist, 2008; Sørensen, 2007). ICTs and digital technologies have also increased the simultaneity of diaspora transnational practices and reduced the time and space needed for these practices. These technologies have influenced how groups construct or reconstruct their identities in relation to their country of origin and the host society (see Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016) in ways that profoundly shape relationships between physical space and cyberspace (Hiller & Franz, 2004). This is reflected in the use of the Internet, email, satellite television, mobile phones, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and social media (e.g., Facebook, Skype, WhatsApp, YouTube, LinkedIn and Twitter) for various purposes (social, cultural and political), within and across borders (see Warnier, 2007; Hiller & Franz, 2004).

Notwithstanding the policy debates and measures introduced for return migration (voluntary and involuntary return), there are many temporary and permanent migrants in destination countries. Stringent immigration policies can interrupt circular migration and push migrants into permanent settlement. Despite restrictions on mobility, many migrants have settled in destination countries, leading to the formation of diaspora communities. In the context of policy
discussions about how to deal with migration, some propose that members of diasporas be enabled to return to their countries of origin (and again to the host country) within the framework of circular migration (Vertovec, 2008b).

Conceptual framework

The transnational practices of diasporas are composed of cross-border connections that are characterised by continued, fluid and frequent contact between members of diaspora communities and people in their country of origin. Because diasporas lead “multi-sited transnational lives” (Collyer & King, 2016, p. 168), the simultaneous nature of their activities and the effects of these activities can be seen in both the country of residence and the country of origin, from a ‘here and there’ perspective (Ong’ayo, 2019). The social fields that diasporas build across geographic and political borders through their mobility between their country of residence and origin provide a basis for understanding how online/offline diaspora connectivity influences migration dynamics between Africa and Europe, and vice versa. This section looks at two concepts – ‘here and there’ and agency – that are essential to understand the connectivity of diaspora communities and how this connectivity affects their mobility and transnational engagement.

‘Here and there’

In this chapter, I deploy the theoretical concept of ‘here and there’ (Ong’ayo, 2019; Waldinger, 2008) to refer to the contexts in which diaspora communities emerge and interact with local social structures and the transnational practices that they engage in from an online/offline perspective. This perspective helps to understand the connections, attachments and loyalties that members of diasporas have with their country of residence and origin and how these connections and attachments impact on their movement and exchanges between the two contexts (see Ong’ayo, 2019). Thus, the notion of ‘here and there’ highlights the lifestyle and practices of members of diasporas, which entail “sustained ties of persons, networks and organisations across the borders of multiple nation-states” (Faist, 2000 p. 2). The diasporas build these social fields across
geographic and political borders through their mobility between their country of residence and country of origin; however, these social fields can be challenged by migration regimes that hinder mobility, especially from Africa. Consequently, these social conditions provide a relevant basis for investigating the implications of the online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities.

The notion of ‘here and there’ further contributes to our understanding of the ties that members of diasporas have with their country of residence and origin. For instance, frequent and dense contact with Ghana does not imply that Ghanaians who actively participate in these processes are less integrated into Dutch society. On the contrary, such collective undertakings are mainly possible for members of the diaspora who are well established in the Netherlands, but who still have enduring ties to those left behind (Vertovec, 2004). This view ties in with the noted link between integration and transnationalism (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013).

To explain how diaspora communities function within the framework of online/offline connectivity, it is important to look at the role of context. Framed within the notion of ‘here and there’ about the country of residence and the country of origin, context often denotes a more deterministic or static form of factors that influence diaspora community formation and transnational engagement. According to Exworthy, context refers to the “milieu within which interventions are mediated but also shapes and is shaped simultaneously by external stimuli like policy” (Exworthy, 2008, p. 319). However, in this chapter, I seek an alternative conceptualisation that sees context as a set of conditions that are fluid and can be characterised as streams (Kingdon, 2014). The analytical value of this conception is recognition of the fact that a more static conception of context does not capture dynamics and processes that are not time bound. Even though context informs the kind of political opportunity structures that influence some of the developments in diaspora communities, context never remains static due to interactions with the agency of diasporas. These social processes become more relevant when
looking at the intersection between migration and the rapid expansion of ICT and digital technology.

**Agency**

Behind diaspora transnational practices, and the social processes they generate, lies an agentic component that shapes, and is shaped by, the actions that members of diasporas take (see Ong’ayo, 2019). The term ‘agency’ is used here to refer to the individual ability to make choices and take decisions within a particular social structure and culture. Studies that focus on empowerment describe agency as “the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them” (Kabeer, 1999, p. 438). In diaspora studies, agency relates to “the meanings held, and practices conducted, by social actors” (Vertovec, 1997, p. 24). When applied to how diaspora communities function within a nation-state, agency has an analytical value in terms of the value that diasporas attach to activities between and within the country of residence and the country origin and the agendas that they have. Drawing on Vertovec’s view, agency can be used to characterise the ability of diasporas to construct and reconstruct narratives around identity and create negotiations about the various aspects of diasporic experiences (see Ong’ayo, 2019). Examples, include narratives about belonging as well as demands for space and recognition (Kleist, 2008), in response to the socioeconomic, political, institutional and policy contexts that diasporas encounter (see Ong’ayo, 2019).

The above description of agency is aligned with Giddens’ view that agency affects structure, as individuals are “the only moving objects in social relations” (Giddens, 1984, p. 181). In line with this understanding, Lacroix highlights several characteristics that enable agents to act, including:

…their transformative power (i.e. the capacity to act upon structures), their knowledgeability (the stock of knowledge they rely on to undertake action), their rationality (the capacity to assess their situation and establish priorities) and their reflexivity (i.e. the consciousness, as a social actor, of their transformative capacity and the capacity to monitor one another’s actions). (Lacroix, 2013, p. 13)
The agentic responsibility that exists in diaspora communities can also be linked to the organisations they have established in the country of residence to manage living conditions in the host country and facilitate their transnational engagement. This function has led to the recognition of diasporas as agents of change (Kleist, 2014). Paying attention to the agency of diasporas, therefore, aids understanding of the various initiatives that diasporas undertake in response to contextual conditions, such as the need to stay connected in the context of the immobility caused by migration regimes.

As noted in the various literature on migration (Vertovec, 2008a; Faist, 2000), the conditions under which diasporas engage transnationally is largely influenced by migration networks, linked to social ties, rapid developments in digital technology, and access to different types of ICTs. In relation to this, it is important to examine the intersections involved and tensions generated by migration and connectivity-linked social processes in terms of how diasporas function within an online/offline framework to maintain ties and remain connected. This is crucial for understanding how agency is exercised within diasporas, especially when mobility is curtailed by strict migration regimes and digital technology is used by states to control their diasporas, construct identities of nationhood, or redefine the identity of citizens abroad (see Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016). The embeddedness of migration dynamics and networks within specific, as well as dispersed (or deterritoralised), contexts (see Ong’ayo, 2019; Vertovec & Cohen, 1999) necessitate the in-depth examination of how ICT and digital technology influence diaspora connections and practices and the positionality of diasporas in relation to the different contexts to which they have an affinity. These concerns are the focus of the main research question in this chapter, as outlined earlier.

**Research method**

The research on which this chapter is based was carried out in three periods, 2009–2010, 2013–2014 and 2016, as part of different
research projects. The analysis is based on 60 in-depth interviews with respondents from the three diaspora communities studied: 14 from Ethiopia (all first-generation migrants), 30 from Eritrea (5 first generation, 24 new arrivals, and 1 second generation migrant) and 16 from Ghana (all first-generation migrants). The respondents were selected through purposive and snowball sampling, as access to some communities (Eritrean and Ethiopian) was only possible through introductions, owing to sensitivities around connections with the country of origin. A similar approach was adopted in the case of the Ghanaian community to overcome trust issues. All the interviews were conducted face-to-face, with follow-ups done by telephone and Skype. Interviews were recorded using a Dictaphone and handwritten notes. These were then transcribed and analysed using thematic coding to determine broad patterns.

The study took an ethnographic approach involving fieldwork within the three diaspora communities in the Netherlands and in the countries of origin (except Eritrea), to verify linkages and the nature of their transnational engagement. This entailed an exploratory and multi-sited case study research design and the use of mixed methods to maximise the strengths of the different data collection tools (Bryman, 2012). The ethnographic approach was useful in investigating the dynamics within the three communities studied, as it facilitated an in-depth examination and ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1983) of networks, social interconnectedness and relationships (Mawere, 2015). An ethnographic approach also pays attention to the historical and political context influencing online/offline diaspora connectivity as part of their transnational practices. An ethnographic approach allows for involvement with the respondents and their

36 The data used was derived from studies that were part of the DIASPEACE project ‘Diaspora for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potentials of Long-distance Diaspora Involvement in Conflict Settings. Case Studies from the Horn of Africa 2009–2010’; from fieldwork for the research project ‘Migration Corridors between the Netherlands and Horn of Africa (Ethiopia)’ (2013–2014); a PhD research project ‘Diaspora Organisations, Transnational Practices and Development: Ghanaians in the Netherlands’ (2011–2014); and a study on the Eritrean community in the Netherlands, their organisations and the influence of the Eritrean government (2016).
communities in ways that help to overcome norms and values that are expressed in (social) expectations and reactions (cognitive, emotional and behavioural). This was important considering the sensitivities that members of these diasporas (especially Ethiopians and Eritreans) attach to information related to their migration experience and transnational activities between the Netherlands and their countries of origin.

During the interviews, I asked the respondents how the use of ICT and digital technology influences their connectedness within the diaspora community and with the country of origin, both at the individual and collective levels. Questions also covered their experiences with dynamics within the two distinct structural contexts and what role their own agency plays in dealing with these conditions. Questions around agency also touched on how respondents interact with various technologies and the choice of these technologies. The interviews were conducted in private homes, and secure office spaces at refugee reception locations to ensure privacy, confidentiality and openness. Direct information was also collected through focus group discussions, which were held in places convenient for the groups. Interviews were mainly conducted in English, but where the respondents, especially refugees, could not speak English, a person fluent in Amharic and several Eritrean languages provided translations. These were later verified by a second person to minimise information lost during translation.

Besides the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, data collection also included direct observations during community cultural events in the municipalities of The Hague, Ede, Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Almere. These events provided opportunities to observe interactions and the kind of mobilisation taking place within these communities. This information was supplemented by a review of the relevant literature on the three communities in the Netherlands in terms of their online/offline connectivity and transnational practices.
Although the data used in this chapter is derived from different research projects and periods (2009–2016), these variations have proved useful for observing developments and changes in online/offline diaspora connectivity. This is important in verifying the use of ICT and digital technology in terms of new and old ties (Hiller & Franz, 2004) across the various categories of migrants (first generation, second generation and newcomers) within their migration networks and engagement with their countries of origin.

**Results of the study**

The aim of this study was to provide an understanding of the various dimensions of the online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities and how these dynamics intersect with their transnational practices in the context of mobility. The results are presented in this section structured according to the five-sub research questions.

*‘Here and there’ manifestations of online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities in their transnational practices*

The online connectivity of members of Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diaspora communities in the Netherlands plays an important role in their transnational practices, some of which transcend the barriers to circularity and create direct linkages with those left behind and networks elsewhere. ICT and digital technology inform the diaspora connectivity that lies behind collective organising in different spaces, as well as individual functioning within distinct, yet interconnected, contexts. The implications of this multiplicity of contexts and layers of belonging and being is captured in the following reaction to a question on the relevance of online/offline connectivity in the lives of members of diasporas:

*As a refugee, I live here and care somewhere else. I am exposed to dual forces, which are competing for my attention and action. Both socio-economic dynamics here in the host society and back home have a profound impact on my identity and thinking. Life in the diaspora is split between your country of residence and your country of origin. This condition demands constant contact and communication, which is only made*
possible through technology, since none of us can physical return home in the foreseeable future. (GT, interview, face-to-face, 14 September 2016)

In line with this, members of the three diaspora communities studied use a combination of ICTs and digital technologies, including regular telephones, recorded video tapes, mobile phones, and Internet-based communications such as email, Yahoo messenger, Skype calling and messaging, Viber calling and messaging, WhatsApp calling and messaging, Facetime, VoIP, and YouTube recordings. Digital technology has enhanced the interactions, networking and collective organising of diasporas with new innovations enabling instant communication and the sharing of information, which can be accessed repeatedly over time.

Members of Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas whose legal status is precarious rely on networks of co-ethnic and diaspora organisations (hometown associations, umbrella organisations and migrant development NGOs), which conduct activities in the various municipalities in the Netherlands, for social support (also see Ong’ayo, 2019, 2016). This has led to the establishment of both physical and online connections as a source of information for migrants who fail to access services provided by host country institutions.

Role of agency in how diasporas deal with multi-layered structural conditions through offline/online connectivity

Based on their agency, some diasporas with more capacity (high-level education or previous work experience) take initiatives that bring newcomers together using ICTs. They reach out to large numbers of newcomers (refugees and migrants) who are challenged by integration. A respondent who has been taking the lead in online/offline mobilisation had this to say:

Through simple efforts, upon finishing my Dutch language course, I have been organising newcomers in the Eindhoven area – organising groups of 30 people directly and online through a chat house of 700 people. […] The goal is to facilitate participation in sports (football and volley ball) and coordinate information meetings.
So now I am seeking to register the group as an organisation. (BG, interview, face-to-face, 18 October 2016)

Online/offline connectivity among the diaspora communities studied demonstrates the critical intersection between technology and agency, especially during emergencies. While members of diasporas may have limited resources, the connections that newcomers establish with ‘pioneers’ or early arrivals with experience on how Dutch public services function, their ability to reach out and take initiative, and the instant exchange of information facilitate quick resource mobilisation. An illustration is provided by the following emergency that needed urgent attention:

A young girl recently delivered a baby at the HMC Westeinde Hospital in The Hague and was discharged, but upon arrival at home she had [high] blood pressure. […] because of lack of confidence and the language barrier, she could not negotiate with service providers. The chairperson of the organisation took her to the house doctor and brought her back to the hospital by his own means. In such cases, the organisation intervenes where members are in bad health situations and asked to wait for a long time. (GG, interview, face-to-face, 11 October 2016)

Most of the information on integration issues is in Dutch, which poses problems for new refugees. Consequently, they rely on social media and other sources to access the relevant information from individuals within their networks who have mastered the Dutch language or who have had experience with the system and know their way around. As described by one leader of the Eritrean community in The Hague:

Our community is a kind of network for support to each other, especially the newcomers who need help with settlement, housing, and acquiring house materials. We also help with finding prayer places and public services. We give advice on the way of life here to individuals […] how to fit within Dutch society. The network that people establish here plays a major role […] and this is made possible through mobile phones and social media, combined with face-to-face meetings. (GG, interview, face-to-face, 21 October 2016)
The online/offline activities of the diasporas also focus on collective organising, particularly socio-cultural events targeting the respective communities, natives and other diaspora communities. The main technologies used for mobilisation include social media, email, telephone calls, Skype and Paltalk. Besides face-to-face communication during community meetings, members of the three diaspora communities also use community radio and television programmes to create awareness and stay informed about developments in their country of origin. Examples include Radio RECOGIN (run by the Representative Council of Ghanaian Organisations in the Netherlands), Ghanatta Radio, Radio Erena, Stichting Eritrea TV Amsterdam, Shekortet (an Eritrean government news website), Stichting Ethiopian Satellite Television and Radio (ESAT), and Oromia Media Network.

During the Irreecha festival (the Oromo Thanksgiving) in Gaasperplas, Amsterdam, one of the respondents involved in the coordination of the event emphasised the added value of ICTs as follows:

>You can see that the participation in this event is very diverse. People came from many parts of Europe, in buses and private cars. They are being hosted by others (friends and families) in the Netherlands. It is a huge logistical job involving mailing, calling directly with mobile phones, and the use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter to inform people of the activities and how to reach the locations, since the event takes place in two phases: One near the water in Diemen and a reception with an evening event in this big hall. (AG, interview, face-to-face, 14 September 2014)

The ties that members of diaspora communities have with their country of origin are also highly political, as many, especially those from Eritrea and Ethiopia, were driven to migrate by regime

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37 Radio Erena (http://erena.org/) is based in France and accessible across the globe via satellite, on the Internet, and calls to listen to the mobile phone service.

38 Shekortet (https://shekortet.com).

39 The Oromia Media Network is described on its Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/pg/OromiaMedia/community/?ref=page_internal) as an independent, nonpartisan and non-profit news enterprise whose mission is to produce original and citizen-driven reporting on Oromia, Ethiopia.
conditions and conflict during the Eritrea-Ethiopia war (the 30-year independence war till 1991 and the second war from May 1998 to June 2000). Likewise, the Ghanaians who came to the Netherlands in the late 1980s and early 1990s were driven by political conditions, instability and mass expulsion from Nigeria. Political connections to these migration experiences inform the relationship between members of the diaspora community and the government in the country of origin, as well as the nature of diaspora politics in the country of residence towards the country of origin. For political mobilisation, online/offline activities involve the use of websites and blogs targeting specific groups and audiences ‘here and there’, especially in the expression of political opinions and agitation. Home country governments and their supporters in the diaspora also use these technologies to counter diaspora activities.

Online/offline diaspora activities target countries of origin at different levels; they can be focused on the immediate family or community at the local level, or target political conditions at the national level. As one respondent noted:

*Every now and then your mood is affected by what happened or what is happening six or seven thousand miles away. On your Facebook page, you might see the picture of a wounded or dead family member, a relative or a friend. You see it just a few minutes after it happened. The problem does not end in knowing what happened somewhere else. You must involve yourself in what happened or what is happening. You may be asked to contribute something, to help make decisions, and to give guidance’s or leadership. This is an everyday challenge for refugees in the diaspora.* (GT, interview, face-to-face, 28 March 2011)

**Effects of interaction of diasporas with ICTs and digital technology**

Members of the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands make use of ICT and digital technology to stay connected and interact in a variety of ways, which include both embodied and disembodied presence (Van Stam, 2017). Digital technology facilitates telepresence, online interactions and access to disembodied information. The relational and emotional connections
and the need to share personal experiences inform the use of ICT and the choice of which type of technology serves the purpose best (cheap, instant, flexible and quality).

*Life in the diaspora is split between your country of residence and your country of origin. As someone who has lived in exile for the last 13 years, this is my daily reality. I lived in Nairobi Kenya and I have memories and connections from there. I have things to remember, I miss people I care about [...] people I know from that time. I have experiences that I share with them. I have stories to tell, agonies that linger in my mind. I am here now, but I am virtually everywhere else.* (GT, interview, face-to-face, 14 September 2016)

Although members of the diasporas from the three communities studied make use of their online connectivity differently in terms how they relate to the government in their country of origin, from an associational perspective the use of online connectivity includes lobbying and advocacy. Digital technology provides possibilities for visibility and anonymity at the same time. At the associational level, online visibility serves as a way of conveying a message to target audiences in the diaspora and at home. Individuals also use these spaces (personal and group websites, blogs and Facebook) to present a wide variety of information to different audiences. For instance, images of Oromo youth behind the recent revolution in Ethiopia broadcast live and images of ongoing events such as police brutality have been rapidly and widely shared online and through social media. Using their agency, these exchanges were done in a manner that successfully established a strong link between those in the diaspora and back home in what could be described as ICT-enabled politics (Miller, 2011). Despite the disruption of connectivity under emergency conditions (between 2014 and 2018), members of the Ethiopian diaspora were able to link up with activists on the ground using mobile phones and digital technologies that bypassed the

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40 Since 2014, several protests took place in the two main regions of Ethiopia, namely, Oromia and Amhara. In reaction, the government declared a state of emergency from October 2016 till August 2017 and again on 16 February 2018 (see Human Rights Watch, 2018).
government block. As narrated by one respondent among the early generation:

*Access to mobile technology enables many of us to stay connected and follow the political developments on the ground in our regions of origin. The smart phones that diasporas sent to next of kin and various connections enabled local activists to communicate locally and share images of police brutality with those in the diaspora and international community. This is how news on the ground reached international media and organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch among others.* (LA, interview, face-to-face, 10 May 2018)

The respondent identified a strong ‘here and there’ life, which involved a mental presence in his country of origin through digital communication.

**Tensions generated by the increased cyber-based connectivity of diaspora communities**

Contextual factors both ‘here and there’ are a major influence on the evolution of diaspora communities and how they function in terms of their multiple layers of belonging. Firstly, they affect diaspora communities because the activities of diasporas are context bound, while at the same time transcending single nation-state borders. This duality of context, belonging and positionality in terms how diasporas function creates tension between these two contexts in terms of the online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities. These tensions emanate from the context of nations serving as locations for the networks to which members of these diasporas belong in cyberspace (see Bernal, 2005).

Secondly, diaspora connectivity is a conduit of influences (identity, sense of belonging, loyalty and practices), which might escape state control or be controlled by states that attempt to control members of their diaspora in other states, for example, by surveillance, intimidation and other forms of control (DSP-Groep & Tilburg University, 2016), or by shaping the identities of diasporas (Van
Reisen & Gerrima, 2016), as in the case of Eritrea. For example, a recent newcomer noted:

*The regime uses social media to reach out to people who listen and watch Eritrean TV stations via satellite. This is because many newcomers like us can access this information online – YouTube and Facebook – where the Eritrean regime and its agents in the diaspora place propaganda videos.* (JA, interview, face-to-face, 21 October 2016)

Thirdly, members of Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas also seek to influence developments in their countries of origin through ICT-enabled politics (see Bernal, 2006). This includes information politics, digital disobedience and political activism, as demonstrated on various Eritrean Facebook sites. These discursive spaces (Internet and social media) have several dimensions and their use varies between the three communities in terms of how they engage in homeland politics in the country of residence. Mobilisation for political activities is linked to party politics in the country of origin and in the diaspora. This mainly applies to Ghanaians and Ethiopians. In the case of Ghanaians, many of the online discussions take place on websites, as well as on radio and television. For members of the Ghanaian diaspora, political activities include petitions to the government through the Ghanaian Embassy in the Netherlands or debating forums organised by the diaspora and visiting ministers and party leaders (see Ong’ayo, 2019). As for the Ethiopian diaspora, these mobilisations take on a confrontational dimension, as diasporas belonging to different ethnic groups and political parties take

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43 For example, Adom TV (Amsterdam), AFAPAC Radio, Ghana Today Media, Ghanatta (radio & TV), Godiya Radio, Radio Akasanoma, Radio RECOGIN, Radio Voice of Africa, Sankofa TV, Spirit FM and Soul Hour Radio (Amsterdam), Quayson K. Media Ministries, and Word FM (Den Haag).
radicalised stances on the political situation in Ethiopia. In the case of Eritreans, their political mobilisation in cyberspace take two forms: in support of the government or in support of the various opposition groups. Mobilisation in support of the government by the Young People's Front for Democracy and Justice (YPFDJ), for example, focuses on recruitment, promoting the 2% tax of the diaspora by the Eritrea government, and organising festivals and demonstrations in defence of the image and position of the Eritrean government abroad (DSP-Groep & Tilburg University, 2016). An illustration of the Eritrean regime and use of ICT for surveillance and intimidation of its diasporas is provided by a recent arrival:

*In the middle of August 2016, I was called by YFPDJ using an anonymous telephone number at midday. I was told to stop my activities about change in Eritrea or else I will be killed. The call was made in Tigrinya, by a male voice, who said, “We advise you to stop”. (DG, Interview, face-to-face, 13 October 2016)*

In contrast, Eritrean opposition groups use ICT tools to engage in lobbying and advocacy targeting host country institutions on their policies towards the Eritrean government. For example, Eritrean opposition parties, NGOs and diaspora organisations based in the Netherlands used ICT within their networks to organise a protest in 2002 against Dutch aid to Eritrea (Chairman of Eritreans for Justice and Democracy-Benelux, interview, face-to-face, Utrecht, 2 December 2008). At the same time, among the newcomers within the Eritrean community, ICT has become an important tool for mobilisation through Eritrean Youth for Change. A respondent observed: “ICT offers alternative tools that enable our group to pursue freedom in Eritrea, rule of law, and constitutional change, providing those oppressed in Eritrea with a voice” (HZ, interview, face-to-face, 13 October 2016). Mobilisation around these activities takes on an online dimension and is influenced by the continued focus of these diaspora communities on the homeland, an aspect that affects their positionality (belonging and citizenship), both ‘here and there’.
Similarities and differences in how the various diaspora communities interact with technology (online/offline connectivity)

The use of ICT and digital technology by Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands further reveals both similarities and differences, which can be partly ascribed to contextual factors (i.e., the social, cultural and institutional environment in which these diasporas function) and partly to the characteristics of the diasporas (i.e., migration experiences, resources and capacities). Commonly shaping online/offline connectivity within the three communities are political factors, which are also a major driver of migration. This mostly applies to the first generation of Ethiopian, Ghanaian and Eritrean migrants, but can also be observed in contemporary migration out of Eritrea and Ethiopia (newcomers). These early arrivals play a connecting role for new migrants in the Netherlands through existing networks and families through offline connectivity. However, with the expansion of access to ICT and digital technology over the last two decades, these diaspora connections have become much more diverse, but still thick. For instance, mobile phone technology has been a critical factor in the migration journey, including the provision of information about routes and destination countries. Eritrean diasporas have been much more engaged with information technology than the other two diasporas studied, as this is the only way they can stay connected to family and friends left behind due to the political situation in Eritrea. In recent years, mobilisation by different Eritrean diaspora groups has been characterised by either loyalty to the government or opposition to the government.

Nonetheless, there are some differences in the online/offline connectivity of the diasporas from the three communities. Variations in the availability of digital technology emanate from contextual factors (socio-economic and political) and technical conditions (connectivity, availability, access, affordable, flexibility and safety). A second determinant is the political context, which either gives space for the use of ICT or not. For example, members of the Ghanaian diaspora can experiment with and deploy a wide variety of emerging
technologies due to the availability of political space in Ghana. The relative political and economic stability in their country of origin enables them to transcend the online/offline demarcations due to the possibilities of returning and helping those left behind (and even sending communication gadgets to those left behind, thus speeding up connectivity and bridging the digital and communication divide). In contrast, Eritreans and Ethiopians have limited possibilities of physical return or bringing back items that could enhance connectivity. These contextual and technological factors have an impact on online/offline connectivity and how diasporas continue to stay in touch with their next of kin and others in their country of origin.

Discussion

This chapter examined online/offline diaspora connectivity within the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diaspora communities in the Netherlands and its effect on mobility and transnational engagement between the country of residence and origin. This called for the adoption of a ‘here and there’ perspective (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; Waldinger, 2008, Ong’ayo, 2019) and the notion of agency to understand the intersection between context-related factors, technology and the agency of members of diasporas. This is examined using the theoretical notion of diaspora transnationalism (Vertovec & Cohen, 1999; Vertovec, 2008a; Faist, 2008; Erdal & Oeppen, 2013), which captures the ‘here and there’ linkages and diaspora practices influenced by technology. Notable within the notion of ‘here and there’ is the positionality of diasporas in terms of their multiple layers of belonging (Madsen & Van Naerssen, 2003), as well as transnational citizenship or trans-state loyalty (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2000; Waldinger, 2008).

How diasporas interact with technology and function within an online/offline connectivity framework further links to the idea of a network society (Castells, 1996) and the changing social relations, identities, spaces and networks (Miller, 2011). Technology, as used by the diasporas in the three communities studied, can be argued to
facilitate cultural forms and immersive experiences (Miller, 2011), leading to new forms of communities and expressions of nationalism (Anderson, 1991). These social processes inform diaspora-state relations in terms of the politics of Internet governance and regulation (Glen, 2017) in the countries of residence and origin and effect the diaspora transnational practices undertaken through online/offline connectivity.

The observed online/offline connectivity within the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diaspora communities in the Netherlands points to the relevance of agency. This agency in diasporas (Lacroix, 2013; Ong’ayo, 2019) relates to their intersection with ICT and digital technology (Vertovec, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Hiller & Franz, 2004; Conversi, 2012). While how diaspora communities function within this framework may suggest technological determinism (Miller, 2011), the agency of diasporas (Ong’ayo, 2019; Lacroix, 2013), in combination with the social and economic conditions, influence the creative use of technology during transnational practices. As argued by Miller in his treatise on base, superstructure and infrastructure, technology not only affects society and culture directly, but is “enabling infrastructures, which are part of the ‘base’ in the base-superstructure relationship between economy and culture” (Miller, 2011, p. 224). Miller’s perspective confirms the agentic responsibility of diasporas in the creative use of technology in transnational practices that overcome disruptions to mobility by migration regimes or government surveillance, as well as facilitating digital disobedience and political activism (Miller, 2011).

This chapter also demonstrates that while some online diaspora connectivity through digital technology is useful for staying connected and maintaining identities, it also influences offline interpersonal interactions and relationships, especially the use of social media. The observed online/offline connectivity of members of diasporas confirms the role of technology in the emergence of an information society (Castells, 1996), in which digital identity, networked society and collective virtual culture influence both the individual and collective identities that members of diasporas build.
through the narratives they share online. These narratives contribute to community building, but also reconfigure identities (religious, ethnic and political). The dynamics generated by ICT and digital technology, as illustrated in the diaspora media, lead to changes in relations. These effects have been noted in the impact of telepresence and embodied presence (Miller, 2011; Van Stam, 2017) on interactions and connections from a distance in the context of fragmented families (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). These new realities in communication and interaction over long distances support Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined communities (Anderson, 1991), linked to the discursive construction and reconstruction of identity because of mobility and dispersion across different geographical locations.

Linked to the findings of previous studies on Eritrean refugees in the digital era (Miller, 2011; Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016; Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017; Van Reisen et al., 2017), I argue that ICT and digital technology is not only used by diasporas to their advantage (staying in touch, remittances, digital disobedience and political activism), but that governments also use the same tools to control and shape the identities of diasporas, through narratives and discourses (Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016). The online data trail and disembodied personal information recorded during online activities enables the government to exert control over members of the diaspora (see Miller, 2011; Van Reisen et al., 2017). Respondents from the Eritrea community, especially those in the second wave (newcomers), and the majority from the Ethiopian community (mostly in the opposition) cited experiences with surveillance, control and intimidation by the government in their country of origin, while in the Netherlands. Others narrated the role of ICT in their migration trajectory, which included their use by traffickers and kidnappers. These findings corroborate studies on ICT-facilitated criminal activities, such as human trafficking for ransom (Van Reisen, Estefanos & Rijken, 2012; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015; Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016; Van Reisen et al., 2017). While useful for sharing information, staying connected, and helping to memorise events, diasporas can also experience traumatic events, through chatrooms and Facebook. As described by
various respondents, such experiences with staying connected through technology confirm observations about the increase in trauma through repeated sharing of images and stories of suffering (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017) and the viewing of websites established by Eritreans during the war with Ethiopia to count or remember the dead (Bernal, 2013).

This chapter highlights some significant features of online/offline diaspora connectivity and its implications for transnational engagement. Nonetheless, missing are the perspectives of the next of kin and governments in the countries of origin, which would strengthen more in-depth analysis of how governments engage with diasporas through ICT and digital technology (identity, imagined communities). Equally, more in-depth comparative analysis based on multi-sited studies on the link between online/offline diaspora connectivity and the reconfiguration of identities and transnational loyalties within a deterritorialised context could shed light on the impact of these dynamics from a ‘here and there’ perspective. This would contribute to a better understanding of how diaspora connectivity reconfigures the interactions and relationship between those who are mobile (migrants) and those who are immobile (in the country of origin). As circumstances vary depending on the context and over time, observing these processes in different places at different times could be useful, as the impact of online/offline diaspora connectivity was greater in Ghana and, to lesser extent, in Ethiopia, and unknown in Eritrea due to regime conditions (hence, this study relied mainly on information provided by Eritreans in the diaspora).

Conclusion

This research sought to answer the question: What is the online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities, and how does this connectivity affect their mobility and transnational engagement? This question was answered by looking at five sub-research questions. The first sub-research question looked at the ‘here and there’ manifestations of online/offline connectivity. Looking at how the
Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands engage transnationally, the three diaspora communities can be described as highly involved in the use of ICT and digital technology in their interactions, which involve both online and offline connectivity. Diasporas from the three communities use ICT and digital technology in activities linked to identity formation and the maintenance of cultural ties, both ‘here and there’. The use of ICT and digital technology can be seen in the organisation of cultural and religious events. Such events are manifestations of the multiple layers of belonging of diasporas, which influence the nature of their engagement and the kinds of interactions they are involved in. Consequently, ICT and digital technology, in the form of telepresence and embodied presence, bring about changes in social relations among members of the diasporas and with their countries of origin (family ties, culture and traditions). These developments have led to the possibility of creating virtual communities, as families have become fragmented through migration.

In relation to the second sub-research question, on the role of agency in how diasporas deal with multi-layered structural conditions through offline/online connectivity, the networks and connections that diasporas from the three communities maintain through online/offline connectivity also serve as mediums for the exchange of information about developments in the region of origin and globally. These exchanges between people and places, which focus on social, cultural and political developments, as well as remittances, have increased due to new communication technologies.

Tensions arose among diasporas from the three communities, mediated by both access to ICTs and digital technology, as well as their use by the state to control diasporas or promote their engagement. Conversely, restrictive conditions on the use of ICTs and digital technologies affect mobility between the countries of origin and the Netherlands, even if diasporas maintain online connectivity. Diasporas from the three countries respond differently to the prevailing conditions (restrictive and open) in ways that create tensions (for the conflict-generated and regime-driven diasporas –
Ethiopia and Eritrea) and opportunities (for the diasporas from states that are stable – Ghana) at the same time. This is more so in cases where diasporas are in pursuit of maintaining connections with those left behind (immobile/offline) by countering state restrictions and control, surveillance and intimidation or through friendly engagement policies.

This research revealed similarities and differences in how the various diaspora communities interact with technology. For example, direct engagement (offline participation) by Ethiopians and Eritreans has been hindered by repressive government policies. The diasporas from these two countries creatively use ICTs and digital technology and political/civic space in the country of residence, especially in opposition to the regimes in Ethiopian and Eritrea, to bypass the constraints put in place by the governments in the countries of origin and surveillance by the agents of these governments in the country of residence. In contrast, for members of the Ghanaian diaspora, their relatively open engagement has been facilitated by non-interference by the government in diaspora transnational activities.

ICTs and digital technology enable diasporas to transcend the online/offline dichotomy as they maintain ties and links with those left behind and those in the diaspora. While the online/offline connectivity among diasporas may create tensions linked to the static conditions of those left behind or those not allowed to return or circulate, the close ties that diasporas maintain with multiple places and people inform their ingenuity in terms of platforms and tools for mobilisation, as part of their transnational engagement. These online platforms established by diasporas enable them to undertake transfers (financial and social remittances) with significant socio-economic and political impact, both in the country of residence and origin.

References


Chapter 8

‘Europe is not Worth Dying For’:
The Dilemma facing Somalis in Europe

Melissa Phillips & Mingo Heiduk

Introduction

“The road to Europe is harder than before”, shared a young female Danish-Somali citizen (aged 29), reflecting the changing attitudes in the Somali diaspora community in Denmark. This chapter investigates these changing attitudes towards Somali migrants and refugees coming to Europe in an irregularised situation (asylum seekers, victims of human trafficking and migrants without the required travel documents). It is based on empirical research conducted by the Danish Refugee Council’s Diaspora Programme and the Mixed Migration Centre between 2016 and 2017, as part of a wider study on the relationships between diasporas and migrants coming to Europe irregularly, involving both Somali and Afghan diasporas (Nimkar & Frouws, 2018).

Diaspora communities in Europe are often perceived as facilitators of migration. But, this study found that, contrary to what is generally believed, their views of newcomers to Europe range from ambivalence to resentment. These perceptions are influenced by the negative migration climate in host countries and by their own status, which is often insecure. The perception of their own situation is affecting how they advise people back home who are considering migrating. Often their advice to potential migrants is that they should refrain from migrating. But, this advice is not always viewed as legitimate.

44 The full study included focus group discussions and an online survey. However, this chapter focuses on the focus group discussions data only.
The objective of this research was to investigate diaspora responses to fellow nationals moving in an irregularised situation and bring these findings to existing discussions about the diaspora’s wider role in supporting their fellow nationals. The main research question is: *What is the attitude of Somalis in the diaspora on irregularised migration by their countrymen and women?* While diasporas are often assumed to be ‘facilitators’ of the journeys of migrants in an irregularised situation (through the financial support they provide to their fellow country nationals) or seen by groups such as politicians as potential ‘blockers’ of migration policies (because they act as key sources of information), this chapter presents a more complex interplay, drawing out the multiple roles played by diasporas and the inter-relationship between diasporas and their co-nationals moving in an irregularised situation (Frouws, Phillips, Hassan, & Twigt, 2016). It highlights a range of attitudes towards newcomers, which include ambivalence and resentment, and widens understanding of the impacts of migrants in an irregularised situation on diasporas in their country of destination. It also examines the policy perspective of diasporas towards irregularised migration.

The authors of this chapter have chosen to use the term ‘irregularised migration’ to highlight the social and political processes that place people in this situation (De Genova, 2002). The term ‘irregular migrant’ will not be used, because it labels the person as irregular rather than the travel method. Migrants may be fleeing war, political unrest or persecution. Some are victims of human trafficking or smuggling. Some are seeking a better life for themselves and their loved ones. Their situation is referred to as ‘irregularised’ because they do not have the necessary documents or authorisation required by the destination (and transit) countries.

The research on which this chapter is based was carried out from 2016 to 2017 in the context of the high level of attention on the number of migrants in an irregularised situation, including those originating from the Horn of Africa, seeking protection (as in the case of refugees) or better opportunities (as in the case of migrants) in Europe. People originating from Somalia have been known to use
both the Central Mediterranean Route through Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean Route through Turkey to reach Europe (UNHCR, 2018). In 2015, 12,433 Somalis reached Italy and 4,301 reached Greece through the above-mentioned sea routes. This number dropped to 7,281 across both routes in 2016, with a small number also reaching Spain from Morocco through the Western Mediterranean Route (UNHCR, 2018). This was due to an overall reduction in people using the Eastern Mediterranean Route after the European Union (EU) and Turkey signed a Statement of Cooperation in March 2016 to control the number of people leaving Turkey for Greece by sea. At the same time there was a shift in the profile of people using the Central Mediterranean Route towards West Africa. Despite this reduction, Somalis still comprise a significant proportion of new asylum seekers in Europe, with 11,890 people originating from Somalia submitting asylum claims in the EU in 2017 and the first quarter of 2018 (Eurostat, 2018).

New arrivals join sizeable Somali diaspora communities in Europe. Such communities have been the subject of studies on remittance sending practices (see, for example, Horst, 2008) and contribute to development in their home country in multiple ways (Sinatti & Horst, 2015). In the context of Denmark, the exact profile of Somali communities will be discussed later, however, they have been subject to increasing restrictions with a large number of Somalis with residence permits having their status reassessed by the Danish authorities with a view to potential revocation for people on subsidiary protection. There has been less attention paid to the relationship between diasporas and migrants in an irregularised situation, with the exception of some early research on diasporas and their impact on asylum flows (Crisp, 1999) and some mention in research on migrants in an irregularised situation (McAuliffe, 2013; Richardson, 2010). This is despite the evidence that people on the move maintain social connections with communities abroad while in transit (Frouws et al., 2016). By investigating the relationship and attitudes of diasporas towards irregularised migration and people arriving in Europe in an irregularised situation, this empirical research seeks to fill a gap in our knowledge about diasporas and migrants in
an irregularised situation, as well as propose future ways in which collaboration between diasporas, international organisations and governments can be established to assist in this critical area. A review of the existing literature on diasporas is detailed next.

**Defining diasporas**

Diasporas are comprised of migrants and refugees who live outside their country of origin in a new country of settlement, but have “taken active steps to preserve their identity as a distinctive community and have an ongoing orientation towards the homeland” (Jones, 2016, cited in Holliday, 2016). Diasporas can be in nearby neighbouring countries, which is commonly known as the ‘near diaspora’, or further away in the ‘wider diaspora’ (Van Hear, 2002, cited in Koser & Van Hear, 2003). Oliver Bakewell of Oxford University’s International Migration Institute asserts that there are four criteria that must be met for a group of people to constitute a diaspora, namely:

(i) movement from an original homeland to more than one country, either through dispersal (forced) or expansion (voluntary) in search of improved livelihoods; (ii) a collective myth of an ideal ancestral home; (iii) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time, based on a shared history, culture and religion; and (iv) a sustained network of social relationships with members of the group living in different countries of settlement. (Bakewell, 2009, p. 2)

It is important to note that being a member of a diaspora is voluntary and not all people who move to another country consider themselves part of a diaspora or join formal diaspora organisations. Furthermore, former migrants and refugees may choose to maintain links with their country of origin without ascribing to diaspora membership.

As a country, Somalia has long been affected by conflict and violence, which has caused the internal displacement of 825,000 people, with 388,000 new displacements in 2017 due to conflict and violence and a further 899,000 due to disasters. In addition, there are approximately 500,000 Somali refugees living in neighbouring countries, Kenya and Ethiopia (Internal Displacement Monitoring
The prevailing conditions in Somalia and repeated efforts by the Kenyan government to close Dadaab camp in Kenya has influenced many Somalis to consider onward migration. Somalis undertake a form of secondary movement known as *tabriib*, which is the emigration of young Somali men and some women mainly from Somaliland and Puntland in search of better opportunities (Ali, 2016). Somalis have long been featured as one of the main groups attempting to move irregularly through Libya, with their numbers on the rise since 2012, although, as noted above, their numbers have been in decline in recent years (Eurostat, 2018).

Somalis are also among the main nationalities seeking asylum in Denmark. Since 2011, asylum application figures for Somalis have declined by approximately 73% (between 2012 and 2016). During 2016, asylum rates in Denmark declined from 21,000 applications in 2015 to 5,959 in 2016, mainly due to increased border controls (Statistics Denmark, 2018). Nevertheless, due to the cumulative growth in Denmark’s migrant and refugee communities, including through family reunification, Denmark’s Somali diaspora is now estimated to comprise approximately 20,000 people (Statistics Denmark, 2018). There are also Somali diasporas in other European countries, the United States and Canada. Notably, Somalia’s 2016 Foreign Policy made explicit reference to Somalia’s estimated two million diaspora members and the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an Office of Diaspora Affairs (Osbiye & Hussein, 2016).

Diasporas make multiple economic, social, cultural and political contributions to their countries of origin, including remittances, economic investments, the transfer of skills, and other philanthropic ventures, as well as playing a role in politics. For example, the ninth President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, was a member of the Somali diaspora in the United States (Cismaan, 2017). Remittances to Somalia are estimated to be around USD 1.4 billion annually, representing 23% of Somalia’s GDP (World Bank, 2016).

Social connectedness is one feature of the transnational ties that diasporas actively foster through global networks, which are based on
social, cultural, class, linguistic and ethnic links (Carling, 2008). Increasingly, these global networks are maintained through social media and information and communication technology (ICT), which allow for links to be developed and maintained across multiple sites, including places of origin, sites of exile and transit, and destination countries (Vertovec, 2004). Through such networks, a range of information can be shared, including information that is increasingly understood to influence decision-making about migration (Frouws et al., 2016). It has been asserted that diaspora, family and community members are generally more trusted sources of information than migration agents, brokers, smugglers and governments (Crisp, 1999; Ambrosini, 2016). Other research has shown that this trust continues when migrants and refugees arrive in destination countries, with diasporas and ethnic networks serving as an important source of assistance for settlement support and employment, as well as representing powerful examples of success (and failure) to others in their country of origin (Bloch & McKay, 2014).

Beyond the general attributes of diasporas summarised here, few studies have explored in detail other attributes of diasporas, including their collective memory and shared consciousness, which are also key attributes of diasporas (Bakewell, 2009). This is important when focusing on the specific relationship between diasporas and migrants, as well as refugees moving in an irregularised situation. Diaspora are living in a host country and, by their very definition, have experiences in other economic, cultural and political situations. This may influence their attitudes towards those who are migrating or moving to seek asylum.

The literature has highlighted the social connectedness of migrants and refugees moving along irregularised routes, including the high use of ICT, which connects them with the diaspora in their preferred country of destination (Frouws et al., 2016; Van Reisen et al., 2017; Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017) and how former refugees may offer information and organisational infrastructure to support irregularised migration (Crisp, 1999) and even pay ransoms for migrants and refugees held by smugglers and traffickers (Van Reisen, Estefanos &
Rijken, 2012, 2014; Jacobsen, Robinson, & Lijnders, 2013; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015). Moreover, research on decision making among people moving to seek asylum, including those planning to move irregularly or those who have moved already, has highlighted links with trusted communities. However, such research notes that the information they receive from family and friends often does not contain granular details (Richardson, 2010); it also notes that the support provided is more generally linked to decision making (McAuliffe, 2013).

Most of the research conducted so far has been from the perspective of people on the move, drawing on data collected from their experiences, with secondary information drawn from diasporas in some cases. These studies have reinforced a widely-held assumption that members of diasporas have a uniquely close relationship with people moving irregularly or are key influencers of migrants in an irregularised situation. In addition, research about smugglers indicates that they comprise a wide range of individuals (for instance, brokers, recruiters, guides, guards, drivers and hotel owners), and may also include migrants and refugees or former migrants and refugees (Tinti & Westcott, 2016), which supports this assumption.

The assumption that diasporas influence co-nationals who may be seeking to migrate may be based on labour migration research, in which there has long been a focus on ‘intermediaries’ (brokers, agents, members of social networks etc.), who help migrants navigate the complex web of immigration policies and procedures including employer sponsorship (see, for example, Fernandez, 2013). Individuals, associations and organisations, together referred to as ‘migrant institutions’, have in other contexts been shown to play a role in facilitating migration (Goss & Lindquist, 1995). Utilising the concept, but adopting a broader frame of reference, Maurizio Ambrosini, proposes that intermediaries can also be found supporting migrants during their irregularised migration journeys and settlement in destination countries, offering connections and providing services and help (Ambrosini, 2016). Ethnic networks and diasporas can be included in this broad definition of intermediaries,
although Ambrosini suggests that diasporas and ethnic networks are mainly involved at the destination country level. Others have shown smuggling and trafficking to be far more regionally interconnected (Van Reisen et al., 2017; Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). The social connectedness of diasporas with people in their countries of origin, as described above, suggests that members of the diaspora can act as intermediaries at all stages of migration journeys.

However, this view neglects other aspects of the social bond between diasporas and (irregular) migrants, such as the attitudes and perceptions of diasporas about people moving in an irregularised situation, the full extent of links diasporas have with migrants and refugees travelling in irregularised ways, as well as the potential role diasporas play, especially with regard to supporting policy development and programmatic responses in transit and destination countries that ensure protection and informed decision making and minimise the risks involved in these journeys. These aspects of diaspora involvement are discussed later in the chapter. The next section details the research methods used.

Research methods

The main research methods used for this study were a literature review and focus group discussions. As this was a preliminary study, the research was modest in size and the findings have limitations as to their generalisability. According to Danish government statistics, there are approximately 21,000 people residing in Denmark claiming Somali ancestry, of which around 11,700 are immigrants and the remainder, some 9,500 people, are their descendants (Statistics Denmark, 2018). The Danish Refugee Council’s Diaspora Programme works with Somali diasporas as a priority group and has access to some 800 members of Somali communities living in Denmark. Research participants were accessed for this study through the Diaspora Programme and a snowball sampling approach used to reach other community members. In addition, advertisements

45 For more on the Diaspora Programme see https://drc.ngo/relief-work/diaspora-programme.
in English, Somali and Danish were placed on the Diaspora Programme’s Facebook page inviting people to participate in the focus group discussions. Two members of the Danish-Somali community who were employees of the Danish Refugee Council carried out the focus group discussions, which took place in Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense between 16 December 2016 and 20 January 2017. Focus group discussions were convened for women, youth and asylum seekers. Participants were asked a range of open-ended questions regarding their general perceptions and expectations about irregularised migration, connections with people on the move, any knowledge of trafficking and the dangers and risks people faced, modes of information sharing, support for integration provided on arrival, and their opinion about European migration and asylum policies. Focus group discussions generally lasted for 60–90 minutes and all focus group discussions were recorded and transcribed.

In total, 27 Somali diaspora members (15 female; 12 male) took part in 6 focus group discussions. Given that this was an initial study with limited funding, targeting both the Danish-Somali and Danish Afghan diasporas, it was decided to purposively keep a small sample size to test the research tools. A further reason for maintaining a small pilot was the fact that, as noted above, there were Danish government actions ongoing at the time to review the status of subsidiary protection for Somalis, which had resulted in a level of stress and concern among the Somalia diaspora in Denmark.

Importantly, all participants were advised that their anonymity would be protected and that participation in the study was voluntary and could be withdrawn at any time. Some participants expressed an eagerness to have the study findings made public in reports and articles so that a wider group of stakeholders could read about the challenges they faced, demonstrating that this research met the principles of action-research (Collie, Liu, Podsiadlowski, & Kindon, 2010). The specific results of the study will be discussed next.
Results

This chapter focuses on four components of the research findings, namely, general perceptions and expectations towards people moving irregularly from Somalia, connections to people on the move including information exchanges, the dilemma facing members of the diaspora community, and policy perspectives. The data cited below follows this structure and comes from the focus group discussions.

**General perceptions of people moving irregularly**

In general, most focus group discussion participants made a distinction between Somalis who arrived during early displacements, for example, during the 1990s, and those coming more recently. They characterised the profile of people leaving the country now as young people who have grown up during the civil war and are seeking better opportunities due to poverty. One male Danish-Somali respondent explained:

*I want to describe the new refugees and migrants as those who flee for their personal ambition and dreams instead of necessity, as those in the 90s did. Those who are fleeing now are not forced to flee, and they know there is a chance of them not reaching Europe given all the risks involved during their journey, and the images they have been told of Europe are completely different from the reality. They see it as the ‘Promised Land’. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 35 years)*

In addition to outlining a profile of youth who are not seeing a future in Somalia, respondents also described a sense of urgency among people arriving more recently, as one female Danish-Somali citizen respondent explained:

*They want to finish their education quickly, get a job quickly and contribute right away. In a nutshell, they want to do the all the things that we Somalis have managed to do over a time span of 20 years in just 3–5 years, and that is not possible. (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years)*
Some respondents recognised that the Somali diaspora may have encouraged this movement through the investments they have made back in Somalia in businesses or by building houses in their home town, which may have sent a positive message about the lifestyle on offer in Europe. They also felt that new arrivals were drawn to Europe for specific things such as education, as compared to earlier groups, who were more likely to be focused on family reunification, for instance. During the focus group discussions some people were adamant that most people leaving Somalia are just looking to reach a safe place, rather than having a specific destination in mind. Others expressed resentment that new arrivals seemed selfish and impatient and were only interested in bettering their own lives, even to the point of ignoring the advice given by members of the diaspora. Reflecting that there was perhaps a lack of knowledge on the part of newly-arrived Somalis about the challenges faced in Europe, compared to those in Somalia, one female Danish-Somali citizen pointed out that: “Peace also means not worrying about getting a job, or applying for asylum and being moved around in various detention or asylum centres across Europe” (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years).

These results suggest that members of the diaspora have a very different domain of knowledge and rely on other experiences regarding settlement in the host country than newly-arrived migrants. These experiences and knowledge are part of the integration process of Somalis in Danish society. As those who have newly arrived do not share this mindset, it can affect the image of the Somali diaspora, as was reflected in the antagonism evident during focus group discussions. The renewed focus on migrants in an irregularised situation impacted on the image of more established members of the Somali diaspora, especially in the media, such that one male Danish-Somali citizen said:

_We who were refugees in the 90s have to start all over again with the process of establishing a good picture of Somalis, and that is even though we have Danish citizenship and passport. All the good stories and initiatives that we have..._
accomplished are flushed down the toilet, and we have to start all over again. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 35 years)

As well as the fact that newly-arrived community members have different perceptions and knowledge about Danish opportunities than established members of the diaspora, the Somali diaspora has different perceptions about potential Somali migrants, especially regarding their willingness to take risks. The risks of irregular migration are often a topic on social media. Hearing about the risks people take led one female Danish-Somali citizen to state:

_I would never sacrifice my body and soul for the possibility of maybe reaching Europe. I also have a friend who lost three of his toes due to the cold weather [walking in the snow in Turkey]. I can’t fathom how traumatising it is._ (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years)

Connections between diaspora and family members are maintained through the Internet, Facebook and WhatsApp. Being so close to the situation of people moving irregularly and witnessing the consequences seems to have led this respondent to develop strong feelings against the practice, with many other respondents reinforcing the sentiment that they did not condone irregularised migration.

In addition, if a migrant is captured by traffickers during the migration journey, members of the diaspora can be asked to pay a ransom for his/her release. In one case a focus group discussion respondent observed a shift in his brother’s social media behaviour while he was studying in Uganda. After a certain point he realised that his brother had left Uganda to try to reach Europe by moving irregularly through Sudan and Egypt with a group of 25 other people, of which only 8, including his brother, survived. While the respondent did not report having to pay money to help his brother, other participants did mention paying ransoms to traffickers or smugglers or assisting financially to ensure the migrant’s survival when family members in Somalia were no longer able to help. In one case, having to pay a ransom reaffirmed a male Danish-Somali citizen’s belief that:
There is no potential positive outcome of them fleeing. It has economic and psychological risks when they flee, and we don’t know if all of them end up reaching Europe, because many die or are captured on their journeys. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 30 years)

Many participants did not feel comfortable sending money to smugglers, but did so because it was often a case of life or death. One male Danish-Somali citizen added: “We don’t want to be responsible for them risking their lives to reach Europe – that is too much of a risk and too much of a burden to have on your shoulders” (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 30 years). Another male Danish-Somali citizen added: “In my view they are better to use the money on their farm or just invest the money in some other means, rather than risking their life trying to cross the sea” (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 45 years).

The precarious situation of many within the Danish-Somali diaspora, whose status is also in jeopardy or who were unemployed, meant that their ability to help was limited. Describing the process of collecting money to pay ransom, one female Danish-Somali citizen said: “Every pocket was searched, every outstanding debt with different individuals was recollected, I mean it is a big project to collect that amount of money” (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years).

Interestingly, advice given by members of the diaspora to potential migrants prior to departure not to migrate is often not heeded. Advice to remain in the country of origin given by someone who is perceived as having achieved through migration what the potential migrant seeks does not carry a lot of weight.

[…] That is, when we tell them that there is nothing in what they are seeking to find in Europe. They are reluctant and will not listen to what we have to say before they have experienced it on their own. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 51 years)
Such advice is given from the perspective of the diaspora, reflecting their knowledge, experiences and objectives.

**Connections with people on the move**

Reaffirming findings from other research, newly-arrived migrants and refugees were observed to be highly networked transnational people. People on the move remained connected throughout their journeys. This is both an individual and a global factor, as one male Danish-Somali citizen explained:

> Globalization has contributed a lot to this refugee crisis in Europe. The Internet is easy to access nowadays. If some of their friends have migrated to Scandinavian countries, they are quick to send back pictures of their situations, and these pictures in my opinion are a false truth. Globalization has contributed to the world being quicker and, through communicating via social media, made the distance between each other smaller. The routes they take also depend on this quick communication. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years)

These networks are formed through the connections migrants have with diaspora communities and through the numerous links they develop in preparation for, and during, their journey. As one female Danish-Somali citizen remarked:

> The network these refugees and migrants require through their journeys is huge. We ourselves don’t even have so many connections. I personally know a handful of migrants, and they actually know, more than you, which countries have which requirements. (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years)

Regarding the direct contact members of the diaspora have with newly-arrived Somalis, one male Danish-Somali citizen explained:

> I have been in contact, and can still get in contact, with refugees or migrants through some of my friends who are newcomers or others who have met them. I’ve also been in contact with extended family who have arrived in Europe, but also through my organisational activities, which are voluntary. I’ve given them advice numerous times
This direct engagement with family members, community members and others highlights the close interactions between newly-arrived Somalis and diaspora communities and, in some cases, suggests the trusted role members of the diaspora play as sources of information. The respondent above added that he felt he needed to give them ‘realistic advice’ as to what is possible during their early settlement period in Europe, perhaps countering information given by smugglers or other community members. It is worth noting that respondents were also in contact with diaspora communities in other countries such as Canada and Australia and maintained contact with family, friends and previous colleagues, among others. A distinction was made by one respondent about the contact he had with Somalis during their journeys and on arrival in Europe. He described the contacts he had during journeys as being “very informal and indirect. In extreme cases they get our phone numbers and contact us directly or by social media” (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 30 years). Whereas contact on arrival is through networks and can be made in person rather than over the phone or via social media.

The dilemma faced by diasporas
As illustrated earlier in this section, diaspora members are trying to manage their lives in their new host country and may regard irregularised migration as a bad choice. This puts members of the diaspora in a dilemma: although they regard irregular migration as a bad choice, due to their social bonds, they feel obliged to help their family members on the dangerous journey. This dilemma was pointed out in the focus group discussions. In one case when a person heard of another community member considering borrowing money to help family members pay smugglers to reach Europe, he argued with him and tried to discourage him. This was due to the level of debt he would be taking on, as well as the integration challenges facing new migrants in Denmark. However, another male Danish-Somali citizen made a distinction between paying for migrants in an irregularised
situation and supporting fellow nationals in need (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 35 years). To this end, he explained how the diaspora invited people for social gatherings and ran programmes that encouraged active participation in sports, for example. Another female Danish-Somali citizen added that “we as Somalis help each other in every way we can, […]. I know I’m fortunate with the outcome of my life, so I don’t mind helping others” (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years). Another male Danish-Somali citizen explained:

Our initial standpoint as diasporas here in Denmark is that we don’t want them [other Somalis] to migrate to Europe and potentially risk their lives. We don’t want any bad things to happen to them. On the other hand, to be frank, they don’t have other opportunities in Somalia or Africa, and that is why they are looking towards Europe. The only thing we as a diaspora community can contribute with is information sharing. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years)

Through their direct engagement, diaspora members can offer people considering irregular migration advice, due to their position as trusted members of the community. However many people still in their country of origin or in transit will not accept such advice and prefer to make their own decision based on other information sources.

Policy perspectives
Respondents were aware of the wider policy debates taking place in Europe at the time the research was conducted, including the externalisation of asylum procedures. Many were opposed in

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46 Externalisation policies describe extraterritorial state action to prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of destination countries or regions or to make them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims. In Europe, the idea to externalise asylum procedures was first introduced in 2003, when British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s cabinet and Home Office circulated a policy paper called ‘A New Vision for Refugees’, which proposed that the European Union establish Regional Protection Areas (RPAs) near refugee-producing countries to contain refugees in countries of first arrival and to serve as places to which asylum seekers who had arrived in Europe could be deported (Noll, 2005). This proposal was withdrawn the same year due to lack of support, but the New Vision has
principle to irregularised migration for a number of reasons, but supportive of alternatives, including offering labour migration and visas for skilled people. A male Danish-Somali citizen suggested that the system should be:

\[\ldots\] more like the American system where you have quotas, because a person from Somalia can get into the US with a green card. \[\ldots\] I think the same system should come to Denmark. \[\ldots\] then everybody gets a fair chance. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 45 years)

Another male Danish-Somali citizen respondent added that the money people get when they are repatriated could be used to realise opportunities in Somalia or other parts of Africa (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 45 years). Overall, there was quite a lot of debate generated between those who supported helping people wishing to start a new life in Denmark and others who were opposed to the practice of irregularised migration. Some saw the challenges Somalis faced with integration and questioned the benefits of supporting people to come to Europe, either financially or emotionally. Notably, several diaspora members suggested they could play a role in helping with integration.

**Discussion and conclusion**

This chapter looked at the attitudes of Somalis in the diaspora on irregularised migration by their countrymen and women. The findings of the research show that the Somali diaspora in Denmark is not a homogenous group and is comprised of new arrivals, long-term residents and citizens, as well as being differentiated by age, gender and region of origin. A further distinction is generational: Danish-born people of Somali heritage and older Danish citizens who were born in Somalia. It is important to keep in mind these distinctions when studying diasporas. However, the criteria mentioned by Bakewell (2009, p. 2) that diaspora have a collective memory and

persisted through the years and is echoed loudly in the 2016 EU-Turkey Action Plan for stemming the irregularised flow of migrants and asylum seekers into the European Union (Frelick, Kysel & Podkul, 2016, p. 206).
shared consciousness is also important to keep in mind. In this research, members of the diaspora expressed a plurality of opinions, among which some trends can be identified, despite the limitations of sample size. These trends are discussed in this section.

Firstly, diasporas were able to observe first-hand the changing profile of new arrivals reaching Europe by irregularised means. In particular, they saw the most recent group of Somalis arriving by boat to Europe as young and primarily seeking better opportunities due to conditions in Somalia. Respondents were reticent to characterise them as not deserving of protection, noting the risky journeys they had made and the hardships they had suffer both on route and in Somalia. However, diaspora responses were moderated by the policy changes taking place at the time, which were impacting on the more-established community, which faced review and possible withdrawal of their complementary protection status. This has led to concerns that newcomers were influencing Danish policy changes affecting established communities. One female Danish-Somali citizen shared that: “it feels like we always have to justify the newcomers’ actions. That we are the ‘go to guys’ whenever there is a negative story in the news. Of course we feel that” (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 24 years).

Secondly, like many other diaspora communities, Danish Somalis are transnationally connected to family, friends and communities in many parts of the world. Similarly, diaspora respondents reported that Somalis on the move were in touch throughout their journeys to share information, seek help and obtain advice. In this way diasporas can and do play a role as guides, both through family connections and through the formal associations of which they are a part. A consequence of being connected that left many people with conflicted feelings was being asked to pay ransom to smugglers for the release of migrants who were being held hostage. Respondents recognised the urgent life or death situation their compatriots were in and felt compelled to act. At the same time, they saw the sums of money being paid and believed it could be better spent in Somalia or the near region. A further issue was that many diaspora members
were in need themselves, often unemployed or, as noted above, at risk of return, and the sums of money being demanded are very high. Despite these reservations, diasporas remain a trusted source of information for people on the move, which continues after arrival in Denmark, and are regularly contacted on social media for assistance – although with the above-mentioned caveat: that advice given by diasporas that potential migrants should refrain from migrating is often not viewed as legitimate by potential migrants.

Finally, based on their relationships with people on the move, members of the diaspora expressed attitudes towards policies and programmes, which could be better harnessed in a more organised manner. This included ideas about regularising migration and voluntary return programmes. Diasporas also help with integration into Danish society and other aspects of social integration for asylum seekers and other newcomers in times of need. This formal support is often done in a voluntary capacity without judgement as to how people have arrived, but instead based on need. These findings, based on a pilot study with a limited number of respondents, during a time when domestic policy towards Somalis seeking asylum in Denmark was in flux, indicate the need for more robust and substantive research in this area, which places the voices and opinions of diaspora communities at the centre. It also shows that diaspora communities can be a rich source of information on this topic.

In an era where attention on people moving in an irregularised situation is at an all-time high, with policymakers seeking to find ways to address this phenomenon and other stakeholders trying to reduce risks and ensure protection for people on the move, this research highlights the unique relationships that diaspora communities in destination countries have with their fellow nationals, which extends to those moving in an irregularised manner. This study shows that diaspora communities have deep and contextualised knowledge about migrants and refugees based on their own experience and the close relationship they have with their fellow nationals as transnational socially-connected individuals. As a result, members of the diaspora hold opinions and expectations about irregularised migration and
people moving irregularly, while at the same time often maintaining links with them on route. Diaspora communities can contribute to policies in this area, including by suggesting alternatives to irregularised migration. Hence, diaspora communities should be considered an important stakeholder in future policy discussions about migration, in addition to their already growing role as supporters of integration, humanitarian and development assistance, and peace-building in many countries around the world.

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References


Chapter 9

Countering Radicalisation in Communities: The Case of Pumwani, Nairobi

Reginald Nalugala

Introduction

The Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh, located next to Pumwani in Kamukunji Constituency, is nicknamed ‘little Mogadishu’ and hosts a thriving Somali community living in Kenya, including many businesses. In recent years, Kamukunji has been associated with violent extremism, following attacks by the Somali-based terror group Al-Shabaab. Al Jazeera summarised the most recent attacks as follows:

2013: In September 2013, al-Shabaab fighters stormed Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, firing indiscriminately at shoppers and killing 67 people in a siege that lasted 80 hours.

[...]

2014: In November 2014, members of Somalia’s al-Shabaab armed group hijacked a bus in Kenya and killed 28 non-Muslims on board.

[...]
April 2015: Al-Shabab launched an assault on Garissa University College in Kenya, killing 148, mainly students.

January 2016: Fighters from the Somali armed group assaulted a Kenyan-run military base for African Union peacekeepers, killing scores of Kenyan soldiers.

January 2019: Two explosions and gunfire heard at an upscale hotel complex in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital. (Al Jazeera, 2019)

An Al-Shabaab spokesman explained to Al Jazeera why the attacks were carried out: “What happened … we did in revenge for what the non-believer government has done to innocent Muslims” (Al Jazeera, 2019). The attacks were found to be connected to one of the mosques in in Pumwani, Riadhaa Mosque (International Crisis Group, 2014; Anzalone, 2012; UN Security Council, 2013; Murunga, 2012; Anderson, 2014). The mosque had been infiltrated by Al-Shabaab through its Kenyan branch, a group known as Al-Hijra (formerly the Muslim Youth Center), and became the epicentre for the radicalisation of youth in Kenya (Anzalone, 2012).

This chapter reflects on ways to counter the radicalisation of Somali migrants and refugees in Pumwani ward in Kamukunji Constituency, Nairobi, Kenya. The study on which it is based is set in the context of perceived exclusion as a result of migration within Africa. Push factors such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, political and economic marginalisation are commonly believed to be the underlying root causes of radicalisation (Hassan, 2012). In addition, many scholars have pointed out that the social exclusion of youth feeds into the recruitment strategies of terrorist group (UNDP, 2019; Chin, 2015; Costanza, 2015). At the same time, certain positive characteristics and benefits ‘pull’ vulnerable individuals to join such groups, including a sense of belonging, the strong bonds of brotherhood that are created, desire for reputation building, and other socialisation benefits (Hellsten, 2016). Political drivers are also present, but not usually discussed (Hegghammer, 2007). Once inside the criminal networks, youth often find that are unable to leave. It is from this perspective that this chapter seeks to explore a preventative model that can be applied to prevent vulnerable youth from joining violent extremist groups.
Kenya is taken as a case study to investigate the factors contributing to youth radicalisation. In particular, the study looks how the Kamukunji Community Peace Network (KCPN) in Punwami ward tackled the problem of radicalisation by involving youth in addressing their own issues and providing a different narrative on migration, and on Kamukunji in general, as a place they could be proud of. The main research question is: What are the factors identified by the KCPN as leading to the radicalisation of youth in Punwami and what was their approach to prevent youth from being recruited by violent extremist groups.

**Radicalisation in Kenya**

In developing countries and fragile states, powerful transnational criminal networks constitute a direct threat to the state itself, not through open confrontation, but by penetrating state institutions through bribery and corruption and by subverting or undermining them from within (Gastrow, 2011). Governments that lack the capacity to counter such penetration, or that acquiesce to it, face the threat of state institutions becoming dysfunctional and criminalised, and the very foundation of the state being undermined. As a result, more and more youth migrate across borders to other countries and continents to escape the situation, and those who cannot find what they seek join gangs, criminal organisations and terrorist networks (Gastrow, 2011).

The 2019 study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Journey to Extremism in Africa*, underscores that one of the main drivers of extremism in Africa is lack of inclusion (on the inclusion of youth, see also Chapter 21, *Where are the Youth? The Missing Agenda in Somalia’s Constitution*, by Istar Ahmed). This is a move away from the much publicised narrative calling for prevention mechanisms, based on military options and security (UNDP, 2019). In his opening remarks, Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary General, said: “I am convinced that the creation of open, equitable, inclusive and pluralist societies, of human rights and with economic opportunities for all, represents the most tangible and meaningful alternative to violent extremism” (UNDP, 2019). The report makes
the connection between violent extremism and lack of the attainment of development goals. These findings unequivocally underscore the relevance of economic factors in radicalisation, as multidimensional poverty leads to multifaceted grievances (UNDP, 2019, pp. 5–6).

This understanding has profound policy implications for preventing the recruitment of especially African youth by violent extremist groups. Bashir (2016) and Mulata (2015) conducted extensive investigations into the factors that contribute to the radicalisation of youth in Kenya. Some of the main factors that emerged from their research were high unemployment, the marginalisation of certain regions, idleness, the false interpretation of religious teaching, and poverty. They also blamed poor governance, government repression in the form of counter-terrorism measures, and radicalised religious environments. In addition, the media was found to play a role through irresponsible reporting, fuelling discrimination and lighting the embers of radicalisation, and globalisation comes into play, as youth see other youth being brutalised or praised for atrocities committed. This view diverges from the popular belief, supported by some studies, that radicalisation is strongly driven by religion (Mills & Miller, 2017; Crone, 2016). The failure of authorities to listen to the complaints of local communities creates a fertile breeding ground for extremism and terrorist activities.

In East Africa, Kenya is considered one of the key countries that is threatened by forced migration, trafficking, and recruitment by criminal gangs and violent extremist groups. Since 2008, Kenya has experienced a dramatic rise in violent extremism, with youth being recruited into crime and terror networks. Between 1970 and 2007, the country experienced 190 terrorist attacks, an average of five per year; since 2008, the average has escalated to 47 attacks a year. The overwhelming majority of these incidents have been attributed to Al-Shabaab (Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke & Humphrey, 2016; Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu & Winterbotham, 2015). During the same period, there has been massive youth radicalisation, an increase in drug trafficking, the proliferation of guns from the warring regions, and increased migration across borders. Safety, security and
rule of law in Kenya have been tested (Finn, Momani, Opatowski & Opondo, 2016; Villa-Vicencio et al., 2016). Gastrow (2011) presents a vivid account of the situation in his reported titled, *Termite at Work. A Report on Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya*. The author refers to a conference by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Programme for Eastern Africa in 2009, which identified inadequate levels of awareness and institutional capacity to counter illicit trafficking, organised crime, and terrorism in the region (Gastrow, 2011). At the conference, the executive director of UNODC said that “in Eastern Africa, warning lights are flashing; we must respond immediately” (cited in Gastrow, 2011, p. xii). In response, ministers from the 13 East African countries pledged their support for the programme. A few weeks after the conference, the UNODC executive director followed with a briefing to the United Nations Security Council in New York, in which he revealed that East Africa had become a receiver and transit zone for “30 to 35 tons of Afghan heroin”, which was being trafficked into the region (Gastrow, 2011). He said that the region was “becoming a free economic zone for all sorts of trafficking: drugs, migrants, guns, hazardous wastes and natural resources”. The report underlined the urgent need to strengthen governance in East Africa based on the rule of law (Gastrow, 2011). The threat posed by organised global crime in countries like Kenya is too serious to ignore (UNDP, 2019; Gastrow, 2011).

Nearly a decade later, the report, *Journey to Extremism in Africa* (UNDP, 2019) revealed startling new evidence to show that security-driven responses are often counter-productive and have been applied insensitively. These security-driven measures have not focused on rule of law and state accountability, citizens’ participation and protection, human rights compliance, or the accountability of state security forces to uphold these rights. The report identifies that the measures to strengthen security have overlooked key aspects, such as the ability of citizens living in high-risk environments to access justice and human rights, and the need for capacity building to support local community run programmes.
The report also points out that without community-based programmes it may be impossible to fight violent extremism. Fuelling exclusion, the government runs the risk of perpetuating criminal power structures, which are overt drivers of recruitment by violent extremist groups in Africa. The report emphasises the need to reinvigorate state legitimacy through improved governance and accountability. This means moving away from an over-concentration on security-driven interventions to improved quality of life and better service delivery. Where the state is weak, citizens should be empowered to contribute to human development at all levels (UNDP, 2019; Rink & Sharma, 2018). Youth returning from migration are particularly vulnerable and, if not managed well, could be a threat to state security and the economic wellbeing of the community (Kana & Dore, 2014). Gielen (2015) observed that the role of the community they came from is crucial in building networks of help in the de-radicalisation of youth who want to reform after leaving terror groups (Dahl & Zalk, 2014). Therefore, communities are encouraged to embark on anti-radicalisation processes (IOM, 2019; Bizina & Gray, 2014) and build strong relations with different groups in communities (Nalugala, 2017).

**Theoretical framework**

This study uses the theory of planned behaviour by Ajzen (1991; 2011) and the concept of a human rights culture by Rorty (1998) as lenses through which to analyse the radicalisation of youth in Pumwani by violent extremist groups.

*Theory of planned behaviour and social norms*

Much of the literature on criminal and terrorist organisations has focused on the security aspects, but what is not discussed is the contribution of social norms to explain the participation of the youth in such groups. The theory of planned behaviour by Ajzen (1991; 2011) takes social norms, as well as attitudes and perceived behaviour, into account when explaining behaviour. It links behaviour to intended behaviour. The theory started in 1980 as the theory of reasoned action, to predict an individual's intention to engage in a
behaviour at a specific time and place and was intended to explain all behaviours over which people have the ability to exert self-control.

![Figure 9.1. Theory of planned behaviour](image)

Source: Ajzen (1991)

According to Ajzen (1991; 2011), a planned behaviour is a function of intention. Intention is built on the relationship between three factors: attitude towards the behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control. Intended behaviour is related to the three constructs. Firstly, individual attitude relates to the example of a vegetable vendor wanting to change our attitude about his products so we will actually buy them. Attitudes, combined with social norms and perceived control and norms, actually predict our intentions. The second is social norms. Our social values are the things that we perceive our social environment deems important, such as equality, honesty, education, effort, perseverance, loyalty, faithfulness, conservation of the environment, and many other concepts. Beliefs are judgments about us and the world around us – they are usually generalisations. The third factor is perceived behavioural control. The factors affecting behavioural control fall into categories according to the type of instructions given and by who (Kupp, Schmitz & Habel, 2019), and the perception of what one can or cannot do. Perceived behavioural control can also lead directly to positive behaviour, because if you perceive that you must do something positive you will generally do it (Ajzen, 1991; 2011; see also Kupp et al., 2019;
Blackman, Buick, O’Flynn, O’Donnell & West, 2019). The question of who controls who, and how, raises the question of rights in different narratives within a given community and its culture. This brings us to the concept of a human rights culture and its relevance to our topic.

**Human rights culture**

Richard Rorty, in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), brings into the discussion a theoretical framework around human rights, rationality, and sentimentality. He talks of finding an alternative feature of what he calls ‘humanness’ (Tartaglia, 2011). As Rorty observes, “Traditionally, the name of the shared human attribute which supposedly ‘grounds’ morality is ‘rationality’ and ‘human rights culture’” (Rorty, 1979, p. xx). For Rorty, the human rights culture is what is left of human rights when we give up the idea that there are natural rights grounded in some aspect of our humanity itself. This is the idea underpinning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which remains as relevant today as it was on the day it was proclaimed in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly. The extraordinary vision and resolve of the drafters produced a document that, for the first time, articulated the rights and freedoms to which every human being is equally and inalienably entitled, declaring that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UN General Assembly, 2016).

The commitments made by party states in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are in themselves a mighty achievement. This Declaration promises to all the economic, social, political, cultural and civic rights that underpin a life free from want and fear (UN General Assembly, 2016). In 2015, the UN General Assembly reviewed the 1948 UN Charter on Human Rights. Part of the conclusion endorsed by the General Assembly states that human rights are the inalienable entitlement of all people, at all times, and in all places – people of every colour, from every race and ethnic group, whether or not they are disabled, citizens or migrants, no matter their sex, their class, their caste, their creed, their age or sexual orientation. This means that governments of any nation that ratified the 2015 declaration should
ensure that all human beings, whether refugees, migrants or citizens, enjoy equal rights. However, for Rorty, there are certain rights that are culturally specific. He argues that a given society can surrender to what is universally called human rights, but at the community there is always a human rights culture (Rorty, 1979).

In ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’, volume three of his *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, Rorty sets out three pragmatic ways one can apply rationality and human rights culture to human rights (Rorty, 1998). The first argument is based on ‘foundationalist’ philosophers like Plato, Aquinas and Kant, who tried to find premises that were true for all human beings. They developed a moral philosophy that argued that human beings were capable of having moral intuitions and justifying those moral intuitions independently. However, Rorty was unable to find such foundations; instead he purports that our moral community determines what is morally good, and we cannot go beyond our language and our historical conditions to find moral ‘truth-in-itself’. Rorty says that:

*The most philosophy can hope to do is to summarize our culturally influenced intuitions about the right thing to do in various situations. The summary is effected by formulating a generalization from which these intuitions can be deduced... That generalization is not supposed to ground our intuitions, but rather to summarize them.* (Rorty, 1998, p. 171).

The second reflection is based on Rorty as a pragmatist and is not about proving moral truths, but finding what works. This aspect of a human rights culture is about how best to fulfil the utopian vision sketched by philosophers like Plato, Aquinas and Kant; for instance:

*If the activities of those who attempt to achieve this foundationalist sort of knowledge appears to be of little use in actualizing this utopia. That is a reason to think there is no such knowledge. If it seems that most of the work of changing moral intuitions is being done by manipulating our feelings rather than by increasing our knowledge, that is a reason to think there is no knowledge of the sort that philosophers like Plato, Aquinas, and Kant hoped to get.* (Rorty, 1998, p. 172)
Therefore, appeals to reason and knowledge carry little weight, according to Rorty. His argument focuses on what works. His conclusion is that “the emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories” (Rorty, 1998, p. 172). This implies that those who use terrorist activities to hurt others, do not care that the victims are human beings. Their mind is set on what they see as the right thing to do. This conclusion forces Rorty to argue that:

*It does little good to point out to the people I have just described that many Muslims and women are good at mathematics or engineering or jurisprudence. Resentful young Nazi toughs were quite aware that many Jews were clever and learned, but this only added to the pleasure they took in beating such Jews. Nor does it do much good to get such people to read Kant and agree that one should not treat rational agents simply as means. For everything turns on who counts as a fellow human being, as a rational agent in the only relevant sense – the sense in which rational agency is synonymous with membership in our moral community.* (Rorty, 1998, p. 177)

The conclusion here is that hurting or killing another is not a problem if it is in line with the popular view. In this sense, rationality is superseded by adherence to cultural norms and views.

The third aspect by Rorty explores the manipulation of sentiments, through sentimental education and the promotion of cosmopolitan utopias. Rorty states that we should remain profoundly grateful to Plato and Kant, “not because they discovered truths but because they prophesied cosmopolitan utopias” (Rorty, 1998, p. 173); but if we put foundationalism behind us, we could “concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on sentimental education” and that would be the best way to promote such cosmopolitan utopias. For Rorty:

*That sort of education gets people of different kinds sufficiently well acquainted with one another that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as only quasi-human. The goal of this sort of manipulation of sentiment is to expand the reference of the terms ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us’. (Rorty, 1998, p. 176).*
This means that local community leadership is fundamental in imparting the right education to its population, especially the youth. This corresponds with what the ethicist Annette Baier called a ‘progress of sentiments’, whose progress is towards increasingly seeing the similarities between ourselves and others, instead of the differences (Baier, 1991, see also Baier, 1987). It is Baier’s work *Progress of Sentiments* that pushed Rorty (1998), as an anti-foundationalist, to critique the popular notion that ‘bad people’ are just deprived of moral knowledge (Rorty & Baier, 1995). Instead, he argues that a well-functioning human rights culture results from two conditions, ‘security’ and ‘sympathy’. By ‘security’, Rorty means:

…cultivating conditions of life which are sufficiently risk-free as to make differences from others not so essential to one’s self-respect, one’s sense of worth. And by ‘sympathy’ I mean the sort of reactions Athenians had more of after seeing Aeschylus’s The Persians than before, the sort that whites in the United States had more of after reading Uncle Tom’s Cabin than before, the sort we have more of after watching television programs about the genocide in Bosnia. (Rorty 1998, p. 180).

**Research methodology**

The study presented here is an ethnographic case study of Pumwani ward in Kamukunji Constituency carried out from January to July 2019. Kamukunji Constituency is located in the suburb of Eastleigh and has five wards, namely: Pumwani, Airbase (close to Eastleigh Airport), California, Eastleigh North and Eastleigh South (Gachie, 2019). Pumwani ward was selected for this study because of the experience of this community with violent extremism and migration. Following the civil war in Somalia that broke out in 1991, many Somali people sought asylum in the Somali-inhabited enclaves in Kenya, such as Pumwani, as migrants or refugees. The Somali community is known for its entrepreneurial spirit and the migrants quickly established themselves in the business sector, investing over USD 1.5 billion in the Eastlands (Shire, 2019; UNHCR, 2019; Kenya/Somalia, 2019). According to UNHCR (2019), Kenya currently hosts over 257,000 Somali refugees, with an estimated 22,000 people living and working in Nairobi, particularly in Eastleigh.
This study is based on discussions and interviews conducted over six weeks with the KCPN, which is formed by the leaders of all the five wards to run activities to divert the attention of youth away from criminal gangs and radicalisation leading to violent extremism. For the study, the researcher immersed himself in the community, including by participating in community meetings and holding conversations and interviews with community leaders and other members of the community. The researcher built trust through intermediaries who introduced him to the community, and by regularly visiting the site and participating in community meetings and conversations (held in Swahili and English). Notes were taken of the meetings, which were analysed and compared.

The social environment in Pumwani ward is dominated by the large, and beautiful, Riadhaa Mosque. After the attacks in 2014, the Government of Kenya accused the leadership of the mosque of encouraging extremism. The leadership took responsibility to investigate the situation and discovered that local youth through the mosque were in fact involved in violent extremism, which had been infiltrated by Al-Shabaab. This study investigates the work of organisations, such as KCPN, including with interfaith groups and other community-based organisations actively working in Pumwani to support and guide the youth to prevent them from being radicalised. The KCPN was established in 2014 and officially registered as a community based organisation in 2016. From his interactions with KCPN leaders, the researcher learnt that there are other organisations actively involved in improving the situation in Kamukunji, including the Muslim Youth Alliance, Life and Peace Institute, Centre for Christian Muslim Relations in Eastleigh, and Foundation for Somalia. The next sections present the results of the research.

The rise of extremism in Riadhaa Mosque

The most startling revelation of the study, and perhaps the major driver of radicalisation in Pumwami, was the relationship between the youth and the elders managing the Riadhaa Mosque. The mosque had
been taken over by youth prior to the attacks, and the elders had been pushed out. In trying to understand why this happened, the KCPN came to the following conclusion:

First, the elders were infiltrated by radicals who misguided the youth into joining terror groups eight years back. The period 2009–2014 saw many youth join Al-Shabaab. The Mosque had become a recruitment centre. Those who refused to agree were eliminated. Second, the elders were also not all supporting radicalisation. But now they were infiltrated by leaders with a different ideology. Third, the fear of police and fear of revenge from Al-Shabaab pushed the youth to unite and think of how to tackle the social challenges they faced. Fourth, The desire for a positive narrative could only succeed if the youth controlled the mosque, they thought. (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019)

Control of the mosque also meant control of its funds: “The mosque generated a lot of revenue from well wishers. The youth leadership thought by controlling the Mosque, they would succeed in managing funds” (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019).

Omar and Salim Juma, who worship at the mosque, explained that the issue driving the conflict was that the money donated to the mosque was presumed by the youth as not being used to fight poverty. What was seen as lack of equal resource distribution was a great driver of youth radicalisation and crime. So the KCPN and the mosque leadership looked for an amicable way that the youth and the elders could work together to solve these issues. Reconsidering the way the mosque was led was a priority for KCPN when it was established in 2014:

KCPN suggested equal representation to enhance good governance in the Kamukunji Constituency. The youth might have thought of the mosque as having money they should use for their short term objectives, but the KCPN proposed long-term projects. The result was the formation of a credit lending entity to support the youth in borrowing money for business. While the mosque handled Muslim youth, the local faith-based groups were also encouraged to help other youth through their church. Those who were coming back from frontline engagement with Al-Shabaab were
induced into corrective and healing programes. One such programe is Kumekucha (a new dawn). (Orantes, Organizing Secretary and Youth Football Coach for KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019).

The community organisations realised that the youth felt left out and they wanted to be heard. The problems of the youth included:

...lack of employment, extreme poverty, fragmented families, environments of moral break-down, drug and alcohol abuse and petty crime, lack of education support, lack of law and order, and lack of community collaboration and leadership to resolve these issues. (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019)

These problems gave rise to frustration and disorientation. The mosque leaders, decided to start income-generating activities as a way of countering extremism. The KCPN Chairman shared:

There have been different narratives about the mosque and its leadership. But from my point of view, I say that the youth felt that the time had come for the leadership to respond to their needs. From 2008 to 2012 the leadership of the mosque was preaching about the bad things that the youth were experiencing in Kamukunji Constituency. They highlighted the poverty situation, broken homes, police brutality, and no identity cards which meant one could not get employment, unemployment. And now the issue of Al-Shabaab giving hope to the youth has became part of the narrative. (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019)

The leadership in the mosque was offering the possibility of joining Al-Shabaab, with the potential of having something to live for, a strong community and a goal in life: “Going to Somalia offered great opportunity, the leaders would say. No need to suffer but go to Somalia and join the Jihadi army, no papers, no identity card no police brutality” (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019).

However, the reality of joining Al-Shabaab did not give youth what was promised, and although many youth were disappointed, it was also very difficult to leave the group:
Once in Somalia, life was unbearable. Those who wanted to return found it extremely difficult. If they escaped and came back then they would be followed and killed. Spies were planted all over to flush out the returnees. If not killed by the security agents, then Al-Shabaab would use its own networks to kill deserters. So, for some, it was better to escape to Yemen, the Arabian Peninsular or to Europe… (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji Ward, 15 July 2019)

The security approach taken in Kamukunji further aggravated the situation:

The whole situation was guided by poor intelligence without the local community being part of the process. The interrogations by the security agents were so brutal that they exacerbated the situation. This played into the Al-Shabaab propaganda, instilling the sense that the youth were not wanted by the government. This promoted the alternative that it was better to fight and die as a Jihadi than to be beaten by the security forces. This pressure from the security agents saw many sympathisers join the Al-Shabaab movement. Some of the recruits came from public universities. The most well publicised was that of the Jomo Kenyatta University graduate with an engineering degree and a law student who was behind the 2015 Garrisa University Good Friday attack. (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019)

The security approach based on repression was counterproductive and when the KCPN was established it sought to develop a new approach.

**Establishing new social norms**

The KCPN identified six critical areas to work in to promote alternative social norms (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019):

- Security action that is based on desirable legal and social norms
- Interfaith dialogue and the involvement of community leaders
- Providing new role models of success to the youth
• Creating pride about Kamukunji Constituency as a historic place
• Embedding education in a comprehensive development approach
• Promoting youth participation in leadership

First, the KCPN engaged in meetings with police and security forces to point out that their approach was counterproductive and that unless the youth in the community themselves were engaged, the problem of terrorism could not be addressed. It was emphasised that the security actions should be based on behaviour that would give an example to the youth and that was coherent with values that would promote security.

The KCPN leaders decided that it was important to locate the problem within the community and closely worked with local leaders, who had much support. They contacted local Member of Parliament, Yusuf Hassan, himself a victim of violent extremism. During the 2013 election campaigns a group of people threw a grenade at his feet tearing his leg muscles to shreds. He had to undergo multiple corrective surgeries on his leg. Another leader working with KCPN is a famous former football player, Orantes, who is inspiring to the youth and provides an important role model. He engages the youth in news platforms about Kamukunji Constituency. Orantes and others have been involved in improving the image of Kamukunji by looking at its rich history.

In order to address the religious extremism, it was critical for KCPN to counsel the youth on faith. In order to do so, an interfaith programme was established to strengthen understanding and knowledge within and between the different faiths. KCPN partners with St John’s Community Centre to provide leadership training and counselling. St John’s also provides rooms in which both boys and girls can do their homework. KCPN works with the Programme for Christian-Muslim relations in Africa (POCMURA), Christian Muslims Interreligious Relations Network and local faith based in order to address the religious extremism, it was critical for KCPN to counsel the youth on faith. In order to do so, an interfaith programme was established to strengthen understanding and knowledge within and between the different faiths. KCPN partners with St John’s Community Centre to provide leadership training and counselling. St John’s also provides rooms in which both boys and girls can do their homework. KCPN works with the Programme for Christian-Muslim relations in Africa (POCMURA), Christian Muslims Interreligious Relations Network and local faith based
groups (within mosques and Christian churches) to advocate for interreligious dialogue.

The young energetic Director of KCPN, Mr Juma Salim, told the researchers:

>Youth recruitment into violent extremism was tearing the community apart. Everyone looked at the Somali community as the breeding ground. The animosity was growing and hatred was burning inside everyone like twigs sprayed with petrol to burn. It was just a matter of time and the whole community would be at war with each other. This is when the community leaders from the Muslim and Christian fraternity started inter faith dialogue. From inter faith dialogue emerged the elders community from both faiths. (Salim Juma, Director of KCPN, interview Kamukunji, 17 July 2019)

The elders of the different faiths now meet regularly, including the leaders of the Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox faiths. This has had an important impact:

>We realised that there is a lot in common between our faiths. We started to understand that there is more in common than there are differences. There is no reason for us as leaders to create division. In fact we started to counsel understanding of the different faiths, and this also helped to increase knowledge of the own faith and a more pastoral approach to faith was the result. (Muslim religious leader, interview, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019)

Due to the work on creating inter-religious understanding, the approach to education also needed to be revised:

>The community was forced to re-think how knowledge is imparted to the youth. The single system of education, where Madaras was the only system, was negotiated and the syllabus expanded to include other disciplines. Also, Madarasas expanded so that children from other faiths could learn together. (Salim Juma, Director of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019)

KCPN leaders established that out of every 10 radicalised youth joining violent extremist groups, 2 were well-educated sympathisers. It
was, therefore, critical to identify a response that would embed education in a comprehensive development programme. KCPN actively prepared and appointed youth leaders to lead the organisation, supported by elders of the community. Salim Juma is one of the youth leader, and works closely with other youth to lead the organisation. Girls and young women are also actively engaged as leaders in the organisation. On 1 August 2019 this led to the establishment of a further decentralised approach launched by KCPN, through the “formation of Kamakinji sub-county countering violent extremism network”. The meeting was attended by sub-county leaders of different faiths (W, personal communication including photograph with Mirjam Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 1 August 2019).

Omar, one of the community leaders, a Muslim studying at Tangaza Catholic University in Nairobi, echoed Salim Juma’s input. He testified as follows:

*Due to the educational programme [University in the Slums Programme in Huruma], my mind has been opened and I have started seeing different realities about life, I did not know about. For instance, I did not see how different faiths could collaborate to fight extremism. But the exposure at Tangaza University slums programme and workshops at St John’s Community Centre, Pumwani, showed me that it is possible to learn from one-another. This has changed my mind about the Muslim faith in relation to other faiths.* (Omar, community leader, interview, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019)

Kamukunji has an important heritage. Established by white colonists on the bank of the river outside the historic city of Nairobi, it has been a place of resistance. The freedom fighters used to meet in this area and people would assemble to take hope and inspiration from their speeches. The word ‘kamukunji’ actually means ‘assembly’.

Freedom fighters like Kenyatta, Tom Mboya and Achieng Aneko lived and worked in Kamukunji in the 1950s. The house of Jomo Kenyatta, the first President of Kenya and father of the current
president, is located at the centre of Kamukunji. This important legacy was promoted to give youth a sense of pride and direction.

During a tour to see the important locations in the area, I was introduced to more places of political importance. Since the introduction of multi-party democracy in Kenya, Kamukunji has been associated with change. The famous Sabababa Rally on 7 July 1990 was addressed there. In July 1990, Kenya experienced a momentous political development that not only shaped the present political scene, but also laid a strong foundation for the 2010 Constitution. In early July 1990, former Cabinet ministers Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia and Raila Odinga were arrested and detained for demanding the re-introduction of multi-party democracy. Despite a ban by the government, thousands of Kenyans marched in defiance of a previously unchallengeable regime to make their way to Nairobi’s Kamukunji grounds to press the case for democracy. The marchers were led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro, Timothy Njoya, James Orengo, Paul Muite, Gitobu Imanyara, and Martin Shikuku, among others – famously known as fathers of democracy in Kenya (Oluoch, 2013).

Since July 1990, this gathering place, ‘Kamukunji’, has been used by politicians to launch new ideas in society. If one wants to be a national leader, he/she must address a ‘kamukunji’, a gathering of people, there. It is considered necessary to garner political support in Kamukunji if one is to rise to leadership in Kenya.

Programmes to transform the youth

Lack of protection is still one of the key concerns that youth express: “The pain and fear we have is for disappearances” (Participant, focus group discussion, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019). Asked about such disappearances, one participant in the focus group discussion explained: “Security forces may come and lift you from your bed and you will never be seen again. You never return. We never hear from you again. We just don’t know what happened to you” (Participant, focus group discussion, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019).
In order to counter this fear, KCPN felt it had to come up with a clear approach to strengthen citizens’ rights and governance accountability in the Kamukunji area. To this end they set up regular meetings with relevant government authorities, including the police and security-related administration. This has helped to build trust and to fund ways of improving communication when problems arise (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019).

In order to strengthen citizens’ rights, the following key approaches have been developed by KCPN:

- Youth have been offered training on the Kenya Constitution and the law on marginalisation and anti-social behaviour. The organisation Kituo Cha Sheria provides legal aid education and has offered training as a key to changing youth’s understanding of their rights. Legal aid programmes have also been established to support youth and to help them when their rights are violated by the security or police forces or other authorities.
- In order to deal with trauma, which is at a high level among members of the community, the project Kumekucha has been established to help youth and families to deal with the death of young people, through what they call a resilience framework. There are 282 families in this programme, which means these families have each lost relatives through crime or violent extremism.
- KCPN has introduced the Chichanue Initiative to counter crime and extremism. At the start of 2019, the project brought together 310 participants to discuss ways of countering extremism through income-generating activities and other initiatives.
- Some of the economic activities developed with the youth are motorbike transport, public toilets and hotshowers for a fee, miraa ‘khat’, games like ludo, spare-parts shops, open home industries like making baskets, and technical skills like plumbing and maintenance.
• New activities have been developed to support leisure activities to help build community spirit including football teams, running (including marathons), and training in DJing, music producing/promotion, dancing, photography, and social media, etc. Their most famous dance troupe is called FBI (Focus Beyond Initiative). The dancers from FBI won the national competition and are now competing in the US for the world title. KCPN feel encouraged by this group. It is a good example of their own endeavour to bring hope to the youth in Kamukunji Constituency.

• A young leader, Whitney, has been empowered to establish a programme for single mothers who are very young, and there are many of them (W, personal communication with Mirjam Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 1 August 2019).

Majengo Slum in Pumwani has been a known for prostitution since before World War II. Women are stigmatised and often traumatised from the violence they have experienced. This affects the youth. KCPN came up with a strong empowerment strategy. Women of all ages were organised into cooperatives to run transport. Women now operate minibuses, known as ‘Matatu’, as public transport. They also have motorbike riders working for them. One of the women leaders, called Fatima, explained that some women also had trained as events organisers, which could meant they could work setting up wedding receptions, political rallies, or fundraisers. In some wards, the women manage table bankings The Alamat Sacco for savings and credit lending is doing very well. With Kenya leading on mobile phone banking, the women have been very successful in credit lending. Khadija and Mueni are some of the women involved in event organising and credit lending. They acknowledge the good work done by KCPN. They say that youth in their community are busy now.

Part of the fight for a wider space for democracy in Kenya is to give youth opportunities in education, which would prepare them for the workforce as well as for leadership. With KCPN on the ground, youth are going to university and acting as role models in Pumwani. For instance, Whitney is an engineering student at the Kenya Institute of
Highway Engineering. She passionately emphasised that: “Youth need an enabling environment in order to thrive. KCPN has embarked on building this space for youth” (Whitney, engineering student, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019). Girls like Whitney are rallying other youth to go to school.

Conclusion

After the terror attacks by Al-Shabaab hit Kenya, the community in Kamukunji Consistency found itself fighting radicalisation within their own community, with Riadhaa Mosque as the epicentre. This chapter investigates the approach of the community-based Kamukunji Community Peace Network to counter the radicalisation of its youth. The theoretical framework for the study was provided by the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; 2011) and the concept of a human rights culture (Rorty, 1998).

In order to achieve results, KCPN had to conduct an in-depth analysis of the problems that had led to the situation in which many of the youth were lured by extremist groups, supported by the local mosque, which had been taken over by radicalised youth. KCPN reconstructed the history of what had happened, but also listened to the youth about the problems that had resulted in their radicalisation. After identifying the frustrations and problems of the youth, KCPN set out a comprehensive strategy. It brought in youth leaders to direct the programmes, supported by elders in the organisation, and famous people and people of standing as positive role models for the youth.

KCPN found that the violence committed by police and security forces to curb security challenges was counterproductive and exacerbated the marginalisation of the youth, who felt that they were not entitled to rights – which were there on paper, but not in reality. Rorty emphasises that rights are only available if there is a human rights culture supporting such rights. In discussions with the authorities, these problems were confronted and legal aid organisations were brought in to make sure that youth had access to justice and were knowledgeable about their rights.
An important component of the approach taken by KCPN was to strengthen social values among youth in the community through interfaith dialogue, which has helped the religious leadership to provide a common foundation for the community, based on a shared understanding of what people from different faiths have in common, rather than divisions. KCPN’s approach also focused on providing youth with positive examples and a positive image of their community and its history. These narratives about the important legacy of Kamukunji have strengthening a positive identity associated with the place.

To tackle problems of marginalisation, a comprehensive approach was taken to provide education and livelihoods, as well as to support community organisation, including for women and girls. Today Kamukunji is thriving and, despite its challenges, has strong social cohesion; it is no longer seen as a breeding ground for radicalisation. In this chapter, I have argued that while the government could control crime through security enforcement, it was unable to prevent the radicalisation that occurred in Kamukunji. In Kamukunji, the local community stepped in to organise ways of managing behaviour among the youth by strengthening social norms. The elders and youth leaders were enabled to direct how the youth behaved at work, school, mosques and churches, and during leisure. By strengthening shared social norms, the KCPN directed the behaviour of youth in new and positive ways, which has been more effective than the repressive security approaches, which merely exacerbated the problem.

Establishing strong social norms, through which youth find a place to contribute to the community and provide leadership for transformation, has been the key to addressing the problems of youth and providing them with a sense of participation in, and responsibility for, the community. By strengthening education on their rights and providing support to protect these, the norms based on the protection of human rights of people, from all faiths, were strengthened. The role of the community elders in supporting youth leaders to take responsibility for the protection and promotion of such rights has also helped to strengthen the accountability of the...
Kenyan government and security forces for respecting and upholding these rights. While this may not always be the reality, the result has been strong norm setting in a rights-based approach, which has led to a rights-based culture of dealing with tensions and conflict. The youth in Kamukunji are now the owners of their future, and proudly hold the legacy of this historic place in their hands, associated no longer with violence, but indeed with kamukunji, the ‘assembly’.

References


Part IV. Livelihoods
Chapter 10

Moving on to Make a Living: The Secondary Migration of Eritrean Refugees in Tigray, Ethiopia

Bereket Godifay Kahsay

Introduction

In its 2016 report, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea found that there are grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed in Eritrea since 1991 (UN Human Rights Council, 2016, p. 83), resulting in thousands of youth fleeing the country. Tigray, in northern Ethiopia, is the main first destination for Eritrean refugees. Currently, there are four refugee camps and one screening centre open only to Eritrean refugees: Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba – Shimelba being the oldest and Hitsats the most recent.

Unlike in Eritrea, in Ethiopia, Eritrean refugees are free from indefinite conscription and the violation of their human rights (GSDRC, 2016, p. 1). They are provided with different basic services by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
and concerned organisations, including income-generating opportunities. However, many refugees move on from Ethiopia due to lack of education and employment opportunities, as well as lack of basic services in the camps (UNHCR, 2016, p. 21).

To prevent secondary migration from Ethiopia to third countries, many livelihood projects have been put in place to support the refugees. Ironically, the major challenge facing livelihood projects is secondary migration, which results in beneficiary drop-out from training and income-generating programmes. For example, for the humanitarian organisation ZOA’s project Hope for Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia (HOPE), the challenge is beneficiaries dropping out of vocational skills training (ZOA, 2016, p. 14). Hence, this chapter looks at why refugees are dropping out of livelihood and education projects, and if the lack of such services is a factor in refugees moving on from Ethiopia.

**Eritrean refugees in northern Ethiopia**

Eritrean refugees living in the refugee camps in Tigray have their own administrative structure. Every matter in the camps is managed by the camp’s Refugee Central Committee (RCC), with close supervision by the Ethiopian government’s Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA). The RCC for each camp is responsible for selecting beneficiaries to receive support, including from livelihood projects.

In Tigray, 75% of the registered Eritrean refugee population are children and youths (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 2). The youth category, which is defined as 15 to 24 years of age (UNHCR, 2017b), accounts for 40.3% of the camp population. Migration on from these camps is common among young Eritrean refugees, who initially seek protection in Shire, Ethiopia (USCRI, 2016, p.2), which is the capital of north-western Tigray and the location of four refugee camps.

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47 The author is currently working in Tigray as area manager for ZOA, creating livelihood opportunities to help young refugees refrain from embarking on illegal secondary migration.
Despite the high influx of refugees, the actual camp population of the refugee camps in Shire has remained relatively stable. In 2017, the registered number of refugees reached more than 150,000, but the actual camp population as at September 2017 was 38,321 (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 1). By June 2018, the camp population had reached 40,820 (UNHCR, 2018). From July 2017 to June 2018, there were 20,817 new arrivals in the camp, out of which 17.7% were unaccompanied and separated children. For the same period, the number of refugees missing from the refugee camps with unknown destination was 23,034 (UNHCR, 2018). Due to poor conditions within the Shire refugee camps and the lack of livelihood opportunities, refugees find it impossible to live comfortably and with hope for the future, and many move on.

Research questions

This study was conducted to investigate the livelihood situation in the refugee camps in Tigray, Ethiopia, with a special focus on livelihood projects implemented from 2015–2017 and the secondary migration of Eritrean refugees from Ethiopia. The research looked at the relationship between secondary migration and livelihood programmes by assessing the livelihood intervention strategies used by the implementing agencies and identifying the livelihood opportunities and challenges facing Eritrean refugees in the study area.

The three main research questions were:

- What are the intervention strategies of the livelihood projects targeting Eritrean refugees living in Tigray, northern Ethiopia?
- What are the livelihood challenges and opportunities facing Eritrean refugees in Tigray, Ethiopia?
- Why are Eritrean refugees moving on from Ethiopia, even when supported by several livelihood projects?
It is hoped that the findings of this research will provide input for policymakers, project designers, and practitioners dealing with the livelihoods of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia.

**Methodology**

The research design for this study was descriptive and explanatory. In the data gathering phase of the study, both secondary and primary data were used. The researcher used qualitative and quantitative data collection methods, including: a quantitative survey, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews, as well as the analysis of secondary sources, to ascertain the livelihoods of Eritrean refugees living in Tigray refugee camps and Shire town. The researcher supervised the data collection process, which was conducted by nine data collectors. Eight individuals participated in the survey, two each in Hitsats, Mai Ayni, and Adi Harush and one each in Shimelba camp and Shire town. One expert and some key informants participated in the focus group discussions. The data collection tools were developed in English, but the actual data were collected using local languages (Tigrigna and Kunama). The data collection was conducted from 28 October to 15 November 2017. Table 10.1 summarises the respondents, sampling methods, and data collection methods used.

*Table 10.1. Respondents, sampling methods and data collection methods*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Sampling method</th>
<th>Data collection method</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>407 households from refugee camps and Shire town</td>
<td>Stratified (by camp), random sampling</td>
<td>Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 staff from organisations running livelihood programmes for refugees in the refugee camps and Shire town</td>
<td>Purposeful</td>
<td>Key informant interview</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Stratified sampling was used to select 407 households from the 4 refugee camps in Tigray and Shire town to participate in the survey, using simple random sampling to identify the actual sample beneficiaries. Accordingly, 128 refugees from Hitsats, 109 from Mai Ayni, 47 from Shimelba, 109 from Adi Harush, and 14 from Shire were sampled. Of the total number of respondents to the survey, 242 (59.5%) were men and 165 (40.5%) were women. The sample households were taken from the refugee camps and Shire town based on their proportion. For the purposes of this study, a household was defined as a group of family members living together. The respondent taking part in the survey was the head of the household. In the case of more than one household residing in one shelter, only one household was asked to participate. A list of house numbers of the existing shelters was used as a sampling frame.

In addition to the survey, 9 focus group discussions were held with RCC members and groups of youth (comprising youth who benefited from livelihood interventions and those who were never targeted by any organisation) in all camps. In addition, 12 key informant interviews were conducted with representatives of organisations implementing livelihood or education programmes and from the monitoring agencies to validate the findings. Only one of the key informants was a woman. The questionnaire aimed at gathering information on the extent to which the refugees had been targeted by livelihood projects, the application of livelihood strategies, the existing challenges and opportunities they faced, and the perspective of the refugees on leaving the camps. The key informant interviews and focus group discussions were designed to gather information on the beneficiary selection process, absolute value chain development, and relationship between livelihood projects and the secondary migration of refugees. The qualitative data sources were also used to obtain facts about refugees’ livelihood strategies, challenges and opportunities.
The quantitative data was collected through an open data kit (ODK), using android mobile phones, and analysed via the software in its package. The general tools of analysis are descriptive and explanatory; hence, the data is presented in tables and using other numerical data presentation mechanisms. The qualitative data from secondary analyses, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews is presented using explanation tools to clearly describe the livelihoods of Eritrean refugees living in the Shire area. The next section presents the secondary analysis (of livelihood interventions in refugee settings), followed by the findings of the study (on livelihood project strategies, livelihood challenges and opportunities, and secondary migration) and a brief conclusion.

Livelihood interventions in refugee settings

Livelihood interventions are usually influenced by a variety of economic, social, political and environmental factors (De Vriese, 2006, p. 31). A successful programme is one that considers many issues like physical location, the availability of food and natural resources, and access to markets, among other things (De Vriese, 2006, p. 31). In the implementation of livelihood projects for refugees, various challenges exist in the form of both internal and external constraints. Lack of organisational capacity and expertise, inability to operationalise and achieve 'sustainability', difficulty in reaching the programme’s intended beneficiaries, and questionable positive impact are some of the main internal challenges facing livelihood projects in refugee settings (Phillips, 2004, pp. 6–8). External factors include restrictive governmental policies and practices and the limited scope of the refugee market (Phillips, 2004, pp. 6–8).

In addition, “The host country’s asylum policy is indeed a defining factor in inhibiting or facilitating the ability of refugees to establish and secure their livelihoods” (De Vriese, 2006, p. 31). “[W]hen host governments do not allow refugees to settle amongst host communities or do not recognize diplomas or certificates, refugees’ access to the labour market may, in fact, be impeded” (De Vriese,
2006, p. 31). This is also the case in Ethiopia. Being able to drive and hold a driving licence, for example, is marketable and many refugees have an interest in this; unfortunately, such certification is not legally supported in Ethiopia. However, the Ethiopian government has recently made ‘Nine Pledges’ in support of refugees, one of which is “[t]o provide work permits to refugees […]” (UNHCR, 2017a, p.1). With these pledges, the Ethiopian policy is changing towards the Uganda model of integrating refugees which is widely praised by political and humanitarian actors (Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019).

Livelihood project strategies in Tigray refugee camps

Livelihood project strategies can be classified into supply and demand-side strategies. The supply-side strategies focus on the human or financial capital of refugees, e.g., building their skills and education, increasing their access to information and communication technologies (ICTs), or providing them with livelihood assets or financial resources. On the other hand, demand-side strategies aim to expand the link between refugees, employers, and markets for labour, goods and services, by either directly creating jobs or connecting refugees to employers (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, pp. 6–7). The research findings on livelihood project strategies are presented in this section.

Supply-side strategies

A number of implementing organisations were found to be operating in the refugee camps in Tigray. The ARRA monitoring and evaluation officer listed the following organisations as providing services to refugees in the camps during the study period: the Norwegian Refugee Council, ZOA, Opportunities Industrialization Centers Ethiopia (OICE), the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus Development and Social Services Commission (also called Mekane Yesus), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Innovative Humanitarian Solutions (IHS), World Food Programme, Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection, and Catholic Relief Services (Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-face, Shire, 3 November 2017). These organisations have generally agreed on collective strategies for implementing livelihood projects.
These strategies, as described by experts from the implementing agencies, include creating livelihood opportunities for refugees to improve their household income/resilience, focusing on youth at risk of migration and vulnerable households (women-headed households) or individuals who do not have any external support; providing support for vulnerable women and youth groups to improve their income/resilience; working jointly with the key actors in all sectors and community-based structures; and adhering to the 75/25 principle\textsuperscript{48} to address the livelihood issues of both refugees and local communities and ensure peaceful coexistence. Implementing agencies seek to generate strategically-designed, needs-based and market-driven livelihood opportunities to boost the camp and local economy. They often use beneficiaries to implement livelihood projects to ensure the sustainability and ownership of projects. In most cases, refugees’ interests and aspirations are taken into account through the RCC and, at some point, through their direct participation in livelihood projects. These strategies are aimed at providing refugees with the skills they need to enhance their livelihoods.

To comprehend the supply-side strategies, the survey and focus group discussions looked in detail at the activities of livelihood projects. It was found that over the three years of the study (2015–2017) such projects have provided refugees primarily with vocational skills training, business development skills training, and revolving funds to start businesses, as well as start-up materials such as livestock (such as chicken and goats) and agricultural materials including seeds for backyard gardening. Local and international humanitarian organisations, mainly, the Norwegian Refugee Council, ZOA, OICE and Mekane Yesus, have been involved in providing vocational skills trainings. According to the key informants, these organisations have

\textsuperscript{48} The 75/25 principle (sometimes called the 70/30 principle) is a customary practice resulting from an agreement between implementing organisations, monitoring agencies (ARRA and UNHCR) and donors to take 75\% of target beneficiaries from the refugee population in the camps and 25\% from among those living in the host community, as explained by the ARRA monitoring and evaluation officer (Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-face, Shire, 3 November 2017).
provided training in food preparation, barbering and beauty salon work, mobile and electronics maintenance, metal and woodwork, plumbing, tailoring, traditional garment making, leather crafting, electric installation, brick making, leather crafting for shoe and ball production, photography and videoing, construction, masonry, soap production, and ICTs.

These trainings were selected based on market assessments, as stated by the livelihood experts from the implementing agencies. The first criterion for the provision of training was its feasibility in the local market, in and around the refugee camp. Practical factors were also considered, including the aspirations of the refugees and local laws.

Although many organisations have been providing vocational skills training in the refugee camps, the key informant interviews revealed that the supply of start-up kits for youth who have completed training is limited due to lack of funds. Moreover, some organisations were giving vocational skills training in the form of educational interventions, without considering their application to future businesses in the camps. As a result, hundreds of trainees completed training subjects every semester, but their chance of obtaining employment or the required start-up kits was low.

The RCC representatives in the focus group discussions said that some other livelihood implementing organisations were making start-up materials available for all their graduates, as well as the graduates of other organisations. However, the time gap between completion of the training and the supply of start-up materials was found to affect migration intention, resulting in refugees moving on while waiting for the distribution of work materials. Many of the implementing organisations took months, if not years, to supply the materials to skills training graduates. Business development skills (mainly skills like financial management, preparation of business plans, and entrepreneurship skills) are also being provided in the refugee camps. Business development skills and entrepreneurship training is aimed at enhancing the skills and knowledge of the refugees to enable them to produce profitable and competitive business proposals and manage
their respective businesses. These trainings usually last for a maximum of five days and aim to enable the beneficiaries to identify business types of their choice to undertake in the camp and request a certain amount of cash or materials with which to start the business.

The study found that the organisations implementing livelihood projects use different modalities. Some organisations are able to facilitate access to local financial institutions to enable beneficiaries to open saving accounts through partnerships with the local government, which monitors financial circulations. The Dutch NGO ZOA, for example, has developed a cluster association that allows business groups to have a common bank account with a local credit and saving institution in Hitsats camp called Dedebit, which, according to an ARRA programme officer, was a pioneer in facilitating this kind of service. Other organisations, in particular a local NGO called Mekane Yesus, have followed the self-help group modality, under which groups have a common bank account in which they make weekly savings, which results in them receiving a matching fund from the organisation.

Agri-business, mainly the supply of chickens and goats, has been another livelihood intervention in the refugee camps. For example, as mentioned in ZOA’s annual report, *Hope for Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia*, Mekane Yesus provided 900 goats and 1,000 chickens for 300 and 200 households, respectively, in Shimelba camp in 2016 (ZOA, 2016, p. 12). However, the distribution of chickens without food and appropriate coops has resulted in the death of chickens. Goat production is unrealistic in all refugee camps, as pointed out by the ARRA zonal monitoring and evaluation officer (Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-face, Shire, 3 November 2017). The provision of agricultural materials for refugees and members of host communities, including small farming tools and seeds of different vegetables and cereals, was another livelihood intervention reported by the respondents.

49 Dedebit is the name for a local saving and credit institution operating Tigray regional state, with many branches in urban and rural areas.
The livelihood implementing organisations appeared to be very strong in capacitating the refugee population to improve their living conditions. In the timeframe of the study, it was observed that supply-side livelihood strategies were given a lot of attention and the resources received from donors were transferred to the beneficiaries in the form of training, working capital and assets such as animals. However, although there are many livelihood projects in the refugee camps, the survey found that only 45% of respondents had participated in a livelihood project between 2015 and 2017. This means that the livelihood interventions being provided do not match the number of refugees who need support: the refugees participating in the projects provided by existing agencies number hundreds each year, while tens of thousands of youth need such training. The survey also found that 28% of the youth who participated in the study have received vocational skills training alone or vocational skills training plus start-up capital in the form of cash or materials to start their own income-generating activities. From this group, only 39% of them ranked the quality of the vocational skills training as ‘very good’.

From the 55% who said they had not benefited from any livelihood-related activities in the stated timeframe (2015–2017), the survey found that 18% of them want to get vocational skills training, 8% of them want to acquire business development skills training, 26% of them want to obtain vocational skills training plus start-up capital to start their income-generating activities, 33% of them want to obtain basic business development skill training plus start-up capital to start their business, and only 3% of them want to be involved in agribusiness, while 12% said they want to be employed using their former skills.

50 By the time of data collection, there were 22,679 refugee households in the refugee camps and Shire town. From this figure, 39.5% (more than 9,000) were children and 12% were unaccompanied and separated children, which accounts for about 3,000 households. So, counting the beneficiaries, 45% is around 8,000 households. The actual target of the Norwegian Refugee Council and ZOA in the study years was about 4,000 individuals. So, the findings show that the beneficiaries of all organisations in all camps that were targeted by livelihood projects appeared to be 45%. However, this figure may differ from camp to camp, as in Hitsats, for example, the number of youth is very high, which could result in them constituting less than 45% of livelihood beneficiaries proportionally.
qualifications. The reason why so few Eritrean refugees wished to find employment within the refugee camps is the very low monthly wage fixed for them by UNHCR and ARRA, which is only USD 26. As key informants from ARRA in Hitsats camp noted, refugees hired as social workers, child-friendly space animators, and community mobilisers etc. are not selected for any livelihood benefits, hence, had no other source of income than their monthly wage.

In general, the study found that Eritrean refugees do want to receive business-related training and funds to start their own businesses. They usually prefer to continue using the qualifications they had previously used in Eritrea, instead of learning new skills from the organisations providing livelihood training. Generally, the livelihood intervention organisations are strong in providing supply-side livelihood strategies and considering the interests of the target beneficiaries. In addition, the services supplied seem to be congruent with the aspirations of the refugees, although the specific trainings and start-up support interventions were found to be somehow divergent from the interests of the beneficiaries.

**Demand-side strategies**

Demand-side livelihood strategies are those that deal with market linkages, the identification of demand for products and services, and government policies related to refugees’ economic activities. The majority of refugees surveyed (60%) perceived the business services being provided as market-oriented and agreed that the organisations providing livelihood programmes have considered the demands of the market when selecting business types. However, 23% of them said that the livelihood projects provided are not based on their livelihood aspirations.

In general, most of the livelihood project interventions were strategically designed to meet the market demands of the refugee camps, as identified in the needs assessments and reviews of the implementation of similar previous projects. However, all livelihood project interventions experienced a big problem with market linkages, which has been given less attention by implementing agencies, as
explained by the ARRA zonal monitoring and evaluation officer (Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-face, Shire, 3 November 2017). To illustrate, the agencies did not work to create market linkages within the camp or with local markets, which resulted in most of the livelihood projects not producing the results they expected.

The businesses started by refugees with the help of implementing agencies are experiencing problems selling their products and buying materials to increase their production scale. In addition to these market linkage problems, refugees are having difficulty obtaining camp exit permits to enable them to obtain raw materials for production and access to nearby towns to buy materials at wholesale prices, although the Ethiopian government has allowed refugees to access the nearby town with restricted camp exit licences, as stated in many of the focus group discussions. This, by implication, means that the livelihood strategies of the implementing agencies are imperfect in dealing with demand-side issues, particularly linking refugees’ businesses to local markets.

**Value chains**

The value chain concept refers to “the way in which a set of activities by numerous actors construct a product consumed by the end user” (Chawiche, 2005, p. 13). A value chain not only includes the production stage, but all nodes that influence, add value to, or reshape the product (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001, cited in Chawiche, 2005, p. 13). So, the development of a value chain in this chapter refers to the establishment of a complete chain with value addition to all the nodes that appear on both the supply and demand side.

Value chains have relevance to the success of any business. Understanding a value chain and opportunities to add value to each stage improves the camp economy and creates market linkages between refugees and refugees, and refugees and locals. Eventually, refugees are able to scale-up their businesses by learning from their business activities, thereby augmenting their earnings. A carefully developed value chain can diversify the livelihood opportunities of refugees and members of the host community, improve the
entrepreneurship skills and business knowledge of refugees, enhance the self-confidence of refugees, and help youth avoid falling into criminal activities or substance abuse.

Figure 10.1 depicts the absolute value chain model used by implementing organisations in the refugee camps in Tigray. It is highly fragmented, which has possibly contributed to the under performance of the livelihood projects. The implementing agencies appear to be applying a model with disjointed bonds between the fundamental nodes of the livelihoods value chain.

![Figure 10.1. Absolute value chain model for vocational skills training (grey arrows represent the main chain; below the arrows are the sub-chains)](image)

Considering the above value chain model for vocational skills training, the model appears to be disjointed in many of the sub and main chains. Some of the problems with the chain, as mentioned in the focus group discussions, are as follows:

- Livelihood projects target interested refugees without considering their probable future and the time they intend stay in camp (the selection of inappropriate beneficiaries).
Livelihood projects provide vocational skills training without conducting market assessments to select viable business types and regardless of access to working materials.

Working materials are distributed regardless of their viability, simply because the budgets are secured from donors.

Working materials are distributed (in cash or in kind) without ensuring that there are work places available or a proper power supply.

Business groups are granted permission to start trades or other activities that are not necessarily demanded in and around the camp.

A huge amount of capital is invested to train and fund refugees, but not on monitoring and following-up activities.

Hence, it appears that the value chains used by the implementing organisations in the camps are fragmented and certain steps are skipped, contributing to the failure of livelihood projects to meet the expectations.

**Selection criteria**

To ensure livelihood projects succeed in enhancing the financial and technical capacity of refugees, the selection process (and criteria) of participants (whom to select for what capacity gap and resource delivery) used by implementing agencies must be well thought out. This study found that organisations select beneficiaries through community leaders, such as the RCC, zone and block leaders, and civic association leaders. Every agency implementing a livelihood project has its own selection criteria, and these can vary greatly; one may have several criteria while another may have limited criteria (as stated by representatives from ARRA and UNHCR, refugees and experts from the livelihood agencies). However, these organisations seldom went down to the grass-roots level to cross check the selection process. As a result, targeting errors like double targeting, omissions and sometimes biased targeting were apparent across all implementing agencies, resulting in conflicts of interests and the misuse of limited resources. Table 10.2 shows the selection criteria.
used by the different livelihood implementing organisations for beneficiaries.

Producing skilled youth who could be engaged in income-generating activities for themselves and their respective families is a common livelihood strategy. However, not every individual is interested in, or capable of, starting a business, as not everyone is endowed with an entrepreneurial mind. Therefore, projects need to select beneficiaries, not just for the sake of giving training, but also taking into account the end goal.

The integration and coordination by organisations implementing livelihood projects was not as expected. Implementing organisations did not complement each other, but seemed to compete among themselves, resulting in the duplication of efforts and depletion of the limited funding available. However, some progress was achieved after the establishment of the Livelihood Working Group (LWG), which was initiated by the Norwegian Refugee Council. This working group has enabled livelihood agencies to discuss all matters to do with livelihood programmes on a monthly basis to eliminate some of the challenges and share some of the lessons learnt so as to enhance service delivery. Unfortunately, so far, there is no common working manual for livelihood projects (such as a standard operating procedures), which would reduce the replication of efforts. The formulation of such a manual or standard operating procedures manual could optimise the effective and efficient use of the inadequate resources available for livelihood projects, establish common selection criteria for beneficiaries, and align the aspirations of the beneficiaries with the programmatic interests of the livelihood agencies. Moreover, having a standard operating procedures manual could improve the implementation modalities of the implementing organisations and facilitate monitoring and evaluation by ARRA and UNHCR.
Table 10.2. Selection criteria and number of beneficiaries of livelihood programmes in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Livelihood training</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Beneficiary selection criteria for vocational skills trainings used in 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **ZOA**                             | Electronics and mobile phone maintenance     | 120 students            | • Beneficiaries must be interested/self-motivated to do business development/vocational skills training and to start a business; to be part of a small homogenous group of 6–8 members and to contribute their own labour and materials to start an income-generating activity; and to work hard to achieve goals.  
• The first target group of beneficiaries shall be refugees with an already existing small business who require additional capital.  
• Preference will be given to more stable beneficiaries who have lived in the camp for more than 1 year and who will stay in the camp for at least the next 2 years.  
• Priority will be given to people with a disability, female-headed households with children, and individuals belonging to categories of refugee classified as extremely vulnerable.  
• Refugees with a large family size (at least greater than or equal to 3) and with very low income should be considered.  
• Beneficiaries should be youths aged 18–35.  
• Preference will be given to refugees with a failed migration process or who have not started the process yet.  
• Beneficiaries should not be targeted by other implementing partners. |
|                                     | Food preparation and spice making             |                         |                                                                             |
|                                     | Hair cutting                                 |                         |                                                                             |
|                                     | Beauty salon                                 |                         |                                                                             |
| **Innovative Humanitarian Solutions** | Leather shoe crafting                        | 68 students             | **General requirements**  
• Refugees who are vulnerable; motivated and have the ability to work; will stay for a minimum of 1 year; are not currently engaged in any income-generating activity |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Poor and marginalised adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disciplined and free from socially-unacceptable habits</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Interested in receiving training</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Completion of at least grade 4 education</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Youth and adults with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Destitute single women and female-headed households</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Refugee who will stay for a minimum of 1 year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Norwegian Refugee Council</th>
<th>Food prep</th>
<th>Beauty salon</th>
<th>Electric work</th>
<th>Computers</th>
<th>Metal work</th>
<th>Carpentry</th>
<th>General tailoring</th>
<th>Traditional garment tailoring</th>
<th>Around 900 students in all camps</th>
<th>Specific criteria</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 15–25 years old for long-term target beneficiaries and adults for short-term training</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 50% female</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Host community (50% of total Youth Education Pack [YEP] beneficiaries) and close to YEP centre/refugee community</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Education background: refugees and host beneficiaries with low access to education and training opportunities for short-term skills training; host community beneficiaries for long-term skills training should have completed grade 10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vulnerability criteria:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Double orphans, child-headed households, former conscripts, youth, single mothers, other vulnerable people (people with disabilities/victims of conflict); one from each family is eligible and they must be without other education support, have stayed in the camp for at least a year and be unlikely to leave for at least one year.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities Industrialization Centers Ethiopia</th>
<th>Plumbing</th>
<th>Beauty salon</th>
<th>Electrical work</th>
<th>Tailoring</th>
<th>Around 400 students</th>
<th>Specific criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Every interested individual who is a refugee living in the camp can attend any of the training in every term.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on interviews with livelihood experts from each organisation in Shire (2–6 November 2017)
Livelihood challenges and opportunities

Challenges
Selection of appropriate beneficiaries is the first step in any successful project. Selecting people who cannot realise the aims of projects is a major obstacle to the success of livelihood projects in the refugee camps. In addition, selection errors in the type of activity provided (business and vocational skills training), as well as shortage of market linkages or deficiency of demand, are also major challenges for livelihood projects in the Tigray refugee camps. Many challenges are equally shared by all organisations and in all refugee camps. Shortage of basic utilities like water and energy, availability or delayed distribution of start-up kits, incorrect placement of business centres (locations), group-based support modalities (number of beneficiaries), and poor market linkages are challenges faced by most livelihood projects. Moreover, new business ideas are not being innovated in the refugee camps. Resource limitation, which is a problem for all livelihood projects in the camps, problems with loan disbursement and repayment modalities specific to microloan and revolving funds, lack of formal micro institutions that specifically support and facilitate loan provision and saving for refugees, and shortage of working spaces for urban refugees are issues mentioned by all agencies, but stressed by the Norwegian Refugee Council livelihood coordinator (Tewedaj, interview with Solomon, face-to-face, Shire, 2 November 2017).

There are also some refugee-driven challenges for livelihood projects, like the localities in Eritrea from which the refugees came and ethnic group segregation, which can cause conflict among groups and result in the theft and misuse of the start-up kits for personal purposes. Refugees’ high expectations and limited motivation, as well as lack of commitment to spend time and effort to improve their livelihoods, were other critical challenges. Such refugee-driven problems have resulted in refugees dropping out of projects and sitting idle or engaging in secondary migration. Business skills gaps among selected beneficiaries, business selection problems (i.e., copying and pasting
business ideas), lack of interest in working in a team, and lack of trust in one another are challenges for livelihood projects. In most of the challenges mentioned by the refugees, there are hidden factors. To appropriately address each challenge, the root causes must be identified. In relation to lack of motivation and commitment and lack of trust among refugees, for example, livelihood projects need to ask ‘why’ when planning project activities.

There are also challenges posed by the local community. For example, conflict with the local community over the use of firewood and grazing of livestock mean that refugees are unable to easily access natural resources around the camps, as stated in the focus group discussions. The livelihood experts also said that there is conflict between the host community and refugees over the use of natural resources by the refugees.

Programming related challenges can also be observed. Key informants reported that livelihood projects often fail to meet their intended outcomes, because they are based on a rough needs assessment, not a detailed and clear appraisal. Key informants also mentioned misunderstanding of the refugee context, lack of standard operating procedures, fragmented monitoring and supervision, and lack of coordination and partnerships among livelihood project implementing organisations as some of the major challenges facing organisations in the Shire area. Therefore, livelihood project implementing organisations need to professionalise their projects, particularly their project initiation and planning stage. Whatever project idea they wish to implement must be based on the actual context and should fit the existing needs of the beneficiaries.

Remittances received from relatives abroad remain an important source of money for Eritrean refugees dwelling in urban areas. In addition, a few reported working as daily labourers. Remittances are also a source of income for refugees living in camps, but their main source of sustenance is the World Food Programme’s monthly food ration. The main constraints hindering urban refugees from participating in income-generating activities and diversifying their
sources of income include lack of working capital and access to credit, lack of technical skills, and lack of a workplace. There are no livelihood interventions for urban refugees by either the government or NGOs, except the recently launched Addressing the Root Causes programme (funded by Dutch Ministry of the Foreign Affairs) and Regional Development and Protection Programme (funded by the European Union) in Shire and Addis Ababa. These programmes have found that the small number of urban refugee households in Shire and the lack of commitment and excessive dependency of Eritrean refugees living in urban settings on livelihood programmes or remittances, specific to Shire town, are major challenges for livelihood projects for urban refugees (Abrha, interview with Kahsay, face-to-face, Shire, 24 October 2017). Conceivably, all the identified challenges could be solved through the existing structures and with existing resources, with strong collaboration among the responsible organisations, led by ARRA, the organisation that manages the camp.

**Opportunities**

Some of the opportunities in the camps that have positively contributed to the implementation of livelihood projects include the exemption of camp refugees from taxation on business activities, the provision of house rent and other support, the provision of technical and material support by livelihood agencies, the potential to sell goods or services on refugee and local markets, and the gridline connection that helps organisations conduct metal and woodwork training in Shimelba refugee camp, as mentioned in the focus group discussions. Moreover, the availability of the vegetable gardening centre in Shimelba camp and access to land for small business activities (like shops, cafes and restaurants) also present refugees with opportunities.

Data collected from the interviews with key informants shows several opportunities that have positively contributed to livelihood projects, such as the existence of business franchises between the locals and refugees, a cadre of refugees and youth who have received vocational skills training, the availability of different structures like vocational skill training centres, and the availability of community-based
structures. The livelihood officer from Innovative Humanitarian Solutions added that the stable environment in Shimelba camp, availability of land for small business activities, peaceful coexistence between the two communities (refugee and local), and their language and cultural similarities have help in the execution of livelihood projects (Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-face, 28 October 2017).

There are many unexploited opportunities that could positively contribute to livelihood programmes. The key informants pointed out the following: the proximity of camps to local towns, availability of refugee and local markets, availability of large numbers of educated and trainable youth, large cash flow inside the camps due to remittances, culture and language similarities, access to land to start small businesses, and the existence of vocational skills graduates. The survey found that about 39% of the respondents believe that refugees’ occupational backgrounds are one of the main opportunities underutilised by livelihood projects. In addition, 36% believe that existing demands in and around the camp present more opportunities. For example, the discussants in the focus group mentioned demand for bakery bread (although the production of bread has started in Adi Harush and Mai Ayni, the bakeries are not yet meeting market demand), dairy products, butchers, boutiques, and power suppliers. In addition, there is demand for metal and woodwork, electronic maintenance, agro-processing (industries like milk and meat factories), and leather crafts, which have good prospects for livelihood projects. The availability of large numbers of trained and experienced youth is also an opportunity that has not yet been exploited by livelihood projects.

**Reasons for secondary migration**

Secondary migration is the foremost challenge for livelihood projects, as it leads participants to drop out of programmes. The vast majority (85%) of the refugees who participated in this study considered lack of livelihood opportunities to be one of the main push factors for the secondary migration of refugees from camps in Ethiopia. In addition,
youth also move on due to lack of basic recreational facilities, services like water, energy, and shelter, and, most importantly, income-generating opportunities. A total of 90% of the survey participants believed that the provision of livelihood opportunities for Eritrean youth refugees living in Tigray could reduce their movement to third counties.

Secondary migration may also be due to an initial plan by refugees to flee Ethiopia. The relationship between livelihood projects and secondary migration is inconsistent. When asked whether an initial plan to pass through Ethiopia was a reason for refugees who have benefited from a livelihood project to move on to a third country, 21% of respondents said ‘yes’, 28% said ‘no’, while 51% said ‘maybe’. At the same time, the survey found that 72% of respondents believed

*Figure 10.2. Respondents’ perception (N=407) of the role of livelihood challenges and opportunities in secondary migration (2017)*
that having an initial plan to pass through Ethiopia was the reason for the secondary migration of refugees: “refugees seem programmed to flee Ethiopia, to just pass through; however, they do not know the next chapter of their life” (M, interview with Michael, face-to-face, 25 October 2017). In this study, all livelihood project interventions were found to encounter this problem across all refugee camps. Moreover, the focus group discussions revealed that the refugees themselves believe that the initial plan to leave Ethiopia is the reason why Eritreans go to third countries, even when supported by livelihood projects.

When participants were asked in an open-ended question why refugees are leaving Ethiopia, even when supported by livelihood projects, some said that some youth are invited by their families to go to third countries. The diaspora community, therefore, plays a role in the secondary migration of Eritreans living in Tigray. The role of smugglers is also substantial. Furthermore, the lack of communication opportunities with relatives back in Eritrea is an additional push factor for refugees to leave Ethiopia and move to Sudan or another country where there is access to direct phone calls.

Conclusion

This study looked at three research questions: What are the intervention strategies of the livelihood projects targeting Eritrean refugees living in Tigray, Ethiopia? What are the livelihood challenges and opportunities facing Eritrean refugees in Tigray, Ethiopia? And, why are Eritrean refugees moving on from Ethiopia, even when supported by several livelihood projects?

Looking at the first research question, the intervention strategies of livelihood implementing organisations working with refugees in Tigray can be broken into two categories, supply-side strategies and demand-side strategies. Supply-side strategies include the provision of vocational skills and business development training, distribution of working capital in cash or kind, the supply of livestock, and provision of agricultural materials. Demand-side strategies include creating
market linkages and ensuring demand for the products and services being promoted. However, many of the businesses started under the livelihood projects are having difficulty finding markets for their products and accessing raw materials (market linkages). In addition, refugees have difficulty obtaining camp exit permits to enable them to access raw materials from nearby towns. Hence, while most implementing agencies had strong supply-side strategies, their demand-side strategies were found to be imperfect, particularly in linking refugees’ businesses to local markets. Livelihood projects have also been criticised for not selecting appropriate beneficiaries, failing to create absolute value chains, and not coordinating among themselves or developing common operation standards, such as selection criteria for beneficiaries and a start-up capital distribution modality. Moreover, lack of value chain development has resulted in the limited success of livelihood programmes in the camps, which impacts on secondary migration.

In relation to the second research question, the study found many livelihood challenges and opportunities in the refugee camps. Some of the major challenges include: linking refugee businesses with demand and local markets (demand-side challenges), conflict between Eritrean refugees of different ethnic origin, theft and misuse of resources by refugees, as well as high expectations and limited motivation and commitment to improve their livelihoods (refugee-driven challenges), conflict over resources such as firewood and grazing land (challenges originating from the local community), and lack of detailed and clear appraisals, misunderstanding of the refugee context, lack of standard operating procedures, fragmented monitoring and supervision, and lack of coordination and partnerships among livelihood project implementing organisations (programming-related challenges). There are also numerous livelihood opportunities in the camps, such as the existing infrastructure in the camps, availability of basic services, existence of training centres, refugee potential (human resources), existing demand in and around the camps, and availability of natural resources. However, because most of interventions are based on shallow assessments, several opportunities (such as refugees’ existing
skills and occupational backgrounds and markets in and around the camp) have been underutilised by livelihood projects. These failures impact on the success of projects, which in turn impacts on secondary migration.

To answer the third research question, why are refugees migrating on from Ethiopia when supported by different livelihood implementing organisations, the study found the following. First, the problems with livelihood intervention strategies, especially on the demand-side, and the fragmented value chain mean that these projects are failing to meet the goal of creating a sustainable income for refugees in the camps, who are moving on in search of a better life. Second, the number of livelihood beneficiaries targeted and the number of youth living in the refugee camps needing livelihood projects does not match; the livelihood implementing organisations are reaching hundreds, whereas tens of thousands of youth need such interventions every year. Third, significant numbers of refugees are crossing the Eritrea-Ethiopia border with the intention of passing through on their way to a third country. Therefore, regardless of the provision of livelihood projects by implementing organisations, a proportion of Eritrean refugees are still moving out of Ethiopia.

Therefore, it is concluded that flanking measures are needed that will strengthen the sense that a sustainable livelihood in Ethiopia is viable. Such measures include the matching of skills and business opportunities, strengthening basis conditions in the camps and ending the operations of human traffickers in the camps as these encourage refugees to engage in secondary migration.

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Chapter 11

Inhospitable Realities: Refugees’ Livelihoods in Hitsats, Ethiopia

Kristína Melicherová

Introduction

In the past few years, Ethiopia has introduced an open-door policy towards refugees from Eritrea, who are welcome on Ethiopian soil. However, the need for a durable solution remains stalled in practice. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over 18,000 Eritreans fled their country to Ethiopia in the first 9 months of 2017 (UNHCR, 2017). Most of the Eritrean refugees are situated in refugee camps in Tigray region in northern Ethiopia. The chance of them returning safely to their country of origin remains very low, unless there is a positive shift towards human rights in Eritrea. Therefore, a solution is needed that can provide these refugees with dignified prospects for their future through livelihoods and integration into the local community in the host country (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016).
Access to a sustainable livelihood is essential for refugees living in the camps, as well as urban refugees, in order to prevent secondary migration and the dangers associated with it, which include human trafficking. In addition, livelihood programmes can enhance self-reliance and lower the dependence of refugees on humanitarian aid (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). The low access of refugees to livelihood activities has been a concern in policy-making and academic circles, as well as among practitioners, in the past years.

The present chapter aims to analyse the dynamics of livelihoods in the refugee camps in northern Ethiopia. With the presumption that access to livelihoods is a crucial entry point for strengthening refugees’ self-reliance and prospects, the present study looked into the main sources of income-generating activities, limitations and obstacles faced by refugees and the practices of organisations working with the refugees in the camps relating to livelihoods.\(^{51}\)

According to UNHCR, ‘self-reliance’ is the social and economic ability of people to fulfil their needs and exercise their rights in a sustainable manner (UNHCR, 2005, 2012). In order to achieve a durable solution for refugees, UNHCR has developed the Development Assistance for Refugees framework, which, among other things, aims to facilitate the “empowerment and enhancement of productive capacities and self-reliance of refugees” (UNHCR, 2003). The Development Assistance for Refugees framework highlights two prerequisites needed for livelihood programmes to lead to self-reliance: the political will of the host government and access to socio-economic activities (UNHCR, 2003). While this study looked at the access of refugees to income-generating activities, the political will of the host government was not included in the empirical research, but is reflected in the literature review.

\(^{51}\) See also Melicherová (2018), which presents the full case study on which this chapter is based.
The next sections in this chapter outline the theoretical framework for this study, including Kingdon’s (2014) policy streams, human rights in international law and the need for a human rights culture. As several research works show, there is a close link between human rights protection and livelihoods (Jacobsen, 2002; Horst & UNHCR, 2006). These sections are followed by the research question and the methodology used during data collection in Hitsats refugee camp. The literature review is then presented, followed by the findings of the empirical study, including the livelihood opportunities for refugees in Hitsats, as well as refugees’ main sources of income. The access of refugees to income-generating activities in the camp is also examined, as well as the main obstacles that prevent refugees from pursuing livelihoods. The chapter then looks at the basic needs of refugees and how they are provided in the camp, as well as some of the practices of the organisations based in the camp. The final section presents some concluding remarks.

**Multiple streams of the policy agenda**

In recent times, the refugee question has become high on the political agenda of various countries. Kingdon, in his multiple streams theory, looks at how particular issues reach the decision agenda. He describes three separate, but loosely-coupled streams – the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream (Kingdon, 2014). The problem stream is where legitimate issues that need to be addressed are identified. Problems can be identified through feedback procedures, such as reports or reviews, or through other systems introduced by the government to monitor a specific situation (Kingdon, 2014). Refugee integration and the enhancement of refugees’ livelihood has been recognised as a problematic issue by several actors (International Rescue Committee, 2018; Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016; Samuel Hall, 2014; Carciotto & d'Orsi, 2017).

To frame a problem in a particular way requires conceptual and political effort. However, problems do not get resolved on their own, without political will and an explicit policy framework. It is, therefore, important to develop ideas for solutions, discuss the ideas within
specific platforms, and combine and change existing ideas. Kingdon (2014) affiliates this process with the policy stream, during which there is discussion and debate among various stakeholders, such as researchers, academics and policymakers. Although a wide variety of ideas are considered, there are some general criteria that have to be taken into account, including technical feasibility (the solution has to be possible to implement), value acceptability (it should fit with the country’s values), and anticipation of future or unexpected constraints (such as budget constraints) (Kingdon, 2014).

The enhancement of self-reliance through economic empowerment and access to livelihoods has a strong place in UNHCR’s protection mandate (UNHCR, 2012). The study of livelihoods has also been pursued by various development actors, which have developed different frameworks\(^52\) in order to address the importance of this issue. However, it is important to note that the literature does not indicate which framework is the most appropriate for refugees (UNHCR, 2006). In addition, new policies, frameworks or ideas have to be backed up by the political will of the state, which is referred to by Kingdon as the political stream.

The primary actors in the political stream are the various government actors, such as the prime minister, president, parliament, and other political appointees. Within this group, general agreement is formed primarily by bargaining and making compromises to build a coalition. The political considerations can be influenced by the national mood, as well as organised political forces such as political parties, interest groups, pressure groups or influential political individuals. A major source of political opportunity can arise from political change in the country and change in key personnel. If a new government comes to power, particularly if it is formed by a different party, political opportunities may change significantly.

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52 Examples are the Department for International Development (DFID), CARE, Oxfam, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), all of which have developed livelihood frameworks.
When an existing problem, the political will to address the problem and a new political environment (the three streams) are coupled together at a particular time a policy window opens (Kingdon, 2014). A policy window can open because a particular problem is brought to attention by an unexpected situation or government observations, or it can open because of an administrative change in the government. When a policy window is open, policy entrepreneurs have to be ready to push the issue onto the decision agenda. If a problem is identified, but no suitable options exist to solve it, it will be unlikely to make it on to the agenda. Similarly, if there is political will, but the issue is not considered a pressing problem, it is also likely to fall short of the agenda. But when all three streams exist and a window opens, policy entrepreneurs have to be ready to take action immediately (Kingdon, 2014).

**Human rights in international law**

One of the factors preventing refugees from pursuing livelihoods is the restriction of the rights of refugees. However, some of these rights are guaranteed under international human rights and refugee law (Jacobsen, 2002; Horst & UNHCR, 2006). Refugees, like other individuals, should be enabled to fulfil their potential and support themselves by engaging in employment. Access to lawful employment is a fundamental human right, and there is a wide range of international and national legal frameworks protecting the right to work. However, when it comes to refugees, legal provisions regulating the right to work vary. One of the most relevant international legal instruments concerning the rights of refugees is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Refugees’ right to work is covered by three articles in this Convention: Article 17 (Wage-earning employment), Article 18 (Self-employment) and Article 19 (Liberal professions) (UN General Assembly, 1951). Article 17 (1) provides for a minimum standard of treatment for those refugees engaged in wage-earning employment. States that are signatories to the Convention are obliged to secure the enjoyment of the right protected under Article 17 through their national legislation. Additionally, a host country has to grant the same
access to the labour market to refugees as any other non-national is granted (University of Michigan Law School, 2010).

Even though the 1951 Convention is a pivotal source of law protecting refugees’ right to work, it does not guarantee a job for refugees. Furthermore, as identified in Craven’s commentary, states are not obliged to create work opportunities based on the preferences of individuals seeking work (Craven, 1995). Instead, work can be seen as “a gateway through which refugees may provide their value to a receiving country, [and] rebuild their lives with dignity” (Wirth, Defilippis & Therkelsen, 2014, p. 11).

The 1951 Convention has to be read and examined together with other human rights treaties. The right to work is established in Article 23.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Preamble of the Convention particularly points to the principles upheld by the Declaration. The right to work is also enshrined in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966; UN General Assembly, 1948).

For international legal provisions to be effective, it is necessary that they be recognised on the local level, which means that they need to be brought into national legislation (Rorty, 1993). Signatory states are bound to enforce their obligations under international law by, among other things, bringing them into national law. Only national legislation and implementation on the ground can bring these provisions into existence and, thus, connect theory with practice. Therefore, it is vital for the present research project to see to what extent the described human rights are recognised in local law and practice, which depends to some extent on the human rights culture in the host country.

**Human rights culture**

The term ‘rights’ has been described by contemporary philosopher Shelly Kagan as “horrendously ambiguous” (Kagan, 1997). However, as Rhoda Howard-Hassmann (2012) writes, all human beings are
entitled to human rights merely by virtue of being biologically human. Hence, individuals do not have to earn rights, as they inhere in them unmediated by social relations. Richard Rorty’s contribution to the discussion explains that “nothing relevant to moral choice separates human beings from animals except historically contingent facts of the world, cultural facts” (Rorty, 1993, p. 116). He continues that ‘rationality’ is a human attribute that grounds morality and denies that there are any morally relevant “transcultural facts” (Rorty, 1993). Rorty claims that a culture in which human rights are respected is the bare minimum level of morality. The idea of a ‘human rights culture’ emerged strongly after World War II. A human rights culture is what is left of human rights when one gives up the idea that there are natural rights present in some aspect of our humanity itself (Rorty, 1993). Human rights are represented by human rights treaties, conventions and agreements. However, the treaties do not bring human rights into existence. Rights can be only attained once they are positively recognised as rights. The concept of a human rights culture represents a basis for their realisation.

Research questions

The current study was conducted in Hitsats camp (which was established to accommodate Eritrean refugees) in order to improve our understanding of the access of Eritrean refugees to livelihoods. To meet this objective the following research question was posed: To what extent do Eritrean refugees have access to livelihood opportunities and to work in refugee camps in Ethiopia and how do Kingdon’s multiple streams align for agenda setting on this issue?

These questions are approached through the following sub-questions:

- What is the policy of the Government of Ethiopia in relation to livelihoods and the right of refugees to work?
- What access to income-generating activities do refugees in Ethiopia have?
- What are Eritrean refugees’ main sources of livelihood?
- Which obstacles and opportunities do refugees face within the camp setting in accessing livelihoods?
• What are the basic needs of refugees and how are they provided for in the camp setting?
• What practices have been established by organisations within the camp with regard to refugees’ livelihood activities?

Methodology

This study consisted of a literature review and an empirical study, both quantitative and qualitative. The literature review was conducted on the existing policies and livelihoods in refugee camps in Ethiopia. The empirical study can be characterised as ethnographic research and was based on two visits to Hitsats refugee camp, which is situated on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. Hitsats camp is the youngest of four refugee camps for Eritrean refugees in Tigray region, Ethiopia. The camp is set in challenging climate conditions, including hot temperatures and strong aridity. At the time of the field research, the camp hosted around 13,000 Eritrean refugees, however, the precise number is difficult to estimate due to the high influx and out-flux of refugees.

The first visit, in December 2017, was aimed at identifying the livelihood options available to refugees in the camp, as well as the obstacles and practices related to earning a livelihood within the camp. This was done by collecting quantitative data through a survey. The qualitative interviews were conducted during the second visit, in January/February 2018. The population studied during the research visits encompasses refugees (both men and women) who had been living in Hitsats refugee camp at least 30 days prior to the day of data collection, as well as the staff of organisations that are active in the camp (non-governmental organisation [NGO] workers). A total of 94 questionnaires were collected from refugees in the group sessions and 7 questionnaires were collected separately from NGO workers (see Table 11.1). In addition to the questionnaires, qualitative interviews were conducted to deepen the understanding of refugees’ livelihoods in Hitsats camp.

53 All tables and figures in this chapter contain original data collected during empirical study by the author.
The study population of refugees was divided into two groups during the selection process: those who had received vocational training by Zuid Oost Azië (ZOA), an international relief and recovery organisation, and those who had not. Participants from both groups were aged 18 years and older and had resided in the camp for more than 30 days prior to the date of data collection. The first group of refugees was selected with the support of ZOA from the list of refugees who had participated in its vocational skill trainings initiatives. For this group, stratified sampling (based on gender) was used (random sampling from the list of male and female beneficiaries of the ZOA training), which resulted in 47 returned questionnaires. The data were gathered in 4 sessions, of maximum 12 participants each, held in Hitsats camp. The sessions were divided according to gender due to convenience during the selection process.

The second group of refugees was selected with support from local fieldwork assistants who helped with the distribution of questionnaires among refugees who had not participated in the ZOA training programmes. Two non-probability sample techniques were used. At first, a convenience sampling technique was used to select participants on the basis of convenience in terms of availability, reach and accessibility. Then a snowball sampling method was implemented for further selection of participants. The gender balance was respected during the whole selection process. For these groups, data were gathered in 5 sessions of maximum 12 participants each, held in Hitsats camp. For this group, 47 questionnaires were also collected.

During each session, a local translator and fieldwork assistant were present. Each question was read to the participants by a translator in the local language and the participants were given time to fill in the answers. In some cases, additional questions were asked by the participants to clarify the questions. Participants who faced problems with literacy or other difficulties were helped by fieldwork assistants to fill in the answers.

The quantitative data collected was transferred into Excel and Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software to prepare
a platform for analysis. Each participant and completed questionnaire was allocated a specific code. In order to establish whether there is statistical evidence that the associated population means are significantly different, an independent samples t-test was carried out in SPSS.

When it comes to the representativeness of the study sample of both refugee groups, several considerations need to be taken into account. As the research question focuses on the livelihoods of the refugees within the camp setting, the interviews of refugees took place in real-life situations to maximise the accuracy of representative samples. In order to ensure that the input from both genders would be represented equally, the study sample was split into men and women. The criterion that the participants needed to have resided in the camp at least 30 days prior to data collection was aimed at increasing the likelihood that the selected samples would reflect upon the livelihood situation within the camp. However, it is important to note that the occurrence of sample bias cannot be excluded entirely from the research. It is possible that mistrust of refugees towards the researcher or towards the fieldwork assistants misled the study sample. In addition, the research on trauma relief conducted within Hitsats camp (Kidane & Stokmans, 2018), observed the presence of individual as well as collective trauma, which may have affected the overall performance and participation of refugees in the study sample. Because of these limitations, the overall representativeness of the sample group selected from the refugee population can be questioned.

The NGO workers were selected using the snowball sampling method, which was carried out with the help of ZOA. In total seven questionnaires were collected. Six questionnaires were contribution by ZOA employees, out of which two were distributed in Hitsats and four in Shire (the city near Hitsats camp). One questionnaire was filled in by an employee of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Having experience with livelihood programmes within the refugee camp was a prerequisite for selection.
Table 11.1. Overview of quantitative analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Sampling method</th>
<th>Data collection method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47 refugees, beneficiaries of ZOA skill trainings</td>
<td>Stratified and random sampling</td>
<td>Questionnaire for refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 refugees, non-beneficiaries of ZOA skill trainings</td>
<td>Convenience and snowball sampling</td>
<td>Questionnaire for refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 NGO workers</td>
<td>Snowball sampling</td>
<td>Questionnaire for NGO workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second data collection followed the analysis of all collected material from the quantitative study. The purpose of the second phase was to conduct qualitative interviews with refugees and NGO workers to deepen the understanding of livelihoods within the camp. The questions used for the qualitative interviews were based on the questionnaires used during the quantitative data collection. Respondents were asked to elaborate upon the questions. Interviews with refugees were conducted in a group setting, during which a local translator assisted with interaction and communication between the interviewer and interviewees. Respondents were selected based on the convenience sampling method, with the help of a fieldwork assistant. In total, four refugees participated in the interviews (three men, one woman). Interviews with NGO workers were held separately in the English, and the selection process was based on convenience sampling. Four conversations with NGO workers were recorded and transcribed into a word document. One conversation was conducted off the record and only the notes were captured from this interview.

Migration policy in Ethiopia

According to UNHCR, approximately 916,678 refugees were registered in Ethiopia as of 31 March 2018 (UNHCR, 2018). The largest group of refugees fled from South Sudan, followed by refugees from Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. Several reports show that despite
Ethiopia’s open-door policy towards refugees, refugees face several restrictions and obstacles in relation to entering the labour market (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016; Carciotto & d’Orsi, 2017; Samuel Hall, 2014). This section (and the next) presents the results of the literature review and helps answer the first sub-research question.

From a legal perspective, Ethiopia is a party to the 1951 Convention, the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Organization of African Unity, 1969; Organization of African Unity, 1981). As discussed earlier, the 1951 Convention upholds the right of refugees to work in Articles 17, 18 and 19. The 1969 Convention is complementary to the 1951 Convention, but has no specific provision protecting refugees’ right to work, however, the African Charter upholds the right to work under Article 15. Ethiopia’s national legal framework also deals with the rights of refugees in the Refugee Proclamation No. 409 of 2004. Although this Proclamation grants some rights to refugees, the legal right to work remains restricted (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004). Refugees in Ethiopia are eligible to work only to the extent that the law allows other foreign nationals to do so (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004, Article 21[3]). Furthermore, as recognised by Zetter and Ruaudel, “Ethiopia’s Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs only grants work permits to foreigners when there are no qualified nationals available and in practice does not grant work permits to refugees” (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016, p. 25). It is, therefore, welcomed that the Government announced the revision of the Refugee Proclamation to expand the rights granted to refugees under this instrument (International Rescue Committee, 2018).

In September 2016, Ethiopia adopted an ambitious plan with ‘Nine Pledges’ aimed at improving the lives and livelihood conditions of refugees residing on Ethiopian territory. These pledges extend and strengthen policies in thematic areas such as work and job creation, education, out-of-camp policies, documentation and local integration (Samuel Hall, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2017). Since 2018, the situation in Ethiopia has been developing rapidly, due
to new political shifts. In May 2018, the Council of Ministers approved a draft refugee proclamation to implement a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, which provides a platform for the Nine Pledges and will, thus, improve the integration process for refugees (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2017; Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs, 2018). In addition, the new bill aims to align its protection measures with the international and regional instruments adopted by Ethiopia (Abiye, 2018).

One of the Nine Pledges is to build industrial parks to expand the job opportunities for refugees and host communities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2017). However, as the International Rescue Committee points out, there are several challenges with industrial parks. Primarily, they are unlikely to generate significant outcomes for job creation in the near-term. Also, the selection process, training of refugees, and transportation to the parks could prove too timely, costly and unsafe. It is, therefore, important that the planning for new job opportunities for refugees goes beyond the introduction of industrial parks (International Rescue Committee, 2018).

Despite the positive initiatives of the Ethiopian government in forming new policies, the current situation leaves refugees in Ethiopia unable to enter the formal labour market. The integration of refugees and protection of their rights has been recognised as a problem, which the new policy instruments are trying to address. The new developments in the political stream have aligned with these instruments and opened a policy window. However, at this moment, it remains unclear what change this will bring for refugees on the ground.

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54 Restrictive policies may face a wind of change with the approach of the new Ethiopian government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Since taking office in April 2018, he has adopted a number of reforms, declaring peace with Eritrea and promising to reform civil society and the situation for refugees (Sengupta, 2018).
Livelihood opportunities for refugees in Ethiopia

Several studies show that access to income-generating activities remain low, both inside and outside refugee camps (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016; Samuel Hall, 2014, Melicherová, 2018). The following factors have been recognised as constraining access to livelihood opportunities for refugees in Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2013; Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016; Moses Okello, 2014):

- **Restrictions on freedom of movement:** Under the Refugee Proclamation No. 409, Article 21(2), Ethiopian authorities designate where refugees and asylum seekers shall live (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004). Until 2009, Ethiopia enforced a strict policy of encampment for all refugees. Since then, an out-of-camp policy has been implemented to allow Eritrean refugees to leave the camps as long as they are able to sustain themselves financially or are supported by relatives living outside the camps.

- **Lack of work permits:** Ethiopian authorities do not grant work permits to refugees, which prevents them from entering the formal labour market.

- **Discrimination:** Many refugees complain that they are subject to discrimination, which makes it difficult to find stable employment.

- **Lack of job opportunities and language barriers:** Lack of job opportunities, language barriers, lack of experience and lack of market information also hinder access to livelihoods for refugees in Ethiopia (Samuel Hall, 2014, p. 7).

Access to livelihoods for refugees in camps in Ethiopia is very low, especially for young refugees. The largest source of employment for camp refugees who are working is with institutions, NGOs or the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) (Samuel Hall, 2014). Exclusion from the formal sector means that refugees have to engage in informal labour, which exposes them to the risk of abuse, exploitation and, in the case of young women, sexual harassment. The research conducted by Samuel Hall
Consulting found that camp refugees engage in the following economic activities (Samuel Hall, 2014, pp. 2–30):

- **Petty trade**: Refugees establish their own small shops with various products. The size, range of products and monthly revenue\(^{55}\) varies.
- **Construction-related services**: Skills such as electricity, woodwork and metalwork are particularly supported by shelter programmes.
- **Personal services**: Shops offering services such as beauty parlours, hairdressing salons and barber shops have been established in the camps.

The work in the camps is irregular, which contributes to the financial insufficiency and lack of self-reliance of the refugees. This makes most refugees dependent on aid provided by UNHCR and NGOs in the camps and motivates refugees to look for alternatives outside camps. However, not that many refugees apply for the out-of-camp programme, because of obstacles such as lack of relatives who could sponsor them, or no guarantee of accessing a livelihood in urban areas (Samuel Hall, 2014, p. 39).

**Livelihoods in Hitsats camp**

This section presents the results of the empirical research conducted in Hitsats camp and helps answer the remaining sub-research questions. In total, 94 refugees took part in the survey in Hitsats camp. Due to the sampling procedure used, men and women were represented equally (47 of each gender) in order to observe whether gender differences affected livelihood and work opportunities. Even though the gender balance was preserved within quantitative data collection, the qualitative interviews found that male refugees dominated the overall camp population: “In every aspect, there is a dominance of male refugees. In [the] overall demographics [of the camp], even in our training and livelihood activities, male refugees are

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\(^{55}\) Smaller shops reported monthly revenue of between 50 and 150 Ethiopian birr (ETB), while larger ones reported up to ETB 550.
dominant” (NRC worker, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 30 January 2018).

In addition to being dominated by young male refugees, some other interesting demographic phenomena were noticed in the camps during the analysis, which are confirmed by other research studies mentioned in the literature review. Almost 80% of the refugee respondents, both men and women, are between 18 and 30-years old, which means that a high proportion of young Eritreans are forced into migration. As Hitsats camp is the youngest in the region, all newly-arrived refugees are situated there, unless they ask for family reunification in one of the other camps. The demography is also fluctuating, as many young refugees leave the camp within a short period of time after their arrival. However, a significant number of Eritreans have been living in the camp for several years. This is because they lack the resources to undertake secondary movement in search of a better future. It is difficult to assess whether living in Hitsats camp is a positive choice for these refugees.

Those who have the chance, opportunity or power have left the camp. People who live in this camp are those who didn’t have any chance or power to go. In this camp it is only those who don’t have money, [or] support. But those who have relatives or money have left. (Interviewee 4, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)

One of the consequences of migration at an early age is that refugees have often missed out on receiving a full education. Respondents to the questionnaires did not have problems with literacy, however, the majority had 10 or less years of education (54% and 33% of female and male respondents, respectively). Consequently, the range of knowledge or practical skills that refugees managed to develop before they were forced to flee Eritrea remains low.

Refugees’ main sources of livelihood
Despite the low access to regular income-generating activities, refugees conceded that they had previously accessed specific sectors through which they had earned their livelihood. A major sector that
provides opportunities for refugees to earn some income is institutional employment. Alongside institutions, refugees engage in petty trade, personal services (such as beauty parlours, hairdressers, and barbers), construction work and technical services (mainly for male refugees). Refugees in Hitsats are not allowed to own a piece of land and, therefore, access to agriculture livelihoods is lacking. The qualitative interviews confirmed that refugees are able to access livelihoods through sectors, even though this access is inadequate.

There are several opportunities in petty trade, personal services, and small businesses – like shops. Those are the main sources of livelihood activities. The main gap is in small industries – like leather craft and soap making. Even agriculture like dairy, poultry, and home-gardening is lacking. (ZOA worker 2, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 14 December 2017)

In total, 87.5% of respondents have not been able to find employment in the same sector as they worked in Eritrea. This is closely related to the fact that most of the refugees are very young and did not have the opportunity to gain experience in the labour market before fleeing Eritrea.

Access by refugees to income-generating activities

The study demonstrated that any kind of income-generating activity, even through informal channels, is severely hinder by several factors. Table 11.2 illustrates, how many respondents had access to work in the 30 days prior to the day of data collection. The independent samples t-test revealed (t=0.933, df=91, p=0.353) that gender does not play a significant role in whether or not the refugee had work in the past month. The vast majority of refugees do not receive any regular income from other sources (e.g., family), which leaves them dependent on humanitarian aid. Even those refugees who have established a small business could not rely on regular earnings, as they lack customers.
Table 11.2. Refugees who had worked in the past month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Worked last month</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The irregular character of income-generating activities in the camps prevents young Eritreans from developing self-reliance, even those who have had the opportunity to access livelihood programmes. Only 15 respondents claimed to work regularly, however, many refugees continuously search for opportunities, even when their access to activities leading to income is irregular.

One of the interviews with NGO workers revealed some interrelation between motivation to search for livelihood opportunities and market demand:

Refugees need sound businesses within the camp. As long as there is a satisfactory opportunity in terms of market linkage, they are interested [to search for opportunities]. If they see that the link to the market is missing, they might not be interested. In existing businesses [the missing link] leads to drop-out [from the business activities]. (ZOA worker 1, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 14 December 2017)

Figure 11.1 provides an overview of the motivational factors that keep refugees participating in income-generating activities. The largest motivational factor is ‘self-sufficiency’, which was indicted by 84% of respondents. Refugees seem to be more than willing to use their talent and potential through their work and leave behind dependency. An independent samples t-test was done to compare genders in relation to all eight motivational factors. The results indicate that none of the compared variables is significant (p>0.05).
The qualitative interviews revealed, however, that beneficiaries of livelihood programmes often lose their motivation to continue with a particular livelihood activity (e.g., a business activity), which may lead to drop-out: “A loss of motivation in a beneficiary is often a problem. Most of them are young. They expect to have a short-term benefit and [at the same time, a] huge benefit” (ZOA worker 2, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 14 December 2017).

**Obstacles and opportunities to access livelihoods**

A wide range of obstacles have been observed among the respondents, which explain the low access of Eritrean refugees to livelihoods (Table 11.3). By far, lack of job opportunities is
considered to be the main constraining element by refugees, which makes it difficult for them to gain an additional income. The independent samples t-test showed that the interaction between the two genders and lack of the market information variable is significant (t=2.284, df=92, p=0.025).

Except for a few micro-businesses, like beauty salons, shops, cafés, and restaurants, very few income-generating activities have developed in the camp, which is closely linked to the demographics and the constant secondary movement of refugees. Even refugees who own a small business face challenges on a daily basis to sustain the business and generate a small income from it.

*I try to work. Mentally, it helps me. I have my small business, but I don’t have a good income. In order to have an income, I need customers. But these people [refugees within the camp], they don’t have money. If they don’t have money, how come they can come to the café to eat? Sometimes you open the doors and for two, three days no one comes. I try to work. But how do I get people to come here? There is no good ground for work. These people are very, very poor. The money they get is not enough for a living.* (Interviewee 3, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)

*Some people have the opportunity to open a café or a shop, but it is very difficult because they don’t have customers. I don’t have the will to open a café nor a shop [when] I see that they [owners] are not working.* (Interviewee 4, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)

The restrictions on the freedom of movement of refugees affect their ability to find work in urban areas. In order to be eligible to leave the camp legally, a refugee has to obtain written permission from ARRA, which requires the holder to return to the camp after a predefined period. For the majority of Eritreans it is impossible to meet the eligibility criteria for the out-of-camp policy, which would entitle them to work in cities. Also, the remoteness of the camp brings challenges for refugees with small businesses, as it is difficult to secure supplies: “There is no chance to go to other cities to work. You need special permission to go. Such conditions do not encourage you to
work (Interviewee 4, interview, with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018).

Table 11.3. Obstacles identified by refugees and their relation to gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacles</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction of movement</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of work permit</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of job opportunities</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language barrier</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of experience</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of education</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of market information</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of acceptance by the host community</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The qualitative interviews confirmed the severity of the lack of income-generating activities.

*It is very difficult to live here [in the camp], [both] mentally and physically. Because it is very hot here. There are no work opportunities; only for few people. … Sometimes there is some opportunity to build [shelters], but it is for a short time. When you finish, there is no work anymore.* (Interviewee 3, interview, with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)

Even for existing activities, it is very challenging to generate some income due to the low level of market opportunities: “In any type of livelihood activities, the market is not encouraging. Alongside the skill trainings and getting support investments, they [refugees] have to be linked to the markets which is tough work for the NGOs” (ZOA worker 1, interview, with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 14 December 2017).
Basic needs of refugees and how they are provided for

All of the constraining factors cause Eritrean refugees to struggle to meet their basic needs on a regular basis. Life in Hitsats brings only a few opportunities to generate income, which makes refugees highly dependent on assistance from UNHCR. However, both refugee respondents, as well as NGO workers, reported many challenges with the aid provided (Table 11.4). In particular, many complained that the monthly food supplies provided by the World Food Programme do not last for the whole month. Each person receives 10 kilograms of wheat and ETB 60 (approximately USD 2), which has been reduced from ETB 100 (approximately USD 3.5). In addition, refugees receive 0.9 litres of oil, 1.5 kilograms of pulses, and 0.25 kilogram of salt.

Only 10 kilograms of wheat are given to the people. It is not enough. Maybe it is enough for two or three weeks. But after that, what are they doing if they don’t have any money? [In order] to manage for one month, the people cook and eat together [rather than] alone. … It is difficult. When I see it, I am disturbed. (Interviewee 1, interview, with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)

It is very difficult to live here. We don’t get enough food. Even the food they give us is not enough. …and because people don’t have enough food they are exposed to illness. (Interviewee 4, interview, with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)

Another problem is water supply. There are constant shortages, even though water taps were installed in Hitsats. The international refugee standard prescribes 20 litres of water per person per day: “Sometimes there are problems with distribution. Sometimes refugees do not get even 20 litres [of water] per day. So they go to rivers or water holes, and they use unsafe water. That is a challenge” (NRC worker, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 30 January 2018).

This time the water [situation] is difficult. For example, now there is a shortage of water. Only two jugs are allowed per house per day. Forty litres is not enough. We can buy water from the locals who have wells, [we have to pay] 2 ETB for 20 litres. (Interviewee 2, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)
There is a shortage of water. We can buy water, but it is not safe. Nobody knows whether it is clean or not. Even during the rainy season, people go to wash in the river. But it is not good. It brings some allergies. ... The situation with water is getting worse. (Interviewee 4, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)

Each refugee who arrives in Hitsats is granted a shelter. However, challenged by the lack of space, refugees have to share shelters with many others. There can be as many as 10 people assigned to share one shelter.

Nine or ten people live together in one house. But we are different. We have different ethnicities, culture; we came from different villages, cities; we don’t know each other or our behaviours. So it is very difficult to live in one house like this. I don’t live with my family nor my friends. Instead, I live with different people who came from different regions. (Interviewee 2, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)

Lastly, the low level of access to energy adds another struggle to the daily reality of refugees. The lack of wood and coal, which are essential for cooking, obliges refugees to search for alternative solutions: “[A] furnace without coal is nothing” (Interviewee 1, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018). Consequently, refugees often cut trees to get some firewood for cooking. This creates tension and causes clashes between refugees and the host community.

We don’t have [fire]wood or coal. We have to pay for it. If we try to take wood from locals [host community] we may fight with them, or they may beat us, or we may [end up in] a detention centre. (Interviewee 2, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018)
Table 11.4. Needs of refugees and how they are provided for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provided by assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication (mobile, Internet)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to energy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Practices of organisations**

Several organisations based in the camp are keen to promote and support livelihood programmes and build greater self-reliance. Refugees are highly motivated to take part in the programmes offered and to obtain certificates, which they may use in the future even after leaving the camp. All the procedural and technical aspects of livelihood programmes initiated by NGOs have to be approved by ARRA, the governmental agency present in the camp.

Various NGOs run programmes to enhance the capacity of refugees through vocational skills trainings and by providing start-up materials and micro-loans for small businesses. Vocational skills trainings are provided inside the camp for refugee as well as host communities. Each NGO provides these training independently based on the assessment conducted prior to the start of livelihood programmes. Long-term programmes of six months include training on skills such as furniture making, food preparation, garment making, and construction. Short-term trainings of three months cover laser work, metal work, and beauty services such as hairdressing. Upon receiving vocational training, participants receive business skills training. After graduating from the trainings, organisations provide micro-loans and
start-up kits for groups to start their own small businesses. NGOs are highly dependent on donors and have a limited budget; therefore, not every graduate qualifies for start-up materials, as the demand is much higher than amount of resources.

Organisations have to face a lot of limitations and challenges, which is closely linked to their limited budget and capacity. This study also found that multiple NGOs are providing the same type of trainings, which leads to duplication and saturation of the market. This is due to lack of horizontal cooperation between organisations during the assessment phase and livelihood planning. “To train people is not enough. To put them in a good business market and to give them a market is good” (Interviewee 1, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018).

The connectivity of refugees to the economic market outside the camp is non-existent, which dramatically decreases their chances of generating enough income to sustain their business activities, which at the same time increases the vulnerability of refugees.

There are also dependency problems. You help them [refugees] to start up a business, and they feel like you will support them all their life here. NGOs try to help them within their limited budget and capacity, but [refugees’] expectations of NGOs are a lot higher. They feel like you always have to be there to support them rather than [they] strengthen themselves. These syndromes are [present] there. It is a problem to make livelihoods really sustainable. You see that their businesses collapses and they start to go down. (ZOA worker 1, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 14 December 2017)

Both the qualitative and quantitative data confirmed that the livelihood programmes in the camps cannot be considered sustainable. Sustainability in livelihood planning is essential, and it also helps to prevent secondary migration movements. The Sustainable Livelihood Framework of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) qualifies a livelihood as sustainable when it does not depend on external assistance, when it recovers from external shocks and stresses, and
when the long-term productivity of natural resources is preserved (DFID, 1999). Therefore, it is necessary to shift from short-term to long-term planning with a holistic approach. Nevertheless, further research is needed in order to understand how sustainability can be embedded within livelihood programmes for refugees.

**Conclusion**

Thousands of young Eritreans are forced to flee their country every year to seek a safe and dignified life. However, their dreams and visions of a life in dignity vanish in the inhospitable reality of the refugee camps. The challenges are diverse and interlinked, but they have one common denominator – all of them take away hope and any visible prospect of self-reliance. The refugees are left in limbo. This chapter look at the access of Eritrean camp refugees to livelihood opportunities in Ethiopia and whether or not a policy window (Kingdon, 2014) has opened to put refugees’ livelihood issues on the decision-making agenda. Despite the international legal instruments that Ethiopia has adopted, the right to work for refugees has not been legislated into national law and is not implemented in practice. The rights of refugees cannot be fully attained, as explained by the concept of a human rights culture (Rorty, 1993), as they are not fully recognised and implemented in practice.

The empirical study found that Eritrean refugees in Hitsats have low, almost non-existent, access to income-generating activities. A major sector that provides employment for camp refugees is institutional employment; refugees are also engaged in petty trade, personal services (such as beauty parlours, hairdressing, and barbering), construction related work and technical services (mainly for male refugees). However, the lack of income-generating opportunities, even in the informal sector, and the irregularity of existing ones leave the majority of Hitsats’ refugees highly dependent on humanitarian aid and the assistance provided by UNHCR. Searching for work alternatives outside the camp in urban areas is also not a viable option, due to the restrictions on freedom of movement defined in Ethiopia’s out-of-camp policy (Samuel Hall, 2014), as well as the lack of
resources of refugees. As well as restriction of movement, the study found ineligibility for work permits and lack of employment opportunities to be major obstacles to accessing livelihoods. According to the Development Assistance for Refugees framework, the access of refugees to socio-economic activities is one of the essential prerequisites for self-reliance. Given the fact that refugees cannot rely on regular income, the social and economic ability of refugees in Hitsats to fulfil their own needs is unattainable (UNHCR, 2003).

Based on the interviews with refugees and NGO workers, it appears that monthly rations of food for camp refugees are not sufficient to sustain them. Refugees tend to cook, eat and manage food rations in groups in order to sustain themselves. In addition, the study found that access to water, shelter and energy are highly challenged within the camp setting. Refugees often do not even get the 20 litres of water a day prescribed by international standards. In addition, water purchased from the water wells to supplement that given is not purified and may lead to health problems. Low access to power also brings complications for refugees, who depend entirely on coal and firewood for cooking. In desperation, refugees often cut down trees for firewood, which causes tension between refugees and host communities. The remoteness of Hitsats camp contributes to these problems. Due to poverty and the hardships faced in camp, young refugees have to strive hard to supplement their food, water and coal supplies. However, it is impossible to do so without regular income or remittances from family members or friends. Even those refugees who have established micro-businesses in the camp are affected, as they do not have enough customers on a regular basis.

Despite the endeavours of several NGOs to promote livelihood activities for refugees, the element of sustainability is lacking in livelihood programmes in Hitsats camp, which is proven by the high number of drop-outs from these programmes. Even though sustainability was not explicit part of the present research, it was observed that in order to bring about long-term solutions, a holistic approach needs to be adopted, together with improvement of
horizontal cooperation between NGOs. According to ILO, in cases where the environment is not sufficient to link refugees to the market and public services, the skills of refugees are not utilised to the full extent (ILO, 2017). Subsequently, this prevents refugees from integrating into the host society (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016), in this case into Ethiopian society.

The results of the present study show that young Eritrean refugees live in a vicious cycle, where one challenge leads to another. This evokes feelings of frustration and hopeless among the refugees. Consequently, refugees often opt to move on from Hitsats camp, in search of a better future. The need for better livelihood programmes remains high. The concept of refugee livelihoods, however, cannot be resolved on its own without looking at the problem holistically. It is not the mere creation of job opportunities and providing skill training that will result in self-reliance and lead to resilience. Livelihoods should be considered within the policy mechanisms available in the host country (Samuel Hall, 2014). A comprehensive study carried out in Northern Uganda showed that the improvement of livelihoods is possible only when trauma relief is taken seriously within the livelihood programming (Van Reisen, Nakazibwe, Stockmans, Vallejo, & Kidane, 2018; also see Kidane & Stokmans, 2018 regarding Hitsats and Shimelba refugee camps).

These problems have been recognised, not only by refugees on the ground, but also by policymakers and the government. Combined with recent developments in the political and policy streams in Ethiopia, such as the adoption of the Nine Pledges and revision of the 2004 Refugee Proclamation, it seems that there is hope for refugees’ livelihood issues to reach the decision agenda. As Kingdon (2014) explains, the problem stream and policy stream have to be supported by a positive political climate in order to introduce specific agenda setting. Over the past years, Ethiopia has gone through great political change and shifts which appear to have been a factor in pushing issues relating to refugees onto the agenda. However, at the time of the empirical data collection, it appears that the policy window has not completely open and the implementation of rights on the
ground is still lacking. While the political shift, led by the new prime minister, has brought new attention to refugee issues, it remains unclear what change this will bring about for the refugees in the near future.

References


Samuel Hall. (2018). *Local integration focus: Refugees in Ethiopia – Gaps and opportunities for refugees who have lived in Ethiopia for 20 years or more*. Regional


Introduction

Many children around the world are at risk of losing parental care and protection. This risk increases in emergency situations. The danger to refugee children, in terms of their safety and wellbeing, when they have lost their parents or caregivers is high. The sudden and violent onset of emergencies, the disruption of families and community structures, as well as the acute shortage of resources affect the physical, psychological and developmental wellbeing of children in refugee camps. Additionally, losing the care and protection of their families or caregivers puts children at increased risk of abduction, human trafficking, unlawful recruitment or use by armed groups, sexual abuse and exploitation, and loss of identity (UNHCR, 1994; UNICEF, 2017). Ethiopia has ratified important international conventions to protect the rights and safety of children (United Nations, 1989; UNCRC, 2013).
Additionally, national policies and laws have been developed to enforce the protection and rights of children (FDRE-ARRA, 2017).

This chapter presents the results of research conducted in Tigray, Ethiopia in 2017 and 2018 on unaccompanied and separated Eritrean children in the refugee camps near the Eritrean border. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989) and the Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (ICRC, 2004) are applied to assess the four refugee camps in Ethiopia that receive most of the Eritrean refugees. The first author is the head of the Shire operation of the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), which is responsible for coordinating the Ethiopian refugee operation, and is responsible for the research reported in this chapter. The second author is a researcher on unaccompanied children and youth from Eritrea in the refugee camps in Tigray. He conducted his own research in the same period as the first author, which has been published separately (Schoenmaeckers, 2018). His contribution to this chapter was to check and organise the original data for the chapter. Although the research is only an initial explorative study, it gives a direct and first-hand insight into the situation of the children in these refugee camps.

In terms of the structure of this chapter, the next sections outline the context of the study, including the Eritrean-Ethiopian border war, the refugee camps in northern Ethiopia and the legal framework for child protection in Ethiopia. The research questions are then set out, followed by the methodology. Then the main findings of the study are presented from the perspective of the children, NGOs and child protection officers, and committee members. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.

**The Eritrean-Ethiopian border war**

After British and Italian rule, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in the 1960s. The result of this annexation was a border war for independence that lasted 30 years. Eventually, the Ethiopian army was defeated in 1991.
and, within a few years, a statehood referendum was held in Eritrea. In 1993, the new nation was born. Unfortunately, Eritrea’s unstable relations with its bordering countries collapsed rapidly and, in 1998, a five-year border war culminated in the slaughter of more than 100,000 people on both sides (Connell, 2016).

Since its independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea has developed a culture of secrecy, intolerance and absolute control, claiming that this is necessary to defend its sovereignty. The regime, headed by President Isaias Afwerki, has been accused of crimes against humanity by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UN Human Rights Council, 2016). This has resulted in an exodus of refugees from Eritrea over the last years, with over 5,000 people leaving Eritrea each month due to lack of fundamental freedoms, conflict and indefinite National Service (Kibreab, 2009; Tewolde-Berhan, Plaut & Smits, 2017; Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017).

The number of Eritreans crossing the Ethiopian border has increased over the last five years, and accelerated after the peace negotiations between Ethiopia and Eritrea started in 2017. The Shire operation of ARRA, which is responsible for four refugee camps in Tigray, has a total registered population of 72,772 people, residing in one of four refugee camps: Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba. The Endabaguna Screening and Reception Centre in Tigray received over 12,701 new arrivals from January to August 2018. Of this, 2,534 were unaccompanied and separated children (UNHCR, 2018d). After the peace agreement between both countries was signed in September 2018, a significant increase in refugees was measured at Endabaguna. Between 3 and 12 October, a total of 5,475 new arrivals were transferred from the border to Endabaguna and 6,987 were transferred from Endabaguna to Mai Ayni, Adi Harush and Hitsats (UNHCR, 2018a). The total inflow between September and December 2018 was 29,753. The inflow of unaccompanied and separated children under the age of 18 was 4,894 in that same period. The total population of unaccompanied and separated children in the four refugee camps in 2018 was 10,533 (UNHCR, 2018d).
Eritrean refugees arriving in Tigray find themselves in a tense situation. Besides a lack of basic resources like timber and water, struggles between Eritreans and Tigrayans revolve around nationality, land, identity and political destiny. These struggles are difficult and painful due to the bloody wars these people have fought against each other, although they are essentially ethnically the same (Reid, 2003). The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (later the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice) and the Tigray’s People’s Liberation Front have played a major role in these tensions. Over the decades, differences in the tactics and ideologies of these former allies have corrupted the relationship and led to violence and contestation over resources, land and identity (Woldemariam & Young, 2018).

**Refugee camps in Ethiopia**

Tigray is located in the north of Ethiopia and has received many refugees from Eritrea over the years. Eritrean refugees are provided with shelter and basic resources in four main refugee camps in Ethiopia: Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba. Although ARRA carries the main responsibility for the refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) assist ARRA in a variety of ways, include by providing food, water and hygiene facilities, as well as education and livelihood programmes (Chapter 11, *Inhospitable Realities: Refugees’ Livelihoods in Hitsats, Ethiopia*, by Kristína Melicherová).

Most of the unaccompanied and separated children are cared for by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and provided shelter in Hitsats refugee camp, which is the newest refugee camp in Tigray. In the Shimelba refugee camp the situation is different than in the other camps. Shimelba is the oldest camp and was established in 2004. The camp is community based and 41% of camp residents are under 18 years of age. The people who live in Shimelba are from the Kunama ethnic group. This is the smallest ethnic group in Eritrea and is found mainly in regions near the Ethiopian border. Their language is Nilo Saharan, which is unrelated to the dominant languages in Ethiopia.
and Eritrea, making communication a serious issue (Lo Dolce & Thompson, 2004; UNHCR, 2018b).

Unaccompanied and separated children in the refugee camps are carefully received and protected. They live in special care arrangements. These arrangements include community care, foster care, and kinship care. In kinship care, relatives or acquaintances of the children’s family are responsible for the children. In foster care, the children live together with other refugees who offer to take responsibility for the children and care for them in their home. Community care is the most common arrangement, in which the children live with each other in group housing in communities. Each community has about 10 shelters and 5 to 10 children live in each. Social workers take care of the children and live together with them. They are refugees themselves and have good relationships with the children. The organisation and coordination of the unaccompanied children in community care is carried out by the NRC (Schoenmaeckers, Al-Qasim & Zanzottera, 2019).

The overall refugee coordination in the camps is executed by ARRA and the UNHCR. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are partners in resettlement and the provision of basic needs. NGOs in the camps provide livelihood programmes, education, protection and health care services. Beside the NRC, the NGOs currently active in the refugee camps include Innovation Humanitarian Solutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Medicine Sans Frontier Holland, the Dutch humanitarian organisation Zuid Oost Azië (ZOA), the Danish Refugee Council, and the International Refugee Committee, among others. In addition to providing relief and basic services, these NGOs support the refugees in organising themselves into committees. The refugee camps have well-established community-based structures where men, women and children are represented by different committees. The committees that are included in this research are the Child Welfare Committee, Refugee Central Committee and Children’s Parliament (UNHCR, 2018b; UNHCR, 2018c). The latter, the Children’s Parliament, was formed
to allow children in the camp to actively contribute to their own welfare. They organise meetings in which issues such as food distribution, leisure time activities and security are discussed. The Children’s Parliament does not have legal power, but acts as a consultative group. The children who are members can be from all different care arrangements, but most active members live in community care.

**Legal framework**

On 14 May 1991, Ethiopia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989). Ethiopia has made much progress since then in terms of child protection and wellbeing. It has ratified various international conventions and treaties over the years in order to protect children and to protect and respect human rights in general (UNCRC, 2013). In particular, ARRA takes measures to ensure the protection of refugee children from discrimination and abuse. It also ensures that refugee children have access to free medical care, education, and social and psychological assistance. The provision of a secure environment and accommodation is one of its main tasks (UNCRC, 2013).

The Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children state that:

> All children are entitled to emergency care and provision for their basic subsistence. Assistance for separated children must adequately meet their basic needs at a standard comparable to the surrounding community and should be provided in a way that preserves family unity, keeps children with their relatives or other care-givers and does not lead to separation. In emergencies, interim care must be provided for children separated from their families until they are reunited, placed with foster parents or other long term arrangements for care are made. This may include fostering, other forms of community-based care, or institutional care. (ICRC, 2004, p. 42)

The definition and function of foster parents or legal guardians varies in different countries. The term guardianship refers to the designation of responsibility to an adult or organisation responsible for ensuring
that the child’s best interests are fully represented. According to Articles 3 and 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF, 1989), a guardian is responsible for administrative and judicial proceedings involving the child. A guardian is responsible for ensuring that the child is properly represented, that his or her views are expressed and that any decision taken is in his or her best interests. Under the Convention, unaccompanied and separated children should be provided with access to appropriate health care. When children live in crowded environments like refugee camps, they become more vulnerable to infectious diseases than otherwise. Therefore, it is important that the food that is provided to the children be balanced and constitutes a nutritious diet, taking into account their cultural eating habits and the diet of the local community (ICRC, 2004, p. 48).

In addition, the right to education needs to be protected. Like all children, refugee children also have the right to receive a proper education. In the case of unaccompanied or separated children, education programmes need to be organised in such a way that they do not encourage or prolong family separation. In addition, access to education should be promoted and monitored. The Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children state that it is desirable for separated refugee children to return to their country of origin with diplomas or certificates, obtained in the host country (ICRC, 2004, p. 49).

Key elements of children’s psycho-social recovery “are the early meeting of basic needs, structured activities to restore a sense of normality, and care and nurturing” (ICRC, 2004, p. 50). In addition, it is crucial for the child’s psychosocial wellbeing that family-reunification is realised where possible:

One of the main principles behind tracing and reunification is that recovery from harm is most likely to take place when children are cared for by people whom they know well and trust. For children who cannot be reunited with their families, it is important to promote community-based care that builds on local culture and provides continuity in learning, socialization and development. […] When there is a need for
Specialized interventions, local resources should be explored and supported if they are in the best interests of the child. (ICRC, 2004, p. 50)

Furthermore, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the national government is the primary body responsible for coordinating programmes at the national and local level:

*National child-welfare services or local authorities should provide an overall framework for, and coordinate action on behalf of, separated children. Organizations should support government efforts to review policies and legislation to ensure that they are in line with international agreed standards. When there is a lack of ability or willingness to apply internationally agreed standards or when government structures and policies are disrupted, responsibility for protecting separated children can be delegated temporarily to organizations that have a mandate or expertise in this area. Support for the government should be continued in order to allow its services to take over coordination of the work as soon as possible.* (ICRC, 2004, p. 67)

It is the duty of UNHCR and UNICEF to contribute and assist the government in fulfilling these responsibilities (ICRC, 2004, p. 67). The Ethiopian government has taken measures in order to address these issues. The basic principle the Ethiopian government relies on is the best interests of the child. This principle is applied in measures for providing basic services, like accommodation, food, water and education, but also leisure-time activities and protection.

The government is collaborating intensively with UNHCR and international partners in order to meet the standards contained in the guidelines (UNCRC, 2013). In September 2016, the Ethiopian government made ‘Nine Pledges’ to improve the lives of refugees. One of the pledges was specifically targeted at children: to increase the enrolment of refugee children in preschool, primary, secondary and tertiary education, without discrimination and within available resources. The other pledges relate to all refugees and include: expansion of the ‘out-of-camp’ policy to benefit 10% of the current total refugee population; provision of work permits to refugees and to those with permanent residence, within the bounds of domestic
law; provision of work permits to refugees in the areas permitted for foreign workers, by giving priority to qualified refugees; making available irrigable land to allow 100,000 people (among them refugees and local communities) to engage in crop production; building industrial parks where a percentage of jobs will be committed to refugees; provision of other benefits such as issuance of birth certificates to refugee children born in Ethiopia, possibility of opening bank accounts and obtaining driving licenses; enhancing the provision of basic and essential social services; and allowing the local integration of those refugees who have lived in Ethiopia for 20 years or more. The planning of these pledges started with the roadmap published in August 2017 and includes actions to implement them (FDRE-ARRA, 2017).

**Research questions**

This study assesses the situation of unaccompanied and separated children in Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba refugee camps in Tigray, northern Ethiopia. It investigates whether the protection of unaccompanied and separated refugee children adheres to the standards set in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF, 1989) and the Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (ICRC, 2004). The chapter examines some of the key principles, as set out in the legal framework. The purpose of the study is to inform government agencies and organisations seeking to improve the wellbeing and protection of Eritrean refugee children in Tigray. For the purposes of the study, unaccompanied children (or minors) are defined as: “children who have been separated from both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so” (ICRC, 2004, p. 13). Separated children “are those separated from both parents or from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily from other relatives. These may, therefore, include children accompanied by other adult family members” (ICRC, 2004, p. 13).
The research question is: *To what extent is the reception and protection of unaccompanied and separated children in Tigray executed according to the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children?*

In order to answer this question, the following sub-questions are posed:

- *Is the provision of basic needs and social services for unaccompanied and separated refugee children in the refugee camps in northern Ethiopia adequate?*
- *What is the role of child protection officers in giving care and support to the unaccompanied and separated children?*
- *What are the main challenges involved in the reception and protection of unaccompanied and separated children?*
- *What is the situation regarding the onward movement of unaccompanied and separated children and the associated risks of smuggling, trafficking and kidnapping?*

**Methodology**

**Data collection**

This study used a mixed methods approach in which quantitative and qualitative data was gathered and analysed (Bryman, 2012). The geographical scope of the study included children who live in the four refugee camps in Tigray: Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba. The data was collected during 2017 and 2018.

Primary sources of data include data gathered directly from unaccompanied and separated children, as well as child protection officers, caregivers from kinship care and foster care arrangements, and social workers. Key informants from ARRA, UNHCR, NRC, Innovation Humanitarian Solutions, Child Welfare Committee and Refugee Central Committee were also approached. The child participants included children who live in community care and who are members of the Children’s Parliament. The quantitative data includes descriptive surveys, which enabled the researcher to assess
the situation of the wider target population in the camps. In addition, observations were made throughout the whole data collection period. Secondary sources of data include policy documents, manuals, discussion papers, and reports regarding children who live in the refugee camps.

The fundamental part of conducting research with children is obtaining parental consent. As the parents of the unaccompanied and separated children are absent, consent is required from the local authority and the person legally responsible for the child in order to ensure the child’s safety. Consequently, informed consent is another key principle for conducting ethical research with children. This is not only to protect the wellbeing of the children, but also to respect their sense of control (Hopkins, 2008).

Prior to the data collection, a request letter was sent to the ARRA zonal office in Shire in order to introduce the aim of the research and obtain permission. After permission was granted and ARRA directed the permission letter to the camp offices, the objective, purpose and focus of the study were discussed with the UNHCR child protection officer and NRC child protection coordinator. Sensitive issues regarding the children, planning and management were thoroughly discussed.

The research methods used included surveys, interviews, focus group discussions and observations. The surveys were carried out to explore the main issues. In order to better understand the answers provided in the survey, the researcher followed up in interviews and focus group discussions. The focus group discussions gave the respondents the security to discuss sensitive issues, whereas the interviews were used to better understand responses in terms of their meaning on a more personal level. The interviews were also used to discuss the questions with resource persons, and their answers are also included in the analysis.

The surveys and interviews with the children took place in the homes of the children and ranged from 50 to 90 minutes each. The focus
group discussions were conducted in the Child Friendly Space and took between 1 and 2 hours. The interviews with key informants from the organisations were conducted in their offices and took between 60 and 90 minutes.

The surveys and interviews were translated into/conducted in the local language Tigrinya. Field notes were taken throughout. These notes were carefully reviewed for accuracy. Afterwards, the data was translated and organised according to the most frequently used words, phrases and sentences. The data was then analysed and is presented here in tables and narrative.

Observations were conducted throughout the research of the children’s living conditions inside their houses and their relationships and interactions with their neighbours and caregivers. Observations were also made during the food distribution programme, in the communal kitchen, at the Child Friendly Space, and at school to see how the children participated.

**Sample**
As at December 2018, the total population of unaccompanied and separated children living in one of the four refugee camps in northern Ethiopia was 10,533 (UNHCR, 2018d). A sample of 200 (150 boys and 50 girls) children, who live in community care arrangements took part in the survey. In addition, 34 child protection officers from ARRA, UNHCR, NRC and Innovation Humanitarian Solutions were interviewed and 100 (of a total of 402) committee members and social workers took part in the focus group discussions. The committee members who participated included children and adults who were members of the following committees: Refugee Central Committee, Children’s Parliament, Child Welfare Committee and social workers (Gebreyesus, 2018). The social workers who participated included the caregivers who provide the children with care in the different arrangements (see Table 12.1).
Table 12.1. Number of respondents and data collection methods used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unaccompanied and separated children (in community care)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child protection officers (ARRA, UNHCR, NRC, Innovation Humanitarian Solutions)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee members (Refugee Central Committee, Children’s Parliament, Child Welfare Committee and social workers)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More males than females participated in the study, as there are more males in the camp than females. The focus group discussions were held in groups of 20 persons. A total of 5 focus groups were organised. Table 12.2 gives the respondents per age group category.

Table 12.2. Age of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>11–15 years</th>
<th>16–18 years</th>
<th>18+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccompanied and separated children (in community care)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child protection officers (ARRA, UNHCR, NRC, Innovation Humanitarian Solutions)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Committee members (Refugee Central Committee, Children’s Parliament, Child Welfare Committee and social workers) | - | - | 40 | 40% | 60 | 60%
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
**Total** | 120 | 36% | 120 | 36% | 94 | 28%

A total of 120 of the unaccompanied and separated children were 11–15 years old; the other 80 were 16–18 years old. All 34 child protection officers were above 18 years old and 40 of the committee members were 16–18 years old. The other 60 were above 18 years old. Table 12.3 sets out the education level of the respondents.

Table 12.3. Education level of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grade 1–4/certificate</th>
<th>Grade 5–8/diploma</th>
<th>High school/degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccompanied and separated children (in community care)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child protection officers (ARRA, UNHCR, NRC, Innovation Humanitarian Solutions)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee members (Refugee Central Committee, Children’s Parliament, Child Welfare Committee) and social workers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As outlined in Table 12.3, 40 of the children who participated in the study were in grades 1–4, 145 were in grades 5–8, and 15 were high school students. All 34 child protection officers were degree holders. Of the members of the committees, 30 were in grades 1–4 or had received a (any) certificate, 55 were in grades 5–8 or held a diploma, and 15 were high school students or degree holders.

Results

This section presents the results and is organised according to the research method used.

Survey of unaccompanied and separated children

The survey was conducted among 200 unaccompanied and separated children who are living in community care. Of the 200 children, 143 (72%) had been living in the camp for 1 or 2 years and 57 (28%) had been living in the camp for 3 or 4 years. All 200 children said that they lived together with 5 to 10 other children in one house. In Table 12.4,\textsuperscript{56} the main reasons given by the minors for leaving Eritrea are given. The children could choose 1 of 4 reasons, which were selected based on explorative research. If the child had a different reason for leaving, they were allowed to give this reason.

As Table 12.4 shows, 23 (12%) of the unaccompanied and separated children left Eritrea to access better education in Ethiopia, 37 (18%) came to reunite with their family members who live in Ethiopia, 33 (17%) came due to peer pressure and the other 107 (53%) children came out of fear of forced military conscription.

\textsuperscript{56} All tables and figures in this chapter contain original data collected during empirical study by the authors.
Table 12.4. Main reason for leaving Eritrea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unaccompanied and separated children (in community care)</th>
<th>To access better education</th>
<th>Family reunification in Ethiopia</th>
<th>Peer pressure</th>
<th>Fear of forced military conscription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 12.5–12.8 present the results of the survey regarding availability, accessibility and quality of services in the camp. These tables show the questions asked in the survey and the responses of the children. Some items from the surveys are not provided in tables and only explained in the text under the items to which they relate.

Table 12.5. Accessibility of services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What services are accessible at your location?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. School</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Play and recreational centres</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Community library</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Food services (communal kitchen)</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Health services</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 12.5 indicates, the majority of the respondents said that most services are accessible at their location. Only the community library (62%) and, to a lesser extent, vocational skills training centres (35%) and water and sanitation facilities (27%) are mentioned as not accessible by a significant number of children. Not all refugee camps in Tigray have a functional community library and vocational skills training courses are not attended by the youngest children, who are going to school. Water and sanitation facilities are insufficient in all four camps, mainly due to a lack of potable water. This explains the high negative responses to these.

Table 12.6. Quality of services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which services are you happy/ satisfied with the quality of?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. School</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Play and recreational centre</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Community library</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Food services (communal kitchen)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Health services</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Water and sanitation facilities</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All of the respondents said that they are happy or satisfied with the quality of the school and most said that they were also happy with the protection and assistance services (89%) provided in the camp. Just over half, or 113 (57%) respondents, said that they were satisfied with the health services – 87 (43%) were not. The majority were not satisfied with the community library (73%), play and recreational centres (92%), food services (62%), water and sanitation facilities (52%), and vocational skill training centres (62%). It is surprising that all 200 children said they were satisfied with the quality of the school as there was no secondary education available in the camp where most of the unaccompanied minors were housed at the time the research was conducted.

To the question what services should be improved regarding availability, accessibility or quality of services, the vast majority of the children claimed that all of the services should be improved. In addition to the services listed in the survey, most also suggested that alternative energy sources, shelters, resettlement procedures, and care givers and house mothers should be improved.

Table 12.7. Services received from NGOs in community care arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What kind of material/services do you receive from NGOs that implement community care?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Clothing</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Shoes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Household utilities</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Food items</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding the materials and services children in group care arrangements receive from NGOs, most of the respondents said that household utilities (73%) and food items (73%) are provided to them. The majority also said that shoes (99%) and alternative energy sources (92%) were not being provided. More than half indicated that clothing (62%), personal sanitary materials (52%) and houses (62%) were not provided by the implementing NGOs. Pertaining to the frequency of the material provision, most of the respondents answered that they receive the materials and services as needed (i.e., no time was indicated).

All of the children said that they receive three meals per day. In the community care arrangements, 99% of the children indicated that housemates prepared food for each other in shifts. Only 1% of the children said that house mothers prepared the food. However, they emphasised that some materials or food ingredients provided to them were not sufficient for their daily consumption and prioritised the following issues as lacking: alternative energy; sugar, oil, onion, pulse and tomatoes; clothing, shoes and blankets; and potable water.

### Table 12.8. Negative impacts on quality and insufficiency of services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is there any negative impact or consequence that the insufficiency or quality of services has</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. School dropout</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secondary movement</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Deviant behaviour</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
had for you or other children?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4. Exposure to child labour</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>147</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>5. Drug and alcohol abuse</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The children were also asked what kind of negative impact the lack of sufficient or quality services had on them. According to the respondents, this led to school dropout, being forced to engage in secondary migration, deviant behaviour, exposure to child labour, and drug and alcohol abuse. School dropout (98%) and secondary movement (92%) were highlighted by most respondents as negative impacts.

**Interviews with NGOs and child protection officers**

Interviews were conducted with the protection officers at ARRA, UNHCR, NRC and Innovation Humanitarian Solutions. Most child protection officers highlighted that they facilitate family reunification for the children. Additionally, they assess the children for the most suitable care arrangements and develop standard operating procedures for the children. However, most confirmed that children do not participate in capacity-building activities. They also said that there were deficiencies in personnel and children do not have adequate guardians and teachers. They said that the protection officers do not analyse the strengths and weaknesses of social welfare and child protection systems, actors and services. Furthermore, the child protection officers do not adapt, develop or establish information management systems, agree on policies and procedures for safe storage and the sharing of information and the provision of basic needs for children is not based on UN standards.

Child protection officers highlighted the main challenges as follows:

- Labour abuse among the children
- Inadequate access to water and sanitation
- Unsafe shelters
• Lack of foster care families
• Lack of adequate food programmes
• Smuggling and human trafficking
• Secondary movement
• Lack of voluntary repatriation
• Lack of durable solutions, such as resettlement
• Harsh environment
• Inconsistent best interest determination (BID)\textsuperscript{57}
• Long distance to high school
• Lack of alternative energy and light
• Lack of Kunama interpreters at the Endabaguna Screening and Reception Centre

The majority of child protection officers said that they facilitate family reunification for the children, aim to work in the best interests of the child, including assessing the children for the most suitable care arrangement. Additionally, they have established standard operating procedures for the protection and reception of children.

\textit{Focus group discussions with committee members}

Focus group discussion were held with the members of the Refugee Central Committee, the Child Welfare Committee, children residing in community care, children from the Children’s Parliament, caregivers from kinship and foster care arrangements, and social workers. The main purpose of the focus group discussions was to assess the main challenges that occur in the lives of the children in the four camps. Five focus group discussions were organised with 20 participants in each group. In the focus group discussions, everyone was given the right to speak freely and express their opinions. In this subsection, the main points raised by the participants are outlined for each theme presented in the discussions.

\textsuperscript{57} "A ‘best interests determination’ (BID) describes the formal process with strict procedural safeguards designed to determine the child’s best interests for particularly important decisions affecting the child. It should facilitate adequate child participation without discrimination, involve decision-makers with relevant areas of expertise, and balance all relevant factors in order to assess the best option” (UNHCR, 2008, p. 8).
What is the situation regarding the onward movement of unaccompanied and separated children and the associated risks of smuggling, trafficking and kidnapping?

The participants of the focus group discussion emphasised that there is not such a high level of onward movement of children from the camps associated with smuggling or trafficking. The main illegal movement of children from the camp is towards Eritrea, mostly of children from the Kunama community and to a lesser extent from Tigrinya communities. Nevertheless, the onward movement towards Eritrea is of high risk. Children who leave for Eritrea are mostly leaving to see their families. The absence of adequate child and youth activities that anchor them to the camp account for this irregular migration. Additionally, the participants of the focus group discussions pointed out that according to them there is only a small number of children who leave for Sudan and Libya, but this group is at increased risk of smuggling and trafficking.

Is adequate shelter available for unaccompanied and separated children?

On this topic the participants said that there are insufficient separate shelters allocated for unaccompanied and separated children living in the camp. They live in the houses of their relatives and foster families. At the time of the research, some newly-constructed shelters were allocated for families that foster unaccompanied and separated children, but these still did not cover the need for shelters for all children. Currently, families in the camp are fostering children in their own houses, which they build themselves and have little living-space. The discussion participants emphasised that appropriate shelters must be constructed for foster families in order to encourage fostering parents to take children. Some participants stated that the main challenge is not only lack of shelters for unaccompanied and separated children, but the lack of adequate shelter in general.

Is there adequate access to the community-care food programme in the camps for unaccompanied and separated children?
And

Is there sufficient funding for the provision of clothes, shoes and hygiene items for the unaccompanied and separated children?

The participants of the focus group discussion pointed out that the budget for unaccompanied and separated children is inadequate. They pointed to the situation in one of the other camps, where community care programmes are supposedly better. They highlighted that children in other camps who live in community care get better support regarding clothing and food than children who live in foster care in the Shire camps. Additionally, they stated that the cash support for families taking care of unaccompanied and separated children is also inadequate. Furthermore, children do not receive clothes, shoes and hygiene materials regularly. The supplies are not need-based and some supplies are not suitable for the children. They stated that in some cases, the inadequate supply of clothing and other materials is causing children to drop out of school.

Is there adequate power supply in the communal kitchens for cooking injera\textsuperscript{58}?

The focus group discussants stated that the camp they were residing in was not connected to the national grid line and that there is no electricity in the communal kitchens. The two communal kitchens that are constructed were not functional at the time of the research. Additionally, collecting firewood was banned by the local government, which aggravates the problem.

Do the children attend school?

And

What obstacles are observed that lead the children not to attend school?

Regarding education, the participants stated that in this school year the enrolment rate of students was high at the beginning of the year due to collaborative work done by the education stakeholders. But

\textsuperscript{58} Injera is a sourdough-risen flatbread made of flour in Eritrea and Ethiopia.
the dropout rate has increased over time. The participants stated that good follow-up opportunities are provided by Innovation Humanitarian Solutions for unaccompanied and separated children who dropout. They outlined the main challenges as:

- The harsh, hot environment of the camp (especially for those who attend classes in the afternoon)
- Poor follow-up of dropouts by teachers, the Parent, Teachers and Student Association and the Refugee Central Committee
- The long distance to the school
- The dominant focus of parents and children on durable solutions like resettlement
- Teachers who repeatedly missed classes
- Inadequate clothes, shoes and other supportive materials
- Low awareness among children about their rights and school rules and regulations
- Corporal punishment

*Are durable solutions available for the children?*

On this topic, the participants said that there is no opportunity for family reunification provided by the ICRC for children who return to Eritrea illegally. The only durable solution available is resettlement. However, the best interest determination process is not done on a regular basis due to the absence of the UNHCR child protection officer. In addition, children with specific needs do not always apply for a durable solution, despite having health or social problems. The participants stated that best interest assessments were done for several unaccompanied and separated children with specific needs by Innovation Humanitarian Solutions, but that the best interest determination process is delayed. The participants also said that providing kinship care and foster care is becoming a reason for delays in the resettlement process for these families (i.e., if a person who is in the process of resettlement is also provided with kinship care or foster care, the resettlement process of that person takes longer).
Is there adequate budget through UNHCR and WFP for supplementary feeding in the camp?

During the focus group discussion, the participants said that supplementary food provision is available in the health centre through budgets from the UNHCR and WFP. However, they noted that there is no specific supplementary food contribution targeting unaccompanied and separated children. Unaccompanied and separated children will get supplementary food if they fulfil the criteria for this service. They also stated that school children get extra meals at school.

Do the child protection officers fulfil their duties and responsibilities to support unaccompanied and separated children?

The participants stated that they are doing their best to support unaccompanied and separated children, and to protect them from any abuse and onward movement. Although, they highlighted again the absence of the UNHCR child protection officer. They also noted that there has been a delay in data correction by ARRA in terms of the age and names of children.

The absence of a Kunama interpreter at the Endabaguna Screening and Reception Centre is another issue outlined by the participants. This can lead to incorrect data being recorded for children registered by UNHCR and other organisations.

Discussion and conclusion

The purpose of this study was to assess the situation of Eritrean unaccompanied and separated refugee children in Tigray. The research attempts to answer the question: To what extent is the reception and protection of unaccompanied and separated children in Tigray executed according to the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children? The data provides important first-hand insights from the refugee camps.
However, it should be kept in mind that the research was an initial explorative study and more extended research is needed to draw firm conclusions.

Both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children are implemented in Tigray. However, serious issues were raised during this research, indicating that these principles are not being fully complied with. For instance, the children said that they live in groups of 5 to 10 children in one house. These groups are too large, which affects privacy and hygiene. The quality of services and materials was generally described as low and insufficient. The lack of basic resources such as water, food, shelter and electricity make life difficult. Lack of materials and services was highlighted as a reason for school drop-out, secondary movement, deviant behaviour, and drug and alcohol abuse.

Based on the results of this study, it appears that the child protection officers are not able to fulfil their duties and responsibilities in the current situation. The workload of the UNHCR child protection officer is too heavy and his hours too limited. This results in much time when the officer is unavailable in the refugee camps. The absence of the child protection officer is highlighted as a main obstacle to adequate care and protection for unaccompanied and separated children in the camps. With the Nine Pledges made by the Ethiopian government in September 2016, these issues should improve considerably, which should strengthen the opportunities for children to study and work in Ethiopia, thereby creating a more conducive situation for the children.

For children who cannot be reunited with their families, it is important to promote community-based care that builds on local culture and provides continuity in learning, socialisation and development. Caregivers play a key role in promoting children’s confidence, trust and security. In the current situation, the caregivers are often refugees themselves, who know the culture and the background of the children, which makes the care situation
community-based and inclusive of the local culture (Schoenmaeckers, Al-Qasim & Zanzottera, 2019). In addition, teachers in the camp should receive extra training in appropriate ways of responding to children who are separated from their families and have emotional and behavioural problems.

In conclusion, all partners (UNHCR, ARRA, NRC, Innovation Humanitarian Solutions, etc.) should work together to fill the gaps in the provision of basic needs and social services for refugee children. Every organisation should have a child protection policy and strategy in place at all levels in order to fully comply with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children.

References


Part V. The Challenges of Return Migration
Chapter 13

Home, but not Home: Reintegration of Ethiopian Women Returning from the Arabian Gulf

Beza L. Nisrane

Introduction

While the migration experiences of domestic workers in Arabian Gulf countries\textsuperscript{59} and high-income Asian countries has received increased attention of late (Demissie, 2018; Gikuru, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2014), their reintegration in their home country upon return has not been well explored. In general, studies on female domestic workers and their reintegration have concentrated on their negative migration experiences (Anbesse, Hanlon, Alem, Packer, & Whitley, 2009; De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; Frantz, 2008; Gikuru, 2013; Jureidini & Moukarbel, 2004; Ketema, 2014; Wickramage, De Silva & Peiris, 2017). This chapter looks at the reintegration of Ethiopian female domestic migrants into their home country upon return from the Arabian Gulf, with a particular focus on the role of interpersonal relationships and sense of belonging. It

\textsuperscript{59} The Arabian Gulf countries (also referred to as Gulf Cooperation Council countries) are Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.
also examines the effect of their post-migration experiences on their intention to re-migrate.

Migration to the Arabian Gulf

The migration of female domestic workers to the Arabian Gulf usually takes the form of temporary migration, whereby migrants are invited to the host country by a particular employer for a specific duration, in most cases two or three years. After arrival in the destination country, whether the migrant has positive or negative experiences depends on the subjective behaviour of the sponsor or employer. Even though some migrants have positive migration experiences, the majority have negative experiences (Jureidini & Moukarbel, 2004; Ketema, 2014; Nisrane, Morissens, Need & Torenvlied, 2017).

The migration experiences of domestic workers in the Arabian Gulf have been equated with slavery by some scholars (Jureidini & Moukarbel, 2004). African female migrants, mostly from Kenya, Ethiopia, or Uganda, are subjected to various forms of physical, sexual, verbal and financial abuse (Gikuru, 2013; Minaye, 2012). Excessive workload, constrained movement and isolation, starvation, forced servitude, rape, and denial or underpayment of wages are recurrent issues (Anbesse et al., 2009; Gikuru, 2013; Minaye, 2012). Migration experiences such as these have a significant impact on the reintegration of return migrants (Cassarino, 2004; Ketema, 2014; Nisrane et al., 2017; Van Houte & De Koning, 2008). Some point to the kafala labour sponsorship system,60 which is found in most Arabian Gulf countries, as being linked to the exploitation and abuse of domestic migrant workers (Mahdavi, 2013; Murray, 2013; Pande, 2013). However, human trafficking activities also play a significant role in their vulnerability and suffering (Fernandez, 2013; Minaye & Zeleke, 2015).

60 A system that binds migrant workers to their employer or sponsor in Arabian Gulf countries (Bajracharya & Sijapati, 2012).
Coming home: The difficult task of reintegrating

Cassarino (2004) argues that the successful reintegration of returnees requires mobilising financial, social and human capital in the host countries. However, domestic migrants in the Arabian Gulf have limited options for accruing such capital. This directly affects their economic reintegration upon return. Structural barriers associated with the *kafala* system – such as inability to change employer, financial exploitation by employers, and inability to access financial institutions – constrain the economic reintegration of returnees (Nisrane *et al.*, 2017). In addition, physical, sexual, and psychological abuse and exploitation during migration affect the mental and physical health of returnees, playing an adverse role in their economic and social reintegration (Anbesse *et al.*, 2009; Habtamu, Minaye & Zeleke, 2017). However, despite the exploitative and abusive working conditions, women often re-migrate to Arabian Gulf countries (Gardner, 2012). This calls for an examination of the post-return conditions affecting reintegration and remigration intention.

This chapter looks at two main questions. First: *What new dynamics in interpersonal relationships unfold in female Ethiopian former domestic migrants’ (hereinafter called returnees⁶¹) lives after returning from the Arabian Gulf?* And, second: *How do female Ethiopian returnees’ interpersonal relationships affect their sense of belonging and, in turn, their reintegration into their home country and remigration intention?* The study builds on existing studies that aim to understand the reintegration of female return migrants from the Arabian Gulf by focusing on the changes that the migration experience brings to the social relationships of the returnees. It also pushes the discussion of their reintegration one step further by moving beyond migration experiences and identifying social factors embodied in the home country context that affect the successful reintegration of returnees and possible social issues that trigger remigration. It is hoped that the findings of this study will help to develop various social support programmes that facilitate the social

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⁶¹ As all the returnees who participated in this study were former domestic workers, the terms former domestic migrants and returnees are used interchangeably in this chapter.
and economic reintegration of returnees from Arabian Gulf countries. The next sections present the conceptual framework for the study (sense of belonging theory), the method used to collect the data, followed by the findings, concluding remarks and policy recommendations.

**Theory of Sense of Belonging**

Relationships and interrelatedness with the environment are what makes life meaningful (Lambert *et al.*, 2013; Stillman & Baumeister, 2009); they are the essence of our day-to-day life. Relatedness to others in the environment, which is most often used to express interpersonal attachment, is a fundamental human need that helps individuals obtain social support and makes their life meaningful (Hagerty, Lynch-Sauer, Patusky, & Bouwsema, 1993). An individual’s relatedness to others in the environment is best conceptualised using ‘sense of belonging’ theory. A sense of belonging is defined as the evaluative feeling or perception that people have of their acceptance in their environment by the people around them – or the degree to which they ‘fit in’ (Hagerty, Lynch-Sauer, Patusky, Bouwsema, & Collier, 1992). Hagerty *et al.* (1992) state that for someone to belong the following antecedents must exist: energy and desire for meaningful involvement and shared characteristics with other people in the environment. The opposite of belonging and connectedness is social exclusion, which refers to a person’s perception of being excluded and rejected from a desired relationship, which can be as painful as physical pain (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Relationships and positive interactions with others are vital for people to function well in their environment.

A number of empirical studies have shown that people who are more socially integrated and who have healthy relationships with others have better general wellbeing and adjust better (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2014; Cohen, 2004; Hagerty, Williams, Coyne, & Early, 1996). Positive interpersonal relationships with others are associated with a high level of cognitive and social achievement (Martin & Dowson, 2009). Conversely, negative
interactions have an adverse effect on health and wellbeing (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The importance of having positive relationships with those around us is not limited to health and wellbeing, but extends to other facets of our life. Individuals become more productive through social interactions and by connecting to the environment (Kitchen, Williams & Chowhan, 2012; Levett-Jones & Lathlean, 2008; Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007; Pooley, Cohen & Pike, 2005; Prusak & Cohen, 2001). Hence, positive relationships are important in the reintegration of female returnees from the Arabian Gulf. In line with this, Cassarino (2004) asserts that having social networks and relationships is vital to the reintegration of return migrants, as they provide crucial emotional support, which facilitates the economic and social reintegration of return migrants.

However, there are factors that may inhibit people’s desire to interact with their community and lead to a low sense of belonging, such as stigma and poverty (Stewart et al., 2009; Walton & Cohen, 2007). Based on a comparative study of high income and low income people in Canada, Stewart et al. (2009) acknowledge that being poor, ashamed or stereotyped, limits people’s ability to initiate and maintain social relationships. Stigma has been found to have a negative impact on the social relationships of Asian female domestic returnees from Arabian Gulf countries (Bélanger & Rahman, 2013; Dannecker, 2005). Past trauma also affects returnees’ social interactions and sense of belonging to their home community. The findings of Ketema (2014) found that sexually-abused female returnees from the Arabian Gulf find it difficult to create healthy relationships with men in their home community after their return. Positive social relationships and a sense of belonging are important for the economic and social development of returnees, as well as their integration into the home community.

The theory of Sense of Belonging helps to evaluate social relationships and people’s connection to their environment. It has two attributes: first, valued involvement, which is “the experience of feeling valued, needed and accepted” and, second, ‘fit’, which refers to a “person’s perception that his or her characteristics articulate with or complement the system or environment” (Hagerty et al., 1992,
p. 173). Sense of belonging is a psychological state and social interactions, companionship, membership and networks are the means by which belongingness is observed physically (Hagerty et al., 1992; Lee & Robbins, 1995). Return migrants’ interactions with their family, friends and community indicate their sense of belonging to their community. It must be noted, however, that sense of belonging not only refers to positive interactions with others, but also to positive, meaningful, and long-term bonds with members of the community that bring about a feeling of being valued and fitting into the environment (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

Based on the above conceptualisations, in this study, sense of belonging is defined as a returnee’s feeling of being loved and accepted as a valued member of the community and of fitting into their environment, evidenced by positive social interactions and the reciprocity of love within the community. By analysing the lived experience of female Ethiopian returnees from domestic work in the Arabian Gulf, this study aims to examine the new dynamics that the migration experience brings to the interpersonal relationships of returnees and evaluates their sense of belonging to the home environment and how it affects their reintegration and remigration intention.

**Methodology**

This ethnographic study is based on field work conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by the author from January 2015 to March 2017. The findings presented in this chapter are part of a larger study that focuses on the socio-economic reintegration of Ethiopian female return migrants (see Nisrane et al., 2017). The data was collected through focus group discussions and in-depth individual interviews with 48 female Ethiopian former domestic workers who had returned from Arabian Gulf countries and were living in Addis Ababa. The returnees were recruited through purposeful and snowball sampling methods (see Table 13.1). As reintegration is a matter that requires time, all selected participants had been residing in their home country
for at least a year and the majority for three years at the time of data collection.

*Table 13.1. Sampling method used to select respondents for interviews and focus group discussions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampling method</th>
<th>Referred by</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purposeful</td>
<td>AGAR Ethiopia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIVE-Addis</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WISE</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowballing</td>
<td>Other respondents</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for this study was collected in two phases. In the first phase, from January to March 2015, 14 individual interviews were conducted. In the second phase, from January 2016 to March 2017, 22 individual interviews were conducted with new respondents and 6 follow-up interviews with interviewees from the first phase. Follow-up interviews helped to show changes in the social and economic reintegration of returnees after a year’s interval. A total of 26 returnees participated in the focus group discussions (14 of these also participated in the individual interviews) in both phases.

Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion topics were prepared in English, translated to Amharic (local language) and then back to English for the analysis. The major discussion themes focused on economic and social reintegration, as well as migration experiences in the host country. Probing questions were used as needed. Individual interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in the local language (Amharic) at places chosen by the respondents, including their homes, cafeterias and parks, training centres and, in some cases, the interviewer’s house or office. The returnees were fully informed of the research objectives and assured about the confidentially of the information provided. Written or oral consent was obtained. Focus group discussions lasted on average 1 hour and 40 minutes, whereas individual interviews lasted on average 1 hour.
Ethnographic studies also rely on informal data collected through informal interviews and field notes (Agar & Hobbs, 1982). Accordingly, the field data for this study is complemented by field notes taken at various personal and social events in the return migrant’s community, including weddings, children’s birthday parties, graduation ceremonies, and meetings/training events organised by local non-government organisations (NGOs). To give a new perspective on issues surrounding the social and economic reintegration of female returnees and to substantiate the data, interviews were also conducted with three coordinators and representatives of local NGOs (AGAR Ethiopia, LIVE-Addis, WISE) and one official from the Ethiopian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs using a semi-structured interview guideline. The interview questions asked of NGO coordinators focused on what major social and economic reintegration challenges returnees face and what social support is provided by NGOs and the government to ensure their successful reintegration.

All discussions and interviews were audio taped. A transcript was made from the audiotape in Amharic by the author and a research assistant. The transcribed documents were subsequently translated into English by a linguist and rechecked by the author for consistency of meaning with the original transcripts. The individual interviews provided detailed accounts of experiences, in contrast to the focus group discussions, which were more general. However, both forms of data collection yielded similar findings and the results complement each other. After re-reading the interviews and focus group discussion transcripts, relevant data (related to returnees’ interpersonal relationships and sense of belonging to their community) were selected from the interview transcripts and focus group discussions.

In the first stage of analysis, themes that showed changes in the interpersonal relationships of returnees with people in their home community because of the migration experiences were identified and coded to identify shared experiences and differences. ATLAS.ti qualitative software was used to facilitate the coding process for the
data from both the focus group discussions and individual interviews. A comparison was made to delineate specific categories in the description of situations, interpersonal relationships, and migration and return settings. In the second stage, identified themes were further analysed to identify their relationship with home country socio-cultural settings and attitudes. The attributes of sense of belonging – such as feeling loved, fitting in, and being accepted – were often explicitly found in the narrations and sometimes implied, despite the fact that the questions focused on general migration and reintegration experiences and challenges. In the final stage, the relationship between sense of belonging and reintegration and remigration intention was analysed and is presented in the next section, with quotes that represent the most common experiences of returnees.

Findings: Interpersonal relationships, belonging and reintegration

The study found that the social relationships of female migrants change dramatically upon their return. Three major themes emerged as affecting the interpersonal relationships of returnees with members of their family and community: first, conflict between returnees and close family members related to betrayal; second, the expectation of members of their family and community that returnees had resources; and third, stigma and negative social perceptions of returnees held by members of their family and community. These factors intersect and overlap with each other, together creating a low sense of belonging among returnees to the home community. They are also linked to the poor reintegration of returnees into their home country and the emergence of remigration intention.

Conflict with family related to betrayal

The need to belong is characterised by stable, positive, and conflict-free social contact with individuals to whom a person feels connected (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In this study, it was found that conflict
often arises between close family members\textsuperscript{62} and the returnees from Arabian Gulf countries. The study also found that family was at the heart of the migration process, with economic deprivation of the family being mentioned as the main reason for the migration of female migrants in the first place. Forty per cent (40\%) of the returnees measured their success by what they did for their family members, even if they had no income or savings for themselves upon return. Supporting parents in household consumption, sending siblings to a better school, supporting family members to obtain better health care, renovating the family house and buying household furniture were mentioned by returnees as some of the benefits of their migration. The vast majority (81\%) of respondents reported not having their own income and being financially dependent on their families upon return. For some, receiving the blessing of their parents (‘\textit{mirkat}’ in the local language) is the best reward for their toil in a foreign country. One participant, who stayed in Saudi Arabia for 22 years supporting her family, and had no savings or income at the time of data collection, reported being happy regardless of the fact that she was now dependent on her family for her financial needs.

\textit{I am happy I could make my family happy. Of course, they [her family] did not save any money for me, but I don’t complain much because my family’s happiness is my reward. That makes me a very happy woman. Happiness is not always measured in terms of money [...]. To tell the truth, I couldn’t change anything for myself. I am not changed at all. I am 41 years old now and I live with my family. (Focus group discussion 4, Addis Ababa, 2015)}

The above quote illustrates the love and sacrifice of some returnees for their family. It also reveals a sense of loss and dissatisfaction on the part of the returnee for losing her youth in a foreign land and being financially dependent on her family in her 40s. This kind of narration was common among returnees. In most cases returnees used such a narration to accept the fact that their migration experience did not benefit them directly. Most returnees mentioned

\textsuperscript{62} ‘Family’ in this study refers to parents, siblings, spouse, children and, in some cases, close relatives such as uncles, aunts and cousins.
often that they regretted leaving their education to go to the Arabian Gulf in order to improve the living conditions of their family, although a few reported being happy about their decision. Many returnees are elementary or high-school dropouts, which makes it difficult for them to find even low-skilled jobs upon their return. High inflation and lack of savings and marketable skills makes it difficult for returnees to participate in income-generating activities in their home country. The average length of stay in the host country for the participants in this study was 8 years (minimum 6 months; maximum 22 years). Some returnees described how time flies and how their youthful beauty was lost in a foreign land striving to help their family and not themselves.

Paradoxically, despite their claim that their migration was for the sake of their family, almost all of the returnees expected their family to save money from the remittances they sent and reported feeling betrayed that they did not. In most cases, the family members of returnees spent the money without saving any for the returnees. Only three returnees who participated in this study reported that their family members saved some of the money they sent and that they were able to use it for their reintegration. The majority sent remittances to their parents and siblings, while a few sent it to their husband or fiancée. Some returnees who sent money to their partner later learnt that the money was wasted on alcohol and drugs, an affair or even marriage with another woman. Based on the narrations of the participants in the individual interviews, some returnees (40%) specifically told their family members how much to use and how much to save, others (44%) trusted family members to save as much as they could, and some (16%) either said nothing about saving or saved money in their own account. A few participants tried to understand the dire economic situation that their family was in and did not blame them for not saving money; however, about half of the participants reported feeling betrayed. One returnee shared the following: “I sent all the money I have worked for to them [her family]. When you find out that your own family do not keep their word, you feel betrayed. Thus, you want to go back” (Interview 23, Addis Ababa, 2015). As reflected in her narration, this returnee felt
betrayed because the action she is complaining about involved people she saw as close to her.

Besides violation of trust, there are other factors that are a source of conflict between returnees and their family members. For example, when the sacrifice made for the family and their response is not congruent it can negatively affect the interpersonal relationships between the returnee and their family members: “I quarrel with my family and tell them that I have suffered a lot for their sake. But when you are broke, nobody cares. This makes you sick. When you have money, they like you” (Interview 27, Addis Ababa, 2017). As live-in domestic workers often send their entire salary to their family members, they are financially dependent on family members upon their return, which is another source of conflict between the returnees and their family members. The returnees claim they are regarded as a burden. Regret and disappointment is clear when they talk and when they reflect on what the future holds for them without any savings or marketable skills to enable them to successfully reintegrate into their home country. In both focus group discussions and individual interviews, not only negative interactions and lack of reciprocity were problems, the returnees’ sense of being valued, loved, and accepted was also low.

The returnees seem to be trapped in a vicious cycle of going and coming. The majority of returnees who participated in this study had migrated more than twice to Arabian Gulf countries. As is reflected in the above quotes, betrayal, particularly by close members, not only results in a low sense of belonging, but also gives rise to an intention to re-migrate. The study found that, next to economic reasons, negative interactions and low sense of belonging in the family and community are the main reasons for female returnees from Arabian Gulf countries to re-migrate. Fifty per cent (50%) of the returnees said they may consider going back if the official route is opened (at the time of the field work it was closed by the Ethiopian government

63 Under the *kafala* system, migrant domestic workers are only allowed to work as a live-in maid for one sponsor and prevented from going out, hence, they often send their entire salary home as they do not have local expenses.
following the reported exploitation and abuse of Ethiopians in destination countries). By the end of data collection, 8% of the returnees who participated in the study had left through illegal means, 20% said that they did not want to go back, while the rest were undecided. One participant shared the following: “I get upset when I look at my life. I benefited neither here nor there. This always make me ask questions such as where will I end up and what is my destiny” (Interview 28, Addis Ababa, 2017).

In summary, 84% of the returnees expected their family members to save some of the money they sent home for their reintegration upon return. However, trust-based remittance management appeared to be counterproductive to the reintegration of the returnees for two reasons. First, the violation of trust and lack of reciprocity (not getting enough love or recognition for the sacrifice they made for their family) disrupted interpersonal relationships between family members. Second, migrants’ families generally did not save any of the remittances, which meant that returnees did not have any financial capital to use for their reintegration. Negative interpersonal interactions meant that the returnees did not receive the emotional support required to successfully reintegrate back into the community. In addition to creating conflict and negative social interactions, betrayal by their close family members affected the returnees’ perception of being loved and valued. When the expected reciprocal love was not received from family members, the returnees questioned whether the sacrifice they had made for their family by working in the Arabian Gulf countries was worth it. Feelings of regret, disappointment and hopelessness were reflected in the discussions with returnees. The sense of belonging to the family (being valued and needed and fitting in) was low for most returnees. In some cases, negative social interactions and low sense of belonging in the community were found to be a source of remigration intention.

**Expectation of resources**

As well as conflict with close family members, this study found that social expectations associated with working abroad also negatively affect the interpersonal relationships of returnees. There is a strong
conception in Ethiopian society that people who migrate abroad come back with a lot of money. Return migrants are confronted with this assumption and are expected to bring financial and material gifts, not only for nuclear family members, but also for members of their extended family, close neighbours and friends. In relation to this, three themes emerged: first, pressure to meet social expectations; second, the shame associated with not meeting social expectations; and third, being rejected for not meeting social expectations. These factors negatively affected the personal interactions of returnees and their sense of belonging to the community, creating a barrier to their successful reintegration.

Trying to bring various financial and material gifts for family members, relatives and others is a very stressful experience for returning migrants. The migration experience of female domestic migrants in the Arabian Gulf is characterised by inability to change employers and financial exploitation, including underpayment and denial of wages. In addition, the migrants send their money periodically to family members in the home country, making saving or buying gifts extremely difficult, if not impossible. The majority of returnees reported trying to meet this expectation, even if they did not agree with the norm or did not have the financial resources to do so. Returnees think about and prepare for this expectation before they return to their home. ‘Ekulb’, a traditional Ethiopian financial cooperative, is one form of social membership that is practised among freelance migrants\(^64\) that enables returnees to buy gifts upon their return. This system is followed by close friends who trust each other and members contribute money periodically ahead of time for a specific purpose. Some are able to bring gifts for close as well as extended family members, neighbours and friends. However, family members and relatives sometimes do not find the quality or type of gift satisfactory.

\(^64\) Freelance migrants are those who work in the host country independently from a sponsor or for a fake sponsor, in other words, illegally.
Most returnees care about the social norm of gift giving, although it is described by many as ‘ynulinta’ (being too concerned about the opinion of others). Family members also want to show off the fact that they have sent a daughter abroad by giving gifts to relatives, neighbours and friends. Most of the returnees cannot meet this expectation, at least at the level that satisfies their relatives, neighbours and friends, for various reasons. This affects their interpersonal relationships and sense of belonging in the community, as they have to deal with the rejection that comes from not fulfilling the norm. For example, one returnee described the irony of the social norm and how it forced her to isolate herself:

*I was frustrated and used to lock myself up in the house. All your relatives expect you to give them money or a gift. If you migrate to the Arabian Gulf for two months with a salary of 3,000 birr [USD 100] and one works within the country with a salary of 50,000 [USD 1,667], just because that individual went abroad people expect that person to come with a bag full of money. Most of my relatives were disappointed in me as they were expecting something from me… I was frustrated so much and regret coming back here. I bad nothing, but my relatives did not understand, or did not want to understand, at all the situation I was in.* (Interview 1, Addis Ababa, 2015)

The rejection and shame this returnee experienced is well reflected in her narrative and was a common experience among the other returnees who participated in the study. As a result, the returnee’s interpersonal relationships with significant others were affected and she had a low sense of belonging (feeling loved and valued and fitting into the environment) to the extent that she questioned whether returning was the right decision. The sense of shame associated with not being able to satisfy social expectations and coming home empty handed is strong. Some returnees explain how the shame of coming home empty handed prolonged their stay in the host country with a lot of suffering and isolated them after they returned home. Social expectations have a great impact on the social relationships of returnees and their sense of belonging. The social interactions and relationships of female return migrants are also affected by the shame associated with a failed migration experience and inability to continue
the role of bread winner for the family. The data also shows that the majority of returnees live with the guilt and shame associated with an unaccomplished migration goal, which the migrants generally respond to by isolating themselves:

*If you don’t have money, nobody loves you even your family, friends and your boyfriend. If you are broke nobody likes to be around you […]. You see, people need you when you have money. I don’t have money so nobody wants me and I don’t need them also. I really don’t have social engagements.* (Interview 10, Addis Ababa, 2015)

Being valued and respected is one element of belonging. Most returnees believe that their family members love them and respect them only when they are a source of income. This creates uncertainty in terms of fitting in to the environment when they do not have financial resources.

Not being valued or respected is not the only issue for return migrants, they also experience rejection for coming home empty handed. For example, one returnee, who had a very bad migration experience with high isolation, heavy workload, denial of salary for one year, starvation, and psychological trauma (threat of being killed by her employer), was extremely happy to come back to her home country alive. However, her close family members did not accept her warmly, instead she experienced rejection and exclusion:

*My relatives expected me to give them some money. When they realised that I had nothing, they started to keep away, hate me […]. I kept my distance from my relatives as they couldn’t accept me with an empty hand […]. I don’t understand why my relatives blame me for not giving them money. They expect a lot just because I went to the Arabian Gulf. Only God knows what I have been through. They think I have money and I don’t want to share it with them. That is really very disappointing.* (Interview 9, Addis Ababa, 2015)

Such rejection plays an adverse role in the reintegration of returnees. As belonging focuses on the quality of relationships and the strength of the bonds in interpersonal relationships. The fact that conflict
arises mostly with close family members affects returnees’ sense of belonging. The study found that returnees experienced various traumatic incidents at the hands of their employers and agents (both Ethiopian and Arab) while in the host country. Few migrants had a good migration experience. Most stated that they were subjected to sexual abuse, starvation, isolation, beating, overwork, forced servitude to other households, degrading verbal comments, psychological trauma such as death threats, and attempted killing. These factors by themselves have an impact on the interpersonal relationships of returnees and their connectedness to others in their community. For example, as documented in this study and a study by Ketema (2014), women who are sexually abused exhibit low or no interest in becoming involved in another intimate relationship upon return. In addition to traumatic experiences in the host countries, experiencing rejection from loved ones upon return may have undesirable consequences, affecting both the mental and physical health of returnees (MacDonald & Leary, 2005) and their social and economic reintegration.

The expectation that returnees have a significant amount of material and financial resources is not limited to family members and relatives of returnees. Returnees also reported that it was difficult to start or maintain spousal relationships because of this belief. In Ethiopian society, men are regarded as the provider for their family, however, changes in this gender role requirements were also evidenced by the data. In this study, the participants acknowledged that it was hard to trust men and that their romantic relationships often ended if the returnee did not accumulate financial or material resources from their migration. The majority of respondents claimed that men approached them thinking that they had money and, when they found out that they did not, no longer want to be with them. The following quote from one of the interviews exemplifies this:

I had a boyfriend before traveling to the Arabian Gulf. But he married another woman while I was there [...]. He cheated on me. I worked hard to build our future. I used to send a lot of money to him, but he wasted it all on another woman. It was devastating. I don’t trust men anymore [...]. Once my friend arranged a date for me.
She introduced me to a guy. On our second date, he asked me how much money I have. He said, “I bet you have a lot of money; I heard you returned from Arabian Gulf”. (Interview 28, Addis Ababa, 2015)

Violation of trust, rejection and not being valued for who they are, but what they might have, were dominant themes in the narrations of returnees in relation to their post-return experiences. Repeated rejection and betrayal by men led the returnees to avoid social interactions: “I don’t trust anyone. What I believe is that they will take advantage of me and leave me alone just as my family did. Therefore, I don’t trust anyone” (Interview 23, Addis Ababa, 2017). This contradicts the strong desire of most returnees to start their own family. Inability to form a family and have children is considered to be one of the major costs of the migration experience by returnees. The returnees regret wasting their youth in a foreign country and feel that their marriage prospects have declined. They also acknowledge the pressure from parents and the community. Only 7 of the 48 returnees who participated in this study are married or have been married (three had divorced because of conflict related to the migration) and have children. The relationship between marital partners is also spoilt by lack of trust and perceived or real infidelity. However, 17 of the returnees had children, mainly out of wedlock and before their migration. Almost all of the returnees reported that they left their children in the care of their mothers when they migrated. The returnees also reported that their children sometimes rejected them due to the long separation, which resulted in low or no attachment.

I always have a fight with my daughter and have no peace at home […]. We have not been together for long and she doesn’t like me at all. She doesn’t have a tiny bit of love or respect for me. I worked so hard in a foreign land to change her future, but lost the love of my child. (Interview 10, Addis Ababa, 2015)

In summary, rejection by close family members or others because of expectations that the returnees have financial or material resources impacts on the various interpersonal relationships of the returnees and raises uncertainty about how they fit into the home environment.
The vast majority of returnees respond to this rejection by isolating themselves and avoiding social interactions. This finding is in line with other studies on relatedness, which found that people who are less connected feel distant and perceive themselves to be outsiders, often finding it difficult to interact with the social world (Lee, Draper, & Lee, 2001). Inability to meet expectations was frustrating for most returnees. Having no or few financial resources was a shameful experience and often made returnees restrict their social engagements. This strengthens other findings that postulate that being poor restricts people’s desire for relationships and sense of belonging (Stewart et al., 2009). Being financially dependent on their families after return is common among the returnees. At the same time, stepping down from the expected status attached to working abroad was a shameful experience and a barrier to becoming involved in a low paying job for some of the returnees. In general, the above findings indicate that the social expectations on returnees create a low sense of belonging because of rejection, shame and doubts about fitting into the environment. Not meeting people’s expectations results in rejection by society in the home country and self-isolation by the returnees. This may affect the social and economic reintegration of returnees and their remigration intention.

Negative perceptions and stigma
Negative perceptions and stigma can lead to poor interpersonal relationships and, hence, affect a person’s relatedness to their environment and sense of belonging. Social perceptions of the migration experience of women to the Arabian Gulf are generally negative. The returnees described being stereotyped and stigmatised by people in their home community. Two dominant stereotypes were associated with female returnees from the Arabian Gulf. First, the returnees were identified as mentally unfit (weird or crazy) and, second, they were considered promiscuous and associated with sex work or prostitution. These stereotypes and stigma created a barrier to migrants interacting with people in the community. The migration experience puts a mark of disgrace on the female returnees for life. The returnees explained how difficult it is to deal with such negative perceptions given the fact that they cannot exclude the migration
experience from their life. For example, one returnee who was rejected by her own family, as they thought she was working as prostitute while she was in the host country and wrongly associated her weight loss with HIV infection, explained the feeling of isolation, betrayal and rejection she felt:

*I hated going outside and meeting people. I didn’t even agree with my family and I was crying all the time. I didn’t go out and I stayed home for a long time […] At the beginning, I even wanted to be a prostitute or go back there again. I tried to commit suicide once […] When I came back here at first, I did not work and did not have any money. I guess my family expected a lot from me. I came here with empty pockets. […] When my employers took me to the office and I knew they were going to send me back to my country, I was really disappointed and tried to kill myself.* (Interview 23, Addis Ababa, 2017)

This quote shows the stigma, rejection and isolation that the returnee experienced. This returnee migrated to the Arabian Gulf twice and how her family treated her after she returned the first time caused her to attempt suicide. There is evidence that suicidal ideation (Kissane & McLaren, 2006; Vanderhorst & McLaren, 2005) and the experience of stigma (Walton & Cohen, 2007) are associated with a low sense of belonging. The majority of returnees reported experiencing stigma and rejection from people with whom they had desired relationships. This shows that the ‘home country’ is not always an environment in which returnees feel at home – a home they aspire to return to and feel safe, loved, valued and accepted in. Negative interactions and conflict with family members was a trigger for some returnees to migrate again. Returnees reported travelling back to Arabian Gulf countries on multiple work contracts (see also Fernandez, 2010). Economic reasons were often mentioned as a cause, such as unemployment or low wages. However, negative social interactions with family members also contribute greatly.

The returnees admitted that the negative perceptions of returnees had some truth (some returnees had been engaged in sex work in the Arabian Gulf), but they are disappointed that all returnees are judged because of the activities of some women. There are female migrants
who are locked in the house and never see the sun until the end of their contract, others are sexually abused or raped. However, these returnees are also perceived as a ‘bad’ woman. Regarding being involved in prostitution, the returnees reported that many migrants escape from their sponsor because of exploitation and abuse or to earn a better income (as ‘freelance migrants’). This act immediately changes the status of the migrants in the host country from legal to illegal. The runaways need to sustain themselves economically and often turn to, or are forced into, sex work. The returnees also admitted that many returnees from the Arabian Gulf suffer from mental health problems and attribute the cause to ill treatment, the poisoning of migrants by employers (to keep them for longer or to avoid paying their salary), isolation and other traumatic experiences in the host country (see Anbesse et al., 2009 and Habtamu et al., 2017).

Their migration experiences influenced the behaviour of some returnees. The returnees who participated in this study admitted that they are easily irritated, speak loudly, isolate themselves, wear a lot of makeup and jewellery, use strong perfume, dress in colourful or sparkly clothes, and wear a lot of accessories. The respondents provided an explanation for some of these behaviours; for example, speaking loudly is associated with the ‘mukeyaf’ (air conditioner) in the houses in the Arabian Gulf – it makes noise, so every member of the house speaks loudly. Irritability is often associated with frustration and shame due to the failed migration and being financially dependent on their family instead of a provider. Dressing colourfully and using a lot of makeup relates to their identification with the host country culture.

Sense of belonging encompasses feeling valued and loved by others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Most returnees stated that they are not taken seriously in most interactions with their family members and in the community and that they are not desired for marital relationships. Some returnees reported hiding their migration experience for fear of rejection and so as not to jeopardise their relationships, including intimate relationships. Stereotyping greatly damages their desire to form a family or maintain already established marital relationships.
This puts pressure on the returnees, as marriage is highly valued in Ethiopia and regarded as completing womanhood. Not fulfilling this desired relationship can cause alienation and detachment from society. The study found that stereotypes and shame are a cause of poor social interaction and low sense of belonging in returnees’ lives. Some of the participants in this study are isolated and do not feel accepted in the community, as evidenced by the following quote:

[…] I did not experience anything bad, but working in the Arabian Gulf made me fearful. I felt ashamed. I could not go along with friends. I became sensitive to what people were saying and felt like they were trying to hurt my feelings. I didn’t want to go out and meet friends, but rather chose to stay in the house. (Interview 3, Addis Ababa, 2015)

Stereotypes associated with the migration experience bring about changes in the self-perception of returnees, their social interactions and sense of belonging. The perceptions of others affect their self-worth (Buckley, Winkel & Leary, 2004). It challenges their feeling of fitness for and acceptance in the social environment, which adversely affects their social and economic reintegration. Another indication that returnees suffer isolation, have poor social interaction and a low sense of belonging is that 80% reported staying home most of the time and only going out for weddings and funerals; the rest mentioned going to church or the mosque, in addition to mandatory social engagements such as funerals. This limited social interaction also relates to their limited economic resources (Nisrane et al., 2017). However, shame associated with unachieved migration goals, stigma and negative social perceptions contributes to this behaviour.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

This study investigated the new dynamics that unfold in the interpersonal relationships of female Ethiopian domestic migrants upon their return from the Arabian Gulf. It also looked at how their interpersonal relationships affect the returnees’ sense of belonging, reintegration and remigration intention. It found that negative social interactions resulting from betrayal by close family members, social
expectations about money and gifts, and negative social perceptions about returnees affected their sense of belonging to the home community. These factors impacted on the returnees’ feeling of being loved and valued and raised uncertainty about them fitting into the home environment. In turn, these factors influenced the returnees’ desire to stay in their home country and their remigration intention.

Negative interpersonal interactions mean that returnees do not receive the emotional support required to successfully reintegrate into the home community. Not being accepted, or even being rejected, by people in the community, including by close family members, and inability to bring about significant economic changes in their own life, apart from in their family’s life, made the returnees question whether they fit into the home environment and whether migrating to the Arabian Gulf was worthwhile in the first place. About 50% of the returnees said that they may consider going back if the official route was reopened, 8% had already left through illegal means by the end of data collection, 20% said that they do not want to go back, while the rest were undecided. The study indicates that negative social interactions is among the factors influencing remigration intention, as is low sense of belonging. Low sense of belonging, next to economic reasons, explains why returnees are willing to return to the Arabian Gulf, despite the risk of exploitative and abusive working conditions. Hence, reintegrating into the home community is not only dependent on the migration experiences of the returnees in the host country, but intertwined with various social issues in the home country. Positive social interactions and a sense of belonging are important for return migrants to successfully reintegrate, socially and economically.

For the returnees who participated in the study, the migration experience did not bring about personal economic gains and improved social status, as expected. Instead they incurred social costs that cannot be measured in monetary terms. The study found that although the family of the migrants experienced some positive economic and social changes, the majority of returnees did not have any savings of their own from their migration, making them economically dependent on their family upon return. This study also
casts doubt on the claim by other studies that migration to the Arabian Gulf is an empowering experience for women and leads to upward movement on the social ladder (Kifleyesus, 2012), in line with Ketema (2014).

This study provides valuable insights into how home country social issues may impact on the reintegration of female domestic workers returning to Ethiopia from the Arabian Gulf and their intention to re-migrate. It serves as a starting point for the further analysis of experiences and issues facing returnees in their home country in relation to reintegration. It also provides a self-evaluation of the returnees’ sense of belonging to their home community. However, it has some limitations related to its scope, which might guide future researchers. First, the participants in this study were all living in Addis Ababa, whereas a significant number of women migrate to the Arabian Gulf from rural parts of Ethiopia. Hence, the social perceptions and social interactions uncovered in this study may not represent the situation of returnees in rural areas. Second, this study used the personal stories of returnees to evaluate social perceptions. Triangulating the results by using various sources, such as family and community members, is suggested for future research. Third, this study found that female returnees are perceived as socially unfit because of stereotypes associated with their migration. Similar findings were made in other studies conducted in Asia (Bélanger & Rahman, 2013; Danneckser, 2005). This similarity may arise because of the existence of a patriarchal social structure in both places. However, our study did not analyse patriarchy or gender roles, which was the case in the other studies. Indeed the social perceptions, and the treatment, of male and female returnees are different. The majority of participants in this study acknowledged that Ethiopian men generally lead a loose lifestyle, having many intimate relationships with women, including exploiting vulnerable female migrants while in the host country. However, the stereotype of

65 They persuade the migrants to escape from their sponsors; once the women leave their employers they become illegal, hence, the agents and brokers force the migrants into sexual relations in exchange for job placement and a house where they can stay.
promiscuity is mainly associated with female returnees. This study did not include the accounts of male returnees, so is unable to answer whether a difference exists in the treatment of female and male returnees. However, it is important to see if patriarchy plays a role and it is suggested that future researchers explore this issue.

The experience of belonging is not only beneficial to the returnees, it also impacts on the community and society at large. A sense of belonging is associated with a higher level of achievement and productivity, which impacts on the community and society over a period of time. Hence, it would be beneficial to society at large to implement policy interventions to improve the reintegration of Ethiopian female domestic migrants returning from the Arabian Gulf. Four policy recommendations can be drawn from this study.

- First, social support and counselling programmes that address problems with interpersonal relationships should be provided.
- Second, one reason why migrants send their entire salary to family members in their home country is because they do not have anywhere to save it while they are in the host country (Nisrane et al., 2017). The option they have is to either keep it with them or save it with their employer, both of which are risky. Hence, creating a remittance system that cultivates the independence of migrants will help them to develop positive relationships upon their return, as well as facilitate better economic reintegration through savings.
- Third, depending on family members for financial needs is a cause of negative interactions and low sense of belonging. Hence, education programmes and vocational training should be provided to returnees to allow them to become financially independent, especially given that many of the migrants are elementary or high-school dropouts.
- Finally, to address the issues of unrealistic social expectations and negative social perceptions, media campaigns should be run to change society’s attitude to returnees.
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Chapter 14

Shattered Dreams: Life after Deportation for Ethiopian Returnees from Saudi Arabia

Shishay Tadesse Abay

Introduction

Ethiopia is one of the major labour sending countries in the world and the largest refugee hosting country in Africa (ILO, 2017). Although the Ethiopian economy, as well as its population, has shown high growth in recent years, this growth has not been accompanied by a significant reduction in poverty or job creation, particularly for the burgeoning youth population (ILO, 2017). Consequently, many Ethiopians consider out-migration as the only way to achieve a better standard of living (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015). In fact, the landscape of migration from Ethiopia has changed in recent decades from that born out of conflict to irregular migration, mainly driven by economic reasons, reflecting the dynamic nature of the

In 2013 and 2017, more than 243,000 Ethiopia migrants were expelled from Saudi Arabia, many without fulfilling their migration goals. These migrants face huge challenges in re-establishing their lives in Ethiopia. Migrants and their families usually invest huge sums of money, selling assets and taking loans, to send a family member abroad. Involuntary return exposes returnees to an unwelcome reception by their families and feelings of shame about failure, hindering reintegration and influencing returnees to re-migrate. While deportation is often seen as a logical policy to respond to increasing numbers of migrants, this chapter shows the sad reality that results from involuntary return.

66 Migration is considered ‘irregular’ when it takes place outside the legal and regulatory norms of the sending, transit, and destination countries (Reitano, Adal, & Shaw, 2014).
issue and the factors that drive it (Zewdu, 2018; Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009). Although the exact number of Ethiopian migrants is hard to ascertain, the brutal beheading of 30 Ethiopians in Libya by Islamic State (ISIS), mass deportation of Ethiopians from Saudi Arabia, and numerous killings of Ethiopians in South Africa and Yemen reflect the magnitude of the problem (IOM, 2014).

Although Ethiopians migrate to many destinations, Saudi Arabia is one of the most popular for unskilled Ethiopian labour migrants. A report by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) on the trends involved in Ethiopian migration revealed that in less than five years (2012 to March 2016) around 317,136 Ethiopian migrants arrived in Yemen, mostly aiming to transit to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States (RMMS, 2016). This is substantiated by empirical evidence that estimates that about 60–70% of Ethiopians migrating to countries in the Middle East, mainly Saudi Arabia, are irregular migrants (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015). Consequently, two rounds of deportation of Ethiopians have been carried out by the Saudi Arabian government. In the first round, 163,000 irregular Ethiopian migrants were forced to return to Ethiopia after an amnesty period came to an end in November 2013 (IOM, 2014). In the second round of deportations, more than 80,000 Ethiopians were expelled from Saudi Arabia between March and June 2017, following the expiration of a 90-day grace period (IOM, 2017). Studies on the lived migration experiences of Ethiopian return migrants from the Middle East show that they are often exposed to physical, sexual, and emotional abuse during the course of their migration (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; Abebaw, 2012; Fernandez, 2010).

Although migration to Saudi Arabia is widespread in Ethiopia, it is particularly prevalent in the Tigray region. Data from the Tigray Region Bureau of Youth and Sports Affairs and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) show that, as of June 2014, there were 30,191 returnees from Saudi Arabia in the region deported between November 2013 and April 2014. This figure accounts for 22% of the 163,000 Ethiopian deportees at the national level (Tigray Region Bureau of Youth and Sports Affairs, 2014; IOM, 2014).
In order to reduce the likelihood of remigration, it is important to develop interventions aimed at helping returnees reintegrate into Ethiopian society. However, evidence shows that migrants who return involuntarily often face huge challenges in re-establishing their lives in their countries of origin (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; Kleist & Milliar, 2013). Furthermore, the reintegration of a sizeable number of returnees is challenging and expensive for poor countries like Ethiopia that do not have the capacity to provide regular and comprehensive assistance for returnees (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015). It has also been argued that livelihood restoration is more complicated for returnees when migration is an established household livelihood strategy, which is often realised through collective decisions and finance-pooling (Kleist & Milliar, 2013).

Scholarly works that focus on exploring the reintegration challenges of return migrants, particularly involuntary returnees, show that multifaceted issues ranging from structural issues in the place of origin (such as poverty and unemployment) to personal problems (such as disdain for local job opportunities, desire to get rich overnight and lack of skills) hinder the reintegration of returnees. A study conducted on the involuntary return of Ghanaian migrants from Libya revealed that the unfavourable mode of return, the high level of dependence by migrants’ families on remittances, and unfavourable local conditions hinder the reintegration of returnees (Mensah, 2014). Similarly, findings on Basotho male return labour migrants to South Africa show how the limited human capital of returnees, lack of psychological preparedness for post-return life, and lack of support make the reintegration of returnees into their home communities problematic (Morojele & Maphosa, 2013).

To date, few studies have been conducted in Ethiopia to examine the problems Ethiopian return migrants from the Middle East have reintegrating. The overwhelming majority of studies focus on the reintegration challenges of female returnees. Research conducted by Nisrane, Morissens, Need and Torenvlied (2017) in Addis Ababa on female return migrants from Saudi Arabia found that the migration
setting (which usually impedes preparedness to return), the personal traits of the migrants, and the absence of post-return assistance were major obstacles to the economic reintegration of female returnees. In another study, the absence of post-return employment and a sustainable source of income, the deteriorating health status of returnees, their lack of capital and the lack of support from external bodies were identified as the main challenges to the successful reintegration of Ethiopian female return migrants from Saudi Arabia (Alemu, 2018). Furthermore, based on a study of 168 Ethiopian involuntarily returned migrants from Saudi Arabia (both men and women), De Regt and Tafesse (2015) found that lack of preparedness to return is the primary reason for the poor social, psychological and economic reintegration of returnees in their communities. All of these researchers confirmed that the vast majority of returnees did not achieve their migration goals and were unable to re-establish their livelihoods at home and, hence, were contemplating re-migrating. Apart from this, there is evidence that the loss of the expected gains from and goals of migration, the reception of families following deportation (Kleist & Milliar, 2013), transnational ties and networks, and socio-cultural feelings of failure held by deportees affect their reintegration (Schuster & Majidi, 2013). However, little is known as to how these factors affect the reintegration process of Ethiopian returnees deported from Saudi Arabia.

International migration is a multi-dimensional global phenomenon and has become a hot topic of debate in today’s world. This is due to the fact that migration impacts on the health, security and wellbeing of people, as well as the economies of both sending and receiving countries (Jamie, 2013). This chapter seeks to further our understanding of the effects of deportation on return migrants. The argument is that the deportation of people against their will and the resultant failure of deportees to meet their migration goals, the negative reception by family members, and the socio-cultural feelings of shame about failure make the reintegration of deportees problematic, motivating remigration. Thus, the question this chapter seeks to answer is: *What are the effects of the deportation of Ethiopian*
migrants from Saudi Arabia on their reintegration in the home country and remigration intention?

The chapter is divided into nine sections including this introduction. The next two sections present a brief review of the literature on the pre-migration expectations of migrants – their dreams of a better life for themselves and their families – and the effect of deportation and returning home empty-handed. This is followed by a description of the methodology used and the characteristics of the respondents. The findings are then presented in four sections which explore the effect of the pre-migration perceptions, expectations and migration goals of returnees and their families; the negative reception of returnees by their families after deportation; the migrants’ socio-cultural feelings of shame about failure; and their transnational ties and networks on their reintegration and remigration intention. This is followed by a brief discussion and conclusion.

Dreams of a better life

Unlike in the 1970s, in recent years migration from Ethiopia has been mainly driven by the desire to improve livelihood and wellbeing. Despite the substantial economic growth in the country, many Ethiopians still consider migration as the only way to achieve a better standard of living (Schroder, 2015; De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; Zewdu, 2018; Estifanos, 2017). Limited employment opportunities for educated people in urban areas and the dwindling share of resources in the rural areas of Ethiopia have pushed numerous youth, and their families, to perceive migration as a short cut to liberation from poverty. Parents in rural areas appreciate having a family member abroad, despite the dangerous routes they take and the hardships they might suffer in their lives as migrant workers (Maru, 2016). Due to an inability to satisfy the basic needs of their family members and the (perceived) better living conditions of the families with migrant children abroad, parents often encourage their children to migrate (Maru, 2016; Gebre-Egziabher, Abay, Fekadu, Gebreegziabher & Kassaye, 2017; Estifanos, 2017).
In relation to this, a study conducted among migration prone communities in southern Ethiopia shows that communities have a strong positive perception of migration, and families who send their children abroad are accorded high social status in the community (Estifanos, 2017). Even in the recent past, religious leaders have encouraged parents to send their children abroad by saying that migration is something opened by God for communities to prosper and, as a result, communities organise farewell programmes to collect money for potential migrants and receive blessings from religious leaders (Zewdu, 2018; Gebre-Egziabher et al., 2017; Maru, 2016; Kanko, Bailey & Teller, 2013). In relation to this, Estifanos (2017) points out that despite the challenges migrants face in the course of their migration, remittances sent back home by migrants are essential to improve the living standards of the families left behind. Hence, remittances are not only an important reason for migrating, but also an insurance for the migrant and poverty-stricken families left behind (Zewdu, 2018).

Prior to the 1970s, migration from Ethiopia was prevalent among educated and urban people in the country. However, currently, those migrating include illiterate youth from rural areas. A study done on potential migrants in the southern part of Ethiopia found that migration has become something everybody wants to try. The overwhelming majority (79%) of the research participants reported that going abroad is one of the things most youth in the community want to experience (Gebre-Egziabher et al., 2017). Another study conducted on Ethiopian return migrants from the Middle East and South Africa found that 55% of the returnees do not believe that working in Ethiopia will help to change their own and their family’s life for the better; similarly, 65% of returnees believe that Ethiopian youth can change their life for the better by working abroad (Minaye & Zeleke, 2017). To this end, Zewdu (2018) pointed out that among the youth in Ethiopia, migration has replaced conventional aspirations of attending school and securing government jobs. The success stories of some pioneer migrants and the physical transformation some Ethiopian migrants and their respective families have enjoyed mask the risks of migration, blinding prospective
migrants, even when the risks are explained to them (Estifanos, 2017). This emanates from the fact that prospective migrants in Ethiopia often seek out positive stories, while discounting reports of negative experiences (Busza, Teferra, Omer & Zimmerman, 2017) and migrate with a predetermined plan, namely, to send remittances back home and invest business activities upon their return (Nisrane et al., 2017; Zewdu, 2018).

Returning empty-handed: Deportation and reintegration

In Ethiopia, the migration of one member of a family abroad for work is often part of a household livelihood diversification strategy, essential for survival and a buffer against varied and multiple crises (Ali, 2018; Fernandez, 2011). However, realising the goals of migration is not as simple as most potential migrants expect. Despite the positive perceptions and expectations of returnees before migration, the actual migration experiences of most returnees show that the situation in destination countries is not necessarily as perceived. As a result, a state of dissonance is created due to the misalignment of the perceptions and expectations of migrant returnees before they migrate with the actual reality experienced at the destination.

It is well documented that Ethiopian migrants to the Middle East are susceptible to different abuses. Overwork, denial of food and medical treatment, withholding of their salary, salary not commensurate with workload, denial of communication, confinement and rape are some of the reported experiences faced by Ethiopian migrants in the Middle East (Abebaw, 2012; Fernandez, 2010). Although migrants experience countless forms of abuse at the hands of their employers and other actors in destination countries, they are seldom in a position to tell their families about these negative experiences. Rather, they prefer to tolerate the undignified and abusive treatment in order to achieve their migration goals (Ali, 2018), which includes remitting the money they earn back home to improve the lives of their families. A study conducted on female Ethiopian return migrants in Addis Ababa and migrants in Kuwait revealed that the majority of the interviewed
women had been remitting most, if not all, of their salaries to support their birth family (Fernandez, 2011). The sending of remittances back home on a regular basis, permits families to improve their livelihoods and social status in the community, which, in turn, leads to the development of a positive mindset about migration on the part of their families. Under such circumstances, families are generally not receptive to negative stories about the migration experiences of their children. Hence, the positive feeling families have about migration hinders their acceptance of the negative information.

Following the end of the grace period announced by the Saudi Arabian government for irregular migrants to leave the country, irregular migrants who stayed were hunted by the security forces, detained and then deported to their country of origin. During their arrest and detention, many migrants experienced innumerable violations, including the looting of their belongings, torture, denial of food and water, and sexual abuse. A study conducted on some of the deported returnees in Addis Ababa showed that, due to the sudden crackdown, many returnees were forced to leave Saudi Arabia empty-handed (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015). De Regt and Tafesse (2015) found that out of the 168 returnees surveyed, only 44.2% were able to bring back some of their belongings, but most returned empty-handed. Similarly, Kuschminder (2014) found that most Ethiopian returnees do not achieve their financial goals of migration or change their living situation in Ethiopia, as the challenges they face during migration do not allow them to do so.

The negative migration experiences of migrants not only destroy their dreams, but also have negative repercussions on the livelihoods of their families, as the primary migration objective is usually to improve the impoverished economic situation of their family and their lives upon return. Involuntary return means the end of remittances. Households in which remittances from migrants constitute the sole or largest source of income are left vulnerable (Zewdu, 2018; Kleist, & Milliar, 2013). The situation becomes worrisome if migrants or their families have fallen into debt to finance the migration process. In his study on Ethiopian female migrants, Ali found that the end of
remittances creates social tension between the returnees and their families and can lead to estrangement (Ali, 2018). The divergence between the high expectations of the families of migrants, on the one hand, and the accumulated negative migration experiences of the returnees, on the other hand, can create unpleasant relations between returnees and their families. The situation is worse if returnees are dependent on their families, causing additional strain on scarce resources.

In communities with high expectations about the economic outcomes of migration, the shame of returning empty-handed can be intense. Thus, some involuntary returnees choose to isolate themselves to avoid gossip and social degradation (Kleist & Milliar, 2013). Furthermore, migrants who were marginalised in the destination country often face stigmatisation and marginalisation in their country of origin after return (Haase & Honerath, 2016). As a result, many deportees suffer from health problems, post-traumatic stress, and depression, which may deteriorate if their families and communities do not understand or believe their negative experiences (Kleist & Milliar, 2013).

Therefore, the positive expectations of families about migration and the unwelcoming reception of unsuccessful returnees by their families are some of the challenges to the successful reintegration of return migrants (Kleist & Milliar, 2013). In some cases, local communities assume that returnees are financially better off than non-migrants in the community. This misconception can negatively affect the morale of returnees in their endeavours to reintegrate.

**Methodology and characteristics of participants**

This chapter is based on research conducted for the author’s PhD in two administrative **woredas** of Tigray region, Ethiopia, namely: Saesie Tsaedaemba and Ahferom. Saesie Tsaedaemba and Ahferom are in

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67 A **woreda** is an administration classification in Ethiopia below the level of a zone (in decreasing order: country-region-zone-woreda-kabele) and equivalent to a district.
the Eastern and Central zones of Tigray region, respectively. These zones are characterised by a history of frequent drought and the people in these zones often suffer from acute food shortages. As well as recurrent drought, the causes of food insecurity in these areas include lack of arable land, erratic rainfall, and degraded natural resources (Berhe, 2013).

As of July 2014, there were 30,192 returnees in Tigray region registered as deported from Saudi Arabia between November 2013 and April 2014 (IOM, 2014). Of these, 20,400 (or 68%) originated from the Eastern and Central zones of the region (Tigray Region Bureau of Youth and Sports Affairs, 2014). Compared to other areas in the region, these zones are hotspots of irregular migration, mainly to Saudi Arabia. Hence, from these zones, these two woredas – Saesie Tsaedaemba and Ahferom – were purposely selected for the study, on account of the number of deportees in each woreda. Finally, respondents were selected from the list provided by officials at the kebele (smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia) level using systematic random sampling technique.

A mixed research approach was used, combining both qualitative and quantitative methods. First a survey was carried out among 218 returnees who had registered in their respective districts. The sample population encompassed deportees who were formerly residents of the districts and who had returned in the two phases of mass deportation from Saudi Arabia (November 2013 to April 2014 and March to July, 2017). The term ‘return migrant’ is used interchangeably with ‘returnee’ and ‘deportee’ in this study to refer to a person who migrated from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia and was returned involuntarily to Ethiopia (deported from Saudi Arabia).

The survey data were collected using an interviewer-administered structured questionnaire, which was filled in by four trained enumerators. This tool was deployed in order to collect quantitative data to enrich and triangulate the qualitative data gathered. The qualitative data were collected using focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. Two focus group discussions were held, one in each
The participants of the focus group discussions included members of the local community, return migrants and parents of returnees. Each focus group discussion had 9–12 discussants. In-depth interviews were carried out with 15 return migrants: 6 in Ahferom and 9 in Saesie Tsaedaemba. Key informant interviews were undertaken with carefully selected representatives of offices in the study areas whose formal or informal engagement with the community gave them knowledge of the subject in question. Key informants included representatives of the Women and Children Affairs, Youth and Sport Affairs, Labour and Social Affairs offices in the study woredas and the Tigray Region Bureau of Youth and Sports Affairs. Guidelines were prepared for the focus group discussions, key informant interviews and in-depth interviews in English and then translated to Tigrigna, the local language of the informants. The data were analysed using thematic analysis. Four themes emerged as common to all participants after careful analysis of their responses.

Regarding the characteristics of respondents to the survey, 75.2% (n=164) were men and 24.8% women. In terms of age distribution at the time of migration, the majority of respondents 84% (n=183) were young adults aged less than 35 years with a mean age of 28 years. There were no respondents to the survey aged less than 18 years old at the time of migration. In relation to the literacy status and education level of the returnees at the time of migration, 10.1% of the respondents were illiterate, and 42.7% had achieved elementary (grades 1–8) education and 41.7% had achieved secondary (grades 9–12) level. Only 5.5% had a tertiary education.

In terms of place of residence before migration, slightly more than half (51.4%) of the respondents to the survey were from rural areas and 48.6% were from urban areas. Although previously dominated by urban dwellers and relatively educated people, the migration of rural dwellers and less educated people has become common in Ethiopia, particularly in Tigray region (Abay & Kassaye, 2015; Berhe, 2013). With regard to the employment status and occupation of the respondents at the time of departure, 45.4% were employed, 34.4% were unemployed and 20.2% were students. The majority of the
returnees who were employed before migration were engaged in agriculture, which is seasonal in nature in Ethiopia, and the others were employed in the informal sector, which generally does not generate a sustainable income. In terms of marital status, 58.3% of the respondents were never married before migration, almost 32% were married and the remaining 9.7% belonged to other categories (widowed, divorced and separated). The following sections present the findings of the study under each of the four themes that emerged.

**Perceptions, expectations and goals of migration**

The study investigated the pre-departure perceptions, expectations and goals of migration of returnees (deportees) from Saudi Arabia in Saesie Tsaedaemba and Ahferom woredas, in Tigray region of Ethiopia. As reported by the majority of respondents, returnees had a broadly held positive perception about the rewards of migrating and working abroad before they migrated. For many rural youth and less educated people in the study areas, the Middle East, mainly Saudi Arabia, is seen as a place where money is plentiful and success is certain. Consequently, many youth (both male and female) drop out of school, leave their jobs, and lease out family land in order to migrate. Even though returnees were somewhat aware of the risk of abuse, death and other negative experiences during the migration journey and at the destination, they reported seeking and recounting positive success stories of early migrants and ignoring reports of negative experiences. They often argued that life is predetermined, whether you migrate or not, implying that it is your fate to have either positive or negative experiences. As reflected by the participants, the selective exposure of returnees to the positive side of migration before they migrated and the structural problems (poverty and unemployment) in the study areas resulted in them developing a strong positive perception of migration before they migrated. For instance, A8 explained the perception he had about migration before his departure:

*I had a positive mindset about working abroad as the only way of changing my and my family’s life for the better. I had tried all the possibilities at home, but I couldn’t*
succeed. Earning a living is difficult here and even harder for uneducated people like me. Hence, I preferred to migrate with the expectation of securing a better job and income. However, my migration experience was really horrible; I paid 20,000 Ethiopian birr [USD 860] to traffickers, took a long journey on foot without water to drink, and experienced frequent intimidation and abuse by the traffickers. Due to my sudden deportation, I left there [Saudi Arabia] with only two months’ salary and my dream of a better future has been totally destroyed. (A8, face-to-face interview with author, Ahferom, 30 December 2017)

The respondents described structural problems at the place of origin, such as lack of job opportunities and a decent income, as the major reasons for them to leave in the first place. During my field work in Ahferom, I witnessed a significant number of idle youth sitting along road sides in Enticho town. In Saesie Tsaedaemba, the rugged nature of the topography, recurrent droughts and general degradedness of the area have left youth with little or no options for gainful employment. Consequently, communities in these woredas use migration as a livelihood strategy. T6, a 36-year-old female, recounted her dreams and expectations about migrating to Saudi Arabia:

*Economic problems and inability to get a job after I completed my TVET [technical and vocational education and training] were the main reasons that forced me to emigrate. On top of that I had the responsibility of caring for and supporting my family (my grandmother and my two kids). Hence, I decided to migrate to Saudi Arabia where I believed I could realise my goals and expectations – change my life and educate my kids properly.* (T6, face-to-face interview with author, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 25 June 2018)

Socio-cultural factors, like the desire of youth to get rich overnight and returnees’ pre-migration exposure to successful returnees in their locality were reported as among the factors that influenced respondents to develop a positive mindset about migration.

According to the in-depth interviewees, seeking better-paid jobs and enough income to improve their and their family’s lives were the main goals of migrating to Saudi Arabia. However, many respondents said that they failed to achieve their migration goals and returned home
empty-handed. Being illegal migrants, they were forced to return back to their homeland by the Saudi government. The deportation happened quickly, before the migrants were ready for the process of return. Hence, instead of improving their life, many ended up in financial trouble. One respondent, a 26-year-old male returnee from Ahferom, shared the following:

*I had been in Saudi Arabia [Riyad] for two consecutive years working illegally as a daily labourer in the construction sector. Following the Saudi government’s sudden and unexpected deportation order, I was forced to return home without my wages. I left four months’ salary behind because my employer was not in a position to pay my salary, so I was forced to leave it. So I did not bring back enough capital to enable me to reintegrate at home and now I am dependent on my family.* (11G, face-to-face interview with author, Ahferom, 29 December 2017)

In short, even though, respondents reported having a positive mindset about migration and working abroad before departure, their actual migration experience did not meet expectations. The majority of the respondents did not achieve their migration goals and this, in turn, inhibited their reintegration upon return. Many returnees were in a worse situation than they were when they left and were contemplating re-migrating, despite the challenges that they had faced the first time around.

**Negative reception by families**

In order to explore the effect of the migrants’ families’ reception on the reintegration of returnees, we need to look at the pre-departure perceptions and expectations of families, their involvement in the initial migration decision-making process, and the benefits they derived from the migration of their family member. The results of the in-depth interviews carried out with families and returnees revealed that many families and parents have positive perceptions of migration. They saw migration as enabling people to generate more income than local employment. Consequently, parents often encourage their children to migrate by telling success stories of some pioneer migrants and returnees in their neighbourhood. Interviewees
said that only narrating success stories of migration and the reluctance of returnees to tell their families about their negative migration experiences has led to the development of a positive perception of migration among families. In most cases, migration was arranged and the final decision made collectively by household members. Parents and family members chose to send the migrant abroad because they perceived life in Saudi Arabia to be desirable; they believed that youth can easily make a large amount of money and the family can then receive remittances on a regular basis. N5, a 52-year-old father of a returnee, recounted the history of migration in the community and the value the community attaches to migration:

In our district [Ahferom] migration began early. Many people have been migrating to Eritrea (before the border conflict), Israel and Sudan. Although there has been a change in destination, migration is continuing and this has become the norm in the community at large. Most of the households in the community have one or more family member with a migration history. This reflects the positive perception of migration. Families who send their children abroad are accorded a high social status in the community, compared to their counterparts. (N5, focus group discussion, Ahferom, 30 December 2017)

As explained by the respondents, the majority of parents were involved in instigating and financing the migration, and expected that their financial investment would be returned. This is substantiated by the survey data, which found that 57.4% (n=125) of the sample returnees funded their migration costs through their parents or borrowed from relatives. In return, out of 218 respondents, 85% (n=185) reported sending remittance home while they were working abroad. As indicated by both the survey and qualitative data, migrants’ remittances were used mainly for household consumption (food, clothes, education, health and social activities) and loan repayment, as well as to purchase assets and saving (Table 14.1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% (n=185)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household consumption</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan repayment</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase assets</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>185</strong></td>
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Being irregular in status, returnees were unable to save the money they earned at the destination, but instead had to send it home to their families (although getting the money back was a problem). It was argued that remittance contribution in preserving family welfare, providing quality of life, and generally reducing the vulnerability of the household is undeniable. B2, a 24-year-old female returnee, explained as follows:

*We [the youth] do have a responsibility to care for and support our families: for instance, I was in Saudi Arabia for almost two years working illegally as a maid and I sent money to my parents living in a rural area mainly to buy agricultural inputs and construction materials to renovate their old hut. However, it is untrue to say that all families who have a family member who has migrated are benefiting from migration. The lucky ones are few compared to the extent of migration in our locality.*

(B2, focus group discussion, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 13 June 2018)

In short, the majority of returnees reported supporting their families back home from the income they earned while abroad. However, as viewed by the families of returnees, the support they obtained was not as life changing as they expected; it was allocated mainly to daily household consumption and repaying debts. Even worse, there were unfortunate families whose investment in the migration of their family member was lost. N5, a 52-year-old father of a returnee, recounted the loss faced by his family:
Some lucky families have been benefiting from the migration of their family members, mostly the families of early migrants. However, currently, many families are becoming destitute because migration has wiped out their meagre resources. For instance, when my son repeatedly nag me to let him migrate, I spent 45,000 Ethiopian birr [USD 1,667] for his migration expenses. Unfortunately, he returned [deported] empty-handed after he had stayed four months in Saudi Arabia. (N5, focus group discussion, Ahferom, 30 December 2017)

This excerpt shows that sending a family member abroad constitutes a major investment on the part of the family, who may sell household assets on the assumption that they will be repaid one day. However, as reported by the majority of families and returnees, their expectations and goals of migration are often not realised. It was argued that the untimely, involuntary return of migrants not only disrupts individual returnee’s hopes and plans, but also those of the migrant’s family, especially if they are unable to repay the loan they took to finance the migration. Returnees stated that they had intended to stay in Saudi Arabia at least until they had repaid the money that they borrowed. A4, a 23-year-old female returnee, recounted her migration process as follows:

The community that I live in is prone to migration and when I was a student, I saw youth migrating abroad and succeeding, so I started contemplating how to migrate. I perceived that education would not bring about the same immediate gains as migration and decide to migrate illegally. To arrive at my destination [Saudi Arabia] it took me six weeks, although I thought the journey would take only two. Until I arrive in Saudi, I spent 40,000 Ethiopian birr [USD 1,481]. I borrowed from my elder brothers. I was working as a house maid for one year and then deported empty-handed. Now, I have nothing at my disposal, let alone to re-establish my live and reintegrate. I am unable to repay the debt I took and my family have become unhappy, which has created hostility with my family. (A4, face-to-face interview with author, Saesie Tsaidaemba, 12 June 2018)

The above excerpt shows that the unplanned return of migrants creates a stressful experience for the returnees and their families. From the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, it became clear that for households who relied on relatives and friends to loan
them money to pay for migration, involuntary return without being able to repay the debt represented a particular economic setback for the entire family. Returnees interviewed stated that due to the economic loss incurred, returning to a situation of debt created an unwelcoming reception by their families and relatives and subsequent decrease in the care and support they received from their families. This often hindered the reintegration of returnees into their community of origin. The returnees who participated in the focus group discussions shared that borrowing money for migration has ruined their reintegration. The returnees who borrowed money from their parents, friends and financial institutions and did not pay it back are treated very badly. In addition to this, the communication among family members and the returnees is not smooth; most of them said that, as a result, they are not happy living with their families and prefer to re-migrate.

As explained by the returnees and their families, the untimely deportation of migrants not only negatively influences migration investment, but also ruins the livelihoods of low-income families who rely on remittances to subsidise their livelihoods. For instance, 7M, one of the participants in this study, described the extent to which his family was dependent on his earnings:

Fortunately, I stayed three and half years in the destination country [Saudi Arabia]. When I was there, I sent money to my family once every three months and my family [my two kids and wife] were entirely dependent on that money for their livelihood and expenses. Now, being the only breadwinner in the family, I am unable to support my family and I am looking for possible options to re-migrate. (7M, focus group discussion, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 13 June 2018)

In short, the majority of interviewees reported that their family’s high level of dependence on remittances, which ended due to deportation, and the negative reception by family members hindered their reintegration and motivated them to want to re-migrate. It was argued that families in which remittances from migrants constituted the sole or largest source of income are particularly vulnerable, especially those returnees who were not able to support themselves upon their
return and became dependent on their families. It was explained during the discussions that although the families did not share their grievances explicitly with the returned family member, they were disappointed with their child's unexpected deportation, the loss of support (remittances) and the additional strain placed on their limited household resources. The following quote from an interview with 7W explains the situation:

My family's reaction and reception when I returned back home was good; however, eventually, some of my family members became unhappy realising that the financial support from remittances had ceased. They were expecting at least to buy a house and educate my little siblings; but I was unfortunately not able to do all these things during my stay abroad. They do not see the challenges I have gone through; rather they only care about my money. I sent all I earned abroad and I have nothing. This has created a bad relationship with my family. Now, I am determined to re-migrate again. (7W, face-to-face interview with author, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 12 June 2018)

In the same vein, key informants explained that at first families usually welcome the returnees back at their return. This is because they do not know the situation. They expect the returnee to come back with at least with some money to enable him/her to lead their life. But, as time passes, and when they realise that the returnee has been deported without enough money, they became unsupportive. Family members often compared returnees to other migrants who have returned with money. This influences returnees to think of re-migrating. Without networks and support from their family, reintegration into a community is difficult, if not impossible.

**Socio-cultural feelings of shame**

As reported by the majority of returnees, the ultimate objective of their migration was to earn a better income to improve their livelihood and that of their family. However, most of the returnees were unable to achieve this objective due to unplanned deportation and the inability to use the money they had sent back home. A focus group discussion with returnees and their families revealed that when
families and communities had high expectations of migration, returning empty-handed created anxiety and feelings of shame about failure in returnees. In addition, key informants explained that in communities where migration has become the norm, the inability of returnees to fulfil families’ expectation regarding the economic outcomes of migration resulted in the development of feelings of shame, loss, failure and stress on the part of returnees, which hindered reintegration. This shame is not only felt by the returnees, but by the whole family. The feeling was worse in returnees who were unable to repay the debt taken to finance their migration. As described earlier, A4 was unable to repay her migration debt: “Now my family does not know my address and I have no relationship with them, because I am afraid to see them” (A4, face-to-face interview with author, Saesie Tsedaemba, 12 June 2018).

In addition, many interviewees said that the assumption by family members and relatives that the returnees had money, when the reality was different, made them nervous. All these sentiments made returnees feel inferior and uncomfortable living in their place of origin and hindered their reintegration. Most of the return migrants said that they spent most of their time with other returnees in other areas, usually in nearby towns. Furthermore, the involuntary return and interruption of hopes not only made the returnees feel like failures, but also made them behave badly towards family members. This behaviour also negatively affected relationships with family members and hampered the social and emotional reintegration of returnees. It was found that returnees who had maintained no or little contact with their families and friends in their countries of origin encountered difficulties establishing social networks upon their return, which are key to reintegration.

Many returnees explained that they are perceived by the community to have money, merely because they were abroad. They said that members of their community did not understand or believe their experiences, instead referring to returnees as ‘deportees’ (tiruz for man and tirzti for woman), which has negative connotations. In addition, members of local communities stereotyped all returnees as
having mental problems, having been raped, and as disobedient to their families and the community at large. This skewed perception of returnees made them feel ashamed and hindered their reintegrating into the community. A 24-year-old female returnee, explained the situation as follows:

After I returned back home, I lived in the village with my family for three weeks, but later I became upset by the gossip and defamation by the local community. These things made me nervous in my village and forced me to leave permanently to live in a small town called Enticho [Ahferom] with other returnees whom I knew when we returned back home together from Saudi Arabia. (9Z, face-to-face interview with author, Ahferom, 29 December, 2017)

On the other hand, it was pointed out that returnees often underestimate the local employment opportunities that are available. In the survey, it was found that although the majority of returnees were from rural areas, they did not want to live and look for job opportunities there. Similarly, in the focus group discussions, it was highlighted that returnees often do not want to work in low paid jobs, because they assume this will not improve their life. Returnees generally did not want to work in their local area if the job did not generate the minimum income they expected. They simply contemplate and gather information on how to re-migrate, instead of looking for ways to reintegrate.

**Transnational ties and networks**

Research has shown that if individuals who are involuntarily returned have close family members or relatives in the deporting country, the impulse to return is very strong (Schuster & Majidi, 2013). In the present study, it was found that, in addition to the aforesaid challenges, transnational ties that link returnees with family members and relatives abroad hinder the reintegration of returnees. The survey data showed that 33.5% (n=73) of the sample returnees had family members or relatives either in the destination country (Saudi Arabia) or other countries. Social capital (meaningful ties with relatives and family members abroad) provides a foundation for the dissemination
of information as well as for patronage or assistance, which increases the likelihood of returnees re-migrating. The survey revealed that, from the total sample of returnees who had family members or relatives in Saudi Arabia or other countries, 57.5% (n=42) reported that they intended to re-migrate. In comparison, the figure for the respondents who had no family members or relatives abroad, but intended to migrate was 42.1%. Using the chi-square test, it can be said that a statistically significant difference in the intention to re-migrate was found between returnees who have family members or relatives abroad and those who do not ($\chi^2=4.66$, df=1, $P=0.03$) (Table 14.2). The role of relatives or family members who live in the potential destination country is immense in perpetuating migration in the study areas. Here is an excerpt from an interview with a returnee (A3) that shows the effect of transnational ties and remittances in reinforcing irregular migration from the study areas.

*Since my return in May 2017, I have been doing nothing. I have no job, but have become dependent on the support I get from my elder sister who lives in Saudi Arabia. Now, I do not want to stay here anymore: my sister is insisting that I re-migrate and I am waiting for her to send me money to help cover the cost of migration.* (A3, face-to-face interview with author, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 13 June 2018)

**Table 14.2. Presence of family member or relatives abroad and intention to re-migrate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have family member or relative abroad (n=218)</th>
<th>Intention to re-migrate (n=218)</th>
<th>Chi-square test ($\chi^2$)</th>
<th>Degree of freedom (df)</th>
<th>P (significance level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (57.5)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>(73 (100%))</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (42.5)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>(42.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (57.9)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>(145 (100%))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Yes (47.2)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>(218 (100%))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (52.8)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The key informant interviews held with representatives of government offices, mainly the Youth and Sports Affairs office at Ahferom, also confirmed that the majority of returnees who re-migrated had family members, relatives or friends abroad. For instance, there were 3,989 returnees (deported from Saudi Arabia in the period 2013–2015) in the district, of whom 1,040 had re-migrated within one year after returning, paying a large amount of money to traffickers, which they received from family members and relatives who live abroad (Ahferom Woreda Youth and Sports Affairs Office, 2016).

Discussion and conclusion

The results of the study on the pre-departure perceptions and expectations of people migrating from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia revealed that returnees see Saudi Arabia as a place of milk and honey, where money is plentiful and success is certain. Although returnees were aware of the serious security risks and increased legal difficulty with being in Saudi Arabia, many of them had positive perceptions about migration before they migrated. The selective exposure of returnees to positive rewards and the success stories of early migrants and disregard for reports of negative migration experiences influence returnees to develop a positive perception about migration before they migrate. However, the majority of interviewees acknowledged a significant difference between their perceptions prior to travel and the reality they experienced at the destination. There was an overestimation or idealisation of the advantages to be reaped from migration on the part of the returnees and their families.

The returnees in this study had primarily migrated in pursuit of economic betterment for themselves and their family members left behind. This corroborates previous research findings that Ethiopians consider migration a good way to earn and secure a promising future (Busza et al., 2017). In earlier times, especially in the 1970s, migration from Ethiopia was mainly driven by political factors. However, since the 1990s, the primary motives behind migration from Ethiopia are
economic factors: to move out of poverty and to augment family living standards. However, this study found that the majority of returnees did not achieve their migration goals owing to their untimely involuntary return and inability to bring back enough capital. This result complements the findings of previous research on Ethiopian female return migrants (see Ali, 2018; Alemu, 2018; Nisrane et al., 2017; Zewdu, 2018; De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; Kuschminder, 2014).

In addition to the structural problems (poverty and unemployment) in the place of origin, which motivated returnees to migrate in the first place, this study found that experiences of deportation and thwarted migration goals add three factors that make the reintegration of returnees difficult and remigration more likely in the study areas: the negative reception of returnees by family and community members, the socio-cultural feelings of shame about failure held by the returnees, and the existence of transnational ties and networks of returnees. A study done by Schuster and Majidi (2013) demonstrates that cross-border migration is an expensive business, one that usually requires family support. Similarly, in the present study, it was found that family members and relatives usually invested large amounts of money to send a family member abroad, for which they leased out their land, sold assets and borrowed money from friends, relatives and financial institutions, on the assumption that they would be repaid one day from the returns of migration (Carling & Carretero, 2008). In a place like Ethiopia where there is no regular institutional support in times of crisis, household assets are an insurance against adversity for many rural and urban families. However, the unplanned involuntary return of a family member not only disrupts individual returnee’s hopes and plans, but also those of the migrant’s family in the following ways: First, the deportation of the migrant before they can achieve their migration goals leads to depletion of household assets that could have been invested locally or saved for the future. Second, in addition to the loss of household assets, inability to pay back loans taken to finance migration exposes families to conflict with the returnees and the creditors, and even financial ruin. Third,
deportation of a family member also affects the livelihood of low-income families, who rely on remittances for their daily subsistence.

When families and relatives have high expectations of migration, returning empty-handed creates an unwelcoming or negative reception for returnees from their families, which damages the relationship between returnees and their families. A study done by Ali on Ethiopian female returnee migrants found similar results. In that study all the female returnees said that they were welcomed by their families at first, however, many of them eventually encountered criticism. As the migrants’ support for the family diminished, family members became unhappy, which created conflict (Ali, 2018). In addition to the accumulated negative migration experiences, the unwelcoming reception of returnees by family members exacerbated any existing post-traumatic stress or depression of returnees. Lack of understanding about the pain that returnees had suffered during their migration cycle and lack of support from family members compelled many returnees to hide themselves from the eye of their families, obstructing their reintegration. In addition to lack of understanding and support, misconceptions about return migrants held by local community members negatively affected the morale of returnees, which hindered their reintegration prompting them to re-migrate.

In addition to the negative reception of returnees by families, socio-cultural feelings of shame about failure held by returnees was found to be one of the factors hindering their reintegration. A study done on Senegalese migrants by Carling and Carretero (2008) had similar findings: in this study returnees were not only frustrated and angry, but also spoke of a sense of shame in relation to having failed and come home empty-handed. On top of the negative migration experiences of the returnees, the feeling of failure to meet personal and family expectations leads to hopelessness, social isolation and low self-esteem on the part of returnees, which hinders their reintegration. Schuster and Majidi, in a study on Afghan deportees, argue that the power of shame about their failure to meet expectations should not be underestimated and that it puts pressure on returnees to re-migrate (Schuster & Majidi, 2013).
In this study, it was also found that the presence of transnational links and networks that connect returnees with family members or acquaintances in the destination country affect the reintegration of return migrants. Evidence shows that if an individual who has been involuntarily returned has close family members or relatives in the country from which they were deported, the impulse to return is very strong (Schuster & Majidi, 2013). The encouragement and pressure to re-migrate coming from family members and relatives living in the destination country hinder the reintegration of return migrants.

In conclusion, unless the structural problems (poverty and unemployment) that cause people to migrate in the first place are addressed, involuntary return without meeting personal and family hopes exposes returnees to an unwelcome reception by families and feelings of shame about failure, which lead to depression, hindering reintegration and influencing returnees to re-migrate. Thus, for migrants who are involuntarily returned and who have negative migration experiences, the mere provision of post-return material and financial support may not lead to their successful reintegration. Hence, improving the prevailing structural problems and the provision of psychosocial, moral and emotional support from family members, relatives, friends and communities at large are imperative.

References


Chapter 15

Life after the Lord’s Resistance Army: Support for Formerly Abducted Girls in Northern Uganda

Primrose Nakazibwe & Mirjam Van Reisen

Introduction

When the guns were finally silenced in Northern Uganda, many people had to live with the after-effects of war in their daily life. The armed conflict in Northern Uganda had lasted 20 years. It was declared officially over in January 2007 by the government. The conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the National Resistance Movement, the ruling political party in Uganda had been extremely violent and left deep scars.

The civil war in Northern Uganda started in 1986 when

When girls abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda realised their dream of returning home, the reality was not what they expected. Often with children fathered by the rebels, they found themselves outcast and ill prepared for life. These girls are deeply traumatised as a result of the abuse and sexual violence experienced in captivity, which is compounded by the discrimination experienced on return. The government’s rehabilitation programme needs to address these issues by reaching out to these girls with psycho-social support and mental health services, as well as improving their livelihoods by securing access to land and helping them develop the skills they need to survive.

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68 This chapter presents some of the findings of a study titled Cost Benefit Analysis of Cash Transfer Programs and Post Trauma Services for Empowerment of Women in North Uganda (EWP-U), which was carried out from 2015 to 2019 (Van Reisen, Nakazibwe, Stokmans, Vallejo & Kidane, 2018). The study was conducted by a consortium of institutions: Tilburg University, Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Makerere University and Isis-Women's International Cross-Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE). We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Netherlands Science Organisation (NWO).
the National Resistance Army, later renamed the National Resistance
Movement, took power in Uganda and the LRA decided to fight the
new government. The LRA began as an evolution of the Holy Spirit
Movement led by Alice Lakwena. When Lakwena was exiled, Joseph
Kony took over. However, with the change of leadership, the rebel
group lost regional support, which forced Kony to engage in self-
preservation, including stealing supplies and abducting children to fill
his ranks. The rebels, thus, embarked on a campaign of terror, which
included child abduction, mutilation, murder and general destruction.
The conflict was concentrated in the Lango and Acholi ethnic sub-
regions of Northern Uganda, including Kitgum District.

This chapter focuses on the experiences of the former abductees ten
years after the end of the war in the context of the rehabilitation effort
by the Government of Uganda in the north. In 2015, when this study
was undertaken, the support provided by the Government in
Northern Uganda was focused on social protection programmes
which offered cash or in-kind livelihood support to the members of
impoverished communities. The objective of the social protection
programmes was to help the region regain its resilience. But has this
objective been attained in the context of the severe trauma
experienced by the population in Northern Uganda?

This study investigates the trauma suffered by the girls abducted by
the LRA in Northern Uganda and how they are coping now as young
women with the traumatic events that happened and how they have
been able to reintegrate back into their communities and participate
in social protection programmes initiated by the government. The
main research question is: How has the trauma experienced by the girls
formerly abducted by the LRA affected their reintegration as young women
returning to their original communities, including their ability to access government
social protection programmes? This research question is approached
through the lens of the feelings as information theory (Schwarz,
2010). This theory holds that feelings present themselves as
information. Therefore, in populations with high trauma, it can be
expected that the resulting negative feelings affect the impact of social
protection programmes. The hypothesis of the study was that the
trauma, left unaddressed, would dampen the results of the efforts of rehabilitation through the social protection programmes. This chapter provides a qualitative assessment of the study that was carried out in Kitgum, located in the far north of Uganda, bordering South Sudan.

**War trauma in Northern Uganda**

Many people in Northern Uganda, including women and children, were left to deal with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of the atrocities committed by the LRA and the National Resistance Movement. The abduction of children by the rebels left many severely traumatised, and their return home did not erase the horrific experiences. When they returned, they found themselves in a wider community that had also experienced a lot of trauma due to the atrocities committed by the rebels. They had to deal with their personal trauma as well as the collective trauma suffered by their community. The civil war in Northern Uganda left the whole region devastated by traumatic experiences, leaving citizens to handle their feelings on their own after the war ended (Logan, 2016). Previous studies conducted in Uganda have indicated that many survivors of the war still suffer the effects of the war (Ovuga, 2005; Ovuga, Oyok & Moro, 2008; Roberts Ockea, Browne, Oyok & Sondorp, 2009). Many of those diagnosed with mental health problems suffer from depression, alcohol abuse, anxiety and suicidal tendencies, which are all signs of untreated trauma (Ovuga, 2005).

War and political conflict are gendered phenomena that affect men and women differently. According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (Ward, 2005), there is a growing body of data that brings to light the sexual violence and torture of civilian women and girls during periods of armed conflict over the last decade. Women and girls in Northern Uganda experienced all the forms of atrocity suffered by women and girls in conflict situations. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the trauma experienced by women and girls, notwithstanding the reality that men
and boys were also severely traumatised by the experiences described in this chapter.

**Social protection programmes**

Social protection is at the heart of attaining the Sustainable Development Goals of the Global Agenda 2030 and Africa’s Agenda 2063 (Guloba, Ssewanyana & Birabwa, 2017). African countries have taken on this agenda by incorporating social protection policies and programmes into their plans of action. Uganda has embraced this call of action at different times, as needed and as financial resources have allowed. After the end of the war, the Government of Uganda rolled out many social protection programmes that specifically targeted war affected districts, alongside the implementation of national programmes aimed at poverty eradication and the modernisation of agriculture.

Some of the social protection programmes that have been put in place and implemented by the Government of Uganda are the National Social Security Fund, National Pensions Scheme, Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, Orphans and Vulnerable Children grant, Universal Primary Education, Universal Secondary Education, Universal Health Services, cash for work schemes, Community Driven Development Programme, Agricultural Livelihood Recovery Programme, Karamoja Livelihood Improvement Programme, and Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment (SAGE), under which there is the Senior Citizen Grant and Vulnerable Family Grant. Much of the interventions on trauma were carried out by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) with limited capacity and small coverage. This chapter looks at the experiences of formerly abducted girls in accessing these programmes after they returned home.

**Theoretical framework: Feelings as information**

The discussion of trauma in this chapter draws on the theory of ‘feelings as information’ to explain the impact of trauma on an individual’s decisions and life. Schwarz (2010) understands human
thinking as informed by a variety of subjective experiences, including moods and emotions, metacognitive feelings and bodily sensations. This theory explains that mood affects the judgement of individuals and they respond and make decisions differently depending on their mood. Individuals in a happy mood are more likely to report higher life satisfaction than those who are sad (Bower, 1981). The theory assumes that people attend to their feelings as a source of information, with different types of feelings providing different types of information and, hence, different reactions (Schwarz, 2010).

People suffering PTSD tend to have sad moods resulting from painful experiences in their life. The definition of PTSD, as given by Ovuga and Larroque (2012, p. 183) – “a psychiatric condition, which develops after a person experiences, witnesses, is confronted with or hears about emotionally stressful and painful experiences beyond what a human being can bear” – offers insights into the impact of PTSD on the emotions and feelings of the victims.

An individual’s feelings may result in different emotional expressions. Emotions exist as signals to underlying appraisal patterns (Schwarz, 2010). People traumatised by war tend to develop self-blame, guilt, and loss of self-confidence and self-esteem (Ovuga & Larroque, 2012). This leads to emotional numbness, which often accompanies the traumatic experience of people with PTSD, which causes severe loss of control over personal routines and dignity, with a pervasive loss of sense of the future with the victim living day-by-day (Herman, 1997; Ovuga & Larroque, 2012). This leads to sad moods resulting in low life satisfaction, which impacts negatively on their self-drive to change the circumstances of their lives after the war. Thus, for people suffering from PTSD, managing their traumatic experiences may be important to restoring their emotional wellbeing and enabling them to reintegrate into their community.

The experiences that lead people to suffer from PTSD cause a sense of helplessness in the affected individuals, as a result of fear and horror, which impact negatively on their mood. Hence, people suffering from PTSD experience negative feelings, which negatively
affects the information they hold about themselves. Ovuga and Larroque, (2012: p. 184) noted that “victims develop self-blame, guilt feelings, loss of self-confidence and self-esteem. Emotional numbness that accompanies the traumatic experience causes severe loss of control over personal routines and dignity with a pervasive loss of sense of the future”. The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) can help explain how negative emotions leading to negative information may lead to negative behaviour towards one-self and towards the community (through perceived negative attitudes). Perceived negative social norms towards the highly traumatised group may further impact on behaviour (Chapter 1, Roaming Africa: A Social Analysis of Migration and Resilience, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Munyaradzi Mawere & Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher).

The expectation is that people suffering from a high level of PTSD may, therefore, not fully benefit from opportunities, as the negative feelings dominate, not allowing them to see or grasp the opportunities.

In this study, the phrase ‘room to manoeuvre’ is used to imply the interplay between actions and competences, which is agency (Simonton & Montenach, 2013; Samman & Santos, 2009). The World Bank defines agency as the “the ability to make decisions about one’s own life and act on them to achieve a desired outcome, free of violence, retribution, or fear” (World Bank, 2014, p. 3). This definition sees agency as: “women’s access to and control over resources; freedom of movement; freedom from the risk of violence; decision-making over family formation; and having a voice in society and influencing policy” (World Bank, 2014, p. 2). The World Bank’s definition is based on the assumption that agency is something someone can receive from somewhere else or can be ‘given’ by those in authority (Nakazibwe, 2017). However, agency is more than observable actions. Although it tends to be operationalised as decision making, it can also take a number of other forms (Kabeer, 1999). Thus, this study adopts the definition of Kabeer (1999, p. 438), who defines agency as “the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them”. Kabeer explains that agency takes many forms, including: “bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion
and resistance as well as more intangible, cognitive processes of reflection and analysis and it can be exercised by individuals as well as by collectives” (1999, p. 438). Meyers (2002) adds that agency is an innate skill that helps an individual to exercise her own will and that women can discover themselves through their ‘agentic skills’. Therefore, the understanding and application of agency in this study identifies formerly abducted women as actors who pursue conscious and unconscious goals to determine their life through interpretative and narrative frameworks that help them make sense of their world and how they relate to it after returning home.

This study further uses the concept of ‘intersectionality’. In this chapter, this is defined as “the interaction between gender, race and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power” (Davis, 2008, p. 68). Intersectionality enables differentiation between women and sheds light on how age, marital status, ethnicity, physical and mental health and other variables impact on the participation of people and to help understand how people in different circumstances may use their room to manoeuvre.

**Methodology**

This study is part of a mixed method research measuring the effect of support programmes on social-economic resilience. The research is conducted in a real-life natural setting. The purpose of the qualitative research was to help interpret a quantitative survey carried out among 470 women (Chapter 16, *Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience among Post-war IDPs in Northern Uganda*, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo). In the survey it was found that the women receiving psycho-social support scored significantly higher than women receiving support in the form of social protection on social-economic resilience. The women receiving both psycho-social support and social protection scored significantly higher than all groups, while the score of control group did not change. These
results point to the importance of addressing post-traumatic stress as part of building social-economic resilience. In this chapter we investigate why unaddressed trauma negatively affects social-economic resilience, even in the context of attempts aiming to regain resilience through social protection. It aims to describe in-depth a wide range of varied experiences, allowing the different lived experiences of participants to be acknowledged. In this way it follows the notion that quantitative findings are the result of different real individual experiences.

The chapter is based on the qualitative analysis of themes that emerged from the stories shared by the women who participated in the study. The findings presented in this chapter were from interviews conducted in July 2015 in Kitgum District. Kitgum was one the districts worst affected by the conflict, due to its location on the border with South Sudan, which was a base for the LRA. The participants were purposively selected from the list of girls who had been supported by the Kitgum Women Peace Initiative (KIWEPI) after the end of the war. KIWEPI is a local NGO based in Kitgum, providing mental health services to the women who returned from the war and giving them practical support such as training or livelihood support.

The 10 participants selected for the interviews were all formerly abducted and were at the time residing in Kitgum District. A number of the women interviewed were young girls at the time of their abduction. The study also included two key informants: the director of KIWEPI and the Kitgum District Development Officer. These key informants shared their expertise, knowledge and views on the local context, changes over time, and their experiences with the women. The office of KIWEPI selected the participants for this study. The study used interviews as a data collection method with an interview guide to facilitate the interviews. The interviews took the shape of story-telling. In order to avoid re-traumatisation, it was left to the respondent to decide what experiences they wished to share with the interviewers.
The interviews were conducted at KIWEPI by a senior team of experienced researchers in the context of investigating events with severe violence. The researchers had been introduced to the organisation by Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE), a Uganda-based NGO specialising in providing support to severely traumatised women and with a long track-record of working in Northern Uganda. The interviews were carried out by a team of trained researchers, including an expert on trauma from Isis-WICCE. Through KIWEPI the interviewers built the trust of the women and were able to hold in-depth interviews. These interviews caused deep distress, but it was necessary to conduct them to understand some of the current causes of impediments to social-economic rehabilitation in the region. Although some of the extracts of the interviews may sound distressing and unreal, the KIWEPI team of professionals confirmed the veracity of the stories and confirmed that there are many stories of similar situations.

The research-team was headed by a team leader who asked the questions during the interviews, while the rest of the team took notes. Each interview lasted about 45 minutes. The interviews were conducted in local language and translated to English. All the women interviewed for this study were aged between 23 and 35 years at the time of the interview. They all had a child born to the rebels or had lost a child born to a rebel. The names used are not the real names of the women, for purposes of confidentiality, but are known to the researchers.

The situation in Kitgum is important for understanding the social dynamics in Northern Uganda. The stories contained in the interviews are testimony to the LRA’s cruel treatment of very young children, snatched from their parents and communities. This cruel war had an impact on Northern Uganda at large with different dynamics occurring in different places as a result of it.
Choice of research site

Interviews held in other locations revealed different traumatising experiences affecting people and communities at large. To give some examples. In Barlonyo people narrated the severe traumatisation as a result of the mass-attack and massacre by the LRA in 2004. The attack claimed the lives of 124 people; although the real number is still disputed by community members, some suggesting that it was more than 300 people. It also left hundreds injured (Site visit, Barlonyo, 26 January 2017 and 21 February 2017) In Amuria, women told of the severe hardship of their communities, who during the war were held for protection in detention centres guarded by the government troops. Lack of food and water forced the women into prostitution resulting in widespread HIV & AIDS among the community (Focus group discussion, 9 July 2015). In other locations, such as in Kaberamaido and Bukedea, women also explained the hardship they faced due to HIV & AIDS, leading to further deprivation and poverty, which they had overcome by organising themselves to give psycho-social support and start a small credit system. In Lira, the researchers were able to speak to young men, who were engaged as child-soldiers during the war, and who equally had a hard time re-engaging with their communities, who regarded them with much mistrust and misgiving (Site visit, Lira, 26 January 2017). In regions such as Katakwi, respondents spoke of the fear of attacks by neighbouring communities and cattle-raids, due to the general lawlessness in the region during the war (Focus group discussion, 9 July 2015).

This chapter focuses on the in-depth qualitative interviews held in Kitgum as a background to understanding the intensity of the post-war trauma experienced for returnees from the LRA.

Abduction of children forced to live with the rebels

This section provides a brief narration of some of the stories of formerly abducted girls and women, explaining their ordeal during the time of their abduction and their stay with the rebels. These narrations
serve to provide understanding of the experiences in Northern Uganda, particularly in Kitgum.

**Abwoli (32 years)**

My name is Abwoli, and I come from Matiri Lagor Village, Kitgum District. I was 11 years old when I was abducted along with three other girls. We were going to town from home when all of a sudden, we realised strange movements in the nearby bush. The rebels were hiding in the trees watching us as we walked. As we proceeded one of the soldiers jumped down with a gun and forced us off the road and we entered the bush where we met hundreds of other soldiers. They slapped us and undressed us and touched us everywhere. Then we had to walk for one week without rest to Sudan. We were forced to carry things beyond our capacity. We were told if we failed to carry our load, they would cut off our breasts. There was no drinking water, we would drink urine; the soldiers would tell the girls to pee and they would drink the urine as there was no water. The girls would try to touch the soil and get water out of the soil. They gave me to an old man without teeth from Gulu; he told me he would look after me as a kid before he turned me into his fourth wife. He forced me to have sex with him in return for food and clothes. I stayed back in the barracks as a sex slave. After about 8–10 months, I realised that I was pregnant. I was left in the hands of my co-wives, who mistreated me almost to death. They did not love me, they would sometimes cook and not give me food. I would steal food [cries]. My husband returned when I was about to give birth and I was taken to Juba for an operation on a stretcher. Then the baby came. (Abwoli, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015)

This interview speaks to the deep distress and fear of very young girls, suddenly cut off from their families, sexually violated and raped, and living in fearful circumstances without any support. There was a deep sense of powerlessness and hopelessness, while the situation appeared completely out of their control.

**Amoti (23 years)**

My name is Amoti, I came from Lamo district. I was 13 years old studying P5 when I was abducted along with my two sisters and three other girls on our way back from school. [Breaks down and cries for about two minutes. She is carrying a
baby whom she keeps shaking as she cries]. Someone told us in class that the place was not safe, the teachers did not release us, thinking the fights would be far away until later in the evening when we were released to go home. On the way, as we ran home, we were stopped by a young boy who later appeared to be with the rebels. The young boy was used by the other seven rebels to distract us while the rest of seven rebels were hiding around the same place. The seven rebels came out and arrested us as we spoke to the young boy and took us to a cassava plantation. In the cassava plantation, we found many other rebels who were cooking as they had been looting. On arrival in the plantation, we were divided into the youngest and the older ones. The very young ones were sent back home. My youngest sister was sent back home with our books. However, my other sister and I were separated that day and until now I have never seen her again. We kept walking. In my group, there was a commander who had kids and I was allocated to carry the children. We kept on rotating around the villages of Gulu for about nine months. Most of the time there was nothing to eat, you just ate raw sweet potatoes. (Amoti, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015)

This was another very emotional interview. The loss of her sisters caused a lot of distress, especially not knowing where they were. From the interview it seemed that the respondent felt guilty in not protecting the other girls, despite her young age at the time of the abduction. Being among the eldest she felt responsible for the safety of the others and suffered a lot of pain from the sense that she had failed them. This also caused a lot of distress in returning, knowing that she had been able to escape, but unable to return her siblings and friends safely. The feeling was that she was still hoping to find them and that they were very present in her current life. Not knowing whether or not they were alive made the loss even more difficult to bear and she had not been able to close the loss.

**Akiki (25 years)**

In September 2003, I was abducted at night with my sister and brothers by the rebels. They tied me to the others and also my brother was tied with the boys. It was at 23:00 at night. We walked for a long time and the soldiers cooked, but we were not allowed to eat. We started walking at 6:00 am without stopping until 18:00 pm. We rested one hour, cooked food. This time they gave us something to eat, then
we started walking again. Every day was like that, resting only one hour in the evening, walking towards Soroti. We walked for four days until we were in Soroti. After several lootings and abductions, finally we moved to Sudan. They started raiding villages and adding more people to the group. We were heading to where Kony was. When they got someone from 10 to 18 they would not kill you because you could carry things. I was trained to become a child soldier and I was trained to kill. I was among the groups of rebels that attacked and looted many villages. I spent seven years in the bush. (Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015)

This interview speaks to the inability of the abducted children to determine their actions. Trained as a child-soldier, this girl – along many other girls and boys – committed war crimes before escaping and returning to the community. The young woman appeared numb and emotionless. It was explained by the KIWEPI team that being both victim and perpetrator makes it much harder to be accepted back into the community on return. From the interview, it was clear that the trauma resulting from what had happened to her and what she had done was alive. Feelings of guilt, remorse and confusion were part of the painful and honest narration of her story.

**Dehumanisation and narrow escape**

In order to ensure the submission of the abductees to the fighters, the children were exposed to severe inhumane treatment. The following are some of the stories the women shared.

**Amoti (23 years)**

*As time went by, they took away my child and made me carry 8–10 chickens and jerry cans. Then there was a boy who befriended me, because I was hurting a lot. He told me that we would escape together [crying]. One day we asked another rebel whether the barracks were far away. We were told, “You are far”. However, we smelt a cigarette, we knew soldiers were around. I was carrying the chickens and the jerry cans and I had to carry them so careful that they would not make noise. We decided to escape on that day. We took a different direction from the other rebels. On our way we heard a gunshot and realised that the soldiers had ambushed the rebels. We were lucky, as this meant that the rebels would not pursue us. The soldiers*
kept shooting and shooting until the rebels started dispersing. The government soldiers threw a bomb, and the soldiers came to see who had died. I hid in the hole that the bomb had made. I was lying down when the soldiers came and I put my hand up. That is how I escaped from the rebels after a painful experience. I lost my sister, and all hope of finding her has vanished. (Amoti, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015)

This young woman suffered deeply from the abduction, the loss of her sister, the loss of the child she gave birth to, and the treatment she experienced in the bush. Her narration centred on the long walks at night, during which she was forced to carry the chickens and jerry cans without making any noise. On these walks, she must have had a deep fear for her life. Any noise could trigger a counter-attack. The soldiers were ruthless in instilling fear in the porters. Today, this sense of fear seemed to override all other feelings and she went into great detail in explaining how she made sure not to trigger any noise during the dangerous trek of the militia.

Life in the rebel camps was full of life-threatening events, which happened almost every day, and many abductees reported that it was difficult to imagine that one would live to see the following day. They were forced to kill to survive, becoming used to death. Atwoki explained:

> When we were still with the rebels, we were given drugs to smoke, especially on days when horrible incidents happened. I remember the day one of the leading commanders was killed, we were given drugs to smoke and while I was very high on drugs, I killed my own cousin. Up to today, I still feel responsible for the death of my cousin and every time I think about it, it brings me a lot of pain [cries]. (Atwoki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015)

Women and girls were raped and later divided among soldiers for wives, often experiencing their first pregnancy in very difficult circumstances at a very young age. Health complications from rape and deliveries not attended by skilled medical personnel left many girls and women with complications, such as fistula, affecting their lives thereafter. One of the women interviewed complained “I have
issues with my breast – it is bleeding. I have cists on my back and on my breast – maybe from the heavy carrying” (Abwoli, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015).

Atwoki shared the following story:

I was 12 when I was abducted. One of the worst memories that I experienced when I had just been abducted was the slaughtering of a pregnant woman as a sign that if any one of us attempted to escape, we would go through the same treatment. They continued to kill women in the same way during the raids. When the rebels saw a pregnant woman they would open up the woman’s womb and if found that she was pregnant with a boy it was stoned and if a girl they put a stick in her private parts. (Atwoki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, July 2015)

Killing or dishonouring the new life that pregnant women carry is a way to dehumanise captives, forcing them into submission, instilling fear and removing their humanity, particularly hope for a future (Van Reisen, 2014). The level of fear instilled in the children was extreme and it would have prevented many from escaping. Yet, despite this, those we interviewed, and others, found the courage to make use of an unexpected moment escape to their community.

**Abwori (32 years)**

In 2001, when my child was eight months, I was able to escape [from the rebels]. Whenever we would go to fetch water we would talk about the escape, choosing the group members carefully so that they would not disappoint. Then one day at nine at night we all escaped. There were five girls with children, one who was pregnant and four without a child. They [the rebels] realised that we had escaped and started following us. There was shooting behind us. We ended up in Sudan barracks, and then the Arab soldiers brought a van that drove us to a house that looked like a store. They later shipped us to Khartoum and we were four months in Khartoum. We were locked up in a place; we would just move out to eat and go back inside. (Abwori, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015)

While the girls longed for an escape and used all their imagination and bravery to succeed in fleeing their daunting circumstance, the escapes were themselves also severely traumatising events. The stories of how
they escaped demonstrate that despite ill health and carrying the children fathered by the rebels, the women still urged and longed to be free in order to give their lives meaning and they engaged in courageous ways of escape. After several months or years, many girls found their way back home through their own action.

The escapes added further trauma to the already serious trauma of the abduction and captivity by the rebels. From the interviews, it was clear that the women had not recovered from these experiences. The stories were at times told in monotonous, disengaged, mechanistic voices. In other interviews the women’s narrations evoked deep emotion and distress over what had occurred. These events were still triggering extremely deep emotions and negative feelings. Often these feeling were paired with a sense of having failed others and low self-esteem and self-worth. KIWEPI appeared as an important source of mental health support. The little pride they expressed was related to the steps they had taken to increase their resilience and to look after themselves. KIWEPI professionals told us that in order for them to make small steps forward, they first had to accept their situation.

**The unreceptive return to the home community**

Having longed to return to their lost home, escaping from the rebels was like winning the lottery for those who survived the abduction and life with the rebels. The fact that they would finally re-join their family brought these girls a lot of joy. Many girls who escaped or were rescued by the army were taken to military points designated for collection and rehabilitation, before being reunited with their families. Those who had families to go back to went straight home, while those with no place to go remained at these centres until the war ended, when they re-joined their community as homeless children.

However, when the girls returned home, they received a mixed reaction from their families and communities. The girls who were lucky enough to have parents alive received both a warm and cold reception. A warm reception came from their parents who were happy to have their children back and treated them as survivors.
However, the wider community did not receive them the same way. During their abduction, many girls were forced to kill their own relatives or friends and those who returned home after they escaped or were rescued by the government soldiers brought back ugly stories. The parents of these children were sometimes forced to send their children away to keep peace with others in the community, whose children had died at their own child’s hands.

In addition, some of the girls returned with children fathered by the rebels. These children reminded parents who had lost their children of the rebels. While the abducted girls were (partially) welcome, their children were not. However, the girls did not have any alternative but to keep their children. So, the only option was to move with their children to a faraway place where they were not recognised as ‘wives of the killers’. Jobless and without any support, most of these girls ended up in Kitgum Town. Many of them ended up marrying to survive in this new place. Many reported that their new husbands did not welcome their children or support them with education. One of the respondents narrated: “When I reached home, my stepmother started to abuse me and my child, calling him the ‘rebels’ child’. I could not stand it and had to leave home and come to Kitgum Town” (Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015).

Many of the girls opted to get married because it was the only sure way they could be supported. However, some of the girls found it difficult to find a husband because of the stigma attached to being formerly abducted. One of the girls shared: “When I came from the bush I found another man, but he did not know I was from the bush and when he found out he ran away, but I was pregnant” (Atoki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015).

However, some girls found husbands who married them even after knowing that they had once been abducted. Unfortunately, many of these new husbands never accepted the children that the girls bore from the rebels and they had to either force their husbands to live with their children or send them to a relative who would take care of them. According to the Kitgum District Development Officer, these
children were now terrorising the communities in the towns, because they knew that the community did not welcome them. Furthermore, the vast majority of these children did not attend school, hence, grew up uneducated and prone to all sorts of negative behaviour. The negative feelings between the community and the children of the returnees fathered in the bush, translated into negative information about each other, exacerbating mutual hostility and negative behaviour towards each other.

**Living a traumatised past**

An epidemiological survey carried out in 2004 by the Ministry of Health in Uganda found rates of up to 50% for depression in the most severely conflict-affected districts (such as those in Northern Uganda), compared to 8% in districts not severely affected by war (Kinyanda, Hjelmeland & Musisi, 2004). In a cross-sectional study of 2,875 individuals in 8 districts in Northern Uganda, Pham, Vinck and Stover (2009) found that over half (56%) of the respondents and over two-thirds of those who experienced abduction met the criteria for PTSD, and that female participants were more susceptible than males.

Through the Ministry of Health, the Government of Uganda has been involved in the treatment of people diagnosed with mental-related health risks through the Butabika National Referral Hospital in Kampala. In order to enhance the mental health service delivery in the northern districts, Ugandan government institutions (the Ministry of Health, Butabika National Referral Hospital, and Makerere University Department of Psychiatry) and the Peter C. Alderman Foundation initiated a public-private partnership in which they established trauma clinics in four districts: Arua, Kitgum, Gulu and Soroti (Nakimuli-Mpungu et al., 2013). The clinics were based on group counselling for those experiencing depression and post-traumatic stress. Despite the efforts by the government to ensure support for women and girls who had been abducted, many did not receive much support when they returned due to the limited time they spent in the reception centres. They were not allowed to heal first before being returned to their families and, hence, ended up taking
the trauma with them into their new life and often mixed response of those receiving them.

When the women and girls returned from rebel captivity, they were very traumatised by their abduction and life in captivity with the rebels. They had been subjected to all sorts of brutal and life-threatening treatment. The abduction in some cases took place during gunfire exchange between the rebels and government soldiers, leaving many dead. They were separated from their families, sometimes as very young children, and taken into the hands of new, strange and ruthless fighters.

Unfortunately, when they returned home, many of these girls were unable to get professional assistance to manage their trauma. The few that returned home through government assistance were only given support for a short amount of time by the government and then encouraged to go home. Some were taken through the traditional ritual of reconciliation without dealing with the trauma. One of the respondents said, “they took us home to do the rituals; step on a raw egg for reconciliation and I was accepted back in the community” (Atenyi, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015).

Another woman shared her story, as follows:

_I came back in 2004 when I surrendered, we were taken to Kichua. Here, they gave us a rapid therapy before returning us to our families; I was there for one month. We were counselled to live with one another and to forgive. They announced on the radio and my uncle heard my name and came to pick me up. I was still very bitter with everyone and it’s my uncle’s wife that sent me to KIWEPI to receive counselling._

(Amoti, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum 11 July 2015)

Another woman narrated the following:

_When I returned home, I did not get much counselling. When we were rescued, I was brought to Entebbe and after taking us through amnesty arrangements, we were connected with our families. I came home with all the anger and frustration. Sometimes when I feel angry, I just want to kill someone._ (Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015)
NGOs have provided some of the women with further trauma management services with semi-professionals, including KIWEPI, opened to support girls affected by the war to reintegrate into the community. KIWEPI provides former child soldiers with a place to meet and share their past with people who have been through similar experiences. This ‘talking’ therapy has helped women and girls to open up and speak about what happened; even though they will never be able to erase the stories from their minds, at least they have been able to share their stories, put them in perspective and compare their own stories with those of others. This has allowed them to re-evaluate their situation and themselves. One of the respondents noted that: “Before I got counselling, my mind was not working well, but now I am positive. I have been able to start a small business to support my family” (Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015).

Through the psycho-social counselling a more positive feeling and mindset has been obtained. The sharing of stories helped women to understand that they were not alone, and that other women were also experiencing similar situations. This has allowed them to assess their situation more positively. Those who had received training from organisations such as KIWEPI, took up the skills they learnt and started small businesses to enable them to survive and support their children. The decision to start their own life as small entrepreneurs in order to survive was a result of the motivation they received from their fellow women, who took the step to establish themselves as independent women, despite the challenges they faced. Some of these women decided to look for help from their relatives to start something, but many of them did not receive any support. They felt that there was no way they could obtain support from the government, because many of the government programmes supported people in groups and they were unable to enrol in these groups, because of social stigma. Having overcome the negative

69 Religious institutions have also played a large role in supporting girls returning from abduction, but, unfortunately, the damage is often too much for some girls to recover from with the support of priests alone.
feelings, they now looked for alternative opportunities. In this way, the women found their own way of surviving.

The social protection gap

The Government of Uganda has put in place many social protection programmes for the rehabilitation of the survivors of the war in Northern Uganda. Many of these programmes target specific categories of people, such as the elderly, youth, women and people with disabilities. One would imagine that formerly abducted women and girls would benefit from these programmes. However, generally, the severely traumatised returnee women who participated in this study were unable to access these programmes because of social stigma and discrimination by members of their community. One of the women noted that “getting amnesty is not getting peace, rather to get peace of mind is to get a piece of land and a house, where the children can be safe and go to school, and to get work” (Atenyi, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015).

The women need resources, such as land, to support themselves and have a sense of belonging, so that they are empowered to live a decent life. Unfortunately, in Uganda, the government did not look at formerly abducted women and girls as a special category requiring special attention. Many of the social protection programmes offered by the government target general categories of people such as women, youth, and people with disabilities. Women are seen as a homogenous group by such programmes. The state of their mental health is not taking into consideration. This explains why none of the 10 girls interviewed in this study had received any support from the government’s social protection programmes. One of the girls explained:

Apart from the mattress I received from Kichua, where we were taken to process our amnesty, and a false promise of corrugated iron sheets, I have never received any other support from the government. A formerly abducted girl is seen as a social outcast who cannot mix with other women, so we are always left out of government programmes. (Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015)
Many of the women interviewed in this study had decided to start their own life, without the support of social protection programmes, displaying personal resilience. Many had taken bold steps to stay away from abusive partners and relatives who did not welcome them (and their children) back and started a new life with minimal support from organisations such as KIWEPI – sometimes with nothing. With the little help provided, some of the women took personal initiatives to counsel themselves to find better alternatives to life, rather than mourning their past life experiences, and to face the challenges that emerged when they returned home.

**Discussion and conclusion**

This chapter presents the results of in-depth interviews conducted among ten girls abducted by the LRA who managed to escape and return to their communities, as well as two resource persons (professionals supporting the women). The interviews confirm the deep trauma that the women are still experiencing, despite the long time that has passed since these events happened. Some of the stories shared by the respondents were traumatising even for the researchers who listened to them. Some of the stories came across as very alive and present in their current situation. The mental processing of the traumatic events was not complete – and in some case had not even begun it. As a result, the participants felt that the triggers of the trauma were still present in their life. The mental trauma impacted negatively on their day-to-day life and the situation was worse for those who had physical pain from health complications like fistula.

Many formerly abducted girls who returned from their ordeals felt the loss, guilt and shame associated with their life with the rebels. The women continue to face many challenges in supporting themselves and the children fathered by the rebels. Despite their high expectations of being able to return home, they experienced a sense of abandonment by their families and communities. They were forced to live on their own, which made it difficult for them to reintegrate into the community. Many of the women interviewed were rejected by their communities when they returned, hence, they were unable to
associate with them. This discrimination does not allow women to be part of the groups formed in their communities to benefit from government programmes.

Hence, isolation partially explains why these women were unable to access government social protection programmes directed towards rehabilitation in the region. When targeting women or youth in groups, rather than as individuals, government social protection programmes often miss out on the most severely traumatised women. Thus, many of them continue to live lives on the margins of society with little hope of receiving support. This study has established that some of women may not be able to access government programmes, even though they are targeted. The women and girls suffering from severe trauma need affirmative action to reach out to them and empower them to benefit from government programmes.

In a research related to this study, it was found that women in Northern Uganda who received psycho-social support performed better in terms of social economic resilience then women who received only social protection programmes (Chapter 16, *Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience among Post-war IDPs in Northern Uganda*, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo). This chapter shows that severe traumatic events result in negative feelings about one’s self and the community, resulting in a high degree of helplessness and disempowerment. Women who received psycho-social support, from organisations such as KIWEPI found that they could transform themselves with a more positive mindset, allowing them to generate opportunities, despite the considerable difficulties they faced. Those who found the support to move on with their life shared many interesting stories about how they were able to manoeuvre within the constraints of their households and with limited access to government support. Hence, the women no longer look at themselves as victims of the wars, but rather as actors in their society who desire to survive, like any other human being. The women can be recognised as agents of change, who can inspire other women who may be going through similar circumstances.
Any effort to support the women who were abducted as young girls and returned to their communities, stands to empower and strengthen them. But what this chapter shows is that the government needs to reach out to these vulnerable women through psycho-social support and mental health programmes, to prepare them for the rehabilitation process. The government can and should further help them to integrate in their communities with resources such as land and support them with specific social protection programmes. These women should also be given tailor-made courses in basic skills, as they many have missed out on basic education.

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References


Part VI. Social Protection
Chapter 16

Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience among Post-war IDPs in Northern Uganda

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Introduction

In 1986, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) started a war in Northern Uganda with extreme brutality, resulting in the nearly total destruction of the region and internal displacement of many people (Van Reisen, Nakazibwe, Stokmans, Vallejo & Kidane, 2018). As a consequence of the military operation of the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) in Southern Sudan, civilians found themselves crushed between the UPDF and the LRA (Apuuli, 2006), and the Ugandan Government ordered that they move to government camps or ‘protected villages’, fuelling the internally displace people (IDP) crisis and increasing the vulnerability of these communities (Lomo & Hovil, 2004; Mukwana & Ridderbos, 2008). It was then that Northern Uganda experienced the worst humanitarian crisis with more than 2 million IDPs (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). The Government of Uganda initiated the Peace,
Recovery and Development Plan in 2007 and commenced full scale implementation in 2009. The overall goal of the plan was to stabilise Northern Uganda and promote rehabilitation through the socio-economic development of communities (Van Reisen et al., 2018). Population surveys conducted after the civil war suggest that people still suffer from traumatic war experiences (Nakimuli-Mpungu et al., 2013) and these findings are confirmed by qualitative research (see Chapter 15, Life after the Lord’s Resistance Army: Support for Formerly Abducted Girls in Northern Uganda, by Primrose Nakazibwe & Mirjam Van Reisen) and quantitative analysis of trauma of the community measured through the Impact of Events Scale (Van Reisen et al., 2018). Studies have also found that the government lacks health services to help traumatised community members (Van Reisen et al., 2018). In this chapter, we focus on the interaction of trauma and socio-economic development that is facilitated by providing social protection to vulnerable communities in Northern Uganda.

Social protection or social security is regarded as a human right (Ulriksen & Plagerson, 2014). The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines social protection as “the set of policies and programmes designed to reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability throughout the life cycle. Thus, social protection policies are vital elements of national development strategies to reduce poverty and vulnerability across the life cycle” (ILO, 2017, p. 2). Social protection for vulnerable groups plays a vital role in inclusive and balanced growth in developing and least developed countries (Sahu, 2011). Due to several factors such as globalization, changes in development practices, as well as increased attention on citizenship, governance and human rights, social protection in developing countries has increased in recent years (Oldekop et al., 2016; Serena & Shelley, 2014; Norton, Conway & Foster, 2001).

In the Ugandan context, social protection refers to public and private interventions to address the risks and vulnerabilities that expose individuals to income insecurity and social deprivation resulting in undignified lives (MGLSD, 2015). It is regarded as a national initiative to reduce poverty levels among vulnerable Ugandans, contributing to
the development of the nation, strengthening household productivity and capacity for income generation (National Planning Authority, 2013, 2015; Norton, Conway & Foster, 2001; MGLSD, 2015). In Uganda, social protection is geared towards reducing poverty, supporting excluded citizens to access services, providing a foundation on which to build productive livelihoods and enabling citizens to live a life that is secure and dignified.

In assessing the effectiveness of social protection programmes, a macro-economic perspective is often taken with a focus on average income in a region as a proxy for poverty, ignoring vulnerability (Fiszbein, Kanbur & Yemtsov, 2014). This is not surprising, as the literature on social protection, particularly in developing countries, shows that social protection programmes (such as the programmes supported by the World Bank) mostly have a narrow emphasis on targeting poverty and inequality through social transfers and benefits (Houtart, 2005), leaving resilience and vulnerability unattended.

In this chapter, we question the macro-economic perspective on poverty by drawing attention to agency: how people perceive opportunities and threats in their current situation, as well as their routine ways of evaluating situations and responding accordingly. According to this perspective, perceived opportunities can be enhanced by social protection, but also by other policies and programmes that reduce vulnerability or promote socio-economic resilience. By focusing on agency to enhance socio-economic resilience, instead of providing financial help to reduce poverty, it becomes clear that a change in mindset, from reacting to problems, a hazard or danger, to pro-active behaviour that is future oriented, can improve (individual) livelihoods. Such a change in mindset may be helpful to understand the effectiveness of social protection provided to communities of displaced people. As indicated in the introduction, many communities in Northern Uganda took in large numbers of IDPs suffering from war-time experiences (Human Rights Watch, 2003). The civil war in Uganda disrupted the social fabric, especially in rural communities, leaving many people traumatised and living in poverty (Dermatis & Kadushin, 1986; Van Reisen et al., 2018). In
such a post-war context, the agency of people may be impaired to the extent that members of the community see no opportunities and only threats, due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Van Reisen et al., 2018).

The research question addressed in this chapter is twofold: Does support to relieve trauma (PTSD) enhance (social and economic) resilience? And, does support to relieve trauma increase the effectiveness of social protection programmes on (social and economic) resilience in vulnerable and traumatised communities?

Most of the discussion on social protection is focused on its (macro) economic impact (Fiszbein et al., 2014) and not on the agency of people to shape their own future. However, we argue that the sustainable economic impact of social protection assumes that people are able to generate their own income and, as a consequence, have the agency to shape their own future. Therefore, this research adds to the existing literature on social protection, by providing lessons and insights for the inclusion of underlying vulnerabilities (such as PTSD) as important elements in the design and implementation of sustainable social protection programmes.

The chapter is articulated as follows: the next section introduces the key concepts underlying the analysis: social protection, resilience, and trauma. This is followed by a review of social protection programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in particular and the methodology used in this study. Then the results of the empirical research are presented, followed by a discussion of the main findings and conclusion, including policy recommendations.

**The key concepts: Social protection, socio-economic resilience, and trauma**

The concept of social protection is not defined unequivocally in the literature, as its description often refers to frameworks that articulate specific aspects of the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and describe the causal mechanisms that reduce poverty – compare, for
example, the definitions of social protection by the World Bank (n.d.), International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2016, p. 4) and Asian Development Bank (2003, p. 1). However, at an abstract level, social protection can be regarded as a human right and, as set out above, can be described as “the set of policies and programmes designed to reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability throughout the life cycle” (ILO, 2017, p. 2). Vulnerability and resilience are related concepts, where vulnerability refers to conditions that make people susceptible to harm and resilience denotes coping with and recovering from a hazard that has already occurred (Bergstrand, Mayer, Brumback & Zhang, 2015, p. 392).

Social protection programmes are believed to play a significant role in reducing poverty and vulnerability, and are viewed as powerful tools for governments, policymakers and donors (Waqas & Awan, 2017). A general aim of social protection is to “enhance the capacity of poor and vulnerable people to escape from poverty and enable them to better manage risks and shocks” (OECD, 2009). In this context, capacity is a characteristic of individuals and can be understood as the power to do something or related to what people are actually able to do and to be (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 36; Nussbaum, 2011, p. 18; Sen, 2009, p. 19). According to this line of reasoning, social protection programmes enhance the capacity of poor and vulnerable individuals. The idea is that, due to this enhanced capacity, one is able to escape poverty and become less vulnerable.

In this chapter we focus on the socio-economic resilience of individuals, as a proxy for the capacity vulnerable people have to escape poverty. Socio-economic resilience at the individual level is not well defined in the literature. For the operationalisation of social resilience, objective indicators at the community level are often used, and in operationalising economic resilience, research often focuses on objective macroeconomic indicators (Cutter, Burton & Enrich, 2010; 70 There is no universally agreed definition of these two terms. Cutter (1996), for example, identifies 18 different definitions of vulnerability across different disciplines. Similarly, when we talk about resilience in social sciences, definitions vary from equilibrist to evolutionary approaches (Simmie & Martin, 2010).
Röhn, Sánchez, Hermansen & Rasmussen, 2015). These indicators are related to the resilience of a community, area or country, but they have only an indirect relationship with the agency of an individual living in those places. This operationalisation was used as it gave the researchers an idea about the indicators of social and economic resilience at the individual level. In our study, ‘social resilience’ refers to individual abilities, and perceived social support, while ‘economic resilience’ focuses on perceived income security.

According to the literature, the capacity people have to operate and function in every day’s life is affected by trauma, as people who are exposed to traumatic events can experience stress responses such as avoidance, sleep disturbances, hyper-arousal and hyper-vigilance (Chrousos & Gold, 1992; Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002). Repeated or constant activation of such a stress response (by, for example, cues that trigger such memories) is referred to as post-traumatic stress disorder and creates a state of fear, hopelessness and even horror (Yehuda, 2002). Moreover, trauma survivors who develop PTSD frequently perceive themselves as less valued by the community and experience a reduced sense of belonging (Catherall, 1989, p. 295). We believe that this negative state of being affects their capacity or agency, as people regard feelings as informative about opportunities and threats (Schwarz, 2011; Van Reisen, et al., 2018; Kidane & Stokmans, 2019). Consequently, those who suffer from PTSD are less socio-economically resilient. If trauma is not healed, people have trouble exerting their agency, remain vulnerable and lack resilience.

By focusing on capacity, the effectiveness of social protection programmes is framed from a social-psychological perspective that supplements the macro-economic emphasis commonly used. In the macro-economic view, it is assumed that the invisible hand of Adam Smith can regulate, for example, the food market by means of supply and demand, and based on individual interest. According to this idea, providing people with (slightly more) money increases their access to the food market, which increases demand (and prices will rise), which makes it more profitable for individuals to enter the supply chain of the food market. Consequently, supply increases and prices drop, but
more people are actively engaged in the economy. However, this line of reasoning assumes that individuals have the capacity or agency to grasp the opportunities provided by the social protection programme to produce food. This capacity may not exist in severely traumatised people. Therefore, the relationship between trauma and social protection needs to be further investigated. Hence, this research hypothesizes that trauma support is necessary to enhance the socio-economic resilience of severely traumatised vulnerable people and that this support interacts with social protection programmes to enhance socio-economic resilience, which in turn reduces poverty. Figure 16.1 summarises the conceptual framework discussed in this section.

![Figure 16.1. Conceptual framework to reduce poverty of traumatised vulnerable people](image)

### Social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in particular

Social protection is important for the first goal of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – end poverty in all its forms everywhere (Kaltenborn, 2015; UNRISD, 2016) and can be targeted in nine areas: child and family benefits, maternity protection, unemployment support, employment injury benefits, sickness benefits, health protection, old age benefits, disability benefits, and survivor benefits (ILO, 2017, p. 2). Social protection programmes – including cash transfers, in-kind transfers, food transfers, school feeding, subsidies, and humanitarian and disaster relief programmes (Fiszbein et al., 2014) – are believed to alleviate short-term deprivations, regularise consumption and reduce the adoption of negative coping strategies.
(Burchi, Scarlato & D'Agostino, 2018). However, as the conceptual framework in Figure 16.1 suggests, these effects assume that the individuals involved have the agency to act accordingly.

![Conceptual Framework Image](image)

**Figure 16.2. Domains of social policy**

Source: Adapted by the authors from Gentilini and Omamo (2011, p. 331)

In Sub-Saharan Africa, social protection programmes started to spread in a significant fashion in the late 1990s, mostly promoted by the World Bank (2001), with other international organisations introducing interventions within a relatively short timeframe (Niño-Zarazúa, Barrientos, Hulme & Hickey, 2012). In the case of Uganda, the government acknowledged that social protection is a state obligation and integrated it in its national policies as early as 2004 (MGLSD, 2011, cited in Van Reisen et al., 2018). Over the years, Uganda’s social protection programmes have included the Direct Income Support programmes, the National Social Security Fund, National Pensions Scheme, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, the Orphans and Vulnerable Children programme, Universal Health Services, Cash for Work Schemes, the Parliamentary Pension Scheme, Universal Primary Education, and Universal Secondary Education (Van Reisen et al., 2018). Social protection policy in Uganda mainly targets vulnerable groups including unemployed persons, older persons, persons with disabilities, ethnic minorities,
orphans and vulnerable children, and vulnerable women. The social protection policy is based on eight principles: individual and family involvement; timeliness, reliability and sustainability; transparency and accountability; universalism and inclusiveness; a human rights based approach to service delivery; gender responsiveness; dignity; and equity (MGLSD, 2015).

There are both informal and formal social protection mechanisms in Uganda. Informal or traditional mechanisms include family and clan support systems, mutual assistance schemes and neighbourhood support groups, while formal mechanisms can be categorised as either social security or social care and support services. Social security is a preventive intervention to mitigate income shocks and social care and support services aim at providing a wide range of services to the poor and vulnerable (MGLSD, 2015).

Food insecurity, understood as lack of access to food, is a chronic challenge, more intensively in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa.71 In these areas, social protection is frequently implemented through cash-transfers programmes. Empirical evidence shows that large cash transfers, together with regular and reliable payments, are significant and determining factors in reducing food security (Berhane, Gilligan, Hoddinott, Kumar & Taffesse, 2014; Tiwari et al., 2016). This effect is achieved in two ways (Burchi et al., 2018; Hidrobo, Hoddinott, Kumar & Olivier, 2018; Tiwari et al., 2016): by improving direct access to food (e.g., by increasing household purchasing power) and increasing household accumulation of productive assets through which food security can be achieved (e.g., increasing agricultural production and crop diversification). However, as the conceptual framework suggests, this second way can only be achieved if the people involved mentally perceive that they are capable of investing in productive assets such as seeds.

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71 Rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by a high concentration of subsistence agriculture, poor infrastructure, low local administrative capacity and low access to services (Burchi et al., 2018).
In Uganda, food insecurity is targeted by the Direct Income Support programmes, which are the core of the Uganda social security. Direct Income Support (also known as social transfers or cash transfers) provides regular and reliable, small transfers (cash, cash-vouchers and in-kind) to vulnerable people and households to provide them with a minimum income that can be spent as they wish. These programmes include the Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment, which encompasses the Senior Citizen Grants and Vulnerable Family Grants, Community Driven Development Programme, Agricultural Livelihood Recovery Programme, Karamoja Livelihood Improvement Programme, Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, and Operation Wealth Creation, formerly the National Agricultural Advisory Services (MGLSD, 2016, cited in Van Reisen et al., 2018).

As indicated above, social security programmes in Uganda are designed to provide people with tangible assets (such as money, cash-vouchers and in-kind) and it is assumed that people use these assets wisely. By focusing on the assets provided and not on the people who receive them, little (if any) attention is paid to the agency of people to perceive themselves as resilient enough to overcome the next problem or hazard. This focus is problematic in communities of displaced people such as in Northern Uganda, as these communities suffer from (severe) trauma. For those traumatised people, food security programmes are not always regarded as a new start (or positive opportunity), but merely as temporary relief of a bad situation. In this study, we will explore to what extent receiving trauma counselling in conjunction with food security programmes can improve the socio-economic resilience of the individuals involved and interacts with the impact of social protection programmes.

**Setting and methodology**

To study the impact of trauma counselling on socio-economic resilience, we conducted a study targeted at women in Northern Uganda, an area with many internally displaced persons who are still suffering from post-war hazard, caused by abductions, killings, and other brutalities (Human Rights Watch, 2003). During the study
(March-April 2016), several social protection programmes were found to be operational, such as the National Agricultural Advisory Services, Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, Uganda Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment, Restocking Programme, Community Driven Development programme, and Youth Livelihood Programme (for a description of these programmes, see Van Reisen et al., 2018). Despite these government initiatives, which mainly focus on social protection (cash, cash-vouchers, and in-kind), Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE) noticed that the aspect of trauma management and healing for survivors was lacking and started programmes targeted at women to fill this gap.

As a first step in the research, the team visited potential study sites and established contact with local women’s groups and local leaders (see Chapter 15, *Life after the Lord’s Resistance Army: Support for Formerly Abducted Girls in Northern Uganda*, by Primrose Nakazibwe & Mirjam Van Reisen). During this phase, the team identified potential study sites together with local resource persons with expertise on the local communities. The participants were sampled from women living in vulnerable rural and remote situations. This procedure ensured that the team was studying a reasonably similar population in terms of gender-specific aspects of trauma; access to social protection and trauma support programmes; and socio-economic gender-based characteristics.

In order to investigate the effect of cash and trauma counselling, four groups of respondents were distinguished, based on whether they were receiving: 1) social protection (cash-transfers, cash-vouchers, or in-kind, received from the Government of Uganda); 2) trauma counselling (provided by NGOs or district bodies); 3) both cash transfers and trauma counselling (defined parallel to the previous two groups); and 4) no social protection or trauma counselling (control group). The respondents were purposively assigned to one of these four groups, as a real-life situation was being investigated.
During the study, the team interviewed 471 women (n=471) with an average age of 42 years (standard deviation 15.55), who had traumatic experiences related to the violence in the area, as well as physical and gender-based violence. These respondents lived in different districts, located in north-eastern Uganda (Lira: 25.7%, Katakwi: 27.8%, Amuria: 10.4%, and Kitgum: 36.1%). Most respondents were farmers (almost 84%). Furthermore, our research indicated that about 84% experienced high levels of PTSD. Analyses revealed that the four groups did not differ in the level of PTSD experienced (Van Reisen et al., 2018, p. 211).

The interviews consisted of three parts. In the first part, the respondents were asked questions about their socio-demographic characteristics. The second part consisted of the Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R; see Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979) to measure PTSD. The last part tapped into socio-economic resilience (SER).

SER consisted of six subscales that relate to the different aspects of socio-economic resilience identified in the foregoing. Social resilience includes: *individual abilities*, which was operationalised with three subscales: ‘capability’ (6 items: ability to pay bills, get information, acquire skills, communication skills), ‘empowerment’ (12 items: ability to act independently and out of free will, improved self-esteem), and ‘worry’ (8 items: worrying about all kind of things); *perceived social support*, operationalised with two subscales: ‘social embeddedness’ (5 items: the social bonds an individual has in her family, community and the leadership of the community) and ‘trust in the system’ (2 items: trust in the government, which taps into rights and access to services). The second part of socio-economic resilience – *economic resilience* – was operationalised with one subscale: ‘perceived income security’ (13 items: the ability to make money, save money and manage money). Each item was answered on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Analysis revealed that the reliability of all subscales is above 0.7, which is considered appropriate (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). Item-analyses indicated that the subscales are somewhat intertwined.
with correlations ranging from 0.06 to 0.606 (for a full description of the subscales and their analyses, see Van Reisen et al., 2018).

Results

In this section, we explore three hypotheses that are put forward by the conceptual framework in Figure 16.1.

- Trauma counselling has a positive effect on the socio-economic resilience of individual in vulnerable and traumatised communities.
- Social protection (cash, cash-vouchers, in-kind) have a positive effect on the socio-economic resilience of individuals in vulnerable and traumatised communities.
- Trauma counselling enhances the effect of social protection on the social-economic resilience of individual in vulnerable and traumatised communities.

In order to investigate these hypotheses, we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for two factors (social protection: yes/no; trauma counselling: yes/no) for each of the subscales of the SER-tool separately and controlled for age (covariate), education level (4 levels: never been to school, attended primary education, attended secondary education, attended tertiary institution) and employment (5 options: farming, business, professional job, none). The averages for each group per subscale of the SER are displayed in Figure 16.3.

We will first discuss the results of the first component of socio-economic resilience: individual abilities, consisting of the subscales ‘capability’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘worry’. As Figure 16.3 suggests, there are differences between the groups in terms of ‘capability’: those who received both social protection and trauma counselling scored slightly higher than the other groups. But the ANOVA revealed\(^\text{72}\) no

\(^{72}\) An ANOVA makes use of an F distribution to test the significance of the difference between the groups involved. The extent the groups differ is indicated by an F-value (F) and its significance depends on the degrees of freedom that goes along with this test. The degrees of freedom are indicated between brackets just
significant effect of social protection \( (F(1, 450) = 1.16; p > 0.10) \) or trauma counselling \( (F(1, 450) < 1) \), and no significant interaction effect between social protection and trauma counselling \( (F(1, 450) < 1) \). There were no differences on the ‘capability’ subscale according to age \( (F(1, 450) < 1) \). However, significant differences were detected according to education level \( (F(3, 450) = 5.41; p < 0.050) \); the lower the education level, the lower the score on ‘capability’. And also according to employment \( (F(4, 450) = 3.92; p < 0.05) \); women with a business or a professional job (but not farming) had a higher score than those without a job.

The next subscale is ‘empowerment’. Figure 16.3 shows that the groups who received both social protection and trauma counselling scored highest. The ANOVA indicates that both social protection \( (F(1, 450) = 3.59; p < 0.05) \) and trauma counselling \( (F(1, 450) = 3.11; p = 0.08) \) have a significant effect; those who received either social protection or counselling (or both) indicated a higher ‘empowerment’ than those who did not. However, the interaction effect between social protection and trauma counselling was not significant \( (F(1, 450) < 1) \). Moreover, there were significant differences on the ‘empowerment’ subscale according to age \( (F(1, 450) = 3.37; p = 0.07) \); the higher the age, the more ‘empowerment’ the respondents reported. No significant effect was detected for education level \( (F(3, 450) < 1) \) or employment \( (F(4, 450) = 1.18; p > 0.10) \).

The subscale, ‘worry’, should be interpreted negatively (the higher the score on ‘worry’ the more a person worries). With this in mind, Figure 16.3 suggests that those who received only trauma counselling had the least ‘worry’. The ANOVA revealed that those who received social protection worried significantly more than those who did not receive social protection \( (F(1, 450) = 4.94; p < 0.05) \). No significant effect was detected for trauma counselling \( (F(1, 450) < 1) \). The interaction effect between receiving social protection and trauma counselling was significant \( (F(1, 450) = 8.261; p < 0.05) \), indicating

after the F (df1, df2). Df1 is related to the number of groups involved in the comparison and df2 is related to the number of respondents included in the comparison (Hair et al., 1998).
than when receiving both cash and counselling, ‘worry’ increases. ‘Worry’ is not significantly affected by age (F(1, 450) < 1), education level (F(3, 450) = 1.086; p > 0.10) or employment (F(4, 450) < 1).

Figure 16.3. Average score for each group per SER subscale

The second component of socio-economic resilience is perceived social support, with two indicators: ‘social embeddedness’ and ‘trust in the system’. Figure 16.3 suggests that the groups score almost equal on the subscale ‘social embeddedness’. The ANOVA indicated no significant effect of social protection (F(1, 450) < 1) or counselling (F(1, 450) < 1), and no significant interaction effect (F(1, 450) < 1). Furthermore, there were no differences in ‘social embeddedness’ according to age (F(1, 450) < 1) or education level (F(3, 450) < 1). However, a significant effect according to employment was detected (F(4, 450) = 3.39; p < 0.05); those without a job scored lower for ‘social embeddedness’ than the other employment groups. Regarding ‘trust in the system’, Figure 16.3 shows that those who received only
social protection scored highest on ‘trust in the system’. The ANOVA does not come to the same conclusion. It appears that social protection has no significant effect (F(1, 450) = 2.272; p > 0.10), while trauma counselling does have a significant effect (F(1, 450) = 5.725; p < 0.05). But, surprisingly, this effect is in the opposite direction: those who received counselling had less faith in the government than those who did not. Again, the interaction effect between social protection and trauma counselling was not significant (F (1, 450) < 1). Moreover, there was a significant effect according to age (F(1, 450) = 10.35; p < 0.05); the higher the age, the more faith respondents had in the government. No significant effect was detected according to education level (F(3, 450) = 1.081; p > 0.10) or employment (F(4, 450) = 1.439 p > 0.10).

The last component of socio-economic resilience pertains to economic resilience and is covered by perceived income. Figure 16.3 shows that those who received neither social protection nor trauma counselling had the lowest perception of their income security and those who received both social protection and trauma counselling had the highest perception of their income security. But, the ANOVA suggests that there is no significant effect of social protection (F(1, 450) = 1.38; p > 0.10), and no significant interaction effect between social protection and trauma counselling (F(1, 450) <1). However, it shows that trauma counselling has a significant effect (F (1, 450) = 3.53; p = 0.06); those who received trauma counselling scored higher on ‘perceived income security’. As expected, marginal, but significant, differences were detected according to education level (F(3,450) = 2.19; p = 0.08); the higher the education level, the higher the ‘perceived income security’. There was also a significant difference according to employment (F(4, 450) = 7.03; p < 0.05); women without a job scored lower on the ‘perceived income security’ than the other employment groups. Again, age had no significant effect (F(1, 450) < 1).
Limitations

The study was based on the purposeful sampling of women living in vulnerable remote rural areas in Northern Uganda and investigated the effect of existing programmes on socio-economic resilience in a natural setting. Such research has several weaknesses. Firstly, background variables may be correlated with receiving social protection (in this case: cash, cash vouchers, or in-kind) and trauma counselling. In this study, we tried to counteract this weakness by controlling for gender (the study only pertained to women), age (as a covariate in the analysis), education level and employment (both factors in the analysis). The second weakness is that there were several social protection programmes and trauma counselling interventions available at the time of the research and that individuals received such support during the last year. So, there is quite a variation in the important key variables (social protection and trauma counselling) which are not controlled in this study. Due to these variations, one can only make claims about general tendencies.

Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter, we problematized the mainly macro-economic perspective of social protection programmes, such as those implemented in Northern Uganda. This perspective assumes that the market can regulate supply and demand. This line of reasoning assumes that individuals have the agency to grasp the economic opportunities available to them. However – and importantly – this logic neglects the fact that individuals live in poverty for a reason. If that reason is rooted in war, violence, and displacement and is combined with trauma, people may not have enough agency to take advantage of the economic opportunities that are on offer.

The second weakness of the macro-economic approach is that it focuses on general indicators of poverty and neglects specific factors that affect the resilience of individuals. If social protection is to contribute to sustainable development, individuals should become more resilient so that they can cope with and recover from a hazard.
that has already occurred. In this chapter, we introduce the concept of socio-economic resilience to measure the effectiveness of social protection programmes to contribute to sustainable development at the individual level. Socio-economic resilience is regarded as a proxy for an individual’s capacity to overcome poverty and it concerns individual abilities (three subscales), perceived social support (two subscales), and perceived income security (one subscale).

Focusing on socio-economic resilience opens up new opportunities to design social protection programmes. In this study we looked at trauma counselling as an alternative programme to enhance socio-economic resilience in vulnerable communities of IDP’s in Northern Uganda, who suffer from post-war hazard, which impairs their capacities, due to PTSD. The research questions addressed in this chapter are: Does support to relieve trauma (PTSD) enhance (social and economic) resilience? And, does support to relieve trauma increase the effectiveness of social protection programmes on (social and economic) resilience in vulnerable and traumatised communities affected by war, conflict and violence?

This study investigated six indicators of social-economic resilience, which can be arranged in three main components. The first one is individual abilities: ‘capability’ (ability to pay bills, get information, acquire skills, communication skills), ‘empowerment’ (ability to act independently and out of free will, improved self-esteem) and ‘worry’ (worrying about all kind of things). The results can be summarised as follows: ‘Capability’ was not affected by social protection nor trauma counselling. ‘Empowerment’ was positively influenced by both social protection and trauma counselling. The last indicator, ‘worry’, produced some unexpected effects. Receiving social protection increased worry. This result can be explained by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which states that losses weigh heavier than gains. This means that individuals are loss averse. As receivers of social protection are dependent on the government, this dependency may strengthen the thought of losing the support in the future, which causes worry. This perceived dependency on social protection became stronger when participants also received trauma counselling. Due to the counselling, the individuals involved were less
troubled by PTSD, were healthier and, as their trauma was less severe, were more able to reflect on and worry about the potential loss of government support. Overall, the results regarding the perceived changes in individual abilities suggest that trauma counselling programmes are as effective in increasing a traumatised persons’ ability to cope with hazard and misfortune as social protection programmes are.

The second component is perceived social support, which consists of ‘social embeddedness’ and ‘trust in the system’. The results revealed that both social protection and trauma counselling had no effect on ‘social embeddedness’. Unexpected results were found for the construct ‘trust in the system’. Social protection had no effect, on this subscale, but trauma counselling had a negative effect. So, by receiving trauma counselling individuals had less faith in the government. These results suggest that individuals who received trauma counselling became more sceptical about the social services component of social protection and that social protection has a minimal effect on the perception of the social context individuals are operating in.

The last indicator of socio-economic resilience pertains to the economic aspect. In our research, it was operationalised as ‘perceived income security’. The results indicate that social protection did not affect ‘perceived income security’, but trauma counselling did (even after controlling for age, education level and employment). These results are contrary to those reported by, for example, Fiszbein et al. (2014), who suggest a positive effect of social protection on poverty reduction. The lack of such a positive effect in this study may be explained by the volume of social protection that individuals received. In the situation we studied, the amount was rather small and, as research indicates (Berhane et al., 2014; Tiwari et al., 2016), large cash-transfers together with regular payments ensures impact. Importantly, the positive effect of trauma counselling is inexplicable from an economic perspective, as those individuals did not receive any cash. Here trauma counselling impacted positively on agency by enhancing the perception that one can manage one’s own future. By receiving
trauma counselling an individual is enabled to handle the PTSD more effectively and perceives more opportunities (which were already there in the situation, but not recognised as such) to participate economically. The results regarding economic resilience suggest that trauma counselling is slightly more effective than social protection in enhancing ‘perceived income security’ and that trauma counselling alone can enhance socio-economic resilience. The findings are confirmed by the study of Kidane and Stokmans (2019), in which trauma counselling was provided by means of the Self Help Low Cost Post Traumatic Stress (SHLCPTS) programme made available by an App on a mobile phone, which was also found to be effective on its own in increasing socio-economic resilience.

Overall, the results of the study suggest that trauma counselling is a valuable tool to enhance the socio-economic resilience of traumatised individuals and deserves a more prominent place in combination with social protection programmes provided to vulnerable people. The results also suggest that trauma counselling is at least as effective in enhancing socio-economic resilience as (small amounts of) social protection programmes are. Trauma counselling is not necessarily costly or hard to arrange. In this study, the trauma counselling was organised by Isis-WICCE and provided by women from the community, without formal training in psycho-social or psychiatric treatment. The programme took an informal, community based, non-medical approach to dealing with trauma. It was based on self-help groups to relieve trauma and to achieve collective healing (Van Reisen et al., 2018). This study found that trauma counselling increases the ability of people with PTSD to cope with hazard and misfortune and that psycho-social support directly and significantly increases socio-economic resilience and, furthermore, it enhances the effects of social protection programmes.
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Roaming Lifestyles: Designing Social Protection for the Pastoralist Afar in Ethiopia

Zeremariam Fre & Naomi Dixon

Introduction

Roaming with their cattle across three countries, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, the Afar people live a pastoralist lifestyle in arid lands. Challenged by climate change and droughts, their resilience is at stake. The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), implemented by the Ethiopian government, aims to support their resilience by strengthening their productive capacity. But, how can the PSNP succeed in the Afar Regional State, possibly one of the most difficult regions in which to implement a social security programme, not in the least because the Afar people are moving within and across the region?

The pastoral lifestyle of the Afar people poses a challenge for social protection programmes, such as Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). This study looked at whether the design of this programme is relevant for the highly mobile Afar and if it has improved their socio-economic resilience. The study found that while the PSNP has the potential to contribute to the resilience of the Afar, their socio-political context needs to be better appreciated and reflected in programme design to increase local relevance. Efforts to improve the programme are certainly worthwhile given that it has the potential to contribute to the socio-economic resilience of the Afar.

Chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia is not just a modern problem, but one that has recurred throughout history; for example, it is believed that a third of the population perished in the Great Famine in the late 19th Century. Between 1998 and 2005, anywhere between 5 and 14
millions of Ethiopians relied on food aid (Devereux, 2006). This may have supported the basic survival of beneficiaries, but is criticised for creating aid dependency, as it failed to offer any long-term solution or protect household assets, the depletion of which left households even more vulnerable to poverty.

The Millennium Development Goals, launched in 2000, set tangible targets for global development that included the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. These were then revisited and expanded on by the Sustainable Development Goals, which began in 2015 and will be reviewed in 2030. The Government of Ethiopia has aligned itself to the African Union 2063 Agenda, ‘The Africa We Want’. In line with this, the Ethiopian government has pursued various development policies to increase agricultural productivity, improve disaster prevention and management, diversify livelihoods and increase food security with the aim of achieving sustainable growth. These policies are provided as social protection policies, rolled out in Sub Saharan Africa (Chapter 16, *Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience among Post-war IDPs in Northern Uganda*, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo). One such policy is the PSNP, which was launched by the government in 2005, together with the World Bank and various other development partners. The programme initially targeted food insecure households in various highland regions and was expanded to the lowlands of the Afar and Somali regions in 2009, at which point the programme integrated with the Climate Smart Initiative (CSI) to prioritise climate resilience (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2011).

Ethiopia is both the largest landlocked country in Africa and the second most populated country in the Sub-Saharan region, with a current estimated population of approximately 100 million (CIA, 2017). Historically, as witnessed across the African continent, the Horn of Africa has been considerably disadvantaged by wider socio-economic processes. Ethiopia, which is located in the Horn of Africa, is marginalised in the globalised trade economy, while also being disproportionately impacted on by the effects of climate change.
Despite proportionately high rates of economic growth which, the World Bank (2017) estimated at nearly 11% per year between 2003 and 2015, the country has a low Human Development Index, ranking 174 out of 185 countries (Government of Ethiopia & UNOCHA, 2017). Furthermore, over 25 million Ethiopians are categorised as living in poverty.

Ethiopia has extreme geographical variations including both tropical and desert climatic zones. For example, the north of the country receives less than 5% of the precipitation received by the south-western highlands, which has 2,200 mm per year, compared to only 100 mm per year in the north. The country has long been susceptible to drought and regularly experiences food insecurity. Historical trends show that Ethiopia’s temperature has increased by up to 1.3°C over the last century, with increases of up to 2.2°C predicted by mid-century (IPCC, 2014). It is expected that significant weather events will become more severe and more regular.

Farming is the cornerstone of Ethiopian livelihoods and relies on predictable rainy seasons. As Shitarek explains:

*Ethiopia’s economy is based mainly on agriculture, including crop and livestock production, which contributes 45% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), more than 80% of employment opportunities and over 90% of the foreign exchange earnings of the country (Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). However, the Ethiopian economy, particularly agricultural development, is extremely vulnerable to external shocks like climate change, global price fluctuations of exports and imports and other external factors. (Shitarek, 2012, pp. 1)*

Changes to climatic conditions could cause further land degradation, making it both harder to grow crops, but also to locate vegetation to sustain cattle. Consequently, the country is increasingly at risk of food insecurity and chronic famine in the coming decades.

The sustainable development of Ethiopia is further strained by the impact of rapid population growth. The fertility rate (average number of births per woman) is currently at 2.45 (World Bank, 2017) and, if
the current growth rate is maintained, the country's population will exceed three hundred million by 2050. Already, cultivated land has expanded widely to meet the sustenance needs of the growing population. Forests, woods and grasslands have been considerably depleted, leading to land degradation.

As part of its strategy to deal with poverty and food insecurity in Ethiopia, the PSNP is being implemented, including in the Afar Regional State in north-eastern Ethiopia. This chapter looks at the implementation of this programme in the Afar region and its impact on communities. The main research question is: Is the design of the social protection programme PSNP relevant for the Afar in Ethiopia and how has the programme improved the socio-economic resilience of this community?

Research methodology

The research presented here is an explorative case study of the implementation of the PSNP in Afar Regional State of Ethiopia. The methodology consisted of a desk review, information gained by interviewing Afar academics with relevant experience from Samara University, and observations made while spending time in the Afar region and with officials managing the programme. The documents reviewed consisted of programme documents, reports and assessments related to the implementation of the PSNP in Ethiopia and the Afar region. Two main questions were asked: 1) in what way is the design of the PSNP targeted to the specific situation of the Afar, and 2) what assessments are reported of the PSNP in terms of increasing the socio-economic resilience among the Afar. In this way in-depth insight was gained into the planning and preparatory processes for the implementation of the PSNP, the challenges that occurred during implementation, and the impact of the research on the beneficiaries, the Afar people.

The study follows Burawoy’s (2009; 2013) extended case method. In this approach the researcher explores the terrain with an open mind without a predetermined frame. This method is particularly suitable for studies of hitherto unexplored topics. This research places socio-
economic resilience in the context of the approach set out in Chapter 1 of this book, as contextually specific (Chapter 1, Roaming Africa: A Social Analysis of Migration and Resilience, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Munyaradzi Mawere & Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher). The promotion of resilience should, therefore, be understood as consisting of actions to protect people’s livelihood assets and support their own priorities and strategies. Resilience is explicitly placed within locally-specific approaches that are relevant to the culture and values in the community. Resilience seen as part of people's dignity, as a basis for ensuring that people can cope and organise their own adequate living conditions.

The Afar region

The Afar Regional State is an arid lowland area found in the north of Ethiopia bordering Djibouti and Eritrea. It is predominantly comprised of pastoralists (90%) and agro-pastoralists (10%), with over 95% of the region’s 1.5 million population depending almost entirely on livestock production for their livelihood. Poverty in the area has differed in previous decades, with the drought of the 1970s being the worst in living memory. In 1973/1974 alone, it is estimated that the Afar people lost 25% of their livestock and over 30% of their human population (International Livestock Centre for Africa, 1981). Subsequent droughts from 1985 to 2017, exacerbated by the El Niño effect, again reduced herd sizes. Humanitarian assistance has been required to enable people to survive periods of drought so regularly that it has become institutionalised within government policy, with the assistance of external donor agencies.

Estimates regarding the pastoralist community vary, as they are often an invisible demographic, in both national and international statistics; however, the World Bank (2017) estimates there to be at least 12 million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in Ethiopia. So far, there has been little opportunity for livelihood diversification and smallholder agriculture still accounts for up to 80% of the population's employment (Wondifraw, Wakaiga & Kibret, 2014).
Determinants of vulnerability and resilience

The Afar region experiences a hot, dry climate. There is considerable topographical variation, with altitudes ranging from 1,500 m above to 120 m below sea level; in turn, daily temperatures range from between 20°C to nearly 50°C in the highest and lowest elevations. Much of the rainfall (between 150 and 500 mm per annum) occurs from mid-June to mid-September, with shorter showers from March to April (suggum) and October to November (dababa) (Eriksen & Marin, 2015). Consequently, the Afar pastoralists partake in seasonal migration patterns that are dictated by the availability of pasture (Chapter 5, Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region, Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen).

The Afar people are known for their strong social cohesion (Chapter 5, Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region, Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). Each Afar locality is identified by a major clan and inhabited by a mixture of clans, which proves to be an effective support network in times of social, economic and political strain. (Chapter 5, Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region, Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). They have their own traditional and informal methods for providing for members of the clan who are experiencing hardship. Predominantly Muslim, the Afar adhere to the duty of zakat, in which they provide resources to the mosque leader, who redistributes them to the poor. These resources can be used to provide daily sustenance and medication for the sick and disabled; cover funeral expenses; contribute livestock to settle debt in the case of a member of another clan being killed; rebuild assets for those families who have drought or migration-induced losses; and cover engagement and marriage expenses. The Afar maintain economic and cultural relationships with external communities, such as the Amharas, Tigrigna and Somalis, which enables alternative sources of income and employment during times of drought (Chapter 5, Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region, Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). However, during concurrent
Pastoralists have long been sustainable custodians of the natural resources of the dry lowland region. But in recent times the droughts have become more severe. The Afar region has experienced increasing drought during the *suggum* period over the last two decades (Viste & Sorteberg, 2013). In turn, livestock holding sizes have been steadily declining. This is caused by both the change in climatic conditions, but also the management and distribution of available

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*Figure 17.1. Map of Afar Regional State showing research sites where the study has been carried out*

Source: Zubairul Islam, Adigrat University
resources. Seasonal mobility usually occurs between December and May, but in some cases, this has been abandoned because there is no reachable pastureland. As it is becoming harder for pastoralists to find both water and pasture for their livestock, food insecurity and asset and resource depletion have become more common. Instead, pastoralists are forced to buy animal feed, such as wheat bran (frusca). The only months they do not buy frusca are the two summer (rainy) months.

The loss of grassland and forest cover has greatly impacted on the ability of the Afar to maintain livestock. Forest cover has been lost due to climate change (either through dry spells or flooding caused by heavy rains on the hard soil); overuse of the forest and overgrazing of the grasslands (for livestock fodder, charcoal, firewood for trade and construction); and drought. As the forest cover shrinks, so does the other vegetation that forms the grazing fields. Indigenous species have also been lost, with invasive species, such as the *Prosopis Juliflora*, which cannot be used for grazing, proliferating. Furthermore, the pastoralists have lost the fertile land surrounding the Awash River, which was vital for dry-season livestock migration, to irrigated agriculture. For example, between 1972 and 2007 alone, the grassland cover in northern Afar decreased by 88% as the land was cleared for cultivation purposes (Tsegaye, Moe, Vedeld & Aynekulu, 2010).

Many pastoralists have found it necessary to diversify to agriculture or are now highly dependent on external support and aid. The deteriorating conditions of the Afar pastoralists’ environment has created the need to implement robust adaptation strategies that strengthen the local adaptive capacity and reduce the root causes of vulnerability (Eriksen & Marin, 2015). For the past 50 years the Ethiopian state has been converting communal grazing areas to irrigated agricultural land, particularly along the Awash River. Many Afar pastoralists are encouraged, both through lack of grazing pastures and government policy, to consider irrigated agriculture and sedentary living as an alternative livelihood to traditional pastoralism (Eriksen & Marin, 2015). Maintaining a sufficient and nomadic herd, considered true pastoralism, is no longer always achievable and so
some have adopted sedentary living. With climatic stresses, land management changes, resource depletion, as well as other economic and political factors, some Afar claim to have ‘given up’ pastoralism. However, livestock are both practically and culturally significant for the Afar, so the loss of livestock has both a practical and cultural impact. The reduction of livestock undermines social norms, such as slaughtering cattle in order to provide meat for visitors and cultural celebrations.

As the clan's social cohesion and support networks have been undermined by drought and resource depletion, some elders consider the Afar identity to have been weakened. The younger population consider the pursuit of traditional pastoralism less important than their elders, and 58% of the population in the Afar region is under the age of 19 (Devereux, 2006). As the younger generation re-evaluate what it means to be 'Afar', it is possible that the economic and social fabric of the region could change considerably in the coming decades. For example, consider absuma marriages, cross-cousin marriages practised within Islam which strengthen clan relations. Ethiopian state law and Islamic law state that the marriage is only valid if the woman accepts, but to refuse such a marriage is both socially stigmatised and requires financial compensation. Refusal of these marriages has been increasing, which is largely attributed to the increasing visibility of women in both education and employment, allowing their individual choice to be valued alongside clan loyalties.

Migration offers access to improved infrastructure, including better health and education, and the opportunity of an alternative, more resilient income that is not weather dependent. Furthermore, it could grant the opportunity for workers to send funds home to family and clan members. However, as well as socio-cultural and linguistic barriers, migrants are required to gain the permission of district officials before they can access state services. Youth unemployment remains high and so many young Afar chose to migrate to cities, or internationally (primarily to Djibouti, Saudi Arabia and Yemen), in search of better economic prospects. However, inequality is still
pronounced and pastoralists are often socially and economically marginalised.

The Afar people usually maintain a good condition of health between December and April, but malaria, cholera and the common cold are prevalent in the rainy periods. One of the indirect impacts of climate change has been the decrease of available livestock by-products, which has negatively affected nutrition. Without sufficient butter, meat and milk there has been a deterioration in health, which has particular affected old people, women and children. Consequently, pregnancy and childbirth can prove to be particularly risky. Traditional midwives are still common in the Afar region. Due to multiple factors, including high infant mortality and the need for future assets, an Afar woman may be expected to produce 6 to 14 children. Contraception is usually forbidden and birth spacing is not commonly practised if the woman is healthy. Diseases and ill health are not just a threat to the Afar people, but also to their livestock. Their animals are susceptible to sheep and goat plague, pasturellosis, shoat pox, ORF (contagious dermatitis), camel respiratory disease complex, as well as parasites and diarrhoea. Veterinary experts visit villages administering free vaccinations, which keep outbreaks under control, but cases increase during times of drought.

Education is difficult among the Afar people, because of their mobile lifestyle. In addition, there is a negative attitude towards education in the region, which is partly due to previous development policies, which saw children forcibly removed from their communities to fulfil enrolment quotas, as seen all across the Sub-Saharan region in the last half century (Tsegay, 2017). However, the demand for education is increasing as attitudes change. But still, there are considerable barriers regarding the supply of standard education, particularly in the remote and arid parts of the Afar region. For example, the teachers provided are often short term, unpaid, under resourced and newly trained. Mobile schools have been difficult to maintain, as the pastoralists within Afar perform irregular migration patterns, meaning social groups disconnect and reform, so long-term contact with students is almost impossible. Barriers to the success rates of boarding schools
include the social stigma of pastoralist livelihoods, which prevents children integrating fully, linguistic barriers caused by differences in dialect, and the separation of the children from their own community and culture. Qur’anic schools have proved to be effective and trusted institutions in the community and could be adapted to include basic literacy and numeracy.

Predominantly, the Afar rely on the following economic activities for sustenance: animal husbandry, trade (such as wood and charcoal), remittances, daily labour work, agriculture and the PSNP. Livestock and livestock products are traded at market, which usually take place once a week. Livestock are purchased in the summer season when animal fodder is available and sold in the winter when there are shortages of water and fodder. Moreover, for profit purposes, livestock are ideally bought when they are most affordable and are sold when their price increases. However, there is a general lack of transport and travel distances can be significant, meaning that products must be sold at market when there, whether or not the price offered is favourable. This is exacerbated in times of drought, when livestock must be sold to mitigate weather shocks and there are no livestock by-products to offer.

Richer pastoralists have greater ability to diversify income sources to increase returns and hedge against livestock risks. Off-farm activities are limited, but include selling firewood and charcoal, daily labour for construction and unloading grain sacks from the tracks (as part of the PSNP). When construction work is available, it is usually completed by highland workers who travel to the area, as they have a more established skill set. Furthermore, there is a general lack of micro-finance institutions and loaning money is often forbidden for religious reasons. Instead, people use an informal system of relatives and clan members to borrow funds. When borrowing is permitted, clan members will share the costs if an individual defaults on a loan.

The Afar share information in a variety of ways, including through mobile phones, the village council or mosque, or an exchange system called dagu. Dagu is an informal communication network through
which news is shared between passing members of the ethnic group and in doing so, can travel great distances, including to clan members who have migrated. *Dayu* can pass between men or women (not youth), but only if the information does not have the potential to incite fighting. Clan leaders are responsible for the security of each clan member and must ensure good standards of behaviour. In times of conflict, which can occur in disputes over grazing land, peace committees are established to allow for discussion (Chapter 5, *Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region*, by Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). Trade, conflict resolution, community management and social provisions are coordinated and managed by clan leaders wherever possible.

**Productive Safety Net Programme**

As climate change increases the frequency and severity of weather events, it has become a priority for the Ethiopian government to address the issue of food security. As agriculture is the cornerstone of its economy, the government has designed seasonal policies to mitigate hardship when harvests are poor. The Productive Safety Net Programme is an attempt by the Ethiopian government and the World Food Programme to advance the country's development process by supporting long-term resilience to food shortages. The PSNP arose because the government decided it was necessary to end the aid dependency of the population affected by poverty-related problems.

The PSNP seeks to mitigate food insecurity by promoting livelihoods, preventing impoverishment and protecting against hunger. In doing so, it hopes to increase resilience to drought and, in turn, allow beneficiaries to escape cycles of poverty and humanitarian aid dependency. It does this by providing food and cash transfers for households that cannot feed themselves for at least three months per annum, to protect household assets (as beneficiaries do not have to sell their livestock, or their livestock by-products, or assume high interest loans in order to purchase food). These transfers are mostly given in exchange for labour, known as public works. Work-for-
resources programmes have long been used by the Ethiopian government to mobilise its large supply of unskilled labour to fulfil infrastructure deficit (for example, the Employment Generation Scheme and Project 2488, supported by the World Bank). The labour provided under such programmes has supported the development of social infrastructure (such as education and health buildings), which are investments in future human capital. Those households without able-bodied members are not required to work, but instead receive direct support payments (Teka, Temesgen & Fre, 2018).

It was believed that dependable cash transfers over an extended period would lead to better spending and saving, which in turn would stimulate growth: “Through the provision of cash transfers rather than food, the programme will enable smallholders to increase consumption and investment levels and stimulate the development of rural markets” (Devereux, Sabates-Wheeler, Tefera & Taye, 2006, p. 2). However, the purchasing power of cash transfers has decreased over time, which has resulted in many beneficiaries preferring food transfers. Typically, transfers are usually three kilograms of grain per day per person for up to five days a month. The PSNP transfer period runs primarily from January to June with able-bodied persons providing labour for approximately six hours (five hours for women) per day. During droughts, the programme has a contingency fund that allows for new beneficiaries to increase the length of time they receive benefits (from five to seven months). Since the beginning of the programme’s implementation, the government has established a network of staff who work at both the district and national level (Fre et al., 2017).

So far, the PSNP is reported to have benefited nearly eight million Ethiopians. The multi-faceted impacts of the programme were demonstrated in a 2015 report by the European Commission, which found that the PSNP has enhanced the climate change resilience of vulnerable populations. The report also found that: soil erosion and sediment losses had decreased by 50%, the average household food gap had decreased from 3.6 months to 2.3 months, 40,000 kilometres of rural access roads (dry weather roads) had been constructed or
were being maintained, 600,000 km of soil and water structures had been rehabilitated, 200,000 ponds and 35,000 hand-dug wells for rainwater harvesting had been built, 2,800 kilometres of canals had been provided for small-scale irrigation, as well as access to water for households, and 4,000 classrooms and 600 new health posts had been built or were being rehabilitated (European Commission, 2017).

The PSNP is now in its fourth phase, which will be implemented between 2015 and 2020. During 2015/2016, the country experienced the most severe drought in 50 years. The Ethiopian government managed a wide-scale response, providing 18.2 million people – 20% of the country’s total population – with food or the cash to buy it, in part through the PSNP. However, the government is still not adequately able to provide for the population's food needs. In response, the World Bank has since approved another USD 100 million to the PSNP, on top of the extra USD 100 million it gave the programme last year. The next sections present the results of the research in answer to the two parts of the research question: Is the design of the PSNP relevant for the Afar in Ethiopia? And how has the programme improved the socio-economic resilience of this community?

Relevance of design of the PSNP

One of the problems with the design of the PSNP is that it is applied in the same way in each region. However, it cannot be assumed that what is applicable in the lowlands is also applicable in the highlands, when there are considerable geographical, socio-cultural, economic and environmental differences. For example, are the crops produced under the programme compatible with the regional diet? Does recruitment for public works projects conflict with the seasonal labour demands of local farms? The PSNP is not tailored to the production and livelihood system of the Afar people, as transfers and public works under the programme do not consider the environmental conditions of the villages. In addition, there are many contextual factors that are not included in the programme design. For instance, polygamous households in the Afar are not recognised and
receive only as much as one household. Likewise, one household is assumed to be comprised of a maximum of five persons, regardless of the total number of family members in the household.

However, the PSNP does include clan leaders in the decision-making process, which does not occur in the highland regions. Clan leaders play a big role in screening residents, both within the appeal committee and regarding beneficiary selection. They work side-by-side with the formal task force to smooth the PSNP transfers and public works activities. Targeting criteria is gender sensitive and considers those most vulnerable. While traditional leaders play a key role, they are not supposed to override formal protocol. While this process grants value to the clan structure, strengthens social ties (which have been consistently undermined by the drought), grants community autonomy in the development process and uses local knowledge in a large-scale development programme, it leaves the PSNP open to manipulation and social connections, authority, social ties, or influence can impact on the decision-making process.

The PSNP does not specifically address gender inequalities, with are high in pastoral areas, particularly in terms of access to, and control over, resources. This contributes to impoverishment because it undermines women’s productive capacity. For example, apart from the lack of power of women in political, social and economic affairs, deep-rooted socio-cultural norms in pastoral areas further marginalise them in poverty reduction efforts. The transfer arrangements in the PSNP do not acknowledging these gender disparities or the diverse cultural contexts.

**Impact of PSNP on socio-economic resilience**

Although there are many practical (logistical and resource based) barriers that effect the implementation of the PSNP across Ethiopia, including lack of funds, staff turnover, transportation difficulties and transfer delays, the PSNP has had a significant impact across Ethiopia. It has been praised for providing a productive approach to addressing the food gap, in which households are more able to
maintain their assets. Where drought has undermined the ability of communities to provide for each other, people have been brought together to develop their communal resources through public works projects. A 2006 review of the first phase of the PSNP found that three-quarters of PSNP households reported consuming more food, or better-quality food (Devereux, 2006, p. 46). While many PSNP households still resorted to selling their assets to sustain themselves, 62% of PSNP households reported that their assets were effectively protected against 'distress sale', while nearly a quarter (23%) increased their assets throughout the year.

But has the PSNP enhanced the resilience of the Afar people? The programme considers multiple factors, including assets, climate change and food security, affecting the resilience of beneficiaries to poverty. Even so, reports on the programme grant more value to the economic processes of development, as is common in global development, but do little to acknowledge socio-cultural data collection or reflection. There is no attention paid to how the programme should be adapted to regional differences. As before, the programme is economically-focused and so omits the need to address social and cultural barriers to implementation. In doing so, the programme frames development as an economic issue, with little attention given to the welfare or satisfaction of beneficiaries.

While the PSNP is being implemented in many areas of Ethiopia, both the Afar and Somali lowland regions are experiencing similar barriers to implementation and success. For this reason, some of the programme reporting refers to these regions together. According to the observations of researchers in the region, the food gap has generally decreased across both the Afar and Somali regions. Furthermore, there has been a general increase in trade, with public works contributing to considerable crop cultivation development and improving access to markets, water, and social and educational services. However, progress has been uneven and some areas have experienced an increase in food insecurity. Consequently, there is no clear evidence that the PSNP can be said to have directly improved food security. Asset protection has not been successful, with the
livestock holdings of the Afar declining; at the same time wealth disparity is pronounced. From our observations we conclude that targeting has been poor in the region, with some well-off households receiving resources and some poor households not being sufficiently supported. Transfers of cash have been inconsistent, both in terms of amount and timing. While the majority of highland and Somali households have a transfer point less than three hours from their home, this does not apply to nearly 40% of the Afar people.

Although the PSNP has been successful as a multi-faceted approach to addressing food insecurity, in the Afar region, one of the most globally vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change, we need to consider whether the programme is addressing long-term adaptation. As it stands, the programme has insufficient resources to provide for all the food insecure households in the country, which is partly being dealt with by an increase of funds from the World Bank. As well as sustaining the survival of the Afar, the programme needs to be evaluated in terms of its capacity to produce graduate beneficiaries that are resilient to poverty in the future. This is somewhat undermined by the sharing that occurs between PSNP and non-PSNP beneficiaries, as members of the community attempt to support their peers. This is further exacerbated by graduation targets in which regional stakeholders may graduate beneficiaries before they are appropriately resilient. As it stands, there is no proof that the assets retained by PSNP beneficiaries are sustainable or evidence of how vulnerable these are to depletion following graduation, as is highlighted by the proportion of the community who report worsened food security after leaving the programme (Fre et al., 2017).

In relation to general programme coordination in the Afar, the drought has severely impacted on the effective implementation of the PSNP. There has been insufficient targeting and there have been delays in addressing this when trying to support the population most in need. Technical software is not yet fully functional in most of the
where the PSNP is being implemented, delays in receiving transfers have been experienced and there is a low quality of reporting. The procurement plan of the PSNP is regarded as poor, both at the woreda and regional levels. There have been severe delays in food transfers, largely accredited to the lack of available transport. Consequently, many of the beneficiaries have had to sell some household assets to survive, further depleting community resilience to future drought.

So far, the food and cash transfer element of the PSNP has received the most attention, but the public works element has also gone some way to mitigating the resource deficit. For instance, a school was constructed in Da’ar, of which four of the eight classrooms were built using PSNP labour. Similarly, houses have been provided for teachers in Eruhna, Adeahnu and Da’ar. Furthermore, in Urkudi, PSNP coordinators have been playing a significant role in introducing and expanding latrines. As many still rely on open defecation, the PSNP coordinators have been trying to create awareness of the benefits of improved sanitation. Public works projects have also created temporary employment for youth, which helps them to continue their studies and provide for their food needs.

However, many of the communal public works assets created have been reported to be below technical standards, such as feeder roads, water harvesting structures, diversion and irrigation canals, and conservation structures. Public works planning and reporting is also generally inadequate. Public works reports were found to be almost non-existent in the Afar region (only 4 of the 32 woredas submitted one of the three required quarterly reports). The public works programmes that have been implemented are based on nearby highland models (with a focus on terracing and soil and water conservation), which may not be appropriate for conditions in the arid lowlands.

73 A kebele is the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia, equivalent to a village or ward.
74 A woreda is equivalent to a district.
More needs to be done to map these resources and who is benefiting from them, how they will be maintained in the future, and whether this would be better managed if it occurred as a programme in its own entity. The way in which this labour is sourced and managed also needs to be considered. It is not that the Afar region experiences a labour deficit, but many households are labour constrained, in that they have limited access to the resources to do so and a disproportionate resource return for this labour. Public works plans have primarily been tailored to the needs of the highlanders, so work needs to be tailored to pastoralist needs. In addition, public work projects are not fully utilised to develop long-term infrastructure to mitigate against climate change.

Furthermore, there has been no progress on the livelihood’s component of the PSNP. Livelihood opportunities in the region have not yet been properly assessed, mapped and developed. One idea was to re-route funds to deal specifically with drought activities. However, this has been hindered by changes in the approved budget and a revised budget needs to be submitted and discussed at the federal level before this can be done. In addition, the programme is not linked to credit or related asset building interventions. There is a need for income diversification opportunities, like off-pastoral income generation and asset building activities (e.g., through cooperatives). Unlike other in regions, the Household Asset Building Programme has yet to be implemented in the Afar region. This is due to the religiously inclined tendency of the Afar people to avoid borrowing.

More broadly, there is debate about whether development programmes in high risk areas like the Afar should be conservative in their approach, to minimise possible losses with smaller returns on poverty reduction or take a more aggressive approach to growth. The PSNP coordinator for the Somali region explained that there is very little to distinguish between beneficiaries of the PSNP and those of food aid programmes, other than the technical terms adopted (Ahmednur Daud, personal communication with Fre, November 2016). While rises in food prices assist net producers, those who struggle to meet their subsistence needs (who must resort to
purchasing food on top of their own agricultural products) are made more vulnerable by such cost increases. So rising food prices are generally good for agriculture, but bad for food security; so, paradoxically, improve economic growth, but increase reliance on social safety nets such as the PSNP.

Little to no action is being taken to instigate tangible improvement in the Afar region. On a nationwide scale, policies still actively discriminate against, or discount the importance of, pastoralist communities and their way of life. Hence, at the regional level, vulnerable groups must be better targeted to ensure development occurs evenly and for those who need it the most. Furthermore, the next generation of Afar – the youth – need to be targeted for tailored interventions to support them in their future ambitions, whether this is pastoral living, a sedentary lifestyle or migrating to urban centres.

**Conclusion**

This study considered the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia and its implementation in the Afar region among the mobile pastoralists who roam across the region. In particular, it looked at whether or not the design of the PSNP is relevant for the Afar people and if the programme improved the socio-economic resilience of this community. The research aimed to understand whether the PSNP can be positively linked to the socio-economic resilience of the Afar people to cope with hardship and emergencies, which is defined as local and context-specific. The research was based on a desk study of locally-collected documents regarding the programme design and implementation of the PSNP, as well as assessments of its impact. Furthermore, observations in the region and contact with officials and members of the Afar communities informed the research.

In relation to the design of the programme and its suitability to the Afar region, there seems to be a lack of understanding of the local culture and reality on the ground. The result is a disconnect with what is provided by the programme on paper and its implementation in the region, resulting in the programme not reaching the intended
beneficiaries resulting in reduced impact. The PSNP has been designed by policymakers and planners who have sedentary or urban backgrounds and who may not appreciate the particular nomadic culture of the Afar and tailor the programme accordingly.

The second part of the research question was on the impact of the PSNP on increasing the socio-economic resilience of the Afar people. The conclusion is that the PSNP does not sufficiently consider the specific conditions of the Afar people, including their traditional coping mechanisms, to be able to enhance resilience. There is a need to recognise the relevance of traditional resource-sharing mechanisms, as a form of community support for those affected by hardship, which the PSNP should aim to supplement and support, not replace. The PSNP should promote livelihoods, with understanding of pastoral livelihood production systems, to support households to maintain food security, even in times of crisis. Migratory patterns are an essential part of pastoral livelihoods; the PSNP can help only by explicitly recognising migration as key to the resilience of the Afar people.

Based on the findings of this study, it is concluded that PSNP has the potential to yield better results, provided that the following recommendations are taken into account:

- Allow for seasonal adjustments to be made to the transfer period, public works schedule and other activities, as well as the payment of transfers, to make them better suited to the needs of pastoral communities
- Focus on alternative income generation approaches to addresses decreases in pastoral livelihoods due to climate change, youth outmigration, insecurity and other factors
- Consider the allocation of resources in polygamous households in the targeting of beneficiaries
- Establish links to financial and credit institutions to enable pastoralists to build productive assets
In conclusion, the socio-political context of the ethnically-marginalised Afar communities need to be better appreciated and reflected in programme design in order to enhance the impact of the PSNP on the socio-economic resilience of the Afar people. With better contextualisation, social protection programmes can support the nomadic Afar community.

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References


Chapter 18

Where is your Brother? Religious Leaders in Eritrea Offer a Counter Narrative to Totalitarianism

Makeda Saba

Introduction

On 12 October 2019, the Nobel Prize Committee awarded the Prize for that year to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed Ali. This focused the spotlight on the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which started in June 2018. However, what has transpired as a consequence of the internationally proclaimed step by Prime Minister Abiy to open a process seeking peace with Eritrea? In October 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Eritrea congratulated Eritrea and Ethiopia on the Peace Process, but also affirmed that, irrespective of the peace process, the human rights situation in Eritrea remains grim and crimes against humanity continue to be perpetuated. The Rapporteur concluded that while: “The achievement of peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia must be duly celebrated. However, Eritrean authorities must urgently embrace and implement bold measures to strengthen

Referred to as an ‘open-air prison’ and the ‘North Korea of Africa’, Eritrea is ruled by an iron fist. The regime has taken full control of the civil and political space, including that of religious communities. In this extreme situation, the religious leaders in Eritrea have risen up to pose a different narrative to the one of totalitarian rule. By asking ‘where is your brother?’ they have shown that there is a space that the government can’t own and thoughts that they cannot control. By reminding people that we are human beings with a responsibility to care for each other they are calling the government to account for the atrocities it has committed and standing up for people’s right to family, to pursue a living and to live in dignity.
the protection of and respect for human rights, justice and accountability” (OHCHR, 2018).

The unexpected Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded in July 2018 immediately raised expectations of a reduction in the number of refugees from Eritrea. Unfortunately, this has not materialised (UNHCR, 2017; 2018a; 2018b). Since 2018, Eritrea has increased in ranking from seventh to ninth largest refugee sending country in the world (UNHCR, 2018c). The overall population of the country is unknown, but estimated to be anywhere between 3.5 million (World Population Review, 2019) and 6 million (Plechner, 2019). Eritrea also has the highest number of refugees per capita who have fled the country (Connell, 2018). According to UNHCR (2018c), officially registered refugees from Eritrea stood at 507,300 at the end of 2018, an increase from the end of 2017 when this population stood at 486,200. These figures do not take into account the unregistered (forced) migrants in Ethiopia.

This chapter examines the reasons for the exodus of Eritrean youth and other refugees and the attempts by religious leaders to preserve spaces that are not controlled by the government. It sets the exodus in the context of the developments in the country during the first two decades since its liberation from Ethiopia in 1991. It sheds light on the social and political structure that the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) has established and its consequences for the people, particularly the youth. This chapter investigates the control Eritrea’s highest authorities have over Kingdon’s three policy streams – political, problem and policy – and, thereby, agenda setting in the country. However, in every environment, there are policy entrepreneurs who, sometimes at great personal risk, interact with the policy agenda and attempt to take advantage of any policy window.

75 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that “Most Eritrean refugees (57%) were hosted by Ethiopia (174,000) and Sudan (114,500), but many also found protection farther away, such as in Germany (55,300), Switzerland (34,100), Sweden (27,700), Norway (15,200), the Netherlands (14,900), Israel (14,500) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and northern Ireland (United Kingdom) (13,000)” (UNHCR, 2018c, p. 17).
opening to influence the formulation of policies. This chapter asks: *What is the role of religious leaders as policy entrepreneurs in Eritrea and how do they engage with the policy agenda to put human rights and the wellbeing of the Eritrean people on the policy agenda?*

The next section gives a quick overview of the situation in Eritrea, including the ruling regime and the political narrative. The chapter then introduces the theoretical concepts used – Kingdon’s policy streams and the idea of a political myth – which are used as lenses through which to understand agenda setting in Eritrea and the role of religious leaders. The methodology of the research is then presented. The section that follows examines the historical context of governance and the legitimisation of power in Eritrea through the ideological narratives that framed its independence. The current political narrative is then explored to explain the relationship between those in power and the subjects of this power. Having examined the key elements through which power is defined, the investigation then focuses on the central policy of the government, namely, National Service, which is integrated with the national development policy and education. We then look at the restrictions imposed by the government on the movement of people and the resistance to this, including fleeing the country. In the next section, the religious leaders in Eritrea are studied as policy entrepreneurs in the context of their contribution to an alternative narrative and their role in agenda setting. Finally, some brief conclusions are drawn.

**Background**

The PFDJ is the only political party in Eritrea and it has near total control of the country. Its nation-building project is geared towards neutralising any opposition and attaining total control over its citizens, as it was during the liberation struggle (Mengisteab & Yohannes, 2005). To achieve this, the PFDJ has established a new social order based on the political myth of struggle against all odds and self-sacrifice for the nation.
This political narrative has raised the status of former liberation fighters (tegadelay) to ‘citizens’ and established the leadership of the PFDJ as political elites. The PFDJ has centralised all government administration within the office of the president, which is run by a small group of political elites trusted by him. In this new social order, not all Eritreans are citizens. Only members of the PFDJ and armed forces, are considered ‘true citizens’, while the rest are considered masses to be moulded into ‘true citizens’ (Woldemikael, 2013).

By redefining citizenship based on struggle and sacrifice, elites within the PFDJ have gained complete control over the policy agenda. Eritrea is a one-man, one-party state without an active constitution, where civil liberties, such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and space for civil society are severely restricted and controlled. To consolidate its position of total control, based on the narrative of ‘self-sacrifice’, the government (i.e., the PFDJ) has implemented integrated policies for National Service, national development (the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme), and education (Dorman, 2003b; Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016). The integration of National Service with development and education has officially extended National Service from the statutory 18 months to indefinitely, meaning that young people in Eritrea face a lifetime of compulsory and continuous service to their country. As a result of such policies, since 2002, young Eritreans have been leaving the country in vast numbers. In 2001/2002, there was a reported increase in the number of people leaving (UNHCR, 2006). Combined with Eritrea’s restrictions on the movement of people abroad, these policies have pushed more youth into the arms of traffickers and smugglers (Amnesty International, 2015).

**Theoretical framework: Agenda setting and political myths**

This chapter analyses the political environment in Eritrea through the lens of Kingdon’s (2014) multiple streams framework of policy development and Bottici’s (2007) political myth.
Kingdon’s proposes three streams to describe and understand the process of public policy agenda setting:

- **Problem stream:** This stream is made up of public problems requiring government action to resolve. Usually such problems reach policymakers because of specific events or crises.
- **Political stream:** In this stream it is expected to see factors that influence the body of politics, such as change in government.
- **Policy stream:** In this stream it is expected to see the participation of the public and civil society, as well as experts who are analysing the situation and proposing solutions.

Each of the streams flow independently until a ‘policy window’ opens, after which three streams come together to resolve an issue. According to Kingdon, the opening of policy windows may be triggered by: “apparently unrelated external factors focusing events, such as crises, accidents, or the presence or absence of Policy Entrepreneurs both within and outside the government” (Kingdon, 2014). So called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ engage by: “coupling policy problems and policy solutions together with political opportunities” (Béland & Howlett, 2016, p. 223).

The policies of the Government of Eritrea are linked to the experience of the liberation struggle and the associated political myth of struggle, martyrdom and self-sacrifice for the nation. In this chapter, the term ‘political myth’ is understood in the terms proposed by Chiara Bottici, who describes it as: “work on a common narrative by members of a social group (or society), to make significance of their experience and deeds” (Bottici, 2007, p. 133). This chapter proposes that the liberation struggle generated a powerful and dramatic narrative of struggle against all odds and self-sacrifice of the individual for the nation, which links the liberation experience to the present and projects it into the future as the struggle to build a nation. According to Bottici (2007), a political myth must have ‘purpose’; therefore, the common narrative of a political myth is not just any
narrative, it is a dramatic narrative that is shared and connects past, present and future events. It must have a prophetic sense to it and, specifically, it has to have significance for a group of people. It is a political story that talks about power, resources, and things that fundamentally matter.

Using the lenses of the multiple stream framework and the political myth, it is proposed that the PFDJ is using the ‘liberation struggle’ experience and narrative of ‘self-sacrifice’ to maintain control of the country. The narrative used during the liberation struggle has become the foundation of the nation-building project. It is used by the government to justify the high level of centralisation of power and control over all aspects of Eritrean life.

**Methodology**

The study combines a historical and ethnographic research design. The study is based on analysis of a collection of secondary data, included desk reviews of documents. An extensive library of policy documents is available to the author and was analysed for the desk review. In addition, qualitative research was conducted, consisting of the collection of both primary and secondary data. This included immersion in Eritrea, where the author worked. Key primary data was collected over a period of 8 weeks in 2016. To collect primary data, the snowball technique was used to obtain referrals of participants for the interviews and discussions. Conversations were held with various people in Eritrea of various ages and genders, and from different backgrounds. In addition, seven Skype interviews (with six men and one woman) were conducted with Eritreans in different locations (i.e., Ethiopia, Sweden, Norway). The individuals who participated, represent a cross-section of Eritreans, including some who chose to leave the country from 2001 to 2018, when the last interview was held. For reasons of security this chapter has been written under a pseudonym. The real identity of the author is known to the editors.
Liberation and the creation of a political myth

The Eritrean Government’s revolutionary model of social transformation is influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology on the reorganisation of society and control of the means of production by the state. The purported aim of the ‘elite’ inner circle is the liberation and advancement of the masses, which is achieved by total control. According to Kebede in this undertaking, the elites are not taking on a representative role of particular interests or constituencies, they are creating:

..... [a] tutorial power: in the name of a class or large sections of the people, conceived unfit to conquer political hegemony, an enlightened group aspires to or seizes power. It claims to have the mandate for tutorship until the class or the people become mature enough to assume the task of self-government. (Kebede, 2003, p. 9)

African revolutionary leaders have historically used socialist theories not only in the organisation of their respective revolutionary movements, but also in an attempt to modernise Africa (Nkrumah, 1975, cited in Serequeberhan, 1989, p. 8). In 1983, in a New York Times article, Colwell described the situation in the following terms:

Socialism of one kind or another took root in Africa in tandem with decolonisation, a reaction to what was perceived as the oppression of foreign capitalists who ruled and exploited them from distant cities. It was a reflex that seemed to fit Marx’s division of the world into oppressors and the oppressed. An African Brand of socialism. (Colwell, 1983)

The Black radical freedom and independence movements of the late 1950s and 1960s, analysed the colonial experience in terms of the Western appropriation of Africa’s means of production (Robinson, 1983, p. 72). For the students who established the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF), the predecessor to the PFDJ, the adoption of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary approach was based on frustration, not only at the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia, but also at the ineffectiveness of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). This led
them to conclude that the only way Eritrea could be liberated, and its perceived ‘backwardness’ reversed, was through a socialist revolution led by them (Kebede, 2003). This approach legitimised the political ambitions and aspirations of the student leaders and provided a strong backing for the elitism that has developed since (Kebede, 2003).

To achieve their purpose, in 1970, the founders of the EPLF established the Eritrean People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), a communist party. The objective of EPRP (which in 1986 became the Eritrean People’s Socialist Party) was to ensure that the liberation struggle would have the appropriate coordination, organisation and political orientation. According to Serequeberhan:

*The EPLF was established as the embodiment of nationalist efforts to overcome the obstacles created by the historically incompetent ELF leadership. In establishing itself the EPLF did so by undertaking a radical critique of the history of the struggle up to that point…* (Serequeberhan, 1989, pp. 28–29)

The EPRP became a tool for the centralisation of power by a secretive, elite, collective leadership that managed to unify the dissident factions in the ELF and guide the EPLF’s liberation efforts (Connell, 2005).

The EPLF considered the liberation of Eritrea as a revolution to free the masses and redesign society (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011). From its inception, the EPLF (now the PFDJ) thought to achieve its goal of liberation of the masses through the total control of all aspects of the economic, social and political life of the people to be liberate. The intention of the PFDJ is to exercise such power until the masses become mature enough to assume the task of self-government (Serequeberhan, 1989).

In 1971, the EPLF leadership produced a document called *NHnan Elaman* (Our Struggle and its Aims) (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011). This document is also known as the ‘Eritrean Manifesto’. The Manifesto lays the foundation for the political narrative of a ‘struggle
against all odds’, of Eritrea surrounded by enemies, and of self-sacrifice of the individual for the nation. According to the Manifesto:

[...] Our present struggle against Ethiopian oppressors is nothing more than an extension of our militant Eritrean struggle against foreign oppressors. We are sacrificing our lives to free our people from the shackles of Haile Selassie [Emperor of Ethiopia] and his master [US imperialism] to attain independence for our country and to realise the self-reliant progress, of the Eritrean people [...] a society where no economic exploitation or political oppression of man by man exists... [A prosperous] nation with educational, agricultural and industrial development based on a ‘National United Front’... (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011, pp. 569, 570, 582)

From the beginning, the EPLF strategy for achieving national unity and liberation and addressing the perceived social and economic backwardness of the country, caused by the colonial experience, was for the EPLF to dominate all social, political and economic spaces and all aspects of policy formulation and implementation.

The EPLF implemented a highly-centralised and opaque administration that continues to operate today (Buysse, Van Reisen & Van Soomeren, 2017). It works on a two-track system: an unseen, powerful, inner circle of elites and public structures projecting the image of egalitarian self-sufficiency. This approach is in line with Lenin’s ideology, as described in his work What is to be done? (Lenin, 1987). For the EPLF, as with Lenin, it was not enough to achieve independence of a society that was considered backwards and holding on to “traditional, religious and social values”. The revolution had to redesign society and create a new “progressive social order” (Mengisteab & Yohannes, 2005, p. 35). This process required not only the indoctrination of members of the armed forces, but also the mobilisation of the civilian population.

Prior to 1991, the EPLF was focused on liberation. After 1991, its focus shifted to nation building. The nation-building project borrowed concepts from the liberation struggle, such as ‘struggle against all odds’, ‘martyrdom’ and ‘self-sacrifice’ for the nation,
absorbing individuals within the political narrative of an Eritrea beset by multiple enemies and struggling against all odds (Dorman, 2003a; 2003b). The resumption of hostilities with Ethiopia, and the ‘no war, no peace’ status that followed, reinforced the narrative and the associated political myth of struggle against all odds (Bundegaard, 2004).

Post liberation, to correct what the EPLF perceived to be the social and economic ‘backwardness’ of the people, it continued to administer the state in a highly-centralised manner. It banned all opposition parties and treated all non-mass movement organisations (i.e., independent civil society) with suspicion and as usurpers of the people’s sovereignty. It reacted to any challenge to its authority with force. In addition, without any consultation, it nationalised land (State of Eritrea, 1994), established a unitary form of government, and changed the administrative boundaries within Eritrea to establish Zobas (State of Eritrea, 1996). This approach deliberately ignored the fact that, despite colonisation, Eritrea has a history of self-administration (Tronvoll, 1998).

**Political narrative: Martyrdom and self-sacrifice**

The culture of martyrdom and sacrifice established in the post-independence period, transformed the concept of citizenship and the social contract between citizens and the Eritrean state. It is no longer a contract based on the protection of the rights of citizens (such as the protection of life and property), it is an expression of the willingness of Eritreans to sacrifice themselves in service of the nation (Bernal, 2017). This culture is based on the narrative of Eritrea as beset by multiple enemies opposed to its independence (Dorman, 2003a). However, through discipline and sacrifice the Eritrean people were able to defeat, without outside help, Ethiopia, a numerically superior enemy supported by a superpower, the Soviet Union (Kaplan, 2003, cited in Bundegaard, 2004, p. 36).

In the aftermath of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war (1998–2000), the PFDJ narrative of struggle and sacrifice for the nation focused on the
threat of Ethiopia. Seizing the opportunity presented by the continuation of hostility between the two countries, and building the narrative of multiple existential threats, the PFDJ indefinitely postponed the implementation of the 1997 Constitution, development of a multiparty system, and the national elections (Al Jazeera, 2008; Chapter 19, Peace, but no Progress: Eritrea, an Unconstitutional State, by Bereket Selassie & Mirjam Van Reisen). Instead, it centralised all political and economic power (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018; Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2002), and proceeded with the implementation of a series of policies to ensure the deployment of the country’s youth for nation building, thus retaining a high level of militarisation (an estimated 300,000 to 350,000 personnel) (AECID, 2007). In this way, the Government of Eritrea replicated the liberation experience of struggle, sacrifice and martyrdom: “In Eritrea, the expectation that the youth will defend the nation, and also serve the nation in peace time has been much more widespread” (Dorman, 2003a, p. 13).

Those who fail to participate in the government’s nation-building activities are denied the rights and benefits of citizenship:

Groups which refused to participate in these programmes (i.e. Service Programmes) are denied the right to citizenship. The first group to resist national service was the small community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. This led the government to claim that they had ‘relinquished’ their rights to citizenship by categorically and repeatedly refusing to recognise the state of Eritrea and its laws. (Dorman, 2003a, p. 10)

The term citizen is used to refer to those who fought and sacrificed themselves for liberation: members of the PFDJ, armed service personnel and former liberation fighters (i.e., tegadelay). The masses (i.e., the bafash, and taxpayers or gabar) are citizens in the making. They constitute the majority, are considered to be backward and have not yet struggled and sacrificed for the nation. This group includes members of the National Service and the diaspora. Non-citizens are people who refuse to participate in the nation-building project (i.e., Jehovah’s Witnesses, youth escaping National Service, and members of the opposition).
The experience of exclusion from citizenship is supported by the distinction between different classes of people in which only those loyal to the PFDJ can be qualified as citizens, who are protected by the regime and can participate in the political and economic life of the country and benefit from it. Those who are excluded from this status, are either forced to prove their allegiance through near-total obedience (the masses) or are denied Eritrean identity and recognition of citizenship and are totally excluded from any form of protection.

**Nation-building: The integration of National Service, development and education**

In 2001, following the arrest of 15 members of the government (known as the G15) who promoted a democratisation process, there was a crackdown followed by the incarceration of students from Asmara University. At the time 5,000 university students were arrested and taken to Wi’a and Gelaalo, two notorious military prisons, and accused of siding with the G15 (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017).

Subsequent to the 2001 arrests, National Service, which had started in 1994, was integrated with the education system. In Eritrea, National Service is a combination of military training and civil service, working for little pay in non-military activities, such as agriculture, the construction of roads, houses, buildings, and mining. From 2002, National Service was linked to the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme. The objective of this programme is to secure the country’s post-war economic rehabilitation and bring about radical change in all development sectors. The programme relies on the deployment of National Service (Warsay) defence force personnel (Yikaalo) as labour. All Warsay Yikaalo activities are carried out under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, conscripts work for an indefinite period of time on development projects and the administration of ministries and local authorities, in many cases also working for government or PFDJ-owned businesses.
Such work is carried out in conditions that are considered to be forced labour (UN Human Rights Council, 2015).

In September 2003, the Ministry of Education announced the comprehensive reform of the national education system. The view of the government was that the existing education system was too academic and did not serve the country’s development objectives (Ministry of Education, 2003, Article 31). Under this reform, Asmara University was closed, an additional year of high school was introduced (to be completed at the Sawa Warsay Yikaalo Military School), and higher education decentralised by establishing a network of regional colleges. Since the 2001 Asmara University student protest, the view of the government is that the higher education offered by Asmara University is a troublesome and bourgeois and has nothing to contribute to the revolution. Hence, the University of Asmara was closed in 2003 and the building has since fallen into decay (Asmarino, 2017b).

Under this system students who have not completed their final year of school at Sawa and have not sat for the National School Certificate, cannot access a college education. The regional colleges subsequently developed are administered jointly by an academic director and a military director:

The Eritrean Institute of Technology at Mai Nefhi is located only a few kilometres South of Asmara. Built on an open field site, it feels isolated and remote. Run jointly by an academic vice director and an army colonel, Nefhi resembles a military camp more than a place of higher learning. Students, at least in theory need permission to leave campus, and in private conversation it’s often referred to as the ‘camp’. (Müller, 2008, p. 122)

Through the integration of these policies, the government is recreating the liberation experience of fighters working for the nation. The effect of these policies is to move students into National Service

76 This protest was over students being required to conduct research in the field without sufficient allowance for accommodation and food (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017; Dorman, 2003b).
and the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme earlier and indefinitely extend the period of service, taking full control over the working population.

At the same time as taking control over the working population, Eritrea has also taken control of economic sectors, including finance, imports and exports, transport, and construction. This was done through a process of unfair competition with private businesses, facilitated by the fact that the government does not pay taxes and does not comply with labour, environmental, and other regulatory requirements. Also, because of the control by the regime over its working population, the authorities have unlimited access to a large pool of free labour, effecting a transfer of labour away from the private sector and keeping it fully government controlled. This policy of moving labour away to labour sites identified and controlled by the government, has crippled the agricultural sector, which still relies to a large extent on subsistence farming (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Kibreab, referring to the construction sector, summarises the situation as follows: “Since April 2006 only PFDJ firms are allowed to engage in construction activities, after private firms and individual entrepreneurs were banned from the construction industry as part of the government’s crackdown on the private sector” (Kibreab, 2014, pp. 62–63).

The government’s control and domination of the economy has not increased economic activity or productivity. In fact, the economy is stagnating, further weakening the private sector and restricting economic opportunities for Eritreans. According to the World Bank’s economic review:

[Despite] recent growth, Eritrea remains one of the least developed countries in the world. Anecdotal evidence indicates that poverty is still widespread in the country, where 65% of the population lives in rural areas and 80% depend on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood, negatively impacting human development statistics. In 2012, Eritrea’s Human Development Index at 0.351, was below the average of 0.446 for countries in the Low Human Development group and below the 0.475 average for countries in the Sub Saharan Africa region. (World Bank, 2018)
Since 2002, there have also been aggressive round-ups of youth for National Service, expanded by the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme and the 2003 education reform. Consequently, the number of Eritrean youths fleeing the country has increased. According to UNHCR, the first significant, post-liberation movement of Eritrean youth started in 2002, coinciding with the introduction of the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme. By 2010, National Service and the Warsay Yikaalo Development Programme were augmented by the Hizbawi Serawit (People’s Army), as an additional service requirement for people aged between 50 and 80 years (Amnesty International, 2015; Globalsecurity.org, n.d.). Members of the Hizbawi Serawit are required to carry out compulsory duties such as guarding public spaces and government property and patrols, as well as working on national development projects. These compulsory duties have in some cases resulted in people having to discontinue their paid employment (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018), thus, contributing to the process of deliberate impoverishment of Eritreans (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017). The situation is eloquently described by Kibreab:

*Present day Eritrea is among the most militarised countries in the world. Even the education system is militarised. After ENS [Eritrean National Service] became open ended and consequently militarisation affected all aspects of life in the country, the unpopularity of the ENS among citizens within and/or approaching the age of conscription increased dramatically. This was reflected on the one hand, in the large number of people fleeing the country, and on the other, hiding within the country to avoid conscription.* (Kibreab, 2014, p. 9)

The youth experience the state as an albatross around their necks. They understand the state in terms of spy networks (Bozzini, 2011), as a human rights violator curtailing civil, political and economic rights, and the source of torture and desperation. They see it as the source of all restrictions and deprivations.
The state has maintained a narrative of threat and struggle for the survival of Eritrea and has proceeded to exercise centralised control, restricting the space for citizen participation in decision making and suffocating any nascent indigenous civil society that could challenge its power (Hepner, 2008, p. 478). In 2014, members of the People’s Army refused to report for training during harvest time (Awate, 2014a). At the time, during an interview with Eri TV, the President stated: “Since training is a priority, harvesting can wait, we can afford weeks or months to do that… And one has to make decisions… We made a trade-off” (Awate, 2014a).

The control over people is linked to a systematic process of political, social, and economic deprivation, and human rights violations – violations that the government refuses to take any responsibility for and, reverting to its ‘threat’ stance, has labelled ‘lies’ and ‘ploys’ of its enemies to undermine the state. A position confirmed by Yemane Gebreab (Head of Political Affairs, PFDJ) who dismissed the finding of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea that Eritrea may have committed crimes against humanity (UN Human Rights Council, 2015): “…[it is] really laughable … There is no basis to the claims of the Commission of Inquiry …” (Harper, 2016a; 2016b).

Through the integration of National Service, the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme, and education, the government has limited the citizenship rights of conscripts who, while in service, cannot: legally obtain a mobile phone or sim card; legally obtain or renew a business licence; access land; or access travel documents and exit visas (Bozzini, 2011). Deserters or objectors are denied any rights and cannot access state services. Thus, the Eritrean official concept of citizenship is intrinsically linked to enlistment and the fulfilment of National Service duties, which also defines who is a proper national subject.
Eritrean youth describe their situation as slavery:

[The] situation in Eritrea and long time ago with slaves is the same. We build the houses of the elites without money. We work on farms of government officials for no money. If you are educated, they deploy you anywhere…. for a short time, you can tolerate it… but this is for life. Freedom is to do your duty and ask for your rights. If you are doing your duty, but do not get rights – then you can complain that you do not have rights… In Eritrea even if you do your duty, you cannot move freely within the country; cannot open own business for yourself. If you cannot do what you want (legally) etc., you can’t say ‘I am free’. (NTN, interview with MS, face-to-face, 2018)

A law graduate from the former Asmara University (KN, interview with MS, Skype, 2016) explained that there are people in Eritrea who have been in the military for 20–30 years. After military training, he served 8 years in the National Service, as a legal advisor at the Ministry of Justice, for 500 Eritrean nakfa (USD 10) a month. Despite the many opportunities for training at the Ministry of Justice, National Service conscripts cannot participate. KN felt that the situation destroyed any hope he had of progressing in life: “They [the Government] took my age and my opportunities” (KN, interview with MS, Skype, 2016).

A young veteran of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war explained that after the year 2000, he continued with National Service as a legal advisor for the government. During this time, he was repeatedly arrested at the whim of his commanding officer. On one occasion he was incarcerated in a container. For this veteran: “Staying at home [in Eritrea] is almost valueless as people cannot improve their economic status, people do not own themselves – so people are moving away for the sake of freedom” (HA, interview with MS, Skype, 2016).

A National Service conscript who had been assigned to work for the Ministry of Information in Asmara, explained that even though he had an interesting job and was close to his family, he decided to leave because his monthly salary of 145 Eritrean nakfa did not meet his basic needs (T, interview with MS, Skype, 2016). He could not achieve
the status of an ‘independent adult’. Also, as a graduate of the Italian School in Asmara, he could not sit for the National School Certificate and as a result had no access to tertiary education.

A former Italian School student who was excused from National Service because of a family situation, explained that this was not the same as clearance or a demobilisation (MA, interview with MS, Skype, 2016). She was still subjected to economic and mobility constraints imposed on National Service conscripts. As a former student of the Italian School, now excused from National Service, she could not pursue higher education at any of the colleges in Eritrea and, as a result, had no opportunity to improve her family’s economic situation.

A priest who had been excused from National Service was subsequently required to report for duty due to a change in policy in 2008 that required all members of a religious order to report for National Service (Y, interview with MS, Skype, 2016). He had a long history of family members who sacrificed their lives for the nation. Some died during the liberation struggle, while others were still serving. However, this did not make a difference to his obligation to serve.

A former military doctor explained that after independence, and especially after the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war, Eritreans were leaving the country because of the political breakdown and suppression of civil space (KB, interview with MS, Skype, 2016). According to him, the phenomenon of Eritreans leaving is linked to extreme impoverishment and a lack of freedom, associated with indefinite National Service – a situation made worse by the government’s decision to close all private health clinics since 2011. As a result of this policy, medical professionals are now leaving the country, further weakening an already fragile health system.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process has not changed the situation within Eritrea and, unfortunately, at the time of writing, there is no indication of any policy change. In an interview with Nizar Manek,
Madame Luul Gebreab, Minister of Labour and Human Welfare (former Director of the National Union of Eritrean Women) explained that: “Definitively a small army will remain, and the others will concentrate on the development work as planned” (Manek, 2018). The ‘development work’ referred to is the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme. This means that the government is not planning to overhaul the system through which it can exercise direct control over labour in the country. Nor has the practice of arresting and disappearing of dissenters changed, as they try to open up a discussion on the dire situation in the country. This is evidenced by the arrest of the former Minister of Finance, Berhane Abrehe, who sought to open up debate on need for reform of the current situation in Eritrea, following the peace agreement (Daily Reporter, 2018).

**Restriction of movement**

The sense of ownership by the authorities over its people is complemented by the restriction of movement forced upon the population. This applies to both internal and external movement. In order to leave the country, all Eritreans aged five and over must obtain an exit visa. The government will not issue an exit visa to any children above the age of five, irrespective of their situation (i.e., health, family reunification, etc.) (Amnesty International, 2017; Freedom House, 2018; Home Office, 2015, p. 12).

The restriction of movement of children above five years old, particularly affects families seeking to reunite in a foreign country. In the case of one family, the parents migrated from Eritrea legally and obtained the relevant migration documents for their seven children from the host country. However, the Eritrean government issued an exit visa only for the child below age five. As a result, the remaining children, aged 8 to 17, were not able to migrate safely with their parents. The family resorted to smuggling the children to Sudan through Karora (the north east border between Eritrea and Sudan). The first attempt failed and resulted in the arrest of all the children, who were released after the payment of a fine. However, the second attempt succeeded (Family A, interview with MS, face-to-face, 2016).
The restriction on external movement forces families to seek the services of smugglers. As a result, human smuggling has become a lucrative activity and many Eritreans are taking up the work (KB, interview with MS, Skype, 2016): “Due to the illegal nature of travel and migration, leaving the country involves illegal payments and illicit money transfers” (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017, p. 98).

Despite PFDJ rhetoric to the contrary, because of policies that the PFDJ is implementing, a wide rift has developed between the government and the Eritrean people. The government has systematically impoverished the population, leaving the youth to choose between a life of slave labour or exile: “Everything on the ground that happened and was done was not only pushing, but forcing people to leave” (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017, p. 108).

Eritrea remains food insecure and it is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranked 176 out of 180 countries in the World Economic Freedom Index (Miller, Kim & Roberts, 2018). According to the Global Hunger Index 2017, Eritrea has a child stunting rate of 53% and a child wasting rate of 14.7 % (Von Grebmer, Bernstein, Brown, Prasai & Yohannes, 2017). The Mo Ibrahim Index 2018 of African Governance ranks Eritrea last (54th place) in the category ‘participation and human rights’ (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018). This category measures civil and political rights, citizen participation in political and electoral processes and respect for basic rights. Such a low ranking is a reflection of the fact that Eritrea is a one-man, one-party state that lacks a constitution; there is no freedom of speech or assembly; and rule of law is lacking (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018).

Even though it is not possible for Eritreans to organise themselves politically and to openly express dissent in the country, they do express defiance and resistance by: refusing to report for National Service (Globalsecurity.org, n.d.); refusing to hand over community schools to the government (ERi-TV 2, 2015); and leaving the country. The religious leaders in Eritrea have supported the people in this resistance by providing an alternative narrative and acting as policy
entrepreneurs in the limited space they are allowed. The next section examines this narrative and investigates their role.

**An alternative narrative: The pastoral letters of the Bishops of Eritrea**

The PFDJ has established a policy environment in Eritrea that is very difficult to engage with or challenge. In relation to religious leaders, Proclamation No.73 of 1995 requires religious groups to register with the government and limits their activities to pastoral work (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018, paragraphs 144–159). Despite the very restricted space and the limitations imposed on faith-based organisations, religious leaders in Eritrea have sought to continue their tradition of interceding on behalf of Eritreans and championing their wellbeing (Negash & Weldemichael, 2018).

Since independence, despite the restrictions imposed by Proclamation No.73 of 1995 and the harassment, arrests and disappearance of religious leaders, faith-based organisations have continued to present alternative voices. Muslim clerics have repeatedly challenged policy on matters such as education and National Service for women, with many of them being arrested and disappearing (Christian Solidarity Worldwide & Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2009). In response, the Eritrean government has sought to silence them:

…[the] Commission finds that former freedom fighters belonging to the ELF, Muslim scholars and businessmen, members of the Afar ethnic group, alleged participants of the Forto incident in January 2013, were particularly targeted by the Eritrean Government, who organized their arrests in the streets, mosques and workplaces by masked Eritrean security agents either in uniform or in civilian clothes. (UN Human Rights Council, 2015, paragraph 44)

In 2004, Patriarch Antonius spoke out against the arrest of three Sunday school instructors and refused to comply with the Government’s request to excommunicate more than 3,000 members of the Church associated with the Medhanie Alem movement. The
government reacted by placing him under house arrest and replacing him with its own nominee, Yoftahe Dimetros (Hepner, 2014). The Eritrean Government’s intimidation and harassment tactics have not worked on many Orthodox clergy, who like so many Eritreans, have sought refuge in the diaspora, particularly Ethiopia. These clergymen have reported the destruction of monasteries, arrest of fellow clergymen for demanding the release of Patriarch Antonious, and the closure of the school at the Enda Marriam Cathedral (Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2018).

In October 2017, the government demanded the surrender of both Al Diia Muslim School as well as the closure of the Catholic Medhanie Alem Secondary School of Asmara (Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2018). Both communities refused to comply. The government responded by arresting the dissenters.

… the government imprisoned the sister working at the pastoral office in Asmara, a Combonian, Sr. Tinsae and the administrator of the school, Abba Haile Paulos, a diocesan priest (he volunteered to be imprisoned in replacement of Sr. Tsigewoini, the director of the school). (Asmarino, 2017a)

Prior to his arrest, the leader of the board of the school, Haj Musa Mohamed Nur addressed a meeting of parents and teachers of Al Diia Muslim School. At that meeting Haj Musa resolutely refused to comply with the government’s directive to hand over the school (ERi-TV 2, 2015). He argued:

… [because] this school is ours, even now, whatever its shortcomings, [your] suggestions that are not compatible with our views will not have acceptance. And because we have full rights there is nothing that should frighten us or scare us. (Awate, 2017a)

The arrest of Haj Musa and members of the Al Diia school board as well as of the Catholic clergy sparked a demonstration in Asmara that was dispersed using force and live fire by the military (Christian
The government attempted to justify its drastic reaction by describing the protest as sectarian:

…the [unruly] group, who were chanting sectarian and inflammatory slogans all the way, proceeded to Liberation Avenue and the Ministry of Education. At this stage, they began to throw stones and to attack the Police. (Letter from the Government of Eritrea to the UN, quoted in Shaban, 2018)

Haji Musa continued his defiance when he refused to be released from prison without his companions (Awate, 2017b). He died in March 2018. According to the Christian Solidarity Worldwide, the Al Diia Muslim School has been reopened and some of the school community members have been released. However, Haji Ibrahim Yonus, a member of the Al Diia School Executive Committee also died in prison in January 2019 (Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2018; 2019).

The pastoral letters of the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea are part of an ongoing tradition of providing alternative voices. Since liberation, the Catholic Bishops have written a series of letters marking the key transitions of Eritrea. In 1991, they thanked God for liberation and the end of the long liberation struggle (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 1991, cited in Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2002 p. 7). In 2001, they lamented the destruction caused by the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war; the top-down approach taken by the government, as well as the harsh repression of dissent (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2002). The Government’s response to this mild rebuke was to close the Catholic press and demand that clerics report for National Service—a request that was declined on the basis that the “bearing of arms was ‘not in accordance’ with the role of clergy” (Christian Solidarity Worldwide & Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2009). In retaliation the government closed Catholic schools and clinics, expelled clergy and other personnel, and denied exit visas for national clergy (Christian Solidarity Worldwide & Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2009).

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See also home videos of the protest: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Khjfl-oAuDc and: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROFs8jAonZE.
Irrespective of this, the Catholic Bishops have continued to issue pastoral letters. In 2004, they acknowledged the growing diaspora and praised them for their efforts to support family and friends in Eritrea and urged them to *Be Steadfast in Hope* (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2004). In 2014, following the tragic drowning of more than 300 Eritreans off the coast of Lampedusa, Italy, the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea wrote a letter asking, *Where is Your Brother?*. By quoting Genesis 4:9, the Bishops reminded the people of Eritrea and the regime that we ‘are our brother’s keepers’ (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2014). It was a strong rebuke of the government for its lack of care for Eritreans leaving the country. The action of the Bishops was supported by Abuna Menkerius, the Arch Diocese of North America, Eritrean Orthodox Church (Awate, 2014b; Arch Diocese of North America, 2014; Tewahado Eritrea, 2013).

With *Where is Your Brother?*, the Bishops have set a precedent. They have reached out and touched the youth deeply. This letter has reached Eritrean youth at home, in refugee camps, on migration routes and in destination countries. In this letter, the Bishops, in keeping with tradition of Catholic social teaching and liberation theology, firmly place themselves on the side of the: “disenfranchised citizens of the country (the poor, the exiled, the victims of accidents at sea and the desert, and the imprisoned)” (Negash & Weldemichael, 2018). The 2014 pastoral letter speaks directly to the heart of the Eritrean people and addresses the deep betrayal that is felt due to the conduct of the PFDJ. In the letter, the Bishops clearly identify the indefinite and poorly-paid National Service and the imprisonment of many young people in detention centres or punishment camps as the direct cause of their misery. They point out that:

> [...] There is no point in just asking: *Why are the youth choosing to go abroad?* For no-one leaves a country of milk and honey to seek another country offering the same opportunities. If one’s homeland is a place of peace, jobs and freedom of expression there is no reason to leave it to suffer hardship, loneliness and exile to look for opportunity elsewhere. (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2014, paragraph 19).

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On 12 October 2018, during mass, Catholic Priest Aba Teklemmichael pointing to the recent reforms in Ethiopia. He urged the Eritrean government to also make the necessary reforms in Eritrea, and to democratise the government to enable Eritreans to influence the formulation of policies and participate in their own governance (Solomon, 2018).

On Easter Friday 2019, the Catholic Bishops, issued a new Pastoral Letter entitled: *Peace to You Who Were Far Off, and Those Who are Near, Call for National Reconciliation* (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2019a). In the letter, once again, the Bishops, recognised the sacrifice and suffering of the youth, pointing out that the regime has failed them and that this failure is responsible for their flight from the country. While, the Bishops welcomed the peace process with Ethiopia, they pointed out that much work must be done internally to achieve peace and reconciliation among Eritreans. They called for: a constitutional government and the rule of law. And, referring to the many Eritreans imprisoned without due process, the Bishops called for justice, pointing out that there can be no peace without justice (Catholic Bishop of Eritrea, 2019b).

On 12 June 2019, two months since the publication of: *Peace to You Who Were Far Off, and Those Who are Near*, the Eritrean Government, in what is believed to be an act of retaliation, closed 22 Catholic health centres. The Bishops vigorously protested the action, writing to the government (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2019b) expressing their concern and dismay at the action. At the same time, they called for 17 days of prayer and fasting until 12 July 2019 (Unah, 2019). They have also recently issued a *Further Clarification on the Recent Take-over and Closure by the PFDJ of the Catholic Clinics in Eritrea* (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2019c).

Through the pastoral letters, the Bishops are engaging in policy dialogue. They review the context, identify issues, and suggest policy options and a holistic approach to development to fulfil all aspects of human life, bringing to life Catholic social teachings and echoing
Amartya Sen’s concept of development as freedom (Sen, 1999; Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2002).

The actions of religious leaders are significant because they have deep historical roots within communities and can speak from experience and a higher moral ground. They can connect the diaspora to communities in Eritrea and, therefore, exercise an incremental influence, preparing the ground for the development of a policy window for future action. These leaders are recalling the primary duty of the authorities to serve the people, respect their dignity, and recognise them as citizens. Although their expressions are non-confrontational, there is no doubt that this narrative is a challenge to the almost total control exercised by the PFDJ. In the current atmosphere in Eritrea, it is community leaders (many of whom are also religious leaders) who are steering initiatives for people-to-people reconciliation and normalisation along the Eritrea-Ethiopia border.

Conclusion

Using Kingdon’s multiple stream framework (political, problem and policy streams), this chapter argues that the regime in Eritrea is exercising control over all aspects of the policy stream in the country. The top-down centralised form of government and the targeting of youth is designed to dispel any potential opposition to the ruling party the PFDJ and President Isaias Afwerki. The regime does not allow any space for policy entrepreneurs, outside those in power.

This chapter identifies various policy mechanisms developed by the government to exercise near-total control over Eritrean society especially the youth, namely, the integration of National Service with the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme and the education system. This integrated mechanism traps youth in a system of indefinite forced labour, in which their right to a family and to work to support themselves is violated. Eritrean youth, experience this as state ownership of their lives – the total control over its people, is tantamount to modern-day slavery. In their experience, the state controls their public and private lives. This repression has contributed
to a rapid increase in the exodus from Eritrea and human trafficking of Eritrean youth.

The PFDJ’s Marxist-Leninist approach supports the achievement of almost total control of all political narratives and policy development, resulting in repression of the people. This includes the direct targeting of people who are active members of religious organisations and who express themselves religiously, especially among the smaller, minority, faith-based organisations. The PFDJ has supported a political myth that the nation-building project is one of sacrifice, in which the Eritrean people live for the good of the nation. Except for those in the inner circle of the regime, all others are excluded from this status and need to continuously prove their allegiance – those who defy the narrative of power are completely excluded.

Despite the almost total control maintained by the government, the youth and others have shown various covert ways to express their resistance. They do so by refusing to report for National Service, the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme and Hizbawi Serawit (the people’s army). The youth are also showing their resistance by leaving the country.

Religious leaders have emerged to challenge the status quo by elevating Eritreans first and foremost as human beings of faith and with a responsibility for the wellbeing of their fellow community members. They have spoken out, expressing their sadness over the loss of life of refugees fleeing from the country. They can be seen as social entrepreneurs in that they propose a narrative based on the freedom of a spiritual belonging as a strong alternative to the dominant ideology of exercising control over people’s lives. Emphasising the importance to care for fellow Eritreans respecting their dignity, these messages challenge the narrative of the PFDJ that the only goal of Eritreans is to serve the PFDJ and sacrifice themselves for the nation.

Risking their life and freedom, elders such as Abuna Philipos and Abuna Antonious (Eritrean Orthodox Church), Haj Musa (who died
in prison after his arrest), the board members of the Al Diia Muslim School, and the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea have been speaking out. Deriving strength from their historical roots in communities and ability to spiritually connect with young Eritreans in the diaspora, they have been able to speak the truth from a higher moral ground and offer human dignity as an alternative to the total civil control exercised by the government.

Asking the rhetorical question ‘Where is your brother?’, the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea have shown that not every space can be controlled by the Government. By posing this question, the religious leaders have called the Eritrean Government to account. The efforts of the religious leaders may be the strongest yet in Eritrea, showing that new ideas may emerge for the policy agenda in the country, namely, that a government may care about its people; that the people of Eritrea may express their thoughts; and that the Eritrean people are human beings, born as spiritually endowed members of the universe, and they deserve to live in dignity.

References


Part VII. Defining Responsibilities at the National Level
Peace, but no Progress: Eritrea, an Unconstitutional State

Bereket Selassie & Mirjam Van Reisen

Introduction

In 2019, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali of Ethiopia following the signing of the Eritrea and Ethiopia Peace agreement in September 2018. When Abiy accepted the post of Prime Minister in April 2018, he immediately announced that Ethiopia would accept the conclusions of the Boundary Commission in relation to the territorial conflict, which both countries must implement. A series of high-level appointments of the State of Eritrea in international organisations followed. One month after the signing of the agreement, Eritrea was elected to the General Assembly of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), a body promoting and protecting human rights. More recently, Eritrea has taken over the chair of the European-led Khartoum Process, which aims to stop human

Although the signing of the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018 was heralded as a new beginning, the Eritrean people have not been able to reap the dividends of peace, as they are still living in a totalitarian dictatorship. This chapter investigates the relationship between peace, progress, and the Constitution of Eritrea, which has never been implemented. Although much awaited, the peace process must be accompanied by implementation of the Constitution, the rule of law, and mechanisms for the protection of human rights, so that the Eritrean people can benefit from peace, move towards rehabilitation and once again live in dignity.

78 Lucie Delecalle and Marco Paron Trivellato provided valuable research support for this chapter.
trafficking (Plaut, 2019). All of these developments have created an expectation that the peace process may lead to an easing of the situation in Eritrea for the Eritrean people. The Peace Agreement has formed the basis for a policy of normalisation of relations with Eritrea, at least for the time being, in the hope that the dividends of peace will materialise by the way of an improvement in the internal situation in Eritrea as well as the regional situation with its neighbours. But meanwhile serious doubts have arisen as to whether Eritrea is able to live up to these expectations, and the absence of progress must explain why President Isaias was not recognized by the Nobel Prize Committee.

The decision by the Nobel Prize Committee to award the Peace Prize to Prime Minister Abiy alone, speaks to the concern that hope of improvements in Eritrea is, as yet, unfounded. This chapter considers the apprehension over the lack of tangible improvements in Eritrea from the perspective of the lack of constitutionality and the absence of any signs that it may return to a constitutional state governed by the rule of law. Plaut calls Eritrea a ‘Mafia State’ (2017), Tronvoll and Mekonnen (2014) refer to it as the ‘Garrison State’ and Riggan (2016) calls it the ‘Struggling State’. The debate on whether or not Eritrea is in fact a constitutional state matters, because if Eritrea is not a constitutional state, then this entirely changes expectations about the dividends that peace may bring.

The existence of a constitutional state is regarded as a sensitive question in Africa, not in the least because the modern African state overlays a rich, functional and meaningful set of governance structures that were overruled and ignored by European colonial rulers and other invaders. The scramble for Africa in Berlin in 1884 redrew the map of Africa without any regard for African realities (Van Reisen, Mawere, Stokmans, Nakazibwe, Van Stam & Ong’ayo, 2019). As a result, it is sometimes suggested that there is tension between constitutionality and African leadership.

Hence, this chapter investigates constitution making in Africa, within the context of peace and stability, taking into account historical and
contextual realities. It discusses certain constitutional principles that are included in most constitutions. It then considers some core issues, relevant to constitutionality in Eritrea, in the context of the peace-making process with its neighbour Ethiopia, before drawing some conclusions. The main research question is: How does the lack of an operable constitution in Eritrea affect the dividends reaped by the people of Eritrea from the 2018 peace agreement between Eritrea with Ethiopia?

The constitution and the rule of law

To understand the fundamental linkages between the rule of law, respect for human rights, and an effective and functioning constitutional system, it is necessary to consider the evolution and definition of the term ‘constitution’. Generally, a constitution is considered to be a set of legal texts defining the role of the various state institutions; it organises their relations, in other words, it defines the powers, rights and duties of bodies in the country. According to Henkin (1994), the constitution of a state specifies the sources of sovereignty, checks and balances, division of power between institutions, judicial control and, above all, individual rights and freedoms. Constitutions also usually include a charter of fundamental rights, as is the case in France,79 or these may be contained in a single text in the form of core democratic values (Civitas, 1991), like in the American Constitution. The constitution is considered to be the highest law in each country (Kelsen & Wilson, 1934); hence, its rights and freedoms are guaranteed and have specific judicial protection (Denoix de Saint Marc, 2009).

Consider South Africa’s constitution: at the end of apartheid, respect for human rights, dignity, freedom and equality were considered essential. Thus, the country’s supreme legal document, which was enacted in 1996, provided legal protection for citizen’s rights and the possibility to hold politicians accountable. It outlined democratic values and principles. The state, thus, became a constitutional democracy (Civic Academy, n.d.).

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79 The Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens (1789) is attached to the French Constitution.
Every constitution in the modern era must contain some core values in order to be considered worthy of the name constitution (McWhinney, 1981). And if we accept the words of a South African scholar that the constitution is the soul of a nation, any constitution without such core values may be likened to a body without a soul (McWhinney, 1981). In our view, a more accurate statement would be: a constitution is a vital requirement of a nation, and constitutionalism is the soul of a constitution, for there have been constitutions without constitutionalism (Elshtain, 1996). The concept of constitutionalism is based on the: “perception of constitution as specific guarantees and on the idea that the political order is subject to a stable and independent of various (first of all political) changes ‘higher law’” (Bieliauskaitė, Šlapkauskas, Vainiutė & Beinoravičius, 2016, p. 378).

It is worth pointing out the connection between constitutional engineering and statecraft. In recent years, state actors, supported by scholars and practitioners, have been increasingly relying on constitutional engineering to create bridges of understanding among different segments in divided societies. In nation building and state construction, particularly in post-colonial African states, defined by colonially-imposed artificial borders, it is better to build bridges than walls, especially in nations divided along ethnic, racial or class lines (Hamilton, Jay & Madison, 1818).

The constitutionality – and, hence, legitimacy – of a state authority can be determined by a set of criteria, which also make common sense, and which ensure that the powers of the authority are used within the boundaries set to protect the citizens. The checklist for the rule of law (or Rechtsstaat) can be identified using the following broad criteria (Venice Mission of the Council of Europe, n.d.):

- The principle of legality
- Legal certainty
- Prohibition on arbitrariness
- Access to an independent and impartial judge
- Non-discrimination and equality of the law
- Separation of powers and checks and balances
- Respect for human rights in a broad sense

The constitutional foundation of a state aims to provide the basic mechanisms for the rule of law to function, within broad respect for human rights.

**Models of constitution making**

Historically, we can discern three main methods of constitution making. The first is the classical method, the Philadelphia model (Selassie, 2003). The American constitutional convention held in Philadelphia in 1787 comprised representatives of the then 13 states and combined the function of a drafting commission and constituent assembly. The constituent character of the Convention was partial, in that the draft coming out of the Philadelphia Convention had to be ratified by the legislature of each of the 13 states.

The second example, which may be called the Westminster model (Harding, 2004), is the one followed by countries with established democratic systems. Under this model the drafting is left to the parliament, or a committee of the parliament, and the ratification done by a large majority (e.g., two-thirds) of the next parliament or by popular referendum. The assumption is that the parliament represents all the constituent members of the political community in the country concerned, which may not be necessarily the case. In fact, there may be instances in which the parliament is simply what James Tully calls “an imperial center” (Selassie, 2010). A recent example of this is the attempt by the Scottish nationalists to obtain sovereignty for Scotland through the Scottish Parliament, which was defeated by the Parliament in Westminster (the imperial parliament), a defeat which the Scottish nationalists still hope to reverse (Spiers, 2015).

The third example is the use of a constitutional commission (Ghai, 2016), which has gained ground in recent years. In this model a specially mandated drafting commission submits a draft constitution to an elected constituent assembly to ratify it. Many African countries
have adopted this model, including Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda. In Namibia, the elected parliament turned itself into a constituent assembly. The common feature of this new type of constitution making in Africa is that it marks a break with the past, when constitutions used to be drafted by experts in the capitals of the metropolis (London, Paris or Brussels), where the debate was limited to among the ruling elite. This is what I (first author) have called in some of my writings the Lancaster House model (Selassie, 2003).

The case of Eritrea

The significance of the constitutional commission model, exemplified by the Eritrean case, is the participation of the public in making the constitution. The law establishing the Constitutional Commission of Eritrea charged the Commission with organising and managing “a wide-ranging and all-embracing national debate and education through public seminars and lecture series on constitutional principles and practices” (Proclamation No. 55/1994 establishing the Constitutional Commission in Eritrea, 1994, Article 4[4]; see State of Eritrea, 1994). The law also provided that, following the public debate on a constitutional draft, the Commission must submit the draft to the National Assembly, having taken the views of the public into account, and that the approved draft must then be submitted to a Constituent Assembly for ratification (State of Eritrea, 1994).

The establishment of the Commission was envisaged in the law that reorganised the Government of Eritrea in the post-referendum period of 1993. That law charged the government, inter alia, with “…preparing the ground and laying the foundation for a democratic system of government” (State of Eritrea, 1994). The National Assembly established the Constitutional Commission in fulfilment of that goal. The Commission, which was accountable to the National Assembly, was composed of a Council of 50 members and an Executive Committee of 10 members drawn from the Council. The Chairman of the Commission presided over both the Council and the Executive Committee. In Eritrea, there was general agreement among the members of the Commission that the process of making the
Constitution, including the drafting, is as important as the product of the process, namely, the final text of the constitution (Selassie, 2010).

**Relevant questions**

Constitution makers start by asking two related questions: First, what should be included in the constitution and, second, how long should the constitution be? These questions logically raise a third question: How does one determine what should or should not be included in the constitution? In other words, is there a set of universally applicable principles, or is each country’s choice determined by its specific (historical) conditions? In answer to the last question, both are true (Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute, n.d.). From the writing of the American Constitution onward, modern constitutions have been based on preceding models or experience, modified to suit the conditions of the particular country. How much such modification affects the universal principles differs from case to case. Nonetheless, the point of departure must be the historical, socio-political situation in the country concerned. Let us note that not everything in the American Constitution was a novel invention, owing nothing to other ideas and experiences. In crafting what later became a model, the American Constitution makers borrowed ideas like separation of powers from the French Enlightenment (Potofsky, 2002) and the federal system of government from the confederacy of the Iroquois nation (Feathers & Feathers, 2007).

As to the length of the constitution, some scholars have attempted to provide general rules for good constitution writing. For example, British scholar and statesman, Lord Bryce, affirms the rule of brevity in writing a constitution, adding simplicity of language and precision as essential requirements. In this respect, he ranks the American Constitution above all other written constitutions:

...for the intrinsic excellence of its scheme, its adaptation to the circumstances of the people, the simplicity, brevity, and precision of its language, its judicious mixture of definiteness in principle with elasticity in detail. (Bryce cited in Krieger, 2001)
The last phrase is worth emphasising: a judicious mixture of definiteness in principle with *elasticity* in detail. This pithy statement suggests that drafting a constitution can be likened to both a work of art and an engineering project. As such, it can test the writing skills of the best draftsman in terms of choice of language, precision and clarity, while at the same time requiring craftsmanship to build the edifice of state institutions. An edifice should be built to last and, in the case of a constitutional edifice, it has to be built to weather the storms brought about by changing political fortunes.

Another counsel of the wise comes from Abbé Sieyes, who insists that a constitution must be neutral. Sieyes, who influenced the constitution making in post-revolutionary France, counselled that the constitution must be kept neutral or at least open-ended in political and ideological terms, particularly in relation to the bill of rights, otherwise they might be too closely identified with the “transient fortunes of a particular party or pressure group, and rise and fall with them” (Selassie, 2010). Neutrality is arguably a pivotal concept in this respect; even a partisan of a ruling group can see the rationale behind Sieyes’ counsel, assuming that such partisan is clearheaded and can see the perils of being wrapped only in the present or in parochial concerns.

The foregoing introductory remarks will hopefully prepare the ground for our discussion on the challenges of constitution making in Africa, focused on one particular country, Eritrea. We will also make reference to other African countries as need be. Let us start with a discussion of some constitutional principles.

**Constitutional principles**

*Rule of law*

The rule of law is a mechanism, practice, or norm that maintains the equality of all citizens before the law (Choi, n.d.) – meaning that the law is superior to any political power and all persons are subject to the law. In accordance with this definition, the power – or government – should favour principles of law and condemn any
attempt by judicial or other authorities to subvert the law. This system became popularised towards the end of the 19th Century in Great Britain and Germany, as ‘Rechtsstaat’ (Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2017a; 2017b), to counter the power of the absolute monarchy (Jean, 2018). According to the German theory, Rechtsstaat guarantees the state and citizens’ freedoms: the sovereign is limited by the principle of legality, which places the law above public authorities. The concept of ‘Rechtsstaat’ or ‘rule of law’ was imported into France by Léon Duguit in 1907 under the name ‘Etat de droit’.

This concept has transcended time and borders: the rule of law is the cornerstone of the European Union (EU), embodying one of the EU’s fundamental values (European Union, 2008, Article 2). Indeed, the EU is filled with the spirit of the rule of law, as reflected in the rule of law checklist of the Venice Commission, also known as the European Commission for Democracy through Law, which was adopted on 12 March 2016 (Council of Europe, 2016). In addition, the EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Věra Jourová, in a Press Conference on 28 May 2018 for the 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard, stated that “Democracy, civic rights and due management of EU funds are under threat without the rule of law” (European Commission, 2018; see also Brzozowski, 2018). However, the implementation of the rule of law by the EU has been called into question recently, as illustrated by the case of the Foundation of Human Rights for Eritreans, which summoned the European Commission alleging that it was violating EU law by funding projects in Eritrea, thereby contributing to the implementation of programmes executed with forced labour (The Guardian, 2019).

An important question is to consider whether or not, and, if so, how, the definition and understanding of the rule of law differs on the
African continent? Writing for the International Journal on Human Rights, Makau Mutua said that the rule of law is often seen as a:

…panacea for ensuring a successful, fair and modern democracy which enables sustainable development. [But no] African country has [ever] truly thrown off the shackles of colonial rule and emerged as a truly just nation state – even though many have the rule of law at the heart of their constitutions [...] the concept must be adapted accordingly to take into account the cultural, geographic and economic peculiarities of each state. (Mutua, 2016)

So, what should an African adaptation of the rule of law be based on? Mawere (2009) proposes an African conception. Writing on the specifically thorny issue of euthanasia and the right to choose death, as analysed in Shona culture in Zimbabwe, Mawere notes:

The Shona people have a tradition rich with knowledge, culture and wisdom that enriched and inspired our ancestors. Tsumo (proverbs), madimikira (idioms), ngano (folklore) and popular sayings are traditionally used to inculcate traditional values, customary laws and the general rules of conduct in Shona society, hence it is in these sociological models that the position (against euthanasia) by the Shona people on euthanasia is drawn. (Mawere, 2009)

Drawing on both African and European notions of the basis of the law in a society as a moral community, Mawere concludes that the aim is to protect the wholeness of society:

In the Western tradition, there are also some scholars who like the Shonas argue that euthanasia is morally wrong for the simple reason that everything naturally loves itself. Besides, every part belongs to the whole and so death injures the whole society. Thomas Aquinas for example, argues that “everything naturally loves itself and, every part as such belongs to the whole. Every man is part of the community. As such man belongs to the community. By having his life terminated, he injures himself and the community to which he belongs”. (Mawere, 2009, p. 105)
According to Mawere, the sanctity of life is central to the protection of the community as one:

*Thus, the Shonas hold the same view, as this is captured in the idiom, Kufa izwa rimwe, kuora igore (Death is one day, corruption is a year). This idiom warns people to beware of what may harm a person and have long-lasting consequences to oneself and society [...]. Thus, in Shona society choosing death in whatever circumstances is considered harmful, destructive and a loss not only to the bearer of life but to family, friends and the community to which the one whose life is terminated is a member.* (Mawere, 2009, p. 105)

The rule of law and its constitutional framework can also be looked at using Mawere’s analysis, based on deep foundational ethical norms and beliefs, which may change over time, but are also are rooted in a deeply religiously embedded understanding of the dignity of life:

*It seems clear that though this view is contentious, it has gained wide acceptance and veneration through the ages, especially in the African cultures because of a respect for the sanctity of life and conformity to the biblical ethics of “Do not kill” (Deuteronomy 20) which is commonly taken as the foundation for ethical concern by the Shona culture and African cultures in general.* (Mawere, 2009, p. 105)

In this sense, the rule of law, or Rechtsstaat, is not a relative idea at the disposition of rulers, but ultimately belongs to the community. The task of the constitution is to protect this process.

This idea – which is more than 2,000 years old – lived through antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment and the modern era. The rule of law appeared in Christian, Jewish and Muslim texts, Classical Greek philosophical essays, and political and legal trials. More recently this notion has been upheld in international and European treaties and national constitutions. The theory that political power cannot be the supreme power was actually present in the Bible: according to Hebrew kings in the Old Testament, God's law – equivalent to justice – was the supreme norm and humans were not
allowed to betray it (Bible Gateway, n.d.-a). This is reiterated in the New Testament, when Peter and the Apostles, who were brought to the high priest because they were standing in the temple courts, answered: “We must obey God rather than human authority” (Bible Gateway, n.d.-b).

The superiority of the law over civil and political power is also developed by several Classical Greek authors. Plato, in his book Statesman (Berges, 2010) and Aristotle in Politics (Cleary & Gurtler, 2000), argued that it is more appropriate for the law to govern, than any citizen. Cicero stated in his book The Republic and the Law that:

The law can’t be countermanded, nor can it be in any way amended, nor can it be totally rescinded. [...] There won’t be one such law in Rome and another in Athens, one now and another in the future, but all people at all times will be embraced by a single and eternal and unchangeable law; and there will be, as it were, one lord and master of us all […]. (Cicero, Rudd & Powell, 1998, p. 83).

Titus Livius added a nuance to Cicero’s definition: “Imperia legum potentiora quam hominum” (Nemo, 2018), which Algernon Sidney and James Harrington translated as “the government of laws not of men” (Houston, 1991).

Democracy
The first author teaches comparative constitutional law in the United States and has been involved in drafting constitutions, including the Constitution of Eritrea, as well as comparative studies of constitutions and constitution making. In this duty, the first author has noticed that comparative constitution making has become a popular subject among scholars, policymakers and practitioners. This development can be traced back to the experience of Eastern Europe in the post-Soviet era, which essentially involved a democratic transition from autocracy. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989

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80“And you, Ezra, in accordance with the wisdom of your God, which you possess, appoint magistrates and judges to administer justice to all the people of Trans-Euphrates – all who know the laws of your God. And you are to teach any who do not know them” (Bible Gateway, n.d.-a).
coincided with popular movements demanding democratic transition in much of Africa, and constitution making became the principal method of achieving democracy, with constitutionalism as a prime element of that objective. Constitution making and constitutionalism, which had been consigned by reductionist ideology to a mere superstructure, have attained a higher status in the current discourse. There has been a paradigm shift.

In constitution making in this modern era, more emphasis is given to process than in earlier times. This emphasis is related to the democratic imperative as the governing principle. For example, in a long-running comparative constitutional study in which I (first author) was involved, cosponsored by the US Institute of Peace and the United Nations Development Programme, the study focused on the process of constitution making more than the content of the constitution (Hart, 2003). The rationale behind this focus is the conviction that process-driven constitution making is better than previous approaches, which depended on the decisions of a select group of people, be they distinguished statesmen, as were the framers of the American Constitution, or a select committee of the government of the day and its expert legal draftsmen, as was the case with the independence constitutions of many African countries.

The process involved in drafting the constitutions of African countries on the eve of their independence excluded African populations from participating in the making of the basic law by which they were to be governed (Selassie, 2010). Indeed, preventing people from being properly involved in the making of their constitution sharpens the risk they will not support the constitution, which can lead to instability, or even revolution, especially in countries undergoing a post-conflict transition. However, no analysis devoted to process can avoid reference to substance. Process and product are dialectically linked: the end prescribes the means and the means impinges on the end. To put it differently, the democratic imperative demands the involvement of the public – the process empowers the public, giving its members a sense of ownership of the constitution and allowing them to air their views on a range of critical
issues that affect their lives. And, public participation in the making of a constitution necessarily raises questions of substance.

Let us probe a little further; so what is democracy? An important part of the contemporary debate on the meaning of democracy concerns the criteria applied to evaluate progress in a democratic transition. A proper debate on the meaning of democracy must first of all focus on its substantive aspects – that is, its source and purpose. Then it can focus on procedure. The classical approach defines democracy in terms of its source and purpose, with the will of the people its source and the common good its purpose. However, in recent times, emphasis has shifted to the procedural aspect as the central feature of democracy, namely, the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people. Implicit in this concept of electoral democracy is the conviction that popular participation and competition are crucial components of a democratic government.

But the question remains: do elections equal democracy? Certainly, elections are a critical part of it, to the extent that elected bodies, as representative institutions, are the primary national institutions accountable to the citizens of a country. But once the representatives are elected, their responsibilities do not end when the election is over. In other words, an election is a means to an end – the end being the proper functioning of representative institutions, which constitute the substantive aspect of democracy. The procedural imperative, although essential, must be analysed in relation to the role of representative institutions in the totality of the constitutional order. Commenting on the undue emphasis placed on process, Jean Bethke Elshtain of Chicago University wrote:

*Democracy is not and has never been primarily a means whereby popular will is tabulated and carried out but, rather, a political world within which citizens negotiate, compromise, engage and hold themselves and those they choose to represent them accountable for action taken. Have we lost this deliberative dimension of democracy? Democracy’s enduring promise is that citizens can come to know a good in common that they cannot know alone.* (Elshtain, 1996)
It is hard to disagree with this statement. Indeed, the other core objectives that we will consider later are shaped, or at least influenced, by the process in which “citizens negotiate, compromise and engage” (Soyinka et al., 2015) in the daily business of the government and in social interactions. To sum up, democracy is the keystone of the entire edifice of the political system of countries in the modern era.

**Stability**

In the life of a nation, stability, as a core value, often goes together with national unity – and the two are essential conditions for social and economic progress. Indeed, the continued existence of the nation depends on them, and the other core values – democracy, sustainable development, social justice and stability – are dependent on them. Only people who have not experienced the dislocating effects of turbulence caused by lack of stability and unity, or who have a dim memory of such effects, can ever question this simple fact.

But what are the conditions that sustain stability? Well, first of all, stability is not simply the absence of conflict, just as peace is not simply the absence of war. True stability cannot be imposed by force. Rather, for stability, citizens must be secure under the rule of law, as opposed to arbitrary personal rule; the government must be subject to the law, just as individual citizens are; no one can be above the law; and everyone must be equal under the law. In a democratic society, citizens know this to be a fundamental constitutional principle.

One of the favourite American founding fathers, Benjamin Franklin, who was a member of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, was asked by a citizen as he came out of the final meeting of the convention what the convention had done. His quick response was:

“We have given you a republic, if you can keep it” 81 (Farrand, 1911). Franklin died the following year aged 84, but the constitution has survived for over 200 years. It has helped the republic to become the wonder that we know today, even with the

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81 Quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin in the words of James McHenry.
state of virtual dysfunction that assails it from time to time due to polarized politics. Another gem among Ben Franklin’s sayings is one that is the basis of stability and that should be posted on every citizen’s door: “The price of liberty is eternal vigilance”. (Burger, 1991)

Whenever the rule of law is violated for any reason, even for reasons of state security, a clash of values occurs, which can lead to serious conflict. In such a situation, a well-informed citizen who knows his/her rights, would invoke another equally basic value, i.e., human rights.

**Human rights**

We will begin the discussion of human rights with a quote from Alexander Hamilton, one of America’s founding fathers. It is remarkable, not least because it comes from a man who was better known for being the father of the American banking system:

*The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rampaged for among old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam in the whole value of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.* (Hamilton et al., 1818)

It is hard to believe that a banker penned these words. Such eloquent, poetic expression of human rights reflects the spirit of the ‘Age of Reason’, couched in the language of natural law philosophy. Written in 1775, Hamilton’s statement presaged that most eloquent of historic documents, the American Declaration of Independence (Selassie, 2003), which came one year later. Hamilton’s language reflects the mood of the Enlightenment, linking reason with God. The attribution of the writing of the “sacred rights of mankind” suggests a reference to the Ten Commandments, in the authorship of which Moses was (to believers) merely an agent, a divinely chosen medium (as Mohammed was of the Holy Qur’an). That the Ten Commandments impose more duties than they confer rights does not diminish their power in Judeo-Christian theology (Sicker, 2003).
Concerning the source of human rights, there has been an ongoing debate between the proponents of natural law and those of the Realist school. In its contemporary phase, the debate boils down to whether human rights are absolute or relative values. On first reading, Jefferson and the framers of the American Constitution seem to subscribe to the view that human rights are absolute values. But Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution proclaim that all men are created equal as a ‘self-evident’ truth at a time when slavery was an accepted institution, and Jefferson himself a slave owner and known to dally with pretty black girls (Greene Bowmand, 2016). We should also remember that women had no right to vote until a century and a half later.

The conclusion is that absolute may be relative in response to the complexities of the world. Hannah Ahrendt solved this problem by identifying human rights at the core as the right to have rights, the right to have a place in the world. These rights are undeniable, even in the absence of a state or if a state does not award any rights. Ahrendt strongly argues that those who are stateless and cannot access rights through the system of states still have rights and that this is an absolute. What is relative is that the implementation of human rights depends on the human rights culture (Rorty, 1993). This recognition of the location of human rights within the living culture was discussed by the founders of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), the basis of the human rights system (Borgman, Plessius & Van Reisen, 2012), and one of the achievements of post-World War II period. Since then, human rights have seen incremental growth and universal acceptance in all their varied forms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided the basic framework for the development of human rights and influenced the writing of national constitutions in this respect. Human rights and democracy, as the paramount political values of our epoch, reinforce each other. A climax in the evolution of human rights was reached in 1966 with the adoption by the United Nations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966a), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966b) and the
declaration of their interdependence in 1993 (UN General Assembly, 1993) for the full realisation of human rights. But the struggle continues in terms of their application, all the time and in all places – in some places more than others (Makei, 2012).

Today, even dictatorial regimes pay lip service to human rights as enshrined in these international legal instruments. And the majority of governments have ratified them and included their essential elements in their national constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg & Simmons, 2013). Some of these rights have such a high level of acceptance that they are not under dispute – whether or not the government has ratified the relevant treaties or made reference to them in their constitution or national legislation. Among these is the right to be free from torture and enslavement.

**Sustainable development**

Sustainable development is defined in the Brundtland Report as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland & World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). This definition reconciles two seemingly contradictory goals – environmental conservation and economic growth. And it offers a solution to today’s global crisis: the crisis of mass poverty and the excessive consumption by the minority. In terms of the global political economy, the two issues of excessive consumption by the minority and mass poverty have been the driving forces behind environmental degradation. This is why the environmental movement is perhaps humanity’s most important movement in the contemporary world. It is also the reason why sustainable development, properly understood and applied, is one of the core values that must be considered in the constitution making of a country.

As indicated above, a distinction can be drawn between economic growth and sustainable development. Economic growth is measured in terms of the quantity of goods and services provided over a given time frame, usually a year (tonnes of steel, bushels of wheat, bales of
cotton or coffee, kilowatts of electricity, etc.). Thus, the gross national product of a country is the amount of goods and services produced in a year. On the other hand, the definition of sustainable development includes something qualitative in addition to growth, including due care taken in the protection and preservation of the environment and the ecosystem, such that economic growth does not adversely affect the interests of future generations, and does not involve hazards to the health and wellbeing of present generations. Is it any wonder that it is considered a core value and essential subject to be included in a constitutional provision?

This idea of sustainable development must be read together with what has been called the new generation of human rights: the right to clean air, clean water, food and employment (Ruppel, n.d.). As already noted, these core values are interconnected and interdependent, but their pursuit can also lead to clashes between or among them, as conflicting demands are made by different segments of society. A growth-oriented state and allied business interests may demand economic growth that does not take into account the environmental damage involved in such growth. In terms of economic growth, there is the advantage of adding more acreage to agricultural development, with the related increase in goods, services and employment. The best example of this is development in the Amazon region of South America, in which agribusiness companies aim to undertake the wholesale destruction of forest areas, clearing the forest for agriculture and timber. Opposed to such schemes are environmental groups and their allies in the government (Gonzales, 2019). This represents a clash of values, with the government and its business associates claiming that such economic growth would generate revenue and jobs for the poor, and environmental groups and their allies claiming that the destruction of the forest will cause permanent damage to the ecosystem and give rise to climate change and related hazards. That this is an unresolved issue is borne out by the failure of the international conference on climate change in Copenhagen (BBC, 2009). Important work is now being carried out to reconcile the Sustainable Development Goals and the existing human rights framework, so that the framework is conducive to sustainability and
to ensure that the goals are strengthened by the human rights framework, which has been built by the international community since 1948 (Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2019).

**Social justice**

Often confused with socialism, the concept of social justice is of recent origin in terms of its inclusion as a constitutional principle. Its application dovetails with human rights principles; indeed, scholars of human rights include aspects of social justice in what they call second generation human rights (Mubangizi, 2004). The success of the application of the other values discussed in the preceding section can also depend on whether or not, and to what extent, they contribute to the attainment of social justice. Human rights may be partly judged by the achievement of human security, measured in terms of the provision, or lack of provision, of some services to citizens.

To this end, the United Nations has created a system of measurement called the Human Development Index (HDI). This is a useful measure of human wellbeing that goes beyond gross domestic product (GDP), and beyond the production of goods and the building of roads and bridges and other infrastructure, important as these are. Poor people throughout the world do not have the ability to attain wellbeing, or even to “picture what wellbeing means”, as one poor Indonesian woman said to some Oxford University researchers (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, n.d.). The HDI embraces different dimensions of human development, including the availability of affordable and adequate nutrition, affordable education, access to good health services, and affordable housing in safe neighbourhoods (Krieger, 2001).

A memorable statement written in an Alabama jail by the late Martin Luther King Jr speaks to this: “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” (King, 1963). It is an incisive statement articulating in simple language the idea of social justice. It was written in an attempt to persuade America of the injustice of racial discrimination. The statement postulates that justice, like peace, is indivisible. Why?
Because the breakout of conflict in one area will impact on neighbouring areas. Peace is indivisible. By the same token, a wounded segment of society, wounded by benign neglect like the inner city of a prosperous town, or by the malignant hostility of an errant leader of a country, will affect the rest. Justice is indivisible; the denial of justice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. It took a prophetic voice and long struggle to cause America to address the wounds of its history.

How do you constitutionalise social justice? With all due humility, as an example, we cite a provision concerning social justice from a constitution, the first author had a hand in drafting. The aim is to make concrete in constitutional terms an abstract idea like social justice. Under the heading ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Right and Responsibilities’, Article 21 of the Constitution of Eritrea in 1997 provides as follows (State of Eritrea, 1997):

1. Every citizen has the right of equal access to publicly funded social services. The state shall endeavor, within the limits of its resources, to make available to all citizens, health, education, cultural and other social services.

2. The state shall secure, within available means, the social welfare of all citizens and particularly those disadvantaged.

3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in any economic activity and to engage in any lawful business.

Furthermore, the last clause of Article 21 (sub-article 5) enjoins the National Assembly to enact laws guaranteeing and securing the social welfare of citizens, including the rights and conditions of labour and other rights and responsibilities listed in Article 21.

So, what has social justice to do with constitution making? We trust that the foregoing discussion has explained how social justice as a core value or objective has everything to do with the constitution.
The constitutionality of the State of Eritrea

Constitution of Eritrea

After independence from Ethiopia in 1991, Eritrea formed a Constitutional Commission to draft a constitution for the new state (State of Eritrea, 1994). In due course, this constitution was written and promulgated (State of Eritrea, 1997). In September 1997, President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea delivered an address at a conference in West Sussex, England on the constitutional process of Eritrea. He keenly set out that the building of a society should expand to include the traditional and historically evolved principles relevant to an African context in a modern society. He listed six fundamental principles (Afwerki, 1998):

- the right to a fair share of national resources
- equal opportunity
- the right to full respect and protection of one’s dignity
- the right to unhindered movement and freedom of expression
- institutional guarantees (a constitution and a judiciary)
- and responsible, transparent and non-corrupt government

Afwerki also listed the causes of the problems with the democratisation process in post-colonial Africa. Unfortunately, as history will tell, he backed away from the idea of democracy. Hence, the Constitution of Eritrea has never been implemented (Zere, 2018), and none of the six points listed by Afwerki have been realised for the majority of Eritrean people.

Rule of law in Eritrea

The British Parliament, by implementing the rule of law in the 17th and 18th centuries (under the Bill of Rights in 1689 and later the Acts of Settlement in 1701 and 1703) – to balance the royal power – developed three constitutive aspects related to the rule of law. First, the equality of all before the law; second, the subjection of political power (including the monarchy) to the laws of the country; and, finally, the idea that even a government democratically elected cannot act in a discretionary manner (Dicey, 1885). Since the Parliament
represents the legislative power, i.e., the source of the law, this institution is, therefore, the supreme one.

While the Eritrean state institutions are built on a similar logic, the rule of law is absent in Eritrea. As power is concentrated in the President and his advisors, they have full control over the government and the judiciary without any checks and balances. The Parliament has not met in 20 years and holds no power independent from the President’s office. The execution of policy and the implementation of the law is arbitrary and dependent on favour, lacking equality before the law. The President exercises a firm control over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, breaching the division of power, a fundamental principle of the rule of law.

In Eritrea, divergence of opinion is not tolerated. According to a report by the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, “the rule of law affirms that the people have a right to know what their government does and how the arms and institutions of state relate with each other. In this way, the people can exercise their duty to elect governments” (Centre for Human Rights, 2015, p. 6). In Eritrea, no elections have ever taken place and freedom of opinion and of speech is severely lacking. Since the 2001 ‘crackdown’ (Plaut, 2017), information and freedoms have been censored. Since then, the situation has worsened: media outlets have been shut down, private press outlawed, journalists detained, and some religions banned. In 2018, Freedom House scored Eritrea as ‘Not Free’ (Freedom House, 2018).

While the Eritrean people have traditionally placed trust in the government of President Afwerki – and have been expected to perform their duties and obey the law – those in power have broken this trust by ignoring the most basic principles of the rule of law.

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82 In September 2001, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki banned independent newspapers, arrested and imprisoned senior government officials, leading to insecurity and arbitrary arrests.
within the country and outside its borders. Plaut refers to Eritrea as a mafia state:

*Eritrea is no ordinary state; rather it resembles a criminal organisation designed to keep its citizens in perpetual servitude. It behaves like a mafia organisation: with covert finances but without a constitution, legislature or elections, run by the country’s president and his closest associates.* (Plaut, 2017)

The last two decades have brought Eritrea closer to the law of the jungle, which according to Rudyard Kipling in his work *Jungle Book* is a “place devoid of ethics where brutality and self-interest reign” (1894), meaning that people do whatever is necessary to survive or succeed (Ammer, 2003) and live a life in fear (UN Human Rights Commission, 2015, 2016).

In any democratic system, people place trust in their government, expecting it to perform duties according to the promises it made and by virtue of the law. In actual fact, promises and laws are frequently broken, which raises the issue of responsibility. This is exactly why accountability and transparency need to be legally and constitutionally required (Selassie, 2011).

**The Eritrean 2% diaspora tax**
The result of the lack of constitutionality in Eritrea is well illustrated by the 2% diaspora tax levied by the Eritrean regime on members of the diaspora. According to a report by DSP-Groep & Tilburg School of Humanities (Buysse, Van Reisen & Van Soomeren, 2017) presented to the Dutch Parliament, *The 2% Tax for Eritreans in the Diaspora*, the 2% tax is an income tax based on two Eritrean proclamations: Proclamation to Provide for the Collection of Rehabilitation Tax (State of Eritrea, 1991) and Proclamation to Provide for the Collection of Tax from Eritreans who Earn Income while Living Abroad (State of Eritrea, 1995) – although neither law clearly applies in this situation. In addition, under the 1997 Constitution, which was ratified, but never implemented, the National Assembly is the only competent institution entitled to levy taxes, but the National Assembly has not met since 2002, and the tax
is currently collected by embassies and ‘representatives’ of the
government, without any (paper) trail or financial accountability
mechanisms. Hence, the 2% diaspora tax has an uncertain legal basis
(Buysse et al., 2017).

The 2% tax is a perfect illustration of what Laub (2016) calls the ‘rule
of fear’ and has been described by the UN Commission of Inquiry on
Human Rights in Eritrea as a: “pervasive control system [that] is used
in absolute arbitrariness to keep the population in a state of
permanent anxiety. It is not law that rules Eritreans – but fear” (UN
describes the 2% tax as ‘protection money’, which is levied through
intimidation, extortion, coercion and social pressure over its citizens,
extending the control of the government to diaspora communities
outside the country, including children of Eritrean citizens who were
born abroad and hold foreign citizenship. Although many officials of
the Eritrea government describe the tax as voluntary, “the 2% Tax is
perceived as mandatory by Eritreans in the diaspora and […] non-
compliance may result in a range of consequences”, such as refusal of
consular services to members of the diaspora and threats to relatives
in Eritrea, to name a few (Buysse et al., 2017, p. 10). As well as a
mechanism to control the diaspora, the tax has been recognised “as a
form of intelligence gathering” (Buysse et al., 2017, p. 14) and a way
of proving allegiance to the government.

The research also found that “the tax is potentially illegal in its
application in practice, and concluded, inter alia, that it is collected
using coercion and intimidation” (Buysse et al., 2017, p. 10). Reacting
to the research results, the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD), an organisation expert on international
taxation, concluded the following:

*There are significant problems if, in the absence of international agreements of mutual assistance in the collection of taxes, people formally or informally representing the interest of Eritrea undertake actions on the territory of another State to force people to pay an Eritrean tax. We consider this as unprecedented in international tax law*
and as a violation of the sovereignty of the Netherlands [or another European country] from a public international law perspective. (Buysse et al., 2017)

In an opinion on the legality of the tax raised by the Eritrean authorities on its diaspora, Nollkaemper stated:

*International law draws boundaries regarding the way the levy and particularly the collection of a diaspora tax can take place. […] The answer as to whether or not the Netherlands can prohibit the levying and/or collection of the 2% tax depends to a large extent on how this levying and collection takes place.* (Buysse et al., 2017, p. 9)

Therefore, it can be concluded that the lack of rule of law not only extends to citizens within the country, but also to those in the diaspora. This causes undue strain in the country itself, as well as abroad, while also undermining the rule of law in foreign countries through interference over their citizens (of Eritrean descent) through control exercised by the ‘long arm’ of the Eritrean government.

**The rise of totalitarianism**
The lack of implementation of the Eritrean constitution has contributed to the lack of checks and balances, which has enabled Eritrea’s authoritarian regime, which has been accused of ongoing crimes against humanity by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea (UN Human Rights Council, 2016). This constitutional vacuum enabled the delay and eventual abandonment of (presidential) elections, allowing President Afwerki's totalitarianism to emerge, as well as grave and systematic human rights violations, resulting in the mass exodus of Eritreans. This and other measures have created what the UN Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights in Eritrea refers to as a ‘culture of fear’ and Laub (2016) refers to as the ‘rule of fear’.

According to Jennifer Riggan (2012), many Eritreans see their country as a prison. Indeed, those who have been able to flee the country, describe the terrible conditions in National Service and the inhumane treatment inflicted on those serving, referring to Eritrea an open-air
prison (Riggan, 2012; see also Mary, 2013 and Teckle, 2018). Van Reisen and Mawere (2017) describe the state of ‘deliberate poverty’ in the country as a mechanism used to encourage young people to flee the country, putting them in a desperate situation, from which those in power in Eritrea benefit in multiple ways (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017).

In various ways, the quality of rule of law within a constitutional framework is also relevant for the legitimacy and constitutionality of the policies of the regime. In that respect, a constitution (written or unwritten) represents a democratic prerogative with core values and a guarantee of citizen rights. However, this privilege is not always granted. A country without a constitution cannot codify the rule of law and, therefore, does not have any legal or efficient way to limit the state or government’s power and, thus, cannot ensure legal protection for its citizens.

**Peace, but no progress**

Notwithstanding the reconciliation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the high expectations of Eritreans and the international community, nothing has changed to allow the Eritrean people to access their rights or implement the Constitution. This is reflected in the continuation of indefinite National Service, despite the signing of the peace agreement with Ethiopia in 2018, causing the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kate Gilmore, to state: “Conscripts continue to confront open-ended duration of service, far beyond the 18 months stipulated in law and often under abusive conditions, which may include the use of torture, sexual violence and forced labour” (UN Human Rights Council, 2019). Similar calls have been made by the UN Human Rights Committee, which has recommended that Eritrea end its National Service and expressed concern about its continued use under severely exploitative circumstances. Lopatka (1980) states that we cannot completely consider a peace process in a society in which human rights and fundamental freedoms are violated on mass. Moreover, the peace process has not included the Eritrean people or its National Assembly. In addition to a lack of participation by the Eritrean people
in the peace process, there is little evidence of an improvement in any real sense for the people in Eritrea. Hence, despite the hope that peace always gives, at the moment of writing, every day hundreds of Eritreans are leaving the country due to these conditions, often lured into the arms of human smugglers and traffickers, facing an uncertain and dangerous future (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017).

Conclusion

Peace is a vital element in building a society in which people can live in dignity. Peace means accepting the unity of the world at large, recognising neighbours and valuing those who are part of our community. Peace has to be built within the moral framework given to us by our forefathers and leaders. African tradition and philosophy is clear and unequivocal in recognising the communal imperative of peace.

The link between a peace process and the rule of law, legal and judicial system, and democratic system of a country has been supported by several scholars (e.g., Tronvoll & Mekonnen, 2017). The Eritrean peace process cannot be considered complete if it is not accompanied by the implementation of the Constitution and the rule of law, as well as mechanisms for the protection of human rights. The Eritrean Constitution is an inclusive framework that offers the mechanisms to advance the wellbeing of society, while upholding the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the need to advance social justice and sustainable development. But, unfortunately, it has never been implemented, arguably because of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the political opportunism of the Afwerki regime, which used this conflict as an excuse not to implement the constitution, shattered the democratic promise of Eritrea (Patterson, n.d.), heightening its isolation and allowed a dictatorship to emerge.

Prima facie, the peace agreement appears to be the long-awaited remedy, ending the 50-year conflict and providing an opportunity to redesign Afwerki's rule. At least this should be the starting point of
any effort towards rebuilding peace. Indeed, the peace process marks a diplomatic, military and democratic shift, reinforced by Eritrea's appointment as Chair of the Khartoum Process in 2019 and member of the General Assembly of the Human Rights Council in late 2018.

However, stability is conditional upon the existence of the other core values or fundamental principles underpinning a democratic and human-centred order (such as rule of law and human rights), which are non-existent in Eritrea. Although the peace agreement is a step forward, it has not involved the participation of the people, or included steps towards the implementation of basic conditions for constitutionality, such as the rule of law, democracy, stability, human rights, sustainable development and social justice. While people have welcomed the peace agreement, they are yearning for a country in which they can live with a little dignity.

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Chapter 20

Moving Through the Policy Window: Women in Constitution Making in Kenya

Stella Maranga

Introduction

The importance of constitutional reform to women’s rights and gender equality cannot be understated. This is especially so in Kenya with its fragile post-colonial political order. Unfortunately until the constitution was passed in 2010, the Kenyan government had largely failed to assure women of their rights and retained many laws that legitimised the subordination of women. Moreover, the structures and administration that support these laws and the socio-economic realities in Kenya are stacked against women (Kameri-Mbote, 2003; Domingo, McCullough, Simbiri & Wanjala, 2016). The 2010 Constitution of Kenya was a product of years of social pressure as a result of democratisation and by political movements keen to address the failings of the prevailing political order. Until that time, gender injustices and women’s empowerment had not emerged strongly as social justice issues in the mainstream in Kenya, but during the constitutional review process these issues garnered national attention and the women’s movement

The rule of law is critical to ensure inclusive societies and political participation. This chapter investigates how political participation was increased as part of Kenya’s constitutional review process in 2010, opening a policy window for women’s rights and gender equality to be placed firmly on the decision-making agenda. The women’s movement in Kenya united to move swiftly through this policy window, in what has been hailed as one of the most successful feminist engagements of our time, resulting in the inclusion of what some consider to be radical gender equality provisions in the Constitution of Kenya.
emerged as one of the most effective mobilisers for constitutional reform.

This chapter examines the role that the women’s movement and feminist thinkers played in the constitutional review process during the passing of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010. In the years since then there have been a number of articles and books written to document the role of women in the constitutional review process. Notably, in the book *Time for Harvest*, Wanjiru Kabira (2012) narrates her first-hand experience with women’s engagement in the review process. A paper published by the Overseas Development Institute (Domingo et al., 2016) also analyses the role women in Kenya played in influencing both the gender equality provisions and social norms and how they participated in the constitution-making process. The point of departure of this chapter is that it examines how women used the policy window opened by the constitutional reform process to bring about what has been hailed as one of the most successful feminist engagements of our time, resulting in the inclusion of what are considered by some as radical gender equality provisions (Tripp, Lott & Khabure, 2014; Domingo et al., 2016). The chapter asks three key questions: How was the gender question articulated as an agenda in the constitution review process? How did the women’s movement organise itself to form a negotiating block? And, finally, what strategies were used to ensure women’s presence at the table at all times?

The chapter reflects on the achievements, but also identifies some of the gaps, in Kenya’s constitution-making process, both in terms of who was at the table and what issues made it onto the agenda. Kingdon’s multiple streams approach and the concept of a policy window are used to guide the analysis (Kingdon, 2006). The chapter is based on a secondary literature review of publications and reports prepared before, during and after the Constitution of Kenya was passed in 2010. The chapter relies primarily on the articles that were presented at a gender conference organised as part of the preparations.
for the review process\textsuperscript{83} and on literature developed after the passing of the constitution.

**Opening a policy window**

The multiple streams approach (Kingdon, 2006) provides a theory of how new ideas enter the policy agenda. Drawing inspiration from organisational development theory, the framework looks at the dynamics of the entire policy process from agenda setting to decision making and implementation and identifies three streams that flow through the policy system: the problem stream, policy stream and political stream. Each is conceptualised as separate from the others, with its own dynamic and rules. At critical moments ‘policy windows open’ and the streams are coupled, dramatically increasing the chances that policymakers will adopt a specific agenda.

The multiple streams approach is part of complexity theory and acknowledges the ambiguity around policy processes (Zahariadis, 2007). It is based on the premise that governments are complex units and not all actors understand the policy process; members know their roles, but are unclear how their job fits with the whole. Participants drift in and out and turnover is high, legislators come and go, and non-government actors exercise significant influence over decisions. People often do not know what they want, forcing politicians to make decisions without having formulated precise preferences (Kingdon, 2006; Zahariadis, 2007). A central premise of the approach is that there is no rational explanation for why some problems are on the agenda (list of subjects that those in government are paying serious attention to) and others are not. The central idea of a policy window is that policy making may not be as straightforward as we assume.

The argument that policymaking is not always a linear process has also been discussed by others. In her analysis of European Union development cooperation after the end of the cold war, Van Reisen observed that change is often assumed to a linear process, whereas, in reality, significant changes are not always the direct product of

\textsuperscript{83}The National Women’s Convention was held in Kenya in 1992.
policy setting or decision making (Van Reisen, 2009). Van Reisen further observes that major changes can happen without a plan or strategy and without policymakers necessarily anticipating the change. She also points out that one event can trigger a series of changes and raise a series of questions. As part of their work towards changing the policy agenda, Fourie, Perche and Schoeman (2010) conducted an ethnographic study of donor assistance for AIDS in South Africa to determine respondents’ views regarding their role in the AIDS policy process. This study is of particular interest as it looks at a policy process in which prevailing values and attitudes were an impediment to policy change. This is comparable to the issues of gender and affirmative action during a constitution-making process, where the emergence of a policy window can provide an opportunity to pass policies that might otherwise face resistance.

**Benefiting from a national mood**

One of the most remarkable phenomena around the time of the constitutional review process in Kenya was public perception of gender inequality and affirmative action. Prevailing social attitudes towards these issues were negative, or were assumed to be negative. Indeed, parliamentary debates on gender equality and affirmative action were always defeated based on the argument that these were elite issues and not priorities for grassroots women (Kabira, 2012). Moreover, gender issues were considered contentious enough to have contributed to the failure of earlier constitutional review attempts. Theories of heuristic biases (Kahneman, 2011) purport that human beings are not always capable of perceiving everything in their environment, so attention is drawn to the most prominent information available. Kahneman states that people tend to make mental short cuts and judgements based on hasty conclusions, or on the information available to them at the time of making these decisions. People’s emotional evaluation of outcomes also plays a central role in guiding decision making.

In Kenya, the gender equality and affirmative action proposals were presented to the public as part of a much-anticipated package of
institutional and policy reforms that Kenyans were extremely excited and motivated about. Two aspects were especially pivotal in engaging the public mood: the potential for a reduction in presidential powers and the devolution of power to the regions. Devolution was especially emotionally charged, as most Kenyans considered it a solution to economic and social inequality and an opportunity for the redistribution of economic benefits. A hypothesis for the very positive perception of the gender equality provisions and affirmative action is that they were perceived by the public to be desirable outcomes for most Kenyans. Later actions would demonstrate that this view changed once the public and policymakers looked at the provisions through another lens.

The constitutional review process

Until 1992, Kenya was a one-party state, formalised by constitutional amendment in 1982. Political power was vested in the executive branch and many state organs were weakened by consecutive authoritarian regimes. Political inequalities had contributed to growing unrest and social protest, opening the way for a push for constitutional reforms. In 1992, the section in the constitution that established Kenya as a one-party state was formally repealed. In 1997, the Constitution of Kenya Review Act was enacted, opening the way for a people-driven constitution-making process. This was followed closely by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission in 2001 (Fitzgerald, 2010). At least four constitutional drafts were produced. The first was the ‘Bomas draft’, which was presented at the national conference in 2004. This was followed by the modified ‘Wako draft’, which was put to a national referendum and defeated in 2005. Following a contentious election and post-election violence in 2007, the constitutional reform process was reinitiated and formalised through the Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 2008, which established four organs: the Commission of Experts (the main technical drafting body made up of nine experts), the Parliamentary

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84 It is not the aim of this chapter to discuss in-depth the process of the constitutional review in Kenya, but to contextualise women’s engagement in the process.
Select Committee, the national assembly and the referendum body (the Kenyan people). This process produced the third version of the constitution, the ‘harmonised draft’, which was presented to the Parliamentary Select Committee. The Parliamentary Select Committee was tasked with discussing and resolving the contentious issues before producing a revised draft, which was returned to the Committee of Experts, which produced a final version that was put to a referendum and approved by a 68% margin.

**Gender equality and affirmative action**

Broadly speaking there were two gender questions that received attention leading up to the constitutional review. The first was ‘gender equality’ and what that meant for women’s rights in the constitution and the second was ‘affirmative action’. Despite the fact that they are related, they were tackled quite differently by gender activists. Affirmative action received more publicity and engagement, sometimes overshadowing other gender questions. In terms of who engaged, the gender question was articulated primarily by feminist thinkers and interest groups, whereas affirmative action seemed to galvanise the women’s movement more broadly.

In articulating gender equality, the first challenge dealt with by gender experts and feminist thinkers was what gender equality meant. The discourse seemed aimed at bringing constitution experts, and specifically the constitution writing team, up to date on the current global gender equality debate and the gaps in Kenyan law in relation to women’s rights. In reading the papers presented at the various preparatory conferences, one comes away with the feeling that the public and policymakers understanding of gender was very limited. Each of the papers started off by providing a very basic definition of gender and gender equality; followed by an argument for why gender equality was not a foreign or Western concept, but one embedded in African culture and values, and religious principles. The papers then all proceeded to demonstrate the impact that gender inequality had on African women’s progress.
Translating gender equality into actionable points for the constitution was not always easy; while some questions were quite straightforward, some were a little more complex. For example, no one seemed to argue that gender equality meant granting women equal citizenship status to men, whereas the situation was less clear when it came to issues like inheritance. It is debatable whether a clear definition of gender equality was needed for the process to move forward, but this was not achieved.

The overarching paper that seems to have guided how gender was handled in the constitutional review process seems to have been the one written by Patricia Kameri-Mbote. In her paper, she provides a broad definition of gender, feminism and women’s rights. She highlights what provisions had been included in constitutions in other countries and what gaps were present in Kenyan law as it stood at the time. In making her case for women she made the following observation: “The danger here is that we may ignore the fact that women suffer double jeopardy as social beings in terms of both class and sex” (Kameri-Mbote, 2003, p. 156). In making the case for affirmative action, she argued for the differential treatment of women, defined as “one of the ways in which the principles of distributive justice can be implemented to foster the realization of substantive equality between men and women” (Kameri-Mbote, 2003, p. 145).

Other writers have expanded the discussion on gender and women’s rights and how these issues should be handled in the constitutional review process. Christian feminists engaged in the process to argue that gender equality was part of the religious doctrine or to raise their objection to some of the more radical feminist positions. The majority of the writers of the papers for the conference seemed to argue that there was an African interpretation of feminism that was more acceptable to the mainstream Kenyan population than the positions taken by women activists. However, it is significant to note
that they all resorted to an almost identical definition of gender equality.\footnote{This is surmised from analysis of the papers presented at the Constitutional Review (Gender) Conference in Bomas, 2003. The papers presented at this conference are quoted extensively in this chapter (see Kibiti, 2003; Mweseli, 2003; Namyalo, 2003; Nasimiyu, 2003; Nzomo, 2003).}

Social and cultural anthropologists have argued for a more contextual interpretation of gender within the Kenyan context. Monica Mweseli (2003), for example, argued that feminism has strengths and weaknesses and promoted ‘African Womanism’ as a more acceptable approach to analysing gender in the constitution. African Womanism, she argued, is less individualistic and takes on board the intersections and unique circumstances of African woman, instead of adopting the more Western-influenced concept of feminism. She identified lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) rights and the rights of commercial sex workers as some of the ideas that African Womanism rejected. She emphasised that African women’s rights must be seen within women’s role as mother and nurturer and identified the focus on divorce as a potentially divisive issue. Pala Achola (2003) made similar arguments about the issue of gender within African culture.

**Violence against women**

Even at this early stage of the gender equality conversation, there were certain discourses that were absent. In her initial paper, Kameri-Mbote (2003) highlighted violence against women as one of the key issues that the constitution needed to address. In her definition of violence, Mbote included issues that were quite radical and varied, like marital rape, sexual harassment, and female genital mutilation, as issues that the law needed to address. She emphasised the need to address negative cultural practices that perpetuate violence against women. However, the conversation does not seem to have been picked up by the mainstream and all the current provisions on violence against women in Kenya are gender neutral and do not identify violence against women as a specific issue of concern.\footnote{Articles 25 and 29 prohibit violence against persons and Article 53 prohibits violence against children, but all are gender-neutral in language.
**Polygamy**

The careful wording of certain issues that were of concern to women was a common feature of the constitution negotiation process in Kenya. In some cases, such as in relation to violence against women, women downplayed their concerns. By presenting violence as gender neutral, a number of the nuances that had been articulated by Kameri-Mbote and others at the beginning of the discourse were missed (Kameri-Mbote, 2003). In the case of polygamy, the language in the constitution was so careful that a law has since been passed that allows men to marry many wives if the first wife allows it.87

In summary, despite the fact that there was almost unanimous agreement that gender equality was the desired goal for women in the Kenyan Constitution, there was less clarity on what exactly that meant and whether it was equally applicable to all women. Contentious issues were either ignored or downplayed; the question of inheritance, for example, was downplayed, because certain religious groups were against an explicit clause providing for women’s inheritance. Minority issues, such as LGBTQ issues, were completely ignored, as was the issue of freedom of choice in relation to reproductive rights. Presenting domestic violence as a gender-neutral issue may have made it acceptable to the general population, but it did not reflect the reality on the ground, where women are disproportionately affected by domestic violence.

**The emergence of affirmative action**

The issue of affirmative action did not emerge for the first time during the constitutional review process; rather, it had been debated in Kenya since the early 1990s. To understand the modern-day struggle for women’s participation in the constitution we look to the National Women’s Convention in 1992 (Kabira, 2012; Nzomo 1993, 1997). The keynote presentation at the convention was made by Maria Nzomo (1993). In her paper, Nzomo argued that women in Kenya face a number of barriers to equally participating politically, economically and socially, and that they could not hope to compete

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87 In 2014, the Kenyan Parliament passed a law that allowed polygamy in some cases, with the consent of the first wife.
equally or effectively unless measures were taken to ensure their participation. The paper and conference were set against the backdrop of the United Nations Women’s Conference, which took place in Kenya in 1985 and in which commitments had been made to promote gender equality and women’s participation in politics and decision making. This conference seems to have mobilised women nationally and was successful in articulating why affirmative action was needed in Kenya. The challenge remained making it a reality.

In 1997, affirmative action became part of the agenda in mainstream Kenyan politics when then member of parliament, Honourable Pheobe Asiyo, tabled a motion in parliament for affirmative action to be entrenched in the Kenyan Parliament. The proposal was modest and well thought out and had the support of all women, and some men, in the parliament – but when it came to a vote, it was defeated. Despite its defeat, the motion by Asiyo seems to have brought affirmative action to the forefront in Kenya in ways that had not been considered before. The motion also coincided with growing efforts for a more inclusive governance structure and more diversity in representation.

**Affirmative action in the 2010 Constitution**

The affirmative action provision articulated by Honourable Member of Parliament Pheobe Asiyo in 1997 formed the basis of what was to be the policy position of Kenyan women over the next 20 years or so in the struggle to pass it into law. The provision has three key elements:

- It requires all registered political parties to nominate at least one-third women candidates to participate in national and local elections
- It introduces a constitution provision to create two parliamentary constituencies in each province exclusively for women candidates
- It links political party funding to the number of women candidates nominated by the party
The affirmative action bill tabled in 2000 added to the petition by asking each district to nominate a woman representative to parliament, based on lessons from other countries in the region. The petition also added an element of political savvy to the process by incorporating other minorities to gain broader support when the vote came up in parliament. The bill was not debated in parliament, but rather referred to the constitutional review process.

In 2006, when the constitutional review process appeared stalled, there was another attempt to introduce minimum reforms by revising constitutional boundaries; once again women attempted to get affirmative action into these reforms. The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs introduced a bill in 2007 to increase the number of constituencies as a minimum reform prior to the constitutional review process. The affirmative action clause requested that 50 seats be reserved for women. This process was also defeated in parliament.

**Affirmative action and the gender quota in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution**

The Constitution of 2010 contained the following provisions on affirmative action:

Section 81 (b): Not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender.

Section 90 (b): Except in the case of the seats provided for under Article 98(1)(b), each party list comprises the appropriate number of qualified candidates and alternates between male and female candidates in the priority in which they are listed.

Section 97: In relation to members of parliament, there shall be:

(b) Forty-seven women, each elected by the registered voters of the counties, each county constituting a single member constituency

(c) Twelve members nominated by parliamentary political parties according to their proportion of members in the National Assembly,
in accordance with Article 90, to represent special interests including youth, persons with disabilities and workers

Section 98: In relation to members of the senate, there shall be:
   (b) Sixteen women members who shall be nominated by political parties according to their proportion of members in the Senate elected under clause (a) in accordance with Article 90
   (c) Two members, being one man and one woman, representing the youth
   (d) Two members, being one man and one woman, representing persons with disabilities

Section 100. Parliament shall enact legislation to promote the representation in Parliament of:
   (a) women
   (b) persons with disabilities
   (c) youth
   (d) ethnic and other minorities
   (e) marginalised communities

Further affirmative action provisions are also contained in Article 27 of the constitution

Article 27(6): The State shall take legislative and other measures, including, but not limited to, affirmative action programmes and policies designed to redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups as a result of past discrimination.

In addition to the measures contemplated in Article 27(6), the State shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender.

Kenyan women’s movement

The modern women’s movement in Kenya has its roots in the precolonial period, when women organised largely around improving the material conditions of women. At that time, the women’s
movement was based primarily on self-help groups. These were primarily focused on building women’s skills within their traditional roles as wives and mothers and for economic development. Since independence, these groups have grown into strong organisations with their own established structures and values (Kabira, 2012).

After the 1985 United Nations Women’s Conference in Nairobi, the women’s movement started to gain momentum and became more political in advocating for women’s rights, especially their right to participate in politics. Women started to broaden the remit of the precolonial women’s groups, with a much more explicit feminist and gender equality agenda. Another pivotal moment in the movement was the National Women’s Convention that took place in 1992, which was organised by the National Council of Women of Kenya. The conference brought together over 2,000 women and had a very clear political agenda. This conference addressed issues on women’s participation in politics and, more importantly, raised concerns about the barriers to women’s participation in politics. The keynote presentation at the conference by Maria Nzomo on women’s economic, social and political participation in Kenya is still seen as pivotal in inspiring political activism (Nzomo, 1993). It was at this conference that women acknowledged that without affirmative action there was no possibility of participating equally in politics (Kabira 2012, p. 19). On the vision or aspirations of Kenyan women, Kabira had this to say: “Nothing, however, has taken so much energy from women than the efforts towards increasing women’s representations in political bodies” (Kabira, 2012, p. 19).

The shift that happened in 1992 was not just in relation to agenda setting, there also seemed to have been a shift in the way that women organised and mobilised. Several special interest or issue groups emerged and new coalitions started forming. Although this chapter does not look at the women’s groups in Kenya in-depth, but as the organising was a critical part of the strategies, this section looks briefly at the three key categories of women’s organisations that were pivotal in campaigning for affirmative action in the constitution.
Political groups/coalitions and alliances

Political groups have always been at the forefront of advocacy work in the women’s movement in Kenya. They have articulated women’s issues to the mainstream, given women access to the political decision makers, and helped women from the newer groups and grassroots women to understand how the mainstream worked. Although these political groups relied on feminist thinkers to articulate and conceptualise the issues, it is important to note that the feminist thinkers were also members of these groups. Some of the groups that stood out in this period are: the Kenya Women’s Political Caucus, which later split to form the Women’s Political Alliance, League of Kenya Women Voters, and Kenya Women Parliamentarians Association. The Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation also needs to be mentioned here as a national women’s organisation. This organisation became politicised by default, after being co-opted into a political party when Kenya was a one-party state.

Special interest and issue groups

Special interest and issue groups have existed in various forms in Kenya since 1992. Although they came into the constitution-making process to promote their special interests and the provisions they wanted included in the constitution, almost all of them supported the affirmative action agenda. Affirmative action was seen as an issue for all women. The special interest groups contributed to the process by mobilising and organising their interest groups, as well as developing thinking on the issues. Some of the key groups here include the Federation of Women Lawyers, Coalition on Violence Against Women, African Women’s Development and Communication Network, Association of African Women in Research and Development, Federation of African Women Educationalists, Education Centre for Women in Democracy, and Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development.

National machineries and national women’s organisations

National machineries and national women’s organisations were pivotal in reaching grassroots women and organising women. Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation, for example, has members in each district in Kenya, and it was impossible to reach women at the
district levels without working through such groups. Another organisation that was pivotal in organising the National Women’s Convention in 1992 is the National Council of Women of Kenya. These national machineries become a force for women’s empowerment in Kenya after the 1985 and 1995 United Nations women’s conferences in Nairobi and Beijing, respectively. These national machineries were housed within the Department of Social Services, where most women’s self-help groups were housed. These groups worked together to register women and get them to attend national events.

**Strategies and counter-strategies to put affirmative action on the agenda**

The realisation that women were never going to be able to compete fairly in Kenyan politics was clearly expressed during the National Women’s Conference in 1992. Women realised that the only way to get into the political scene was by getting a special provision passed that would bring affirmative action into law. Many strategies were used towards this. Perhaps the simplest and first strategy for women was to articulate what they wanted in terms of policy options. Once the policy options for affirmative action had been articulated, they did not change much – a few requests were modified or adapted depending on the response in parliament, but the basic demands were consistent.

**Women working together**

When the first affirmative action motion was defeated in 1997, women quickly realised that they had a serious battle on their hands and that they would not succeed without standing together. So perhaps the strongest strategy that women adopted was to work together. To this end, women adopted both formal and informal ways of organising and forming coalitions and groups, learnt to speak and communicate with one voice, and learnt to accommodate differences. Uniting women meant transcending political, tribal and class barriers and establishing networks and linkages between the national, district and constituency levels. From 1998, when the constitutional review process started in earnest, until the passing of the Constitution in
2010, all national meetings included a quota for women, as well as representatives from the constituency to the national levels. Another level of organising was the formation of steering groups (the Affirmative Action Steering Committee was one such group), and determining where each of the women’s groups’ strengths lay (for example, there were technical working groups and lobby groups).

**Women negotiating: Gaining a seat at the table**

Having a united front was a key step for women in the negotiation process – the next step was to gain a seat at the table. Between 1998 and 2010 there were several processes related to the constitutional review process. In order to ensure that both their participation and their agenda were part of the dialogue, Kenyan women:

- ensured the inclusion of women in the constitution drafting team (five out of twelve member drafting team were women)
- negotiated for a participatory and inclusive process, meaning that any draft would be subjected to grassroots consultations, which would include women
- ensured that women’s organisations would be recognised as nominating bodies
- ensured that 30% of representatives from civil society, commissioners and district representatives would be women

On how the women performed once they were at the negotiating table, a number of writers have highlighted the engagement of women not just in gender and affirmative action issues, but in mediating between the parties when the processes stalled. Kabira had this to say: “They coordinated themselves on a daily basis, prepared their positions, met before the meeting to agree on positions they would take, and agreed on who should lobby who” (Kabira, 2012, p. 36). This proved very effective.

**Building alliances and overcoming obstacles**

The very first obstacle that women faced when the issue of affirmative action came before a parliamentary debate was whether women were capable of being leaders and whether affirmative action
was necessary. When the issue came up for debate in 1997, three arguments were presented to oppose the motion. The first was that women were not by nature or nurture meant for parliament. The second was that affirmative action was going against the principle of universal suffrage (one man, one vote) and, finally, that elected men in parliament were already adequately representing their constituents, including women.

As already mentioned, the 1997 motion was defeated, so the arguments above had enough male sympathisers to defeat the motion. However, there was also a large percentage of men who supported the motion, and made very eloquent arguments for why affirmative action was needed. Women, on their part, started to understand that the notion of women speaking for themselves was new to some of the elected members of parliament and that they would need to tackle the issues delicately, but firmly.

*I want to respond to that by saying that by nature a woman is capable of taking dual or multiple responsibilities quite effective. We should therefore, not be told about our maternal duties when we ask to participate in leadership.* (Karua, M., quoted in Kabira, 2012 p. 24)

Another criticism levied against affirmative action was that it was an elitist feminist agenda that lacked the support of grassroots women (Kabira, 2012). This was actually two related accusations: the first was that the agenda itself did not reflect the issues or needs of women at the grassroots, the second was that the negotiations were being undertaken by an unrepresentative sample of women. In other words, women from certain communities and from the grassroots were not at the negotiating table. The irony that the first accusation was levied by men who had spoken for women almost their entire lives was not lost on the women and gender activists, as evidenced by this observation by Kabira: “Public knowledge of women has always been articulated by men. Men claim knowledge about and on women without any regard to what the same women think or feel” (Kabira, 2012, p. 21).
The second accusation took on quite serious proportions, as it threatened to break the strong alliance that women had formed. A section of the women’s movement filed a court case to demand that the selection of commissioners for the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission be revisited. The conclusion by the women at the forefront was that this was an attempt by the opponents to affirmative action to put in women who were more malleable.

**Conclusion**

Perhaps the strongest message sent by women in the process of Kenya’s constitutional review was that when they presented a united front, women were capable of achieving anything. Their engagement with the constitutional review process made it possible to include all the gender provisions and gains in the constitution. It also enabled the entire process to move forward when political shenanigans threatened to stall it.

One of the loudest criticisms of the advocacy around affirmative action was that it was an elitist movement driven by urban well-educated women. While this was considered a tactic by men to derail the petition, at the same time it was a genuine criticism of the women’s movement in Kenya. Despite the fact that all the processes leading up to the constitutional review process involved grassroots women, it is not clear what their input was in the process. Most of the documentation shows the women being given information or engaging in sensitisation programmes on the constitution, however, there is little evidence of them being substantively engaged or of a genuine attempt by the leaders of the movement to seek their views, especially on affirmative action clauses.

Gender issues were among the most contentious issues in the constitution. While women presented a fairly harmonised front on all gender and affirmative action issues, it is interesting to look at the issues that were ignored or not entirely embraced by the women’s movement. Issues of inheritance where practices differed between religions and cultures, for example, were downplayed for the sake of
presenting a harmonised front. Issues of LGBTQ rights were raised early on, but were panned by broader civil society and the women’s movement. On the question of reproductive rights, a woman’s right to choose (abortion) was dropped as it was considered to be too radical for the largely Christian population in Kenya. Finally, on the question of polygamy, the constitution left a loophole that allowed parliament to pass a law that allowed polygamy in certain cases.

One of the key arguments of the multiple streams approach is that, because of the complexity of decision making and ambiguity surrounding policy processes, there is no rational reason why certain policy positions are more acceptable than others. This seems to be the case for affirmative action in the Kenyan Constitution. There is no evidence that the policy positions resisting affirmative action had shifted in favour of women participating in politics; instead, women seemed to have been very effective in making use of the window of opportunity presented by the constitution review process. In an Overseas Development Institute report on how women shaped the constitutional review process in Kenya, the authors remarked that: “No single strategy explains the gains the women achieved through the constitutional reform process. Institutional change is an uneven process” (Domingo et al., 2016, p. 9).

References


Chapter 21

Where are the Youth? The Missing Agenda in Somalia’s Constitution

Istar Ahmed

Introduction

A constitution enjoys a special place in the life of any nation. It is the supreme law upon which all other laws are based. It sets out the state’s basic structure, including the exercise of political power and the relationship between political entities, and between the state and the people. It has been referred to as a ‘social contract’ between the rulers and the ruled (Lermack, 2007). It is also a consensus among the people themselves. A constitution is, therefore, more than just a document: it embodies the wishes and aspirations of a country.

A constitution embodies the wishes and aspirations of a country. But where are Somalia’s youth in its constitution-making process? And what are their wishes and aspirations? This chapter investigates the youth agenda in Somalia’s constitution-making process and finds that it is glaringly lacking. With 67% of youth unemployed, their exclusion from economic and political participation could cause many to find alternatives elsewhere. If the voices of youth are excluded from the constitution it will not only impact on the legitimacy of this most important statute, it could also affect the future stability of Somalia.

As the former Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice Ismail Mohamed, observed:

…a constitution is not simply a statute which mechanically defines the structures of the government and the relations between the government and the governed, but it is a mirror that reflects the national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspiration
Okoth-Ogendo (1991) argues that a constitution is a power map upon which the framers may delineate a whole set of concerns, ranging from application of the Hobbesian concept of ‘a covenant’, to an authoritative affirmation on the basis of social, moral, political or cultural ideals, including the ideals towards which the constitution strives. This implies that constitution making is a process that involves making choices regarding which concerns should appear on the ‘map’. How these choices are made can affect some positively and others negatively, depending on how they are involved in making the choices. Hart (2003) asserts that, unlike traditional constitution making, which considers the constitution as an act of ‘completion’, modern constitution making focuses on a participatory process and conversational ‘new constitutionalism’. Today, there is a broad consensus that a constitution should be made democratically and that a constitution-making process is only democratic if it is participatory and all-inclusive at all stages leading up to the final document.

The United States Institute of Peace asserts that constitution making, if properly organised and given adequate attention and resources, can transform a society from worse to better or, if it fails to do this, can result in continued unrest (Kaariye, 2017; Chapter 9, Countering Radicalisation in Communities: The Case of Pumwani, Nairobi, by Reginald Nalugala). Somalia, having lacked an effective national government since 1991 (when the government collapsed following the ousting of President Mohamed Siyad Barre), requires a national framework to ensure lasting peace (Nur, 2011). The road to lasting peace in Somalia requires the re-establishment of the rule of law through an effective government (Kaariye, 2017).

The adoption of the Provisional Constitution by the National Constitution Assembly on 1 August 2012 is a milestone. The Provisional Constitution is a progressive document based on Islamic principles; it contains key elements of the rule of law and lays out a vision of democratic governance. It also establishes federalism with a
parliamentary system of government. The constitution attempts to respond to historic injustices and appreciates that where security and justice are not available to all equally, grievances may develop that can cause or aggravate conflict. However, missing from the constitution of Somalia are the voices of youth, who have been absent from the whole constitution-making process.

Objectives

This research was undertaken to ask questions about the role of youth in the constitution-making process towards ensuring that a section of society is not left behind in the development of the country.

This study has the following specific objectives:

- To determine the role of youth in the constitution-making process in Somalia
- To determine the importance of addressing youth issues through an article in the constitution
- To recommend strategies to draw attention to the role of youth in the constitution-making process and to address constitutional gaps

Research methodology

In order to meet these objectives, the study conducted both theoretical and practical analyses. For the theoretical analysis, a literature review (of books, journals and articles) was conducted focusing on the legitimacy of a constitution-making process and how the Somali constitution was formed. This literature review focused on youth in Somalia and interventions for their inclusion in decision making and policymaking. For the review, data was collected from government publications, technical documents, and annual reports on the youth upsurge in Somalia. Valuable insights were also gained from research conducted by various United Nations bodies driving development and humanitarian projects and interventions in Somalia, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Analysis was carried out by grouping the research literature into themes in line with the objectives of the study.

Primary data were also gathered over a period of six months in face-to-face interviews with federal and regional governments, in particular, the Federal Minister of Constitutional Affairs, international development partners, university students, youth-led organisations, civil society and national youth networks across all regions in Somalia. The key informants who participated in this study were selected through non-probability purposive sampling processes, including a combination of expert and snowball sampling methods. The qualitative data from the interviews were coded thematically and then analysed statistically. The data was analysed using conceptual content analysis, which is the best method of analysis for this type of study (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2013).

**Democracy and a constitution**

Saunders (2010) contends that democracy, as a form of majoritarian rule, can lead to tyranny of the majority over the minority; however, if we seek a more stable and all-inclusive polity, democracy should be more than simply majoritarian rule. In this sense, scholars have often pointed to the limitations of a simple interpretation of democracy. Peczenik (2002), argues for a broader definition of democracy: political representation of the interests of citizens, majority rule, the participation of citizens in politics, freedom of opinion, the protection of human and political rights, legal certainty, and the division of power and responsibility among those in power. Saunders (2010) points to certain criteria – voting equality at a decisive stage, effective participation, enlightened understanding, final control of the agenda, and inclusiveness – as essential for a democracy not to end up a majority tyranny. Despite the differences in the criteria presented by different scholars, there is a common understanding that for rights to be protected in a democracy the majority should act only within prescribed rules, there should be legal certainty and there should be an all-inclusive political environment (Saunders, 2010). A constitution
can prescribe such rules and provide such legal certainty, which is why a constitution and democracy are often considered inseparable.

**A legitimate constitution**

According to Bannon (2010), constitutional legitimacy depends on the legal, moral and social tolerability of the document by all who are ruled by it. A constitution enjoys legitimacy when the public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or hope of personal rewards (Bannon, 2010). Bilkin (2004) adds that the legitimacy of a constitution requires genuine social acceptance, whereby the public reveres and honours both the political intention, expression behind the constitution, and legal forms and foundational institutions established by the constitution. It is that which, Bilkin argues, creates a sense of ownership or a feeling in the people that the document should be obeyed or is ‘respect-worthy’.

Legitimacy, in general, requires the acceptability of the process-content analysis (Bilkin, 2004). Not only does the process need to be participatory, but the values, principles, rules and institutions adopted must command the respect and loyalty of the public. Yet, it is also valid to argue that the acceptability of the process should be capable of justifying the substance (Bilkin, 2004). Because, if the text is the product of the genuine deliberation by all groups, there should not be any legitimate reason to question the validity of the content.

**Public participation**

Constitution making is not like the formulation of a league or a treaty, which only involves the legislature. Constitution making is founded on the people; one of the main differences between the law and the constitution is that in a constitution there is peoples’ involvement. While a treaty lacks direct people’s involvement, constitution making depends on public involvement (Bannon, 2010).

Neil (1996) notes that different rationales have been used for public involvement in constitution making. Popular sovereignty is the notion behind many nations’ struggle for democracy. In fact, it is the
The most common ideal underpinning constitutions and, therefore, has been construed as a universal value of constitutions and modern democracy (Neil, 1996). Most constitutions also declare the primacy of popular sovereignty and that ultimate power resides with ‘the people’. More importantly, modern constitutions usually regard the people not only as the place sovereignty resides, but also as the source of the constitution itself. Hence, if sovereignty is vested in, and flows from, the people, they should also be able to determine how it is delegated and exercised.

Until people are given the power to choose the government and the society that they prefer to live in, it is meaningless to talk about the sovereignty of people. The concept of sovereignty and participatory democracy are, therefore, interlinked with one another. In fact, participatory democracy has now been accepted as a condition for genuine democracy (Pateman, 1970).

Therefore, public participation in modern constitution making is important, because it enhances the legitimacy of the constitution (Pateman, 1970). The question of legitimacy is concerned with how to make a constitution that commands the loyalty and confidence of the people. In order for this, a constitution should be generally understood by the people and acceptable to them (Cohen, 2003). To achieve public engagement in constitution making, certain requirements have to be satisfied. In countries where democracy is a novel concept, educating the populace must precede other tasks (Christiano, 2003). This usually involves two elements: First, the population must be educated about the role that they will play in creating the new constitution. Then, they must be informed about how democracy and constitutional supremacy works and, more specifically, about the possible considerations they need to take into account in forming the constitution (Christiano, 2003).

In addition, public consultation as part of the constitution-making process must be all-inclusive and extensive to overcome the power gap. Consultation must not be limited to the elite or main power holders; all classes of society must be afforded the opportunity to
participate. Ordinary people must be empowered to make effective contributions to the debate and they must be provided with the necessary channels through which to participate (Samuel, 2006).

So the legitimacy of the constitution-making process is affected by the ability to overcome the information and power gap between the common people and the ruling elite. At the political level this means that common people should have access to knowledge about democracy as well as facilities to participate in (public) debate as part of the constitution-making process. However, knowledge and facilities are only prerequisites so that people can take part in the public debate, the ruling elite must also respect their voices.

**Theoretical framework**

In this section, the social process to overcome the information and power gap is framed within Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams framework. This framework is applied in the context of the developing democracy of Somalia, and used as a tool for analysing public policy making at the agenda setting stage. Kingdon’s multiple streams framework argues that policy decisions flow from the coupling of problems, policies, and politics. In the Somalia constitution-making process, the problem stream is the power and knowledge gap between the ruling elite and the common people, which hinders the common people from participating in the constitution-making process. The policy stream encompasses the provisional constitution as well as current and new policies to facilitate the participation of common people in the constitution-making process, and regards the social and decision-making processes of the ruling elite in the constitution-making process.

Kingdon’s (1995) discussion of the three streams has significance for identifying problems arising from the youth bulge in Somalia, highlighting the importance of having youth policies in order to include youth and of attracting political goodwill to include youth issues in the constitution. The three streams are driven by different forces and are independent of each other, so none can single-
handedly decide the overall outcome of the policy-making process. At some critical points, policy entrepreneurs are able to bring the streams together in what Kingdon calls ‘coupling’, which leads to the opening of a policy window, which creates opportunities for policy proposals and the alternatives to be specified. Kingdon contends that the coupling of the streams is sustainable only when an issue is linked to all three streams: an identified problem is matched with a possible solution in a politically favourable environment. The distinction between the streams is noteworthy because it offers an understanding of how the dynamic characteristics of each stream contribute to the agenda-setting process (Kingdon, 1995).

It is important to note that, in Somalia, there is currently a situation in which a policy window may open due to the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution in 2019. The Provisional Constitution, in Article 3 (4), guarantees, among other things, human rights, rule of law, justice, participatory, consultative and inclusive government, and efficiency and responsiveness to the interests of the people. These (policy) provisions provide avenues for the inclusion of youth in the new constitution, which is currently being drafted. These provisions also allow policymakers to address concerns about the lack of involvement of youth in the constitution-making process and the lack of an article that specifically addresses youth issues (by redefining the problem in accordance with the policy stream). The aim is to accomplish partial coupling between the problem and policy stream, so a policy window opens to generate the necessary official attention and action.

Kingdon (1995) highlights the role of policy entrepreneurs in the partial coupling of the problem and policy stream. He describes policy entrepreneurs as individuals who invest their time, energy and resources to ensure that an idea or proposal (an alternative solution to a problem at hand) becomes part of the agenda that will receive attention and political support from the governing elite. So, policy entrepreneurs are able to couple a particular problem with plausible solutions, while working to focus the attention of political actors on certain issues. The qualities described by Kingdon include: expertise
or authority that serve as a source of influence and the ability to speak for others; political connections or negotiating skills; and persistence. Having worked as a National Youth Policy Advisor appointed by the Federal Government of Somalia between 2014 and 2015, the author of this paper fits Kingdon’s description of a policy entrepreneur.

**The plight of youth in Somalia**

Somalia has been in the throes of an affliction, which predominantly affects young Somalis. Simply stated, this can be summed up as a powerful, almost uncontrollable urge to emigrate in search of better opportunities. The Somalis have dubbed it ‘dhoof’, which roughly translates as ‘migration syndrome’. Another term often used is ‘buufis’, which means ‘delusional obsession’. Of course, this is not specific only to Somalia and Somali youth. Recent events in the Middle East and across Europe have proven the global nature of this crisis in the most graphic way.

However, the situation has older and deeper roots in Somalia, initially starting in the 1970s. In those days, the Arabian Peninsula, especially the oil rich Gulf countries, were the preferred destination. The Gulf was geographically close, safe and easy to travel to. Opportunities for work were bountiful, and the pay was good. Somali youth and men went to these countries in droves, and often came back with considerable wealth. In the 1980s a significant number of Somalis, including families and children, began going to Europe and beyond as migrants and refugees. The civil war that broke out during that time accelerated migration and by the 1990s, one of the consequences of the Somali civil war was the unprecedented large-scale displacement of Somalis across the world, making Somalia a household name worldwide as a nation of refugees and migrants.

In more recent times, Somali youth have looked to Europe, seeking employment opportunities and a better life. Unfortunately, many
end up victims of smugglers and traffickers, who extort their families for ransom. One of the participants in this study shared the following:

The main driver of illegal migration from Somali is the lack of employment opportunities for the youth. My daughter was 18 years of age; she went via Yemen with her friends who had siblings who migrated to Italy safely. The smugglers promised safe and false hope to my daughter. I paid the USD 5,000, thinking that she could lead a better future elsewhere and support her siblings in the future… After four weeks, my daughter called at 4 am in the morning crying with a weak voice: “I am in need of USD 7,000; they won’t take me to the promised destination unless I pay this within two day. Next morning, my daughter called me from unknown number again, this time a man with a scary voice said: “She will die if you don’t send the money by tomorrow”, and disconnected the phone call. I sold my house for USD 15,000 and sent USD 7,000 to save my daughter. Within two days of the smugglers receiving the money, I was told my daughter had died from sexual abuse and a broken back. (A., interview, Mogadishu, September 2018)

Another respondent, Amina, explained how she was now living in an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Puntland after having lost everything to smugglers (Amina, interview, face-to-face, Garoe, Puntland, 15 April 2018).

Somali youth migrants face enormous risks and challenges during the migration process including, detention, torture, sexual abuse and even death, at the hands of smugglers and traffickers. Moreover, youth migrants do not usually attain the high expectations they had had before they migrated and many face a difficult life in their destination country. Families have to choose between two difficult situations: to protect their sons/daughters from the recruiters of violent, extremist groups (such as Al-Shabaab), or support them to take a risky journey in search of a better future and employment opportunities to support their families. A 21-year-old respondent shared this:

We are against two dangerous factors here in Somalia and we have a tough choice to make. In my case, I am the first-born of six children. I have three younger brothers and two sisters. I have finished university, yet cannot secure employment and support my mother or help raise my siblings. We are running away from unemployment,
Somalia is a youthful nation. According to the UNFPA, 81.5% of the population are below the age of 30, of which 67% are unemployed. In addition, those between the age of 14 and 29 constitute 42% of the population, making it one of the youngest nations in the world with one of the highest unemployment rates (UNFPA, 2014). These young people grew up during the conflict, which spanned two and half decades, from 1991 to 2019 (Federal Government of Somalia, 2018). This means that many did not have the opportunity to access public services such as education. According to civil society activist Abdi, youth, particularly female youth, are marginalised in social aspects, education and wellbeing, which contributes to the knowledge and power gap described earlier. He argues that:

*The prolonged strife in Somalia has meant that youth, and especially female youth, have limited access to the care and comfort of their parents and immediate families, communal peace and societal cohesion, their basic human rights and dignity, legal protection and basic social services provided by the state.* (Abdi, interview, face-to-face in Mogadishu, 15 July 2018)

The youth upsurge in Somalia presents both challenges and opportunities. According to the Jubbaland Regional Minister for Youth, Honourable Osman Hagi:

*Challenges come from the failure of educational institutions and unemployment, resulting in social exclusion and economic marginalisation. Dealing with such a large section of society means a large portion of national resources should focus on frameworks and avenues for the development of youth, something that is hard to come by. However, it presents an opportunity for us as the government to make efforts towards ensuring that youth issues are addressed to strike a balance.* (Minister for Youth, Osman Hagi, interview, face-to-face, Nairobi, Kenya, 3 November 2018)
The conflict in Somalia has generated extreme poverty, vulnerability and a complex set of political and social grievances, which remain a threat to the country’s stability. The conflict has been largely attributed to the youth bulge. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgent group that is posing a major security problem in the country, has its roots in youth dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in Somalia. In this sense, Somali youth are trapped in a seemingly endless cycle of violence, both as participants and victims. Despite the fact that the conflict has ended, avenues for youth to obtain an education and gain full employment are still limited, and opportunities to engage politically, economically or socially remain weak or non-existent. Opportunities are even further limited for girls and young women. These information and power gaps will hinder the inclusion of youth in the constitution-making process, as it will be a hard task to overcome both gaps due to education poverty.

Somalia’s youth

- Youth in Somalia face extreme education poverty: 61% of those aged 17–22 and 67% of the 23–27 age group have less than two years of schooling. In addition, 90% of the 7–16 year olds have never been to school.
- The literacy rate in Somalia is about 48% in the age group 14 to 29.
- Youth unemployment in Somalia is at 67%, one of the highest rates worldwide, and for young women this figure rises to 74%.

Source: UNDP, 2012

The conflict and the continued poverty and lack of opportunities in Somalia have driven large numbers of youth to flee the country. It is estimated that there are 1.02 million Somali refugees in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, of which children and youth constitute a considerable proportion (MoHD&PS, 2013). Their return, voluntarily or through mandatory repatriation, seems increasingly likely, following the recent decision by the Government of Kenya to repatriate Somali refugees. In fact, many have already left Kenya and returned to Somalia. How their educational and other needs will be
addressed in Somalia is not entirely clear. The Regional Minister for Youth explained:

> Our current headache is now exacerbated by the fact that more Somali refugees are being repatriated from Kenya. A large proportion of these refugees are youth and children. While at the refugee camps, these youth were getting access to quality education. While Somalia also has education frameworks they can fit into, problems arise as to how to immediately assimilate this large group into the education system at once. Any failure to provide appropriate opportunities for this large segment of the population could have enormous economic, political, cultural, and social consequences. Engaging the youth population fully is, therefore, no longer a choice, but an imperative in the development process that is also recognised by the government of Somalia. (Minister for Youth, Osman Hagi, interview, face-to-face, Kismayo, Jubbaland, March 2018)

As Minister Hagi warns, failure to provide opportunities for youth could have serious consequences, also in the context of the constitution-making process. Although there is no doubt that the Government of Somalia and its international development partners are attempting to address youth challenges, Somali youth are still a missing agenda in the constitution. The draft bill of rights on youth, as a stand-alone article, has been ignored, despite the country’s youth upsurge being one of the largest in the world (UNDP, 2012). So the problem of the information gap, which can only be overcome by education (policy), is recognised, but the information gap is not framed as a problem to be addressed in the provisional constitution (policy). According to Kingdon’s multiple stream models, a policy entrepreneur is needed to make this happen.

**The role of youth in the constitution-making**

In 2012, Somalia endorsed a provisional constitution that set in place a national and central legal framework to guide the country towards the process of rebuilding itself according to the rule of law and separation of powers (UNDP, 2012). This constitution-making process has the potential to empower youth and strengthen their role in state and peace building. However, it requires promoting the inclusion of the country’s youth, both male and female (Samuels,
With such a large youth population, empowerment is critical, as youth exclusion, grievances, and perceptions of inequity have resulted in youth making up the majority of militias like Al-Shabaab (Kaariye, 2017). Hammond (2013) found that the omission of the youth agenda from constitution making in Somalia has frustrated and demoralised youth, leading many to join terrorist groups or emigrate. Some try risky border crossings in search of better lives. The young people who stay behind are vulnerable to crime, drugs, radicalism and piracy, and there are no policies in place to help overcome these issues (Hammond, 2013). In a recent study by UNDP, over 60% of the youth in Somalia expressed interest in leaving the country in search of better livelihood opportunities. However, if provided with the tools to thrive and succeed, Somalia’s youth population could be its greatest asset (UNDP, 2016).

Societies emerging from conflict face the difficulty of channelling future political contestation through institutional pathways. Rebuilding often takes place in the context of collapsed state institutions, weak political will for reconciliation, and distrust. An unprecedented constitution building boom followed the end of the Cold War in 1989. During this boom seven countries in South America started constitution-building processes: Brazil, Columbia, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia. In Africa, 23 out of 52 states had experienced internal conflict by 1994. In all of these countries, constitution building followed peace building. Somalia can be considered part of this boom.

The African Union, declared 2009–2018 as the African Youth Decade. As in many war-torn countries, youth in Somalia have suffered through a societal breakdown that has left them feeling victimised. At the same time, they are a source of conflict, which affects society at large. These two dimensions have combined to create a ‘youth crisis’, which has become a fundamental barrier to breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty and conflict, and promoting sustainable peace and security.
However, there are also opportunities; with the vast youth population in Somalia who have lived, studied and worked in developed countries slowly coming back, a good portion of them may be suitable to become policy entrepreneurs. While there have been minimal efforts to leverage it, the government of Somalia is looking to making use of youth who have had an opportunity to get an education from developed nations. In an interview with the author, the Federal Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Honourable Abdirahman Abdi Hoosh, pointed out the following:

*With the vast population of youth who have lived, studied and worked in developed countries slowly coming back to the state, it is apparent that a good portion of them might be trained in leadership concepts. Such individuals should be at the forefront of campaigning and taking up political and social leadership positions. Once they have acquired these positions, they can use the opportunity to disperse their knowledge and opinions on how the constitution should appear or amendments that must be fulfilled. Moreover, the leaders can take up the chance to bring the respective communities together and possibly consider ending the conflict, which has raged through the country for several decades.* (Federal Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Abdirahman Abdi Hoosh, interview, face-to-face, Mogadishu, 3 November 2018)

In this quote the Federal Minister acknowledges the role of highly educated returning youth as policy entrepreneurs to overcome the information and power gap. In addition to this, civil society activist Abdi pointed out that:

*Civic education is one of the activities conducted to ensure that the public understands and appreciates the various sections of the legal document. However, with Somalia’s youthful population, this can prove to be difficult. Young people can take up the mantle and actively become part of the solution by sacrificing their time and effort to educate others. It will be a form of empowerment that vindicates their contribution towards creating a self-sufficient and reliant Somalia.* (Abdi, interview, face-to-face, Kismayu, Jubbaland, 15 July 2018)
The United Nations recognises youth as partners for peace and development, and promotes youth inclusion in political participation and decision making. Somali youth can play a critical role in decision making and constitution making. Psychologically, the active participation and involvement of young people in the constitution-making process enhances national pride and the development spirit, thus promoting social inclusion. In recent times, there has been an increased level of recognition of the need for participation as a tool to stabilise the post-conflict situation in Somalia. The engagement of youth in the constitution-making process and other political processes has been proposed as an effective approach to enhance peace building and economic development (International Crisis Group, 2003). Honourable Abdi Hoosh, the Federal Minister of Constitutional Affairs argues that:

*An important element in empowering the youth in Somalia is to guarantee the inclusion of their rights and interests in their country’s constitution as a legal document. This will enable the country to achieve lasting peace as the youth will feel represented politically, socially and economically in the affairs of the state. It is essential that youth perspectives be included in the constitution and decision-making in order to advance their socio-economic rights.* (Abdi Hoosh, interview, face-to-face, Mogadishu, 26 July 2018)

The lack of youth involvement in the constitution-making process creates youth exclusion, particularly in relation to female youth (Feldman, 2011). When young people contribute to the constitutional review process, it provides them with a sense of ownership, as well as bringing about a paradigmatic shift in the concept of youth to transform them from being victims or agents of violence to being active agents of peace-building, democracy, socio-economic development and positive social change (Elazar, 1985).

Feldman (2011) notes that empowerment is deemed to be the provision of power to citizens to perform civic duties and, consequently, create change. Youth should always be empowered with a positive mindset by teaching them about their potential and capacity, both in their lives and as members of society (UNDP, 2016).
The empowerment of youth can occur in several ways during constitution making, including when promoting the constitution-making process. Young people can be influenced by values that support consistent behaviour and attitudes towards constitution making, and youth who have embraced these values can empower other youth to possess the same mentality.

**The importance of a youth article in the constitution**

It is of great importance for Somalia to consider a youth bill of rights as a stand-alone article in the Somalia constitution. This is because youth have the ability to raise genuine concerns about issues affecting society and offer workable options and solutions to existing challenges. The process of adding youth rights to the constitution as a stand-alone article should go beyond giving views in formal consultations and dialogues that can guide decisions and genuinely represent a body of opinion. The inclusion of an article must form part of an engagement process whereby youth are actively involved in the planning, review and implementation of the constitution to include their rights (Al-Ali, 2011). Such engagement is likely to lead to a greater connection between the government and youth.

Youth in Somalia have remained at the periphery of the country’s affairs for decades and their needs and aspirations have not been accorded due recognition. Youth have not been participating in developing the policies that affect them, and, as a result, their knowledge, skills and energy have been underutilised. While governments around the world are increasingly supporting youth empowerment, youth policies and youth programmes, there seems to be a lack of appreciation that young people are the future of Somalia’s development. As Samuels (2010) notes, Somalia, like many other war-torn countries, still has a long way to go in realising the potential of its youth. Youth in Somalia are a major asset for socio-economic development and political prosperity. They can contribute immensely to good governance at both local and national levels. However, the challenge is for the authorities, international organisations and other stakeholders to ensure that youth rights are included in the constitution.
Setting the youth agenda in the constitution will drive the attention of the general public to the role of youth in the development process and in building a cohesive and peaceful community in Somalia. On this, the Federal Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Honourable Abdi Hoosh, stated that:

As professionals and individuals charged with the responsibility of guiding the country in the right direction, we are all aware of the role youth play in our society. But that is just at the level of a few elites in society. How about the whole country! Do our institutions recognise the role youth play in society? If you go to the lowest level of administration, or the lowest unit in our society — our families, do they appreciate the role of youth? This is why we are of the opinion that including this as part of the constitution will go a long way in instilling a culture that supports youth issues and agendas. (Abdi Hoosh, interview, face-to-face, Nairobi, 26 July 2018)

This quote illustrates that the information gap in the constitution-making process is recognised. However, the acceptance of the inclusion of (highly educated) youth as policy entrepreneurs in the constitution-making process (as an alternative solution) is not recognised. One could also say that the ruling elite should set a good example for lower governments and the general public by actively engaging with highly educated youth as policy entrepreneurs in the constitution-making process. As proposed by Kingdon (1995), setting the agenda for nationwide policies on the plight of youth in Somalia will need policy entrepreneurs that push forward an article in the constitution addressing the plight of youth. A constitution sets the values that guide society. If youth issues are addressed in the constitution, leaders at both local and national levels can ensure young people’s inclusion in development and decision making. Inclusion of a comprehensive article that addresses youth rights in the constitution can enhance positive development initiatives by youth, who are significant agents in community and national development (Chesterman, 2011). As a result, youth will be increasingly engaged in development initiatives that can re-shape political processes in Somalia, mainly through youth organisations. This can also lead to
the emergence of an aggressive youth discourse as a result of addressing the issues affecting youth in the constitution.

Conclusion

This chapter examines the critical role of youth in Somalia’s provisional constitution-making and review process. It points out the missing agenda in Somalia’s Constitution: a youth bill of rights as a stand-alone article. The process of creating a formal constitution is daunting, as it requires the government and several stakeholders to be involved, as well as an active youth population. Although youth make up the majority Somalia’s population, they are excluded from political decision making, even though these very decisions determine their future.

Youth in Somalia are confronted with multiple challenges, with violent extremism and unemployment featuring prominently. Unemployment among youth in Somalia is unacceptably high, at 67% overall and rising to 74% for young women (Federal Government of Somalia, 2018). With some of the worst indicators in the world, the health of young people in Somalia is also in a critical state (Federal Government of Somalia, 2018).

Youth participation in reconstructing Somalia, particularly their inclusive participation in constitution making, is crucial to the implementation of policies that can advance the socio-economic empowerment of youth, as well as the general economic development of the country. The lack of mechanisms for youth and youth-led organisations to engage with stakeholders excludes them from participation. Immediate steps must, therefore, be taken to create opportunities for the participation of youth in decision-making processes, both at local and national levels. The need to prepare young people to become responsible adults and to harness their creative energies for national development cannot be over-emphasised.
The Government of Somalia and other stakeholders must, therefore, work together to effectively support young people and implement holistic policies that mainstream youth into the overall peace and state-building processes of the country (Peczenik, 2002). It is crucial that the new constitution includes issues that affect youth and ensures that youth are fully engaged in making development decisions, as this will ensure that the policies formulated and services provided respond to their needs. According to the analyses provided in this paper an alternative solution is to overcome the information and power gap by giving highly educated Somali youth the opportunity to engage in the constitution making and review process as policy entrepreneurs. The failure to give a voice to this large segment of the population could have enormous economic, political, cultural, and social consequences. Engaging youth in decision and constitution making is, therefore, no longer a choice, but an imperative in the development process, which is also recognised by the government. There is no doubt that the Government of Somalia and its international development partners have made a number of efforts to address youth challenges. However, Somali youth are still the missing agenda in the constitution. A bill of rights on youth as a stand-alone article has been ignored, despite the fact that Somalia has one of the largest youth demographics in the world (Federal Government of Somalia, 2018). Such a bill could signal that youth are important social partners, that the problems they are facing are on the political agenda and that youth are invited to take part in the policy-making process.

Recommendations

While the efforts currently underway to bring Somalia back to its feet through constitutional review are commendable, it is the belief of the author that more can be done to realise this dream. The following recommendations are made:

- **Introduce a bill of rights**: First and foremost, a bill of rights on youth should be introduced in the constitution. This should be a stand-alone article that:
- Provides for the recognition, protection and enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of both young men and women in Somalia
- Ensures that youth have access to relevant education, training and employment
- Provides opportunities for youth to be represented and participate in political, social and economic spheres of life
- Provides protection from harmful cultural practices, such as female genital mutilation
- Provides protection for girls and women against gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse
- Takes into account the contribution of youth in designing, implementing and evaluating national policies and plans affecting their concerns

- **Make policy proposals to open a policy window:** The prolonged youth crisis in Somalia has the potential to turn into a bigger calamity with far-reaching consequences for Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the world at large. This calls for urgent and decisive action. The Federal Republic of Somalia, the United Nations and Somalia’s development partners are urged to pay more attention to the rights of youth in the constitution and their participation in the constitution-making process. Whilst youth participation is already a problem in the constitution-making process, it will only reach the policy-making agenda if it is combined with political will and policy proposals (solutions) from all the relevant stakeholders, to allow for the opening of a policy window.

**References**


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